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In 2009, three decades of conflict came to an end in Sri Lanka. The final six 
months of the war between state forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam saw extensive violence against the Tamil population of the Vanni 
region. Informed by discourse analysis and qualitative interviews conducted 
in Sri Lanka, this thesis examines the manufacture of consent for a military 
solution under the current Rajapaksa government and the suppression of 
Tamil political agency post-war. 
  
After the end of the civil war, a national security state was established in Sri 
Lanka, incorporating a militant and anti-minority Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalist ideology. This thesis provides an analysis of triumphant and 
antagonistic processes of post-war ‘Sinhalisation’ in the nascent Tamil Eelam. 
It demonstrates Sri Lanka’s rejection of liberal conceptions of peace-building 
and transitional justice, and reveals the state’s actions and rhetoric in this 
regard as strategic performances, designed to avoid accountability and 
international censure. Engaging themes of language, power and nationalistic 
performativity, I explore political discourse, state terror and state-corporate 
collusion, and the authorship of a ‘national story’ for the post-war nation-
building project. 
  
I provide a genealogy of the country’s competing nation-building processes 
and attendant political violence – both state-orchestrated and Tamil, and the 
historical expansion of mechanisms of social and discursive control. The 
draconian laws introduced to tackle ‘Tamil terrorism’ have persisted beyond 
the end of the civil war, as have extra-legal practices designed to terrorise the 
population. I examine the various ways in which the Sri Lankan state relies 
heavily on state denial and the manipulation and reinterpretation of events, 
often facilitated by public-relations companies. 
  
By describing militarisation, the post-war detention and surveillance of the 
Tamil community, and state-run projects designed to politically neutralise 
and culturally erase Tamil life, I examine the post-conflict reconfiguration of 
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Tamil political agency and the potential of the newly established Tamil-led 
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An Introduction: Without “Our Undisciplined Army” 
 
 
i. Introduction: The End of the War 
 
The Sri Lankan state and the militant separatist group the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (the LTTE or the Tamil Tigers) became embroiled in armed 
conflict in July 1983. A long and devastating war continued for nearly three 
decades. The LTTE sought self-determination for the Tamil minority, who 
were marginalised, discriminated against and rejected as the ‘Other’ in post-
colonial nation-building by the majority Sinhalese population. The war was 
marked by atrocity on both sides, including torture and violence against 
civilians, and propaganda. The war has resulted, this thesis will argue, in the 
establishment of a national security state. A generation of Tamils was lost to 
violence and migration, and a high number of Sinhalese people were killed, 
including civilians and state forces personnel. The island’s Muslim population 
has also suffered deep losses: death, displacement and ethnic persecution by 
the LTTE. The LTTE controlled the North Eastern Province from 1987 – 
merging the North and Eastern Provinces and brutally enforcing their 
conception of Tamil culture and identity in the area.  This represented a 
formidable challenge to the unitary structure of the state, crucial to Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalist ideology.  
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In May 2009, the LTTE fell to the state forces. Credible reports of war crimes 
committed by both the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE have emerged, 
with the final six months of the war proving catastrophic in terms of lives lost 
and human rights abuses (PPT, 2012, 2013; UN, 2011). Adopting Sharika 
Thiranagama’s stylistic device, the final, devastating period of military 
warfare will be referred to as “the End.” Thiranagama uses the terms “the 
Exile” and “the Exodus”, respectively, to refer to the flight of thousands of 
Tamils from Sri Lanka in the wake of the 1983 anti-Tamil pogrom, into self-
imposed exile to ensure their personal safety, and the LTTE’s forced exodus of 
the Muslim population from the Northern Province in 1990 (Thiranagama, 
2011).  
 
The End was a period defined by immense violence and humanitarian 
failures (UN, 2011; LLRC, 2011; UN, 2012). Tamil civilians caught up in this 
event were brutalised and betrayed by both groups, which publicly claimed 
to have their best interests at heart. The LTTE used the Tamil civilians as 
human shields and shot defectors with the hallmark ruthlessness of the 
organisation as it implored Tamil diaspora and the international community 
to enforce a ceasefire (UN, 2011; LLRC, 2011; Harrison, 2012: 62-63). Casualty 
figures for this period in time are caught between the government’s vigorous 
assertion that a “zero civilian casualty” policy was pursued, resulting in 8,000 
deaths including LTTE cadres and those caught in the crossfire (EVE, 2011), 
and the assertion by a UN-appointed panel of experts that credible 
information from media, human rights and diaspora groups points to a 
possible figure of 40,000 civilian deaths (UN, 2011). Enumerating civilian 
casualties was also complicated by a spike in the well-documented practice of 
forced conscription and child recruitment by the LTTE (HRW, 2004). Civilians 
became militants at the behest of the “undisciplined army” refusing to 
surrender the Tamil separatist cause (MR, 2012).  
 
The brutal tactics adopted by the LTTE at this juncture suggest that the 
survival of the organisation was considered to supersede the lives of the 
Tamil people and civilians were used as “human shields” (HRW, 2009; UN, 
2012: 9). In “a quest to pursue a war that was clearly lost; many civilians were 
sacrificed on the altar of the LTTE cause and its efforts to preserve its senior 
leadership” (UN, 2010: iii). Reports from the conflict area in the Vanni 
describe a situation of mayhem, horror, hunger and extreme terror as the state 
forces and the LTTE battled in the presence of more than 300,000 civilians. 
Instrumentalised in this way by the LTTE, and shelled by the state forces as 
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they declared intentions to “rescue” them, the Tamils were displaced from 
their homes and trapped in officially declared and quickly shrinking “safe 
zones” (UN, 2011). When the war ended, with the LTTE defeated and its 
leaders executed while holding white flags in surrender (UTHR-J, 2009), the 
state forces oversaw a screening and detention process that kept 300,000 
displaced Tamils in poorly serviced camps for up to three years (AI, 2009; 
IRIN News, 2012b).  
 
On release, which took place in a staggered manner (the state cited landmine 
removal as the primary impediment to return), the Tamils returned to an 
intensely repressive environment of militarisation, surveillance and suspicion 
in the North and Eastern provinces. Thousands of people remain missing as a 
result of the conflict (IRIN News, 2012a). Agitation in pursuit of information 
and accountability has been met with state denial and repression. The Tamil 
media is consistently under siege by unidentified assailants, thought to be 
pro-state militia and military intelligence (TAG, 2013). Disappearances in the 
North (and to a lesser extent, country-wide) occur regularly, with one report 




ii. The Thesis 
 
This thesis offers a deep and comprehensive analysis of Sri Lanka’s 
contemporary conflict dynamics, providing an account of the country’s 
competing nation-building processes and attendant political violence – both 
state-orchestrated and Tamil - that is both historical and empirically 
informed. It departs from mainstream conceptions of ethno-political conflict 
(Imityaz and Stavis, 2008), politico-economic conflict (Bandarage, 2009), and 
Tamil separatist terrorism (Van de Voorde, 2005), arguing that contemporary 
Sri Lankan nation-building, particularly since the End, is premised on the 
establishment of a national security state. I engage themes of language, power 
and nationalistic performativity to explore political discourse, state terror and 
state-corporate collusion, and the authorship of a ‘national story’ for the 
project of nation-building. In particular, I ask how discourse has been 
weaponised. How has discourse been used in a violent and exclusionary 
process of nation-building? The incorporation of Sinhala-Buddhist ideology 
as an exclusionary nationalism into processes of nation-building, I argue, is 
clear at the level of discourse and in political performativity. A post-war 
analysis of triumphant and antagonistic processes of ‘Sinhalisation’ in the 
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nascent Tamil Eelam demonstrates Sri Lanka’s rejection of liberal conceptions 
of peace-building and reconciliation, and reveals the state’s post-conflict 
actions and rhetoric in this regard as strategic performances, designed to 
avoid accountability and international censure. 
 
The title of this thesis – “Without ‘Our Undisciplined Army’” – is a quotation 
from an interview with a senior Tamil bureaucrat in Jaffna in 2012. It reflects 
the popular sentiment I encountered in the population towards the LTTE: a 
loyalty and avowed support that recognises the failings of the militant group 
and the atrocities committed in pursuit of Eelam. In the war-torn North 
Eastern Province, faith in the separatist movement and the achievement of 
Eelam maintained the popularity and deification of the LTTE, despite the 
organisation’s brutal methods of governance. ‘The boys’, as the members of 
the LTTE are popularly known (despite the influx of women to the ranks), 
were “ours” – they acted on behalf of the Tamil population, in their interests, 
and as the only protection against a persecutory Sinhala state. The 
organisation’s infilitraton into Tamil communal life was a deliberate strategy 
(Thiranagama, 2011). An historical examination of nation-building in pursuit 
of Tamil Eelam under the LTTE explores nation-building performatives and 
rituals, largely related to the commemoration of martyrs, and analyses the 
current socio-political landscape, where commemorative practices are 
criminalised and Tamil life is excluded from life considered “grievable” 
(Butler, 2004).  
 
 
iii. Literature Review 
 
This research sits at the intersection of criminological accounts of state 
violence and political violence, investigations of nation-building processes, 
studies of nationalism and associated commemorative practices, and critical 
approaches to transitional justice. This research is situated between these 
literature clusters in order to locate the End within the context of social 
relations and methods of governance in Sri Lanka. This approach necessitated 
an exploration of the relevant historical, socio-economic, political and cultural 
structures. This thesis aims to contribute to a growing literature base that 
combines political and institutional analysis with an interrogation of state 
violence and atrocity, the cultural foundations of power relations, and 
processes of militarisation and minority subjugation that operate in the 
service of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka (de Mel, 2007, 2012; de 
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Mel and Uyangoda, 2012; de Votta, 2007; Thiranagama, 2011, 2013; 
Bartholomeusz and de Silva, 1998; Ismail and Jegananthan, 1995).  
 
State crime was a central resource for my methodological approach (Green 
and Ward, 2006). The 9/11 attacks and the attendant extensions and abuses of 
state power have been a catalyst for “investments in the potential of human 
rights” by criminologists (Murphy and Whitty, 2013). Criminological research 
has become a component of an agenda of activism, litigation and scholarship 
in response to the ‘War on Terror’. State crime, a scholarship within the field 
that has long connected with human rights, engages with human rights 
reports as documentary evidence of state violence and victimhood, seeking 
“to expose violations when they occur” (Stanley, 2007: 190). Green and Ward 
(2004) define state crime as “state organised deviance involving the violation 
of human rights.” While human rights resources are relied upon, state crime 
includes critiques of the limiting, legalistic and hegemonic nature of rights 
regimes (Cohen, 1996; Murphy and Whitty, 2013). Analysis and reports by 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), human rights organisations and the 
United Nations (UN) represented one primary source of information on the 
End in 2009, outside of the information provided by the government of Sri 
Lanka itself. McCamant (1984) would categorise these reports as an 
“alternative view”, outside of the state’s monopoly on coercive forces and 
control of the media.  
 
In 2012, the UN produced a self-critical report on its actions in Sri Lanka at 
the End, prompted by a memo delivered to the Secretary-General by his Panel 
of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, which stated that some agencies 
and individuals within the UN had failed in their mandates to protect people, 
had under-reported Government violations, and suppressed reporting efforts 
by their field staff (UN, 2012: 4). Acknowledging the organisation’s failure to 
systematically document deaths and injuries, and willingness not to publicly 
mention government responsibility for violations of international law in order 
to ensure humanitarian access, it is an exemplary condemnation of 
humanitarian actors and their political responsibilities (2012: 12). Sri Lanka’s 
human rights situation has been heavily documented in (primarily legalistic) 
reports by local and international organisations, for example the University 
Teachers for Human Rights – Jaffna (2009), the Colombo-based Law and 
Society Trust (2010) and the International Commission of Jurists (2010). As 
Nesiah and Keenan (2004) argue, the framework of human rights and legal 
avenues of redress is dominant in Sri Lanka, a framework that detracts from 
critical analysis of the social structure in which individual violations take 
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place. Several books have been produced by international observers such as 
former United Nations representative Gordon Weiss (2011) and BBC 
journalist Frances Harrison (2011), which describe the horror of the End from 
the position of the international humanitarian community and from 
interviews with Tamil survivors, respectively.  
 
The involvement of international agencies, other states and institutions of 
justice as conflict actors and audiences is critiqued in a growing literature on 
humanitarianism in Sri Lanka (Keen, 2013; Harris, 2010; Weissman, 2011). The 
violence of the End prompted international responses founded in the 
international framework of human rights and debates on humanitarian law. 
This research explores the implications of the End for international law, 
global governance and the ‘liberal way of doing war’ from the perspective of 
critical legal scholars such as David Kennedy (2005) and Laleh Khalili (2013). 
In the post-conflict phase, as the government established the Lessons Learnt 
and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) and Tamil politicians and 
commentators voiced an emerging concern with conflict memory, critical 
literature on transitional justice, reconciliation mechanisms and the demands 
of the liberal peace became useful to explain and critique the process 
undertaken by the state (Rubli, 2012; McEvoy, 2007; McGregor, 2006; Orjuela 
and Höglund, 2013; Gowing, 2013).  
 
This research seeks to add further texture to existing accounts by examining 
the wider socio-cultural and socio-political structures in which the End 
occurred. Anthropological studies have produced exhaustive and devastating 
accounts of the “theatre of cruelty” that Sri Lanka has become since the war 
began (Daniel, 1996: 69; Jeganathan, 1998; Lawrence, 2000; Derges, 2012). A 
literature review included a reading of Sri Lanka’s history, politics and 
sociology; the political economy of conflict; the Sinhala-Buddhist and Tamil 
nationalisms that have defined the conflict; and the social and psychosocial 
impacts of violence (for example Uyangoda, 2007; Bloom, 2003; Jeganathan 
and Ismail, 1995; DeVotta, 2004; Tambiah, 1986; Abeysekara, 2001; 
Somasundaram, 1998). Critical socio-legal literature depicts state terror and 
state violence in Sri Lanka, facilitated through both legal mechanisms and 
discourses of counter-terrorism (Ganeshalingham, 2009; Nadarajah and 
Sentas, 2013; Kleinfield, 2003).  
 
Violence is investigated here in its manifest, concealed, discursive and 
structural forms. Following Galtung (1969: 177), this thesis acknowledges that 
violence is built into the state administrative structure and “shows up as 
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unequal power and consequently as un-equal life chances.” Structural 
violence may also be conceptualised as social injustice (1969: 177); in Sri 
Lanka that injustice follows an ethnicised logic, explored here in writings on 
ethnic relations and conflict (Kuran, 1998; Kaufman, 2001; Rogers, Spencer 
and Uyangoda, 1998). This research is grounded in the historical discursive 
construction of competing nationalisms in Sri Lanka and cognisant of the 
power relations falling in favour of the state, which labeled the LTTE as 
“terrorist” (Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah, 2008). 
 
Agamben’s (1998) writings on states of exception framed my analysis of Sri 
Lanka’s legislative response to LTTE “terrorism” and the development of a 
national security state (See also Pallmeyer-Nelson, 1992). In such a state, the 
architecture of state institutions is re-engineered to concentrate power under 
the executive, militarisation is institutionalised and the state’s tools of 
surveillance and social control are expanded.1 Literature on the militarisation 
of Sri Lanka with regard to the Executive Presidency, counter-terror 
legislation and the state of emergency was instructive. Neloufer de Mel’s 
Militarising Sri Lanka (2007) served as a foundational text in this regard. 
Existing literature on state violence and the logic of political violence 
informed my analysis (Feitlowitz, 1998; Sluka, 2000; Stohl and Lopez, 1984; 
Arendt, 1970; Chomsky, 1991; Uyangoda, 2008).  
 
Drawing on literature on nation-building, mass ritual, commemorative 
practices and the authorship of public space, the consolidation of Sinhala-
Buddhist hegemony and the suppression of Tamil nationalist sentiment are 
examined here as part of the state’s post-war nation-building strategy (Khalili, 
2007; Perera, 2010; Dag Tjaden, 2012). This thesis is founded on theoretical 
and comparative research of post-war commemorative practices, examining 
the way in which “official histories” are consolidated in the service of nation-
building (Scraton, 2007: 10; Hodgkin and Radstone, 2009; Olick and Robbins, 
1998; Bar-Tal, 2003). Jasper Dag Tjaden’s (2012) analysis of Chile’s mass ritual 
and selective memory processes provided the analytical tools for mass ritual 
discourse analysis.  
 
Employing these theoretical resources in parallel with rich empirical research, 
the thesis seeks to explain how state discourse has been weaponised as a 
means to, i) manufacture consent for militarism, ii) repress the Tamil 
                                                        
1 See Chapter Two for elaboration and a detailed description of this process in Sri Lanka. 
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minority, and iii) consolidate Sinhala-Buddhist hegemony to create a national 
security state.  
 
 
iv. Conceptual Foundations and Definitions: 
 
Tracing the line between state discursive practices that facilitate exclusion and 
violence, my point of departure was the monumental violence perpetrated 
against the Tamils of the Vanni in 2009. The return to militarism was framed 
as a ‘humanitarian’ and ‘necessary’ counter-terror operation under 
Rajapaksa’s Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) government and led to the End: 
a period of sustained and persecutory violence perpetrated upon the Tamil 
community and the defeat of the LTTE. This return to militarism did not 
occur in a vacuum and the Rajapaksa government was not the first Sri Lankan 
leadership to advocate for a military solution over conflict resolution methods 
associated with the “liberal peace.”2 Chandrika Kumaratunga’s presidency 
(1994-2005) was eventually defined by the slogan “War for Peace.” A return to 
all-out war was preserved within the popular imagination by the 
militarisation of popular culture (de Mel, 2007).  
 
Particularly in relation to political texts such as speeches, policy documents, 
official reports and state-controlled media outputs which aim to achieve or 
maintain ideological hegemony, the analysis of texts interrogates the 
reproduction or reformation of the wider social world (Rear, 2013: 15). As 
Michel Foucault asserted, discourse “is not simply that which translates 
struggles or systems of domination, but it is the thing for which and by which 
there is struggle, discourse is the power which is to be seized” (1984: 10). This 
section includes definitions of the concepts of ideology, nationalism and 
hegemony, in order to situate my methodological approach.  
 
Throughout this thesis, the ‘government’ in power is acknowledged as the 
current power-holder of the state institutions, thereby representing the ‘state.’ 
‘The state’ as a term is denoted to indicate institutional and repressive 
                                                        
2 Chapter Two examines the Sri Lankan departure from the expectations imposed by the 
liberal peace framework. See Oliver P. Richmond for a review of “the ethics of the 
disciplinary liberal peace” (2009: 559). With reference to peace-building and state-building, 
primarily in relation to vulnerable, “rogue” or post-conflict states, the liberal peace signifies 
“the processes, actors, and ‘technologies’ associated with humanitarian intervention. This is 
along with security sector reform…with institution building, good governance, 
democratisation, rule of law programming, human rights, reconstruction, development, and 
free market reform” (Richmond, 2009: 559). 
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capacity, as well as ‘the capacity to rule’ and command loyalty (Lemay-
Hébert, 2009). The state should also be recognised as a discursive product, 
one that has been constructed and sustained in Sri Lanka along Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalist lines. Sri Lankan state leaders have displayed an 
historical tendency to adopt a partisan role as leaders of the Sinhalese in their 
conflict with the Tamils (Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah, 2005: 92), and 
Mahinda Rajapaksa of the SLFP has epitomised this position (Rampton, 2011). 
In light of this, the discourse of the ‘government’ is at once an expression of 
the Sinhala-dominated state.  
 
Following Herman and Chomsky’s (1988: 302) contention that “official 
truths” are not natural or organic but reflect the “manufacture of consent,” I 
interrogate the Sri Lankan state’s deliberate use of ideological tools, semiotics 
and practical control of information. The “truth” in question is constructed: it 
is determined by power relations, reliant on the participation of the media 
and produced through the political processes of government (Scraton, 2007: 
10). It is based on a system of principles and presuppositions that constitute 
elite consensus, “a system so powerful as to be internalised largely without 
awareness” (Herman and Chomsky, 1988: 302). An investigation of the state’s 
“selective commissioning or appropriation of knowledge” elucidates how 
“credible status” is imparted on a particular version of history “in the context 
of a prevailing ‘politics of truth’” (Scraton, 2007: 11).  
 
That ‘truth’ is operationalised in the service of political projects such as 
nation-building. Noting that ‘state-building’ and ‘nation-building’ mean 
different things in different contexts, this thesis follows Beetham (1991: 133) in 
asserting that state authorities often appeal to national identity as “a powerful 
source of support, especially in the face of external threat or interference.” 
Hugh Seton-Watson (1977: 1) clarifies that a state “is a legal and political 
organization with the power to require obedience and loyalty from its 
citizens”, while “a nation is a community of people whose members are 
bound together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture, national 
consciousness.” The idea of the ‘nation’ can provide an important resource for 
state-builders, who discursively assign the state (as a set of institutions) with 
loyalty on the basis of ‘national identity.’ In the post-Cold War geopolitical 
reality, Lemay-Hébert (2009: 24) acknowledges, “political authority has been 
reconfigured along ostensibly national lines”. Gellner (1983: 55), however, 




 - Ideology, Hegemony and Nationalism: 
 
Ideology is “a system of ideas, values and beliefs oriented to explaining a 
given political order, legitimizing existing hierarchies and power relations 
and preserving group identities” (Chiapello and Fairclough, 2002: 187). 
Nationalist ideology, in turn, is organised around the core principle of 
prioritising the nation (Sutherland, 2005). The nature of nationalism has been 
interrogated and defined as a manifestation of the objective conditions of 
industrial modernity (Gellner, 1983); a “cultural artefact” and a moment of 
“imagining” and “creation” (Anderson, 1991: 4-6); and an “autonomous mode 
of socio-political organization” (Nairn (1981 [1977]: 347). David Rampton 
(2011: 254) compellingly explains Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism in terms of 
hegemonisation, arguing that the “gradual but incremental hegemonisation of 
the social” means that the social imaginary of Sri Lankan space as Sinhala-
Buddhist is no longer solely the mobilising rhetoric of elites.3 The concept of 
hegemony is crucial to understanding the gradual process of Sinhala-
Buddhist ideological nation-building and its spread through the state 
apparatus and social field. 
 
Antonio Gramsci (1971) interrogated “the spontaneous consent given by the 
great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life 
by the dominant fundamental group” and described the process of 
“transaction, negotiation and compromise that takes place between ruling 
and subaltern groups” that results in “hegemony” (1971: 12, 10). Hegemony is 
a political concept that describes the oscillation between coercion and consent 
as the dominant group maintains its power over the subaltern. Laclau and 
Mouffe (1985) argue for a conception of hegemony that explains the fluid 
nature of the social, while remaining cognisant of forces that attempt to 
reproduce dominant representations through the logic of modern political 
mobilisation. Consensus in society is achieved through the transformation of 
the hegemonic worldview into “common sense” for the subordinate classes 
(Gramsci, 1971).  
 
This hegemonic ideology, however, is not identical to the organic ideology of 
the superordinate class. Rather, the hegemonic ideology brings together 
elements from the organic ideologies of allied groups (Mouffe 1979). A 
particular demand or subject position (such as nationalist emancipation) may 
                                                        
3 A “social imaginary” is defined by Laclau (1990:63) as “a horizon” or “absolute limit which 
structures a field of intelligibility.” 
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act as a focal point for socio-political mobilisation but the various forces 
acting upon it can remove its particularity and transform it into an empty 
signifier (Laclau, 2005: 93; Rampton, 2011: 253). It is precisely through the 
articulation of these forces, Rampton explains in the context of Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalism, that hegemony and the attempted fixing of the social 
field are achieved (Rampton, 2011: 253).4  
 
Attention to discursive formations and the means by which that discourse is 
promoted and controlled can elucidate the process by which the ideological 
construction of the nation relies on hegemonic rearticulation (Sutherland, 
2005: 185). 
 
 - Discourse and Narrative: 
 
The term ‘discourse’ is used in various ways by academics and within 
different academic cultures. 5  Jager and Maier suggest that we imagine 
discourse as a flow of knowledge through time (2001: 35). A discourse is 
constituted of recurrent contents, symbols and strategies, leading to the 
emergence and consolidation of “knowledge” (2001: 38). It is a social and 
political construction, one that establishes a system of relations or 
“meaningful practices” between different objects and practices, while 
providing subject positions with which social agents can identify (Howarth 
and Stavrakakis, 2000: 2). Jager and Maier rely on Jürgen Link (1982), who 
defines discourse as “an institutionalized way of talking that regulates and 
reinforces action and thereby exerts power” (2001: 35). The Foucauldian, 
structuralist approach that they advocate explores the relationship between 
power and knowledge, couched in an explanation of knowledge as 
conditional and derived from a person’s discursive surroundings.  
 
Power, for Foucault, refers to “a whole series of particular mechanisms, 
definable and defined, that seem capable of influencing behavior or 
discourses” (1996: 394). There are many discourses that are intimately 
entangled and interact with one another, producing an ever-changing and 
                                                        
4 The meaning of articulation in discourse theory is “any practice establishing a relation 
among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice”, 
while a discourse is “the structured totality resulting from this articulatory practice” (Laclau 
and Mouffe, 1985: 105). An “element” refers to a sign within the discourse whose meaning 
has not yet been fixed. 
5 See Wodak and Meyer (2009: 6) for a concise description of the academic culture-specific use 
of the term, explaining the distinctions made between “discourse” and “text”, whether 
written and oral, rhetoric and discourse as a structured form of knowledge.  
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complex “overall societal discourse” (Jager and Maier, 2001: 35). A political 
project, Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000: 2) note, will attempt to weave 
together different strands of discourse in an effort to dominate or organise a 
field of meaning and therefore social reality. Discourses exercise power in 
society because they institutionalise and regulate behaviour and ways of 
thinking (Jager and Maier, 2001: 35). The line of implication between rhetoric 
and impact is not dependent on the intentions of the authors (Sentas, 2009), 
but discursive changes can be introduced by power-holders, whether 
intentional manipulation is orchestrated or not, as they have increased access 
to opportunities to influence the public, in official speeches and in the media 
(Jager and Maier, 2001: 39). The discursive formation of concrete systems of 
social relations and practices is intrinsically political: it involves the 
construction of antagonisms and the drawing of political frontiers between  
‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ and always involves the exercise of power (Howarth 
and Stavrakakis, 2000: 4). 
 
Narrative is a component of discourse, defined as any account of connected 
events, presented to a reader or listener in a sequence of written or spoken 
words, or in a sequence of pictures (Oxford English Dictionary, 2014). Ian 
Patel (2012) notes that the past thirty years has seen an ascendency in 
narrative-based research – that is to say, research whose primary empirical 
data is comprised of narrative(s) – in a number of fields. This has been 
identified as a “narrative turn” in the social sciences. More precisely, Patel 
(2012: 235) notes, “(most) narrative research draws on the accounts of specific 
individuals which are referred to generically in terms such as self-narration, 
life history, auto- biographical narration, biographical analysis, oral history, 
and testimony”.6 Narrative, therefore, contributes to discourse and can be a 
product of discourse, as the ‘stories’ that emerge from lived experience are 
embedded in discursive systems. Narrative is used in this thesis to describe 
individual and official accounts, consolidating and representative of 
discourse.  
 
 - Propaganda: 
 
Sri Lankan state discourse operated in constant interaction with the coherent 
and powerful discourse of the LTTE and that of the wider Tamil nationalist 
                                                        
6 Patel’s article poses crucial questions about “our ideas about self-narration as a form of 
testimony” and our “assumptions about the act of account-giving itself that complicate our 
attempts at interpretation” (2012: 235). 
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movement. The LTTE were “masters of definition” (AB, 2012) and Tamil 
nationalistic rhetoric as developed in its discourse is addressed in Chapter 
Five. While state-orchestrated methods of controlling counter-narratives 
include regular incidences of terror such as disappearances, torture and 
killings, the labelling tool of “terrorist propaganda” has also been used with 
alacrity to delegitimise claims of state-perpetrated atrocity. Propaganda can 
be defined as “a deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, 
manipulate cognitions and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers 
the desired intent of the propagandist” (Jowett and O’ Donnell, 2012: 289). 
The purpose of propaganda is to render the ideology of the propagandist 
accepted by the people. It is also operationalised for the purpose of 
maintaining an entity’s legitimacy and therefore the legitimacy of that entity’s 
actions. Propaganda is associated with the control of information flow: agents 
rely on communication sources (and benefit from a monopoly over these 
sources) to utilise sacred and authority symbols (including techniques such as 
exaggeration and innuendo) and visual symbols of power, music, and 
emotional language and presentation to present information in favourable 
form (Jowett and O’ Donnell, 2012). Information is the prized commodity in 
this battle for credibility and influence. Forms of misinformation and 
techniques of denial relied upon by the state apparatus are directly derived 
from power, structural violence and economic control. 
 
This thesis explores the discursive contest over “truth” at the End, a contest 
marked by claims of “propaganda” that persists into the post-conflict phase, 
in the shadow of the state’s discursive and militarised practices of nation-
building in the service of Sinhala-Buddhist hegemony. For the state, I argue, 
military triumph and the defeat of terrorism have operated as tools of 
hegemony, maximised upon in mass ritual. The Rajapaksa government has 
benefited from the fact that “the majority in the country are still preoccupied 
with savoring what was an undoubtedly historic military victory” 
(Anonymous, 2011: 32).7 For the Tamil community, the End has contributed to 
an oppositional conflict memory of persecution, victimhood, and even 
genocide. Exploring the respective forms and content of mass ritual and 
commemorative practices, I draw a straight line between the state’s Sinhala-
Buddhist hegemonic discourse, the politics of memory and the socio-political 
experiences of the Tamil community in the post-war period. 
                                                        
7 The International Journal of Transitional Justice noted in the article authored by 










The purpose of this research is to interrogate the conceptual content of state 
discourse under the Rajapaksa regime. I interrogate the post-war 
reproduction of the hierarchy of power through themes of national security, 
liberal governance, and nation-building. Bearing in mind that the battle for 
hegemony, which accompanies the creation of nation-states, is reﬂected in the 
power to deﬁne language (Billig 1995: 32), I examine entangled discursive 
representations of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism; the demonisation and 
criminalisation of the Tamil citizen; the domestication of ‘War on Terror’ and 
humanitarian discourse; and mechanics of social control including restrictions 
on freedom of expression and commemorative practices in the post-war 
phase. The long-standing discourse that reached its height with the military 
destruction of the LTTE (along with thousands of civilians) is that of Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalism. The state’s self-representation as protector of the 
Sinhalese majority is set in constant comparison to the destructive and brutal 
separatist campaign of the LTTE. The narrative is one of a land and people 
under siege by a terrorist separatist group, intent on the destruction of the 
unitary state of Sri Lanka and, by extension, the security, destiny and 
existence of the Sinhalese people.  
 
This narrative is carried in the official state discourse under the Rajapaksa 
government: a sophisticated consolidation of Sinhala-Buddhist historical 
consciousness, international principles of sovereignty and territorial defence, 
and the international discourses of counter-terror and humanitarianism. The 
state has exploited existing discourses, both Sri Lankan and international, in 
disseminating information to the domestic population and to the international 
community. This strategy might be called the adoption and localisation of 
transnational discourses. Catering selectively to its audience, the state 
sometimes employs the usefulness of language differences, by emphasising 
nationalistic aspects of discourse in the Sinhala language medium while 
propagating humanitarianism, state sovereignty and adherence to 
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international norms in English and international media and forums.8 Ethnic 
bias in the respective language media has led to community divisions and an 
"essentializing of ethnicity", where Sinhalese, Tamils, and Muslims are 
referred to as monolithic wholes (Nadarajah, 2005: 6). Sri Lankan journalists 
raised this issue with Reporters Sans Frontiers (RSF) in 2004, stating there are 
"dangers to peace … posed by the differences in content from one publication 
language to another" (2004: 9).9 Using the tools at its disposal with great 
dexterity, the state has been “highly effective” diplomatically (Jayatilleka, 
2013) and, with the help of “government spin doctors” (LG, 2012) and 
international public relations corporations, has provided “flawless, consistent 
propaganda” (AH, 2012) to inform domestic and international understandings 
of the conflict and its End.10  
 
The different elements of state discourse simultaneously legitimated and 
denied the use of disproportionate violence against the LTTE and the Tamil 
population at the End. This thesis scrutinises the official state discourse and 
its inconsistencies; it examines the disparity between rhetoric and reality and 
the antagonistic policies and actions of the government that conflict with the 
rhetoric of humanitarianism, counter-terror, recovery and reconciliation. My 
concern, therefore, was rooted in the state’s self-representation and 
techniques of denial. To this end, a mixed methodology of discourse analysis, 
qualitative interviews and ethnographic observation, and engagement with 
literature provided an opportunity to “triangulate” original research data.  
 
The state’s official narrative and lexicon was vigilantly and consistently 
maintained in Ministry of Defence (MOD) news sources, official reports and 
state-controlled media; these sources were easily available for analysis. The 
MOD news portal, the only source of information deemed “credible” for 
mainstream and state-controlled media at the time provides the raw data for a 
critical discourse analysis, described below (SB, SH, LG, 2012). It is important 
to note that a number of Tamil journalists remained in the war zones at the 
                                                        
8 The Colombo-based Centre for Policy Alternatives operated a media monitoring project in 
the latter years of the conflict, finding that Sinhala-Buddhist nationalistic rhetoric was higher 
and more vitriolic in the Sinhala media than in the English language media, which is aimed at 
Colombo elite classes and for international consumption.  
9 This problem persists in the education system also, as discussed in Chapter One, and in the 
state’s failure to properly implement its “trilingual policy” which aims to educate all citizens 
in Sinhalese, Tamil and English as well as make provisions for communication in all three 
languages in public administration. 
10 The hire of marketing and PR companies by the Sri Lankan government is discussed in 
Chapter Two. 
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End, though human rights organisations promoted a narrative of a “war 
without witness” (HRW, 2009). Those reporters “provided us a picture of the 
unimaginable scope of the individual and collective tragedies inflicted upon 
the people of the Vanni region” but, at the time, the images and reports they 
issued were broadcast only on Tamil diaspora television, radio, and websites 
(Varatharajah, 2013). Only a few mainstream western broadcasters used that 
material in their coverage of the End. Major news carriers dismissed the work 
of these Tamil journalists as “unauthenticated”, “biased”, “doctored” or 
“propaganda” at the time, though years later, Varatharajah (2013) observes, 
“their work has become ‘mainstream’ enough to be aired by the very same 
institutions.” The imagery captured by those journalists constituted “a direct 
threat to the Sri Lankan war machinery” and they paid a heavy price: most 
were killed or went missing in the war’s final stages (Varatharajah, 2013).11 
The state’s narrative was, therefore, promoted and deemed more “credible” 
than the reports of Tamils journalists who recounted their experiences of  
“being there” (Scraton, 2007: 5). This is explicable in the Sinhalese domestic 
media given the complex combination of editorial controls: “fear, political 
patronage, personal loyalties, and prejudices” (Nadarajah, 2005). 
Internationally, however, Varatharajah (2013) argues that local Tamil voices 
were marginalised in the “war without witness” narrative, “reinforcing the 
notion that only white and non-local interpretations of war can be regarded as 
objective, substantive and truthful.”  
 
In the interest of challenging state-produced “propagandist accounts” that 
make up “official history,” I sought to prioritise “alternative interpretations of 
social and political reality” (Scraton, 2007: 4-5). This methodology seeks to 
analyse language and other semiotic tools at the service of the state critically, 
exposing the workings of power and ideology (Billig, 2008: 783). As Daniel 
(1996: 74) notes, words “are not passive carriers of history.” Rather, “like 
symbols, they embody a genealogy of power relations” (1996: 74); a close 
reading of narrative structures reveals the presence of violence in words and 
social relations.  
 
                                                        
11 Journalists for Democracy and Tamils Against Genocide, represented by Varatharajah in his 
media comment piece have documented the deaths and disappearances of P. Sathyamurthy, S. 
Mathan, M. Maheswaran, AntonR. Densey, J. Susithara, M. Anthoneykumar, T. Tharshan, I. Priya 
Thirukulasingham, Thavabalan, V. Susiparan , K.Suvendiran, T. Thavapaalan, Christpher Payas, H. 
Vijayakumar, B. Sivakumaran and Punniyamurtu at the End in 2009. These are “just few of the 
cases we have documented, but even more Tamil journalists are still unaccounted for” 
(Varatharajah, 2013).  
 26 
Interviews offered the prospect of first-hand accounts of alternative 
narratives, adding empirical texture to an examination of state violence, 
mechanisms of social control and the exclusionary potential of nation-
building, and the struggle against repression. I interviewed Tamil, Sinhalese 
and Muslim academics, journalists, news editors, politicians, civil society 
activists and community leaders, human rights workers, government 
representatives, international agency staff, a political economist and a trauma 
worker. Biographical details (anonymised as requested) are available in 
Appendix Three. The content of interviews and the experience of 
interviewing in such an environment itself were sources of information. The 
advantage of this qualitative data is that it allowed the social meanings and 
processes of state terror, violence and exclusion to be understood through the 
words and practices of interviewees. Some experiences during my fieldwork 
visit, described below, illustrated the way in which the Tamil population of 
Sri Lanka lives under a “shadow of violence” (Jeganathan, 1998).  
 
The End, however, was a period of sustained violence against the Tamil 
population beyond anything experienced during the war. Under the 
Rajapaksa government, in the post-conflict environment, critics of the 
government work in a state of ‘anticipation of violence’, facing threats, 
intimidation and physical violence (TAG, 2014; CPJ, 2014; Pillay, 2013). Due to 
state surveillance (elaborated upon below), interviews were necessarily 
mediated accounts of the war’s final phase, removed from the population of 
the Vanni, and were designed instead to interrogate discourses surrounding 
the End and practices of state terror, including the interviewees’ experiences 
of the post-conflict political environment.  
 
In keeping with the approach of critical social research, this thesis “seeks out, 
records and champions the “view from below,” ensuring the voices and 
experiences of those marginalised by institutionalised state practices are 
heard and represented” (Scraton, 2007: 10). Allowing local voices to contest 
the master themes of conflict and nation-building, this thesis interrogates the 
political and social realities that are concealed by state discourse and the 
state’s reliance on violence and terror. By adopting this mixed methodology, I 
follow in the path of critical researchers who concern themselves with 
“speaking truth to great power” by documenting views and experiences 
“from below” and, in the process, recast their research to become “a form of 
resistance” (Scraton, 2007: 239-40).  
 
 - Discourse Analysis:  
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This thesis interrogates the range of statements that were “sayable and not 
sayable” at the End and seek to discover the strategies by which these 
discursive limits were established (Jager and Maier, 2001: 47). Discourse 
shapes collective understanding of an event and, more generally, the 
functioning of a regime. Normalised discursive practices, practices that 
employ vocabularies dispensed by the state, “need to be interrogated” 
(Daniel, 1996: 130). Alternative narratives are otherwise “deflected, ignored, 
subordinated, excluded, or destroyed by (normalising) discursive formations” 
(1996: 130). Through interviews and discourse analysis of MOD data and 
other primary resources, I examine the conflict discourse around the End and 
the nation-building rhetoric employed in its aftermath. As a discourse 
analysis framework, I rely on the “themes of selective memory” employed by 
Jasper Dag Tjaden (2012) in order to examine discursive content in a 
systematic manner, explored in Chapter Two. Those themes are as follows: 
“inclusion and exclusion”, “legitimisation”, “heroisation”, “integration”, 
“continuity”, “validation” and “emotionalisation”.  
 
Jager and Maier define a “discursive event” as an event that appears 
intensively, extensively and for a prolonged period of time on the “discourse 
plane” of politics and the media (2001: 48). 12 A discursive event is constitutive 
as well as constituted: “it helps to sustain and reproduce the status quo and in 
that sense it contributes to transforming it” (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 
258). Following Jager and Maier (2001), my discourse analysis of the MOD 
archives stretched from 1 December 2008 to the defeat of the LTTE in May 
2009: this period I refer to as “the End”. This was the final phase of Eelam 
War IV, launched in July 2006 on “humanitarian grounds”, as the state 
declared that the LTTE were holding the Maavilaru reservoir in the North 
Eastern Province hostage (Rambukwella, quoted in BBC News, 2006). 13 The 
conflict was officially declared over on 19 May 2009 (MOD, 2009a). By Jager 
and Maier’s (2001) definition, the End constitutes a “discursive event”, as the 
military operation attained consistent and intense media coverage and 
                                                        
12 A “discourse plane” is defined as a social location from which speaking takes place, for example 
the media, the sciences, everyday life and politics. Jager and Maier (2001: 48) note that discourse 
planes influence each other and relate to one another and that a discourse plane can be “tightly 
interwoven in itself”, meaning that content is multiplied and shared within the discourse plane. 
For example, leading media sources may build on and repeat content from other media. 
13 BBC News reported Tommy Lekenmyr, chief of staff at the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission as 
criticising the military actions of the government: "It is quite obvious they are not interested in 
water. They are interested in something else". He insinuated in his comments that the closure of 
the sluice gate was an excuse to begin Eelam War IV.  
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political commentary. The six-month timeframe was one in which huge 
popular support was required domestically for the war effort, to avert 
pressure from international voices calling for a halt to military operations and 
a ceasefire (for example, Miliband and Kouchner, 2009).  
 
Sri Lanka’s state of terror has relied heavily on denial and the manipulation 
and reinterpretation of events. Language, Marguerite Feitlowitz (1998: 87) 
warns, can become a prison of fear and alternate understanding, where words 
are thrown up like walls to reform or block collective memory. As Feitlowitz 
(1998: 20) discovered in her research on the Argentinian regime of terror, 
language was used with “diabolical skill” to: “1) shroud in mystery its true 
actions and intentions, 2) say the opposite of what it meant, 3) inspire trust, 
both at home and abroad, 4) instil guilt, especially in mothers, to steal their 
complicity, and 5) sow paralyzing terror and confusion”. While the Rajapaksa 
regime is not as “intensely verbal” (1998: ix) as the Argentinian junta, it has 
displayed a tendency to use language in nefarious ways, appropriating and 
adapting discourses for its political benefit and survival, to avoid 
accountability for atrocity domestically and internationally, and to terrorise 
the population.  
 
Sri Lanka has controlled the societal discourse through terror, intimidation of 
the media and selectively targeted killings, leaving the state-sponsored media 
as the dominant source of information (IPFFEM, 2008; Hattotuwa, 2009; TAG, 
2013).14 In addition to the MOD news data, discourse analysis incorporated 
other primary sources including official speeches by the President, Mahinda 
Rajapaksa; reports issued by the MOD; the official manifesto of Mahinda 
Rajapaksa for the 2005 Presidential Election and his 2010 manifesto. Dag 
Tjaden’s (2012) “themes of mass ritual discourse” - “pride in leadership”, 
“active society”, “realignment with tradition” and “power and popularity” - 




vi. Fieldwork Commentary: Qualitative Interviews in Sri Lanka 
 
                                                        
14 Ethnic bias against the Tamils in the mainstream media has been noted by studies (for 
example, Gunasekara, 1994) and the official counter-terrorism discourse has focussed entirely on 
atrocities carried out by the LTTE, with little or no mention or explanation of government-
perpetrated crimes and human rights abuses. 
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I carried out qualitative fieldwork in Sri Lanka in 2012, seeking to investigate 
the state’s methods of discursive control, garner local reactions to the End and 
its official representation, and attain a sense of the post-conflict socio-political 
landscape. Qualitative interviews sought to “put the state on the same footing 
as the people who inhabit it” and explore how state discourse related to 
political and social reality “on the ground” (Greenhouse, 2002: 7). Following 
Greenhouse (2002: 1), I also sought to explore the “experiential connections 
between political instability and social life” in the post-conflict phase, through 
qualitative interviews and observation.  
 
I conducted fifty-three semi-structured interviews in five of Sri Lanka’s cities 
and towns, several remotely via Skype and with diaspora activists on my 
return to London. I visited Colombo, the metropolitan and lively capital, 
where the majority of English speaking elites, politicians, academics and civil 
society organisations are based; the University town of Peradeniya, with its 
the beautiful and expansive campus and culture of student activism; Jaffna, 
the dusty and underdeveloped cultural capital of the nascent Tamil Eelam; 
Trincomalee, a picturesque and strategic port town; and Batticalao, a coastal 
town in the East with a high Muslim population and the fault-line of an LTTE 
split in 2005 that weakened the movement irreparably.  
 
 - Fieldwork Research Precautions and Restrictions 
 
In Sri Lanka, the “targets of the security apparatus are ordinary citizens. 
Trade unionists, journalists, members of civil society organizations, officials 
and activists in opposition political parties, and even citizens engaged in 
simple protest are all of special concern – but all aspects of Sri Lankan life 
have now come under its surveillance” (AHRC, 2010: 5). I was concerned 
about surveillance networks and ensuring the safety of interviewees. State 
paranoia with respect to the activities of foreign researchers was at a height 
during my visit in early 2012. A United Nations Human Rights Council 
meeting in Geneva took place on 22 March, in which a resolution was tabled 
and passed “against” Sri Lanka. Foreign media and researchers, no matter 
their affiliation, were suspected of gathering evidence of war crimes. The state 
security services and their proxies have a reputation for harassing and 
intimidating people in the wake of visits from foreigners. This was most 
recently publicised with the August 2013 visit of Navi Pillay, after which she 
noted the “utterly unacceptable” harassment and intimidation of a number of 
human rights defenders who met with her. Police and military officers paid 
visits to ordinary people both before and after they spoke with Pillay. She 
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noted that while “surveillance and harassment appears to be getting worse in 
Sri Lanka…it is particularly extraordinary for such treatment to be meted out 
during a visit by a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights” (quoted in 
Colombo Telegraph, 2013).  
Warned of routine security services checks on electronic equipment, I carried 
a clean laptop, kept the ‘history’ bar of my web browser clean and coded my 
record of interviewees. A small Dictaphone was easy to carry and quite 
discreet. Following each interview (where the interviewee was happy for me 
to record our conversation), I uploaded the recording immediately to the 
online storage site Dropbox and ensured that the file was securely deleted 
from my laptop. Ramifications are a very real risk in Sri Lanka and meetings 
were often clandestine in nature. Interviews took place in offices, public 
places and the homes of interviewees, at their request and with the explicit 
intention of avoiding surveillance. Those with the ‘protection’ of a public and 
international profile were less concerned and invited me to their offices; the 
eyes of the international community were on Sri Lanka as the Geneva meeting 
approached.  
A number of incidents brought the pervasive and normalised nature of 
surveillance, intimidation and terror to my attention. In Batticaloa, as I shared 
a cup of tea with a Muslim human rights activist, two men sat silently nearby. 
My interviewee assumed that they were informants and responded in turn by 
speaking softly and alerting me to their presence. Also in Batticaloa, a hired 
vehicle driver brought me to the house of an interviewee and proceeded to 
ask him a range of questions about his profession and to request his phone 
number, which my interviewee refused to provide. Again, the driver was 
assumed by my interviewee to be an informant. In Jaffna, Tamil media 
workers commemorating the life and death of the journalist Marie Colvin 
were aware of plain-clothes members of the state forces nearby. On another 
evening in Jaffna, a man questioned me repeatedly outside my guesthouse as 
I waited to be collected by a driver. As we drove away, the driver casually 
asked me to check whether the stranger was following us. Despite these 
incidents, no state authorities approached me in their official capacity. These 
minor incidents were unsettling and indicative of the wider pattern of 
surveillance that Sri Lankans must negotiate daily.  
As noted by Penny Green (2003), concerns relating to personal safety, fear and 
personal integrity become very real in carrying out research in a state known 
for its practice of human rights violations. I engaged with relevant literature 
and conversations in person and by email with academics and NGO workers 
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who have recently carried out work in Sri Lanka or similarly difficult 
fieldwork destinations (VV, 2012; Green, 2012; Siriam et al., 2009). These 
conversations continued with civil society and international agency 
representatives in Colombo (SH, LG, AS, 2012). Precautions were necessary to 
prevent repercussions against interviewees. The worst outcome for me would 
be questioning, intimidation and perhaps difficulty in regaining access to the 
country at a later stage, but interviewees could face harassment, surveillance 
or violence. Academic researchers are not, however, generally considered to 
be threatening to the same extent of INGOs such as Human Rights Watch 
(HRW) and Amnesty International (AI), who are concerned with gathering 
evidence of atrocity in order to expose illegal activity and human rights 
abuses (Green, 2003). I nevertheless sought to remain below the radar of state 
surveillance, to avoid questioning on the nature of my research. I did not 
attempt to interview the political elite. It was a tense and politically unstable 
time. It was also unlikely that such interviewees would stray from the official 
narrative. As Paddy Hillyard argues, researching the powerful means that 
analysis is often incomplete. This is a direct result of power and the benefits 
arising from that power: there are “powerful forces at work to deny and 
disguise the nature of state crime” (2003: 208). 
 
There was a risk of state interference with my research. A Jaffna-based 
academic, in correspondence prior to my field visit, told me of a group of 
students who visited Jaffna in order to carry out research on the post-conflict 
environment (KG, 2012). They entered the country on a tourist visa and did 
not inform the government of their intention to engage in research. An 
informant (a psychiatrist working with former LTTE cadres) alerted the 
security services to their presence and activities. The students were 
immediately brought in for questioning. The remainder of their visit was 
organised by the MOD. State officials arranged all interviews, directing the 
students towards the ‘proper’ people to speak to, thereby attempting to 
maintain the official narrative. The students could not access any critical or 
alternative voices deemed ‘improper’ by the MOD.  
 
In order to avoid detection as a researcher potentially critical of the 
government and assumptions of a “pro-Tamil” or “pro-Tiger” bias, I 
shortened the intended length of my stay in Jaffna from two months to two 
weeks. Jaffna remains highly militarised by the Sri Lankan armed forces and 
informants are presumed to be everywhere. LG (2012) predicted that I would 
be “chased out of Jaffna within a week.” Suspicion of researchers is at its height in 
the North and tourists - especially young, female tourists travelling alone - are 
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extremely rare. I managed to secure a wealth of interviews in the South, 
between Colombo, Peradeniya, Trincomalee and Batticaloa.  
 
 - Interviews 
 
Before arriving in Sri Lanka, I researched and contacted academics, policy 
staff, journalists and civil society activists in Sri Lanka by email. Contacts 
nurtured through my work at the Tamil Information Centre (TIC) were 
alerted to my impending arrival. I was cautious in stating my connection to 
TIC outright. Many Sri Lankans, in a large part due to state propaganda, 
assume that all Tamil diaspora organisations are supporters of the LTTE – 
material or otherwise – and I sought to avoid being labelled as “pro-Tiger”. In 
other situations, however, affiliation to TIC facilitated access that otherwise 
would have been difficult to achieve, with individuals who work covertly and 
discreetly. The more outspoken and public critics of the government were 
happy to be quoted, but the majority of (mainly Tamil) interviewees spoke on 
condition of anonymity. “It depends on what you ask, and what I say”, said one 
Tamil academic, preferring to speak off record (SM, 2012). Appendix Three is 
a list of interviewees with biographical details, though many are anonymised 
to protect their identities.  
 
Rubin and Rubin (1995) describe four ideals to be adhered to in recruiting 
interviewees: finding knowledgeable informants, getting a range of views, 
testing emerging themes with new interviewees, and choosing interviewees 
to extend results. Rather than seeking the “truth”, I was concerned with the 
varying accounts offered by the stakeholders and the manner in which they 
reflected or challenged “formally sanctioned knowledge” (Scraton, 2007: 10). 
Though I specifically sought to unearth alternative accounts, I engaged with 
more pro-government stakeholders in order to add depth and nuance to my 
analysis of the official narrative. I ensured to interview members of the 
Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim communities, in the South, the East and the 
North. The communities are not homogenous in culture, political outlook or 
aspirations. I attempted to engage with difference and avoid essentialisations. 
Each community experienced the conflict in very different and localised ways 
and I sought conversations with representatives of the three largest ethnic 
groups in order to develop a rich understanding of Sri Lanka’s social fabric in 
the post-conflict phase.  
 
Textual discourse analysis informed the discursive aspect of my study and 
also prepared me for entry into the “unknown mental universe” of Sri Lankan 
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public officials and pro-government interviewees, informing my 
understanding of their worldview and the manner in which they chose to 
present the events at the End (Schirmer, 2012: 13). The analysis of discourse 
and terminology assumed by the state was invaluable. My ability to frame 
questions with a delicate and deliberate usage of this language, for example 
avoiding the word ‘war’ and using the term ‘humanitarian operation,’ 
ensured that my questions fit within the accepted vocabulary of pro-
government interviewees. By adhering to the sanctioned lexicon, pro-
government interviewees such as journalists, editors and state representatives 
may have seen me as an “outside insider” (Schirmer, 2012: 13). The success of 
this strategy was articulated in the keenness of one state-affiliated interviewee 
that I share with others at home what I had learned in Sri Lanka (LH, 2012). It 
became clear throughout my fieldwork that my choice to adopt the official 
lexicon for strategic purposes was a decision shared with many actors in Sri 
Lanka. The implications are explored in Chapter Two. Post-war, every 
interaction and every decision is coloured by the violence of the End and by 
the constraints of state terror in which actors pursue their lives.  
 
 
vii. Chapter Structure:  
This thesis is structured in six chapters. The accounts of interviewees are 
woven into analysis, informing and adding empirical texture to the thematic 
examination. Fieldwork commentary is included below as an introduction to 
the methodological challenges posed by researching a politically sensitive 
country such as Sri Lanka. 
Chapter One returns to the historical roots of the conflict; it traces the nation-
building project of the Sinhala-Buddhist state and its gradual marriage with 
militarism. Providing an explanatory framework for the alienation and 
marginalisation of the Tamil minority group, this chapter is an overview of 
the content and dominant nature of this majoritarian nationalism. The 
military success of the Rajapaksa regime, and its successive elections to 
power, I argue, depended on a deep societal polarisation and appropriation of 
mass rituals by the state in the service of Sinhala-Buddhism. The Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalist establishment – supported by a politicised Buddhism – 
was committed to a military defeat of the LTTE at the End. This chapter 
explains the manner in which a hegemonic militant Sinhala-Buddhist 
discourse was formed. 
Chapter Two explores the Sri Lankan state narrative at the End and highlights 
discursive themes that are central to the Rajapaksas’ nation-building project. 
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This chapter also provides an account of the state of terror established in Sri 
Lanka. I examine the consolidation of power under the Rajapaksa 
government, the myriad mechanisms of social and discursive control, and the 
establishment of a national security state.  
Chapter Three provides the reader with a portrait of the post-conflict lived 
experience of the Tamil people in the North and Eastern provinces. Drawing 
heavily on interviews and fieldwork observation, this chapter is an account of 
Sinhala-Buddhist militarisation, the post-conflict detention and surveillance 
of the Tamil community, and projects designed to politically neutralise and 
culturally erase Tamil life. The birth of a ‘new independence’ where the 
military is the conveyor of a ‘charitable’ peace, I argue, is premised on the 
suppression of Tamil nationalism and political aspirations. Chapter Three 
also outlines the state reconciliation initiatives underway, arguing that they 
serve a merely performative function by a recalcitrant state. I examine the 
influence and interests of the so-called international community in 
monitoring and directing Sri Lanka’s adherence to standard post-conflict 
processes as features of the liberal peace.  
In Chapter Four, I demonstrate how the Sri Lankan state has benefited from 
incorporating transnational discourses of terrorism and humanitarianism into 
the state conflict narrative, earning international support against the LTTE 
and international consent to finish the war by military means. This chapter 
acknowledges the labelling power exercised by the state in defining the LTTE 
as ‘terrorist’ and traces the implications of that label. The chapter concludes 
with analysis of the ‘humanitarian’ portrayal of the final military operation 
and an account of the diplomatic struggles in the halls of the United Nations 
during and immediately after the End.  
Chapter Five unearths the narrative of Tamil interviewees and interrogates the 
manner in which the End is being drawn into the constituent narrative of 
Tamil nationalism. Describing the historical development of the Tamil 
separatist movement and the LTTE’s nation-building project, this chapter 
acknowledges the organisation’s reliance on commemorative rituals as 
cultural repertories of resistance. Examples serve to illustrate the state’s 
suppression of these practices in the post-war period. I examine the post-
conflict reconfiguration of Tamil political agency and the potential of the 
newly established Tamil-led Northern Provincial Council. 
As a conclusion, I bring together the major themes of the thesis in an analysis 
of how the End has been incorporated into Sri Lanka’s national story. That 
story, I argue, perpetuates competing nationalisms and has been crafted, with 
the assistance of public relations companies, for the specific purpose of 
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avoiding accountability for war crimes and masking the continued 






























The Sri Lankan conflict is often described an artificial imposition of ethnic 
hostility for the sake of political expediency (Rogers, 1990), though, as the 
discussion below will elucidate, the hegemonic potentiality of nationalism 
and ethnicity ought not to be dismissed in favour of constructivist accounts 
(Rampton, 2011). Though often framed as a country blighted by “ethnic war”, 
before colonial intervention, a “socio-cultural, political and economic mosaic” 
existed in Sri Lanka, representing more fluid modes of social and political 
interactions across communities prior to the introduction of colonial and post-
colonial “modern power frameworks” which brought rigidity, discrete 
divisions and compartmentalisations based on caste, religion, language and 
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kinship (Rampton, 2011: 257; Tambiah, 1986, 1992). This is exemplified largely 
by the shared religious spaces across the island, where Hinduism and 
Buddhism were practiced in unison and the communities came together to 
worship, demonstrating mutual tolerance and respect through long traditions 
of religious syncretism and cohabitation (Walters, 1995; Imtiyaz, 2013). 
 
This chapter seeks to explain the successes of the Rajapaksa government, to 
interrogate the means by which it procured popular support for a military 
defeat of the LTTE and a continuing drift towards authoritarianism (Pillay, 
2013). This chapter presents the Rajapaksas’ self-insertion into the nation’s 
historical, political and ideological narrative on election in 2005. Far from an 
explanation of conflict as counter-terrorism and humanitarian action, the 
military success of the Rajapaksa regime and its successive elections to power 
depended on a deep societal polarisation and the ascent of a hegemonic 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, sustained by the political use and 
appropriation of mass rituals. Following the tendency of state leaders to 
adopt partisan role as leaders of the Sinhalese in their conflict with the Tamils 
(Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah, 2005: 92), Mahinda Rajapaksa presents 
himself as such in rhetoric, semiotics and policy.  
 
 
1.2 A History of Ethnic Polarisation 
 
While the state adheres to the internationally palatable discourse of 
reconciliation, a paradigm of militarisation and national security is in fact in 
existence (Interviews, 2013; Satkunanthan, 2012), one that consigns the Tamil 
people to marginalisation, deprivation and repression. This chapter explores 
the history of ethnic polarisation in Sri Lanka and investigates the processes 
by which the two ethnic groups came to be so diametrically and violently 
opposed in terms of political aspirations and ideologies. This chapter 
acknowledges that ancient antagonisms between the Sinhalese people and 
Tamils are not necessarily correctly described as such. Rather, political 
expediency has compelled Sinhalese leaders to perform their ideological 
commitment to Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, progressively contributing to 
exclusionary, anti-minority positioning and discursive and violent practices 
of nationalism that have continuously reproduced the social field. Through an 
overview of the literature on inter-ethnic differences, clashes and political 
manipulations in Sri Lanka, and relying on interview material, this chapter 
suggests that “ethnic conflict” is a simplified framework of understanding for 
international consumption. Within Sri Lankan society, the ascendency of 
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Sinhala-Buddhist hegemony and the Tamil defensive narrative of victimhood 
have given rise to powerful nationalisms that have informed and sustained 
the conflict.  
 
Within this chapter, the ascendency of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism and its 
influence on politics provides an explanatory framework for the state’s 
unremittingly chauvinistic approach to Tamil grievances and political 
aspirations. Post-war, Mahinda Rajapaksa’s Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) - 
in power since 2005 - has incorporated ‘extremist’ Sinhalese-Buddhist political 
parties into the ruling coalition, tacitly supports anti-minority campaigns and, 
as such, relies on populist strategies to cater exclusively to the Sinhala-
Buddhist population. The amplification of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism is a 
major cause of communal tensions and suspicion; it justifies the exclusion of 
minorities as threats to Sinhala-Buddhist values and national security. This 
chapter explores the roots of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, its politicisation 
and various incarnations since Sri Lankan independence and offer analysis of 




1.3 Colonialism and Politicised Ethnic Antagonism 
 
Ethnic polarisation in Sri Lanka in the post-independence phase has been 
attributed to the state structure put in place during the British colonial period 
(1796-1948). Under colonisation, distinctions between ethnic groups became 
one of the main ordering principles of Sri Lankan society and politics as a 
result “became fashioned around an understanding of the island as 
differentiated by distinct racial communities” (Thiranagama, 2013: 95). This 
was in fitting with ideas of racial difference that were applied in colonial 
territories in the Victorian period (Thiranagama, 2013; Rogers, 1990). The 
“civilizing” ethos of the colonial powers produced a new field of socio-
cultural, political and economic mapping practices in Sri Lankan society 
(Rampton, 2011; Nissan, 1989). Orientalist historiography and philology, 
educational policies and the establishment of a print press and colonial census 
contributed to this process (2011: 257). Further, ethnicities became politicised 
as a result of ethnic representation in the Legislative Council, the first form of 
representative government in Ceylon, founded in 1833 (2011: 257; Rogers, 
1990). Ethnic antagonisms were sown in the colonial period, as the Sinhalese 
believed that Tamils enjoyed privileged positions and benefits under the 
British administration (Imtiyaz, 2013: 4).  
 38 
 
Religious identities in the late 19th Century began to be conflated with ethnic 
or national identities and nationalisms (Bartholomeusz and de Silva, 1998: 18-
19). In the colonial period, Rajasingham-Senanayake (2009: 8) argues, 
essentially linguistic identities and differences between the Tamil and 
Sinhala-speaking people were racialised. The colonial “scientific” mode of 
racial coding among “native” populations transformed the groups into 
distinct “races” (2009: 8). Marisa Angell (1998) describes how the classification 
of language was tied up with the classification of race. Turning “linguistic 
connection into cultural and racial connection”, colonial powers deduced that 
the Sinhalese are linguistically and racially Aryan, Tamils are Dravidian, and 
that the Aryan Sinhala race is superior both racially and culturally (Angell, 
1998: 47). Colonial anthropology research by the Royal Asiatic Society abetted 
this Aryan racial theory from 1880 to 1895 (Angell, 1998: 48-9). The British 
reified racial categories, institutionalised them in various ways and 
transposed those categories into the past. The “Aryan myth,” Nissan explains, 
gained ground in European thought and Indology and the history of the 
island came to be understood accordingly. Racial categories were easily 
mapped onto a Chronicle history, provided by the Mahavamsa, which was 
already established in European scholarship on the island. The text reinforced 
European historical and racial predilections (Nissan, 1989: 68-9). The 
Sinhalese ‘Aryans’ came to be opposed to the Tamil ‘Dravidians’ in absolute 
terms historically, a distinction maintained today (1989: 69). The racial 
superiority complex fused with Sri Lankan mytho-history in the colonial 
period to give rise to a specific form of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism.  
 
Michael Roberts (2012) argues that the British period had a marked influence 
on Sinhala conceptions of nationalism through “(a) the administrative and 
communicational unification established by the colonial dispensation; (b) the 
capitalist transformation of the island’s political economy; (c) the intellectual 
currents from Europe that were taken up by the articulate elements of 
indigenous society, including here the concept “Ceylonese” which was an 
outgrowth of the island name “Ceylon;” and (d) the influence of print 
technology and modern political associations in disseminating currents of 
thought” (Roberts, 2012: 28). Roberts warns against oversimplification, 
however, and “a failure to consider the complexities of circumstance and the 
incomplete transformations of modern times” (2012: 28). In “Sinhalaness and 
its Reproduction, 1232-1818” he examines the period pre-dating British 
colonialism. He refers to the ideology in question as a form of “nascent 
national consciousness” rather than concrete nationalism because the 
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meanings accrued to the concept of nationalism following the French 
Revolution could not yet be applied (2012: 28). The collective identity of 
“Sinhalaness” linked to the Sri Lankan territory can be, however, traced 
through the period analysed by Roberts – the beginnings of a form of 
nationalism: patriotism or “politicized ethnicity” (Strathern, 2012, quoted in 
Roberts, 2012: 6).  
 
The reconfiguration of identity frameworks under colonialism replaced 
“more fluid modes of social and political interactions” with “more 
compartmentalized, rigid and discrete divisions between religious, linguistic, 
caste and kinship communities” (Rampton, 2011: 256; Tambiah, 1986, 1992). 
The island’s diverse hybrid communities are often neglected in political 
discourse and understandings of communities. Muslims, Sinhalese, and 
Tamils are simplistically portrayed as mutually exclusive (Brun, 2008). The 
tendency towards homogenising diverse communities within the “Tamil” 
monolithic ethnic category and within the ethnocentric creation of a Sinhalese 
“race” in political discourses has denied complex identities within both 
groups and supported divisions between these essentialised ethnicities 
(Hollup, 1998: 74-5). The Tamil community is primarily Hindu and the 
Sinhalese are primarily Buddhist. Missionaries in the years of colonisation 
also introduced Christianity to the island and a number of adherents exist 
across ethnic groups. Despite signs of solidarity in the 19th Century, as 
Buddhists and non-Buddhists on the island came together to resist Christian 
proselytisation, the crystallisation of identities on the basis of religion and 
ethnicity sharpened divisions overall (Bartholomeusz and de Silva, 1998).  
 
On independence in 1948, the Sinhalese community represented 69.4% of the 
population, while the Tamils (both Indian and Sri Lankan) accounted for 
22.9%. 15  The remainder of the Sri Lankan population was constituted of 
Muslim Moors (5.6%) and other minorities including the Burghers (2.2%).16 
The British left a democratic system based on the Westminster model: a 
                                                        
15 The ‘Indian’ or ‘Hill Country’ Tamils were brought from India by the British to work on Sri 
Lanka’s colonial plantations in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The plantations first 
produced coffee and then later tea and rubber. In 1921, Indian Tamils comprised 13.4% of the 
total Tamil population, which in turn represented 24.8% of the inhabitants of Sri Lanka 
(Bartholomeusz and de Silva, 1998; Census of Population and Housing, 1981).  
16 The Burghers are a community arising from the marriage of European colonisers to Sinhalese 
women, forming a community primarily based along Sri Lankan’s coast. On independence in 
1948, Burghers comprised 0.6% of the total population. In 2001, Burghers only accounted for 
0.2% of the island’s total population, largely due to migration to Australia, Canada and the United 
Kingdom (Department of Census and Statistics – Sri Lanka, 2008). 
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highly centralised state where universal suffrage determined that the 
Sinhalese, by their numerical advantage, would be the dominant ethnicity in 
the political system (Clarance, 2007: 33). Newly formed political parties vied 
for supremacy within a complex system of governance with a competitive 
pluralistic make-up including multi-ethnic and ethnically aligned parties 
(Abeyratne, 2004).  
 
Authors have suggested that because the process of independence from 
British rule occurred as a planned move by the British, rather than as a result 
of popular uprising or a campaign to oust the colonisers, a Sri Lankan (at that 
time, Ceylonese) national consciousness failed to form (Canagarajah, 1994; 
Rampton, 2011). On the contrary, relations between the Sinhalese and Tamils 
had deteriorated in the latter years of colonial rule (Clarance, 2007). This 
deterioration can be explained in part by increasingly exclusionary discourses 
emanating from prominent voices of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism such as 
the Buddhist revival movement, described below.  
 
 
1.4 A Genealogy of Sinhala-Buddhist Nationalism 
 
The terminology attributed to Sinhala Buddhist ideology ranges from 
nationalism to fundamentalism to extremism. “Nationalism” will be used 
here to capture the most pervasive forms of this ideology, though 
exclusionary views considered ‘extremist’ by liberal Sinhalese have infiltrated 
central government through the JHU political party and the recent Bodu Bala 
Sena (BBS) movement, described below. The ideology that supports the 
Sinhalese-Buddhist political prerogative is derived from three beliefs within 
the group. The Sinhalese believe that they are the only true, original 
inhabitants on the island; that they were entrusted by Buddha to keep the 
island as a sacred place for his teachings; and that they are in fact a minority 
in the region, given that all other ethnic groups have ties in neighbouring 
countries (DeVotta, 2005; Spencer, 1990). The founding concept of the modern 
Sri Lankan state is Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism (LG, 2012). Territorial 
nationalism for the Sinhalese majority is inexorably tied to the Buddhist 
beliefs of the group. The growth and development of an exclusionary Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalism, and the centralisation of that form of nationalism in 
government is the contemporary source of marginalisation and repression of 
the Tamil population. Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, progressive Sinhalese 
academics interviewed argued, was embraced by the state systematically and 
with alacrity after independence (LG, MSP, MM, 2012).  
 41 
 
The process of ethnic outbidding between the main Sinhala political parties, 
the SLFP and the UNP, suggests that elite instrumentality produced a virulent 
Sinhala nationalism (Jeganathan & Ismail, 1995; DeVotta, 2004; Stokke, 
1998).17 Rampton (2011: 261) argues, however, that the potency of Sinhala 
nationalism cannot be fully explained by elite rationalistic instrumentalism. 
The nationalism has become hegemonic, produced at a range of social sites 
and representative of Sri Lanka as a political and socio-cultural space in 
which “the aspirations of the Sinhala-Buddhist people and the unitary state 
and the integrity of the island territory form a profound nexus.” The 
nationalism is disseminated widely through “diverse apparatuses which 
invest the social field” and reproduced in popular culture and social practices 
(2011: 254).  
 
Bartholomeusz and de Silva (1998: 2) describe a Sinhala-Buddhist 
fundamentalism that occupies and shapes a spectrum of political action, 
arguing that it shares the “family resemblances” of religious fundamentalism 
elsewhere: a reliance on religion as a source of identity, erection of boundaries 
on the basis of religion that determine the question of belonging, faith in a 
theological doctrine related to death and the afterlife, and “the dramatization 
and mythologization of enemies.” The mytho-history supporting Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalism has infiltrated history and become accepted as 
indisputable truth. It is recounted regularly by Sinhalese politicians and state 
media and is taught as history in school textbooks (Spencer, 1990: 3; DeVotta, 
2004: 5-6; Jayawardane, 2006). The source of Sinhala-Buddhist ideology and 
history is the Buddhist chronicle The Mahavamsa. This “authoritative” sacred 
text has been unbroken since it was begun by monks in 6AD, and has been 
updated by government-funded work since 1815 (Spencer, 1990: 5). The text 
entered public consciousness in the late 19th Century following its translation 
from Pali into English in 1837 and republication in 1889. It supplied the 
Sinhala-Buddhists with an “incredibly sophisticated history” (and Aryan 
roots) (Bartholomeusz and de Silva, 1998). It tells the story of the history and 
development of Buddhism in Sri Lanka. According to the Mahavamsa, 
Buddha visited Sri Lanka three times in his life and paid great attention to the 
land and its people. The Sinhalese people are said to have ascended from an 
Indian prince named Vijaya, whose arrival on the island coincided with the 
                                                        
17 Kristian Stokke’s (1998) analysis of Sinhala nationalism is based on rational elite 
machinations, but departs from the mainstream of thought by asserting a theory attuned to class: 
that political legitimation is sought by the ruling class through the vehicle of Sinhala nationalism.   
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death of the Buddha. The story of Vijaya’s birth begins with the daughter of 
the Indian King of Vanga being stolen away by a lion and forced to mate with 
it, resulting in the birth of a son and a daughter. The son grew up to kill the 
lion and marry his sister. Vijaya was born from this marriage, after his parents 
had become king and queen in Vanga (DeVotta, 2004: 6). The historical 
association of the Sinhalese people with Buddhism began on the day of the 
arrival of the prince in Sri Lanka, as it is believed that Vijaya was sent to 
protect the land on behalf of the Buddha, as requested by Buddha himself 
(Edirippulige, 2004: 32). This mytho-history is ingrained in the majority 
collective identity, cementing the notion that Sri Lanka is Sihaadipa (land of 
the Sinhalese) and Dhammadipa (Island of the Doctrine) (DeVotta, 2004: 13; 
Bartholomueusz and de Silva, 1998: 2). In the Theravada Buddhist world and 
canon, Dhammadipa is a place where the “pure doctrine” ought to flourish and 
be promoted and preserved (Rajasingham-Senanayake, 2009). Sinhala people 
are, therefore, ethnically superior and must occupy a position of privilege on 
these terms (Bartholomeusz and de Silva, 1998: 3).  
 
The ideology suggests that other ethno-religious communities living in Sri 
Lanka do so at the sufferance of the Sinhalese (DeVotta, 2007). The hegemonic 
socio-political representation of Sri Lanka on these terms establishes a 
hierarchy with the Sinhalese at the apex, with the minority communities 
relegated to a position of subordination (Rampton, 2011; Kapferer, 1999). 
While the main tenets of Buddhism promote peace and non-violence without 
exception, the Mahavamsa provides historical tales of violence being executed 
on persons posing a threat to the existence of the religion. It suggests that 
invaders and enemies may be defeated by force, as the ends may justify the 
means (Mahavamsa 5: 264, quoted in Rajasingham-Senanayake, 2009: 7). 
Periods of colonisation by the Portugese (1505-1656) and Dutch (1640-1796) 
were considered dangerous by the Buddhist clergy in Sri Lanka, as the 
colonisers introduced Christianity to the nation and state policy unofficially 
favoured Christianity (Edirippulige, 2004: 32). Following British success in 
conquering the Sri Lankan Kingdom of Kandy, the colonists signed the 
Kandyan Convention, which pledged to protect Buddhism (DeVotta, 2004: 
13). The British reneged on this promise under pressure from British 
Evangelicals, prompting Sinhala-Buddhist political activism to recapture 
status for the religion and ethnic identity (Bartholomeusz and de Silva, 1998: 
3; DeVotta, 2007). The late 19th Century became a period of Buddhist 
revivalism and fundamentalism, against the backdrop of political and labour 
agitations against the British colonial state (Gombrich and Obeysekere, 1998). 
Mid-19th Century monks who played the role of vocal anti-Christian Buddhist 
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revivalists such as Migettuwatte Gunananda and Hikkaduwe Sumangala 
were “given an institutional and propagandist basis” with the arrival of 
Colonel Henry Olcott and his Buddhist Theosophist society (Tambiah, 1992: 5; 
DeVotta, 2007). The Theosophosists countered the near-monopoly that the 
Christian missionaries had established over the education system in Sri Lanka 
by creating Buddhist schools.  
 
Anargarika Dharmapala Thero, who began his career as a revivalist within 
this movement, broke away to pursue his own form of Buddhist 
modernisation. Termed “Protestant Buddhism”, it was extremely influential 
amongst the emerging Sinhala-Buddhist middle and business classes 
(Tambiah, 1992; Gombrich and Obeysekere, 1988). The revival of Buddhist 
political action was born into an island populated by colonisers and 
dominated by the colonial plantation economy. The 'pollutant’ Christian 
religion and Muslims, Moors and “foreigners” represented business 
competitors to the Sinhalese and “demarcated threats to the nation” 
(Rampton, 2011: 258). These groups fell outside of the “frontier of 
authenticity” defined in Sinhala discourse from the mid-19th Century: the 
image of the Sinhalese peasant and the traditional rural economy (Rampton, 
2011: 258; Gombrich and Obeysekere, 1988). The discourse necessarily 
excluded the Tamils and Hinduism as external to the rightfully Sinhala-
Buddhist nature of the island (Tambiah, 1992; DeVotta, 2007). Sinhala-
Buddhist fundamentalist activism has also excluded the island’s smaller 
Muslim community (Barthmolomeusz and de Silva, 1998: 7; Thiranagama, 
2011; MA, 2012). The riots of 1915, directed at the Muslim business 
community, were fuelled by the rhetoric of Dharmapala; he was interned in 
Calcutta in 1915 for his part in stoking anti-Muslim sentiment. In 1912, a 
journal run by Dharmapala, Sinhala Bauddaya, complained: 
 
“From the day the foreign white man stepped in this country, the 
industries, habits and customs of the Sinhalese began to disappear and 
now the Sinhalese are obliged to fall at the feet of the Coast Moors and 
the Tamils” (quoted in Tambiah, 1992: 8).  
 
Rampton (2010) observes that the discourses that began to emanate from the 
Buddhist revival movement adopted the dynamics of nationalist inclusion 
and exclusion. Exclusion on religious terms suggested to its adherents that 
outsiders to Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism were inferior and did not belong. 
Further, the focus on “purity” drew boundaries between the Sinhalese – the 
righteous inhabitants of Sri Lanka – and the corrupt or impure forces that 
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could potentially harm Buddhism (Bartholomueusz and de Silva, 1998: 3). It is 
historically claimed within this powerful nationalism that Sinhala-Buddhist 
rulers must always be in power in Sri Lanka and must always enjoy cultural, 
religious, economic and linguistic hegemony, leading to an exclusionist 
position and ethnic chauvinism towards minority groups (Bartholomeusz and 
de Silva, 1998). Fears regarding Tamil domination and aggressive challenges 
to Sinhalese power are historically embedded throughout the Mahavamsa, 
providing legitimation for a religiously infused, defensive nationalism 
(Imtiyaz and Stavis, 2008: 13). The Sinhalese must sit at the nation’s 
hierarchical apex of power.  
 
The frontiers of belonging established by this discourse, however, does not 
allow for power sharing or political self-determination for ‘outsider’ 
minorities, rather, the minorities are maintained as subordinates within the 
unitary territory. Resistance to claims of secession flows from the perception 
of the island as gifted by the Buddha to the Sinhalese. Separation of the state 
would amount to a failure by the Sinhalese people to protect the island for 
Buddhist teachings, as the Buddha required. The ideology has generated a 
powerful resistance to the idea of devolution of authority and allows no 
discussion on the possibility of the island’s division (Tambiah, 1992). The 
ideology lends itself to the expansion and perpetuation of Sinhala-Buddhist 
supremacy within a unitary state.  
 
The history contained in the Mahavasma, the defensive Buddhist justification 
for violence and the mobilisation and political participation of Sri Lankan 
monks were powerful forces in creating a nationalist ideology within which 
the Tamil population and the other minorities had no place (Abeysekara, 
2001). The Mahavamsa has played a vital role in infusing the conflict with 
notions of a ‘duty’ to possess and protect the Dhammadipa. The political 
significance of the Mahavamsa in contemporary Sri Lankan politics is widely 
appreciated and though academics acknowledge its complexity, certain 
readings of the text have entered the public consciousness and informed 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism (Bartholomeusz and de Silva, 1998: 56; Spencer, 
1990). Progressive Sinhalese academics and civil society leaders interviewed 
drew on the text to explain the continuity between the history contained in its 
pages and current discourses, political positions and the events at the End 
(SBP, LG, JP, MSP, PNB, 2012). The Mahavamsa is a political resource in the 
present, used strategically by the Rajapaksa government. The “Dutugemunu 
episode” of the Mahavamsa, which is described in 861 verses out of 2906, 
became a source of “preoccupation” and legitimacy for “just war” in 
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Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalism and has been used to frame historical events 
as an ethnic war spanning centuries (Dheerananda, 2006, DeVotta, 2007). In 
one verse, the Tamil people are specifically referred to as sub-human and 
inferior as the Sinhalese King Dutugemunu is reassured by his Buddhist 
clergy that killing Tamils is not a sin “for they are less than human beings” 
(Somasundaram, 1998: 100, Tambiah, 1992: 1). This moment of mytho-history 
was repeated by Sinhalese and Tamil academics alike in interviews, who 
referred to its prevalence in popular consciousness and the emphasis on the 
King’s defeat of the Tamil King Elara in history and schoolbooks (PNB, MM, 
MT, 2012). Sinhala-Buddhist fundamentalists have “constructed Tamils as the 
“Other,” as threatening and dangerous to the prosperity of Buddhism and Sri 
Lanka” (Bartholomuesz and de Silva, 1998: 6). The hegemonic nature of 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism suggests that this logic is thoroughly infused in 
social relations.  
 
 
1.5 Post-Independence Politics 
 
Political parties were, in the post-colonial period, largely formed on the basis 
of ethnicity as the Tamils and the Sinhalese asserted their separate identities 
and cultural rights. The introduction of an ethnic competitive element to the 
democratic process paved the way for clashes in political interests between 
the majority ethnic groups and the Tamils, the country’s largest minority 
(Abeyratne, 2004:7). Increasingly, post-independence polarisation on the basis 
of race or ethnicity resulted from the marginalisation of minorities in the 
Sinhalese-dominated system and minority experiences of discrimination. 
Using the cultural tools of language and religion to mobilise the majority 
population in their favour, and exploiting a “swollen” Sinhala majoritarian 
post-colonial urge to reclaim the island for Sinhalese-Buddhists, the Sinhala-
dominated government oversaw the official adoption of Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalism as the state’s hegemonic ideology (Rampton, 2011). The Official 
Language Act 1956 (hereafter the “Sinhala Only Act” as colloquially known in 
Sri Lankan political and academic circles) represented the crux of this political 
behaviour. Under the leadership of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, the Sri Lanka 
Freedom Party (SLFP) “espoused competitive Sinhala chauvinism and 
economic nationalism to outbid his electoral enemies, particularly the liberal-
leaning ruling UNP” (United National Party) (Imtiyaz, 2013: 4). Passing this 
Act represented a “landmark moment in the hegemonisation of Sinhala 
nationalism” (Rampton, 2011: 259; DeVotta, 2004).  The suppression of the 
interests of the minority and a pattern of political subjugation and ethnic 
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politicking was institutionalised. 18  The use of “religio-ethnic symbolic 
sentiments” secured the election of the SLFP, which promised to safeguard 
the interests of Buddhists (Imtiyaz, 2013: 4) Sinhala language policies arising 
from the Sinhala Only Act were powerful mobilisers along ethnic lines, 
especially among the rural Sinhalese population, and fuelled ethnic 
antagonisms rooted in ethno-linguistic symbols and discrimination (DeVotta, 
2004; Imtiyaz and Stavis, 2008). The SLFP campaigned heavily in Sinhalese 
villages and customarily relied upon socially and politically influential 
groups including the Buddhist order to reach Sinhalese villages and influence 
the political decisions of villagers (Imtiyaz, 2013). 
 
The grievances voiced by Tamil politicians were largely in response to the 
Sinhalese monopoly on political power and socio-economic prosperity, at the 
expense of Tamil rights. Minority rights were conceived as vulnerable to 
decimation or assimilation in a context of Sinhalese dominance of politics 
(Rajanayagam, 1994: 76 Clarance, 2007: 33). Post-1956, Rampton (2011: 259) 
notes, nationalist orientated policies in the fields of education, language 
policy and state recruitment combined with existing nationalist policies of 
citizenship and development, resulting in a “profound permeation of Sinhala 
nationalism into diverse practices of state and society”. Bartholomeusz and de 
Silva (1998) argue that the dominance of Sinhala-Buddhist “fundamentalist” 
nationalist ideology and its attendant chauvinism set the tone for ethnic 
antagonism. The formation of a dominant in-group based on the Sinhala-
Buddhist ethnic identity resulted in a fundamentally exclusionary position 
towards the other ethnic groups. Proponents were primarily the Sinhala-
educated intelligentsia and Buddhist monks, who nurtured intolerance 
towards the non-Buddhist Sri Lankan population (Rogers, 1987: 593). Post-
1956 and the success of the SLFP, the major Sinhala parties began to engage in 
religio-ethnic symbolic politics as a means of gaining Sinhalese electoral 
support: using emotive language of religion and ethnic hostility (Imtiyaz, 
2013). 
 
The solidification of Sinhalese politics on these terms signified a threat to 
other ethnic groups that stimulated and strengthened divisions between the 
                                                        
18 Fareed Zakaria (1997) argues that it is a common and mistaken assumption that a democratic 
system naturally provides for ethnic peace.  It may instead lead to “hyper-nationalism and war-
mongering” (1997: 37). The competing political aims of the different groups may be 
incompatible, yet ethnic political leaders understand the strength of appeals to ethnicity as 
mobilising tools. The resultant conflict of interests may spiral out of control into violent ethnic 
conflict. 
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groups (Clarance, 2007: 33).19 In a process of counter-organisation, political 
groups formed within the Tamil community in order to ensure the protection 
of their interests and welfare. Tamil nationalism and its development will be 
expanded upon in Chapter Five but for the purpose of description here, the 
main demands of the Tamil political movement were “parity of the Sinhala 
and Tamil languages, collective and personal protection, political 
representation, freedom from state discrimination, access to state resources, 
and the cessation of state-aided colonisation in Tamil-speaking areas” 
(Satkunanathan, 2012: 619). The alignment of parties along ethnic lines, and a 
number of coinciding and interwoven factors such as economic hardship and 
limited opportunity for social mobility, political and economic issues of 
employment, education, land ownership, and citizenship and voting rights 
(Eddirippulige, 2004: 30; Shastri, 2004) cemented the political salience of 
ethnic identities and influenced a spiral of political decision-making. Given 
the institutionalised nature of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, it was purported 
to equate to Sri Lankan national identity.  
 
Since the outbreak of war in the early 1980s, the communities have been 
separated in geographical space, language, and nationalistic ideology and 
conflict discourse. The ethnic nature of the political problems that led to the 
war has been emphasised by both groups in politics, propaganda and mutual 
‘Othering’. For the Tamils, “Tamilness” came to mean victimisation by a 
repressive Sinhalese state and the denial of equal rights in terms of education, 
culture and social mobility (Brun, 2008). For the Sinhalese, the unitary state - 
maintained as such for the Sinhalese on the foundations of Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalism - became the objective of post-colonisation politics and nation-
building, strengthened in reaction to Tamil calls for autonomy and 
federalism. Reacting to this majoritarian, exclusionary ideology, “Tamil 
Nationalism as an ideology and as a concrete political movement thus arose 
as a historical consequence of Sinhala chauvinistic state oppression” 
(Balasingham, 2004: 9).  
 
The Tamil Federal Party formed in 1949 in reaction to the Citizenship Act of 
1948, which rendered nearly a million Indian Tamil plantation workers 
stateless, an Act that further minimised the political power of the minorities 
(Samaranayake, 1991; Clarance, 2007: 35). For the minorities, the passing of 
                                                        
19 Though minority communities in Sri Lanka do have a history of seeking solidarity in 
“Otherness” – their non-Sinhala-Buddhist identities - in common recognition of Sinhalese 
exclusionary policies. See Bartholomeusz and de Silva (1998) on the relationship between Tamils 
and Muslims from the late 19th Century to the post-independence struggle for representation.  
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this Act indicated the intention of the government to build a state premised 
on Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism. In reaction to perceived preferential 
treatment granted to the Tamils under colonisation, including superior 
education and land rights (Clarance, 2007: 31; Azeem, 2008), positive 
discrimination measures were introduced to the education system and the 
public service to ‘even the playing field’ for the Sinhalese. The exclusivist 
policies in education and state employment actively marginalised the Tamil-
speaking people and intensified the minority instinct towards self-
preservation. Education has become a “traditional” facet of Tamil identity 
since British colonisation and these policies were viewed as an assault on 
Tamil socio-economic upward mobility and culture. The passing of the 
“Sinhala-Only Act” named Sinhala as the official state language, making no 
mention of Tamil. The legislation had both symbolic and practical 
implications. The Tamil people felt unrecognised as equal citizens of Sri 
Lanka and the related linguistic-nationalist institutional practices and social 
changes led to discrimination against the Tamils in education, public service 
employment and interaction with both state institutions and the majority 
Sinhala community (Samaranayake, 1991; Rogers et al., 1998; DeVotta, 2004, 
2005). Socio-economically, there were much-reduced professional 
opportunities available for Tamils in the civil service due to lack of Sinhala 
language skills (DeVotta, 2005).  
 
A political Buddhism supported the Sinhala-Only movement, declaring the 
Sinhala-Buddhist responsibility to protect the purely Buddhist nature of the 
island (Tambiah, 1992). The Buddhist monks who authored the Mahavamsa 
Chronicles (which is the basis for the Sinhala-Buddhist history of the island) 
were concerned with the survival of Buddhism on the island and as the text 
rose to prominence in Sinhala history, this became a key ingredient of the 
Sinhala ‘Aryan’ race (Nissan, 1998). Sinhalese politicians, capturing post-
colonial nationalist sentiment, framed the survival and continuance of Sinhala 
culture and its ‘‘divine tryst’’ with Buddhism as being under threat 
(Radhakrishnan, 2010: 97). The Tamils, representing a threat to Sinhala-
Buddhist ideology, became the ‘Other’ to be marginalised and rejected in 
post-colonial nation building. 20  Talks held between Tamil political 
representatives and the SLFP were subject to immense pressure from extreme 
Sinhala-Buddhists and political Buddhist monks: they were met with a 
“frequently potent nationalist backlash” mobilised by opposition parties and 
                                                        
20 The plethora of Tamil militant separatist groups that emerged in this political environment, of 
which the LTTE was the most brutal and successful, confirmed that perception for the Sinhalese. 
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including populist protest and rioting (Rampton, 2011: 261).  President 
S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike was assassinated in 1959 by a Buddhist monk who 
opposed his move to implement the Tamil Language Act, which would grant 
legal status to Tamil as a language of administration in the North and East 
(Clarance, 2007: 38; Rogers: 1987: 596). His widow, Simavaro Bandaranaike, as 
the subsequent leader of the SLFP, asserted a renewed focus on “Sinhala-
Only,” under pressure not to appear to be endangering Sinhala-Buddhist 
interests (Manogaran, 1987: 53). Sinhalese politicians have consistently faced 
the threat of political failure or violence if they fail to demonstrate Sinhala-
Buddhist commitment.  
 
The inability of the political process to accommodate the concerns of the 
Tamil people was perceived as consistent refusal by the state to recognise 
their political and cultural rights. The Constitutions of 1972 and 1978 named 
Buddhism as the official state religion and Sinhala as the official language, 
removed minority protections in place and established an Executive 
Presidency with few democratic safeguards. These measures were infused 
with Sinhala nationalist logic that rejects the prospect of power sharing in a 
unitary state (Welikala, 2008; Rampton, 2011). The gradual process of 
“Sinhalisation” of the state alienated and marginalised Tamils, prompting the 
organisation of a campaign for a separate state of Tamil Eelam (Samarayanke, 
1991; Rogers et al., 1998; Rampton, 2011). “Tamilness”, as described in 
Chapter Five on the development of Tamil nationalism, came to relate 
intimately to the denial of rights, an identity contrasted with the negative 
image of the Sinhalese Other – the denier of those rights (Brun, 2008). The 
island of Sri Lanka has different meanings for the ethnic groups, as a 
“primordial homeland used in the production of national identity, as sacred 
space for the island’s Buddhist population, as protection against an 
aggressive other, as theatre of war, and, as political-economic prize” 
(Kleinfield, 2005: 287). 
 
 
1.6 Sinhalese Mob Violence 
 
The perception amongst Tamils has been that the racist mob violence of 1983, 
the most devastating of a series of riots in that period, was condoned and 
backed by the state (Bloom, 2003; Rogers et al., 1990; Bose, 1994; Gunesinghe, 
2004). Statements by officials further encouraged this perception by referring 
to the perpetrators as heroes of the Sinhala people and framing the riots as a 
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“mass movement by the generality of the Sinhalese people” (Jayawardene, 
1983) and stating that: 
 
“Sri Lanka is inherently and rightfully a Sinhalese state...and it must be 
accepted as such, not a matter of opinion to be debated. For attempting 
to challenge this premise, Tamils have brought the wrath of Sinhalese 
on their own heads; they have themselves to blame.”21  
 
Although Kapferer (1988: 32) credits the violence to an inherent “culture of 
nationalism” in the Sinhala race, Rogers (1987) posits that the collective 
violence at this formative stage of the conflict was driven by the interaction 
between economic aspirations and social identity, as the Sinhalese population 
saw the Tamils as obstacles in gaining social mobility and economic success. 
Gunesinghe’s (2004) reading of the riots contests mainstream account - as an 
emotional mass reaction to the killing of 13 soldiers by the LTTE – as 
reductive, instead explaining that the riots were a result of wider societal 
dislocations and nationalist currents directly related to the rapid liberalisation 
of the economy from 1977. He argues that that the period between 1977 and 
1983 was one of “of incessant ethnic rioting” (2004: 100). Economic 
discrimination was certainly an aspect of the repression and marginalisation 
of the Tamils by the majoritarian state, which exacerbated ethnic tensions. 
Foreign donors were not blameless in this process, as aid was primarily 
directed to the Sinhala-dominated South (Goodhand et al., 2005: 78). 
Krishna’s (1999) post-colonial approach situates the riots within a context of 
powerful state- and nation-building nationalist discourses that reached a 
zenith in the same period. Ethnic opposition was now embedded in societal 
relations (Nadarajah and Sentas, 2013). 
 
The island-wide assaults and killings of Tamils occurred alongside the 
political forfeiture of power by Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) 
politicians, as the 6th amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution in 1983 
demanded a new oath of allegiance to the Sri Lankan state, one that 
prohibited the “violation of territorial integrity” of Sri Lanka. The amendment 
criminalised advocacy for Tamil separation, as discussed in Chapter Four. 
The amendment effectively blocked any legal or political route towards the 
achievement of Tamil self-determination. It signalled the state’s intention to 
                                                        
21 Attributed as a governmental statement in reaction to the riots by Elizabeth Nissan in “Some 
Thoughts on Sinhalese Justification for (1983) Violence”, quoted in Bloom, M. M. (2003), pp. 63 - 
64. 
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equate “separatism” with “terrorism” (Nadarajah and Sentas, 2013). The 
TULF MPs refused to take the oath and therefore forfeited their seats in 
parliament (Imtiyaz, 2013). These events congruently signalled the futility of 
political negotiations within official channels and illustrated the extent and 
power of anti-Tamil sentiment in Sinhalese-dominated society; support for 
the militant brand of Tamil nationalism headed by the LTTE solidified 
(Satkunanathan, 2012). Sinhalese political parties were represented in Tamil 
discourse as chauvinistic and incapable of transformation (Brun, 2008). Tamil 
political parties who sought to engage with the Sinhalese political parties in 
government were disillusioned and self-determination in a separate state of 
Tamil Eelam came to prevalence as the only viable option. Militant 
movements became a mode of resisting the repressive Sinhalese state where 
participation in politics was seen as futile (Balasingham, 2004). The 
militarised movement became the only avenue within which the aspirations 
of the Tamil youth could be vocalised (Brun, 2008). 
 
 
1.7 Othering and the Hegemonisation of Sinhala-Buddhist Ideology 
 
The ‘Othering’ of the Tamil community since independence has been 
embedded in the institutions of education and public administration, state 
policy and practice on language and religion, and intensified by the 
discursive association of the entire population with the LTTE. In discourse 
and practice, demonstrated in counter-terror policing, this association led to 
the majority Sinhalese equation of all Tamils with Tiger “terrorists.” Rampton 
(2011: 268) argues that the discourses and apparatuses of nationalism “have 
become articulated into an enduring social formation where they have 
attained a hegemonic depth beyond mere instrumentality.” Rather than a 
vehicle for electoral gain, to be manipulated by Sinhala politicians, the 
populist value of this ideology is its intrinsic inseparability from the concept 
of the state. The Sinhala-Buddhist exclusionary position towards minorities, 
particularly the Tamil community, is ingrained “right from the beginning” (MT, 
2012) and “natural” (SH, 2012). One interviewee, a Sinhalese media worker 
with an English literature background, noted the nature of the name 
colloquially given to the Tamil community in the Sinhala language, demellic 
or demala: 
 
“The technical term for the Tamil community is Damilla. But when you say 
demellic; I won’t say it is derogatory but there is a tinge of Otherness to it. 
You never say Sinhellic, for example. There is no word called Sinhellic. But 
Demallic or Demella-cartia; there is a whole range of words that you would 
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use in Sinhala to call the Tamil community that always stresses on the 
Otherness aspect” (SH, 2012). 
 
For SH, this mark on language indicates that Tamils “are never part of the 
identity of this country.” Political speeches and discourses of reconciliation may 
promote the notion that Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic nation “but in popular 
terminology it is accepted to emphasise the Otherness” (SH, 2012). Quick to deny 
that this is a characteristic of individual racism, he argues that the majority 
“don’t see it as being a term that is stressing the Otherness. It is just natural. It is 
part and parcel of discourse” (SH, 2012). A Sinhalese academic argued that the 
Sinhalese are “poisoned by long-standing traditions” in Sri Lankan society that 
promotes Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism (MSP, 2012). Traceable in the 
language of restraint that defines military operations and the lack of public 
outcry where Tamil media personnel and activists are killed or made to 
disappear, this Othering of Tamils amounts to indifference at best, and 
antipathy at worst (TAG, 2013).  
 
De Silva (2013: 157) argues, in line with Rampton (2011) and Abeysekara 
(2002), that analyses of processes of nationalist formations ought to 
interrogate “minute conjunctures” of discourses in which agency is not 
reducible to the state. An autobiographical description of the hegemonic 
power of the ideology, offered by a Sinhalese media worker and advocate, is 
insightful. The capacity to resist the overwhelming proliferation of Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalism is an individual struggle, one that requires strength, 
critical faculty and vigilance. Responding to a question related to the 
Othering of the Tamil community, he referred to the content of schoolbooks 
and the power of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism: 
 
“Oh yes, it is in me also. I was brought up as a Sinhalese and I was fed that. 
We did a study of the school text curriculum…I am a product of that. Even 
today, now in this conversation I almost slipped up. I treated Tamils as the 
Other, I don’t know if you noticed but I slipped. I sometimes mean to say Sri 
Lankan and I say Sinhalese, or I mean to say Sri Lankan and I say Sinhalese. 
Without thinking. There is no other Sri Lankans but Sinhalese Buddhists. I 
am not even Buddhist…but that is the heresy. Even I still think like a Sinhala-
Buddhist because I have been brought up like that.  
 
These other guys who are with me [challenging Sinhala-Buddhist ideology], 
these are not so asinine, and they are pure Sinhala-Buddhist. They are 
completely anti-Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinist. They are risking their lives, 
fleeing to India. So you can imagine the high ideological turn they had to take. 
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I can’t unlearn everything I have learned, so you can imagine the kind of inner 
struggle they are in, to resist Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism, being Buddhist 
themselves” (LG, 2012). 
 
 
1.8 Sinhala-Buddhism in Education 
 
Though Sri Lanka’s National Education Commission, founded in 1992, 
emphasises in its reports the need to develop an educational system that 
promotes “national cohesion, national integrity, national unity” as a goal 
appropriate to a multicultural society, the education system actually 
maintains and perpetuates divisions between communities (Jayawardane, 
2006: 225). Crucial to the problem of ethnic polarisation is the current school 
system, which on the basis of a 1964 policy of Swabhasha “native language” 
education segregates children on the basis of language (Jayawardane, 2006; 
Gunasena, 2006). The Sinhalese school curriculum textbooks and storybooks 
rely on the Mahavamsa as the primary source of history. Education in Sri 
Lanka is primarily a state-run venture and the island has an education policy 
that allows for free textbooks since 1980, which are published and distributed 
by the Department of Educational Publications under the Ministry of 
Education (Ministry of Education, 2004; Jayawardane, 2006). Interviewees 
noted that the history found in the Sinhalese state-provided books is infused 
with Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist ideology (MM, PNB, MT, LG, 2012). The 
books have been identified as inappropriate for a multi-ethnic and multi-
religious society in reports since the 1980s (Jayawardene, 2006). The charges 
levelled against the books include insensitivity to diversity and sowing 
prejudice. Amal Jayawardene, in a publication produced by the National 
Integration Programme Unit (2006: 219-20), lists the complaints: Sinhala-
Buddhist dominance; under-representation of other cultures; an almost 
exclusive focus on Sinhala-Buddhist kings; the non-involvement of Tamil or 
Muslim authors in writing textbooks; and “silence over controversial issues in 
the recent past.”  
 
A Sinhalese academic interviewee recounted a moment in the Mahavasma, 
contained in school textbooks and problematic in its violent and 
dehumanising implications:  
 
“Before Dutugemunu was born, his mother had the desire to drink blood 
mixed with water, washed of the steel of a sword which had killed a Tamil. 
‘Doloduke’: the craving, desire to eat that comes from a baby, symbolised the 
 54 
desire to defeat that Dutugemunu had even in his mother’s womb” (PNB, 
2012). 
 
The powerful imagery in this story jars with the recommendations of the 
National Education Commission Report in 2003, appointed by President 
Chandrika Kumaratunga, which highlighted social cohesion and national 
integration as relevant considerations when teaching history. The report 
stated that Sri Lanka needs an “integration-friendly mind-set in the books” 
(PNB, 2012), to “eschew ethnic, religious, gender, and social class divisions” 
(NEC, 2003, quoted in Jayawardane, 2006: 225). The report suggested that 
teachers and books stimulate “interest in and understanding of the past, of 
how the nation grew and was shaped by the contributions of all population 
groups and segments and individuals” (NEC, 2003, quoted in Jayawardene, 
2006: 225). Interviewees posit that the content of schoolbooks has not altered 
to reflect this goal. One interviewee charged that Sinhala-Buddhist protests 
against the alteration of history books had prevented progressive changes in 




1.9 Political Buddhism 
 
Neil DeVotta (2007: 10) asserts that because “the requisite imaginings had 
been performed centuries before, modern Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists did 
not need to create a mytho-history when they began calibrating an ideological 
project to ensure their group’s supremacy.” Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism and 
political Buddhism are “phenomena based on regional pressures, threats and 
insecurities” (DeVotta, 2007: 11). The violence of the LTTE became a source of 
further polarisation on ethnic grounds and a political Buddhism, extant since 
the late 19th century, rose to prevalence in the early 1980s. The 1978 
Constitution introduced by the UNP administration led by J. R. Jayewardene 
(commonly known as ‘the second republic’) grants a “foremost place” to 
Buddhism in Article 9, a move by Jayewardene to endear the Sinhala 
constituency to his government (Imtiyaz, 2013). This Constitutional move 
inspired Sinhala-Buddhist extremists inside Parliament to progressively 
strengthen the community’s efforts to politicise the religion (2013: 8).  
 
Abeysekera (2001) describes how the Sinhalese-Buddhist population were, in 
the early 1980s, drawn into a divided and complicated conception of the place 
of violence and Buddhism in politics. Buddhist discourses “began to 
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authorize a particular Buddhist image of the "fearless" young monk who 
would march to the "battlefront" and lay down his life to rescue and lead the 
Buddhist nation facing the threat of "terrorism” (Abeysekara, 2001: 5). The 
JVP – a Marxist political party representing primarily the rural Sinhalese - 
exploited this notion: to join the JVP was to pledge support for an urgent, 
“sacred” Buddhist task – to destroy the threat of terrorism and prevent the 
ruination of the sacred land (2001: 5). Monks joined the JVP and presented 
themselves as true patriots, willing to use violence in defence of the Sinhala-
Buddhist nation, while the UNP government purported to stand for a 
dharmista (righteous) society in which a “pristine” Buddhism existed, a 
Buddhism that did not differentiate between ethnicities and, in which, monks 
would reject involvement in politics to lead "pure," exemplary monastic lives 
(Abeysekara, 2001: 10). The Sangha (Buddhist order), however, have 
historically provided patronage and legitimacy to Sri Lankan rulers (De 
Votta, 2007; Rajasingham-Senanayake, 2009), and the JVP’s conception 
chimed with the masses.   
 
In 1983, Maduluwawe Sobhita, a popular Buddhist preacher, stated that:  
 
“Some say that monks do not need politics; but we cannot do anything 
except through politics. Even if we do not endorse party politics, we 
have to take certain decisions in important situations. We should have 
the right to comment on good and bad things that the government 
does.... [I]f a government engages in things that are against the religion 
[Buddhism] and the nation (jatika virbdhi agam virōdhi) it becomes 
necessary for Buddhist monks to appoint a new government” 
(Maduluwawe Sobhita, 1983, quoted in Abeysekara, 2001: 8). 
 
Jayawardene was termed a “traitor” by JVP-associated monks who criticised 
his introduction of a capitalist, open market economy and blamed him for the 
various vices that seeped into Sri Lanka, leading to a perceived moral collapse 
and an “unrighteous society” (Abeysekara, 2001: 11). The JVP maximised on 
this discourse to erect, in Rampton’s language, a “frontier of populist 
authenticity” where the rural Sinhala citizen was “inside” and elite politicians 
implicated in the globalising process, neoliberalism and neo-colonialism were 
“outside” (2011: 265). Drawing on militant language of marching, battles, 
death and self-sacrifice, Walpola Rahula Thero was influential in the radical 
development of the new political Buddhist activism by monks (Deegalle, 
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2004).22 He publicly stated that the "Sangha is ready to lay down their lives” 
should the government make political concessions to the Tamils (Rahula, 
1984, quoted in Abeysekara, 2001: 13-4). Another monk, Mahapallegama 
Dhammalankara declared that "monks should march to the battle front 
without practicing the monastic image of silence", stating that "there is no 
Buddhist sangha where there is no Sinhalese race and there is no Sinhalese 
race where there is no Buddhist sangha," and that monks ought not "isolate 
themselves practicing meditation in times of national crisis" (1985, quoted in 
Abeysekara, 2001: 13). This same rhetoric is relied upon today. On 3 July 2013, 
Buddhist monk Rev. Galagoda-Atte Gnanasara Thero re-formulated 
Dhammalankara’s 1985 declaration:  
 
“This is not the time for Buddhist monks to meditate in temples…. If 
politicians are going in the wrong direction, we have a sacred right to 
step in” (quoted in Gunasekara, 2013a).  
 
As LTTE violence shook the country from the early 1980s, this vocal sector of 
Buddhist monks embraced militarism and publicly demanded that the 
government wage a full war against the LTTE. Rejecting the idea of peace 
talks with this threat to “the unity of the country”, Labuduwe Siridhamma 
urged the government to pursue “victory through war” (1984, quoted in 
Abeysekara, 2001: 16). President Jayawardene expressed his reluctance to 
follow the path of violence as antithetical to Buddhism. He questioned the 
Buddhist identity of these monks who advocated violence as a solution to the 
“terrorist problem” (Abeysekara, 2001: 16). The militant discourse of the 
monks increased in vehemence and in 1985, Uduwawalle Chandananda made 
front-page headline news, stating that the government was failing to "tackle 
terrorism" and had "made it impossible for the Sinhala people to live in 
dignity in their own country” (quoted in Abeysekara, 2001: 17). He proposed 
that the Sangha ought to be granted powers of leadership in such a situation, 
where the government would not consult and rely upon the guidance of the 
Sangha, as Sinhala Kings had for centuries. Chandananda, Sobhita and 
Rahula claimed that the government had lost its Buddhist identity and also its 
mandate to rule "Sinhala Buddhist" Sri Lanka by failing to pursue military 
self-protection (Abeysekara, 2001: 18). 23  The JVP monks also sought to 
                                                        
22 Rahula is the author of The Heritage of the Bhikkhu (1974, originally published in Sinhala in 
1946 as Bhisuvagē Urumaya). 
23 Abeysekara notes that concerns about the threat of "terrorism" to Buddhism and particularly 
to monks were considered to be confirmed by an atrocity committed in mid-1987, where the 
LTTE decapitated thirty-two monks on Buddhist pilgrimage in Arantalawa, Ampar (2001: 19).  
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discredit the monks who supported Jayawardene, portraying them as archaic 
overseers of the destruction of Buddhist Sri Lanka, while emphasising the 
vital character of young monks who had the potential to be the future 
engineers of a righteous Sri Lankan society (Abeysekara, 2001).  
 
The Sangha largely remained on the fringes of politics. Although they 
contested local elections, “none dared to stand in the parliamentary 
elections”, preferring to resort to protests and public statements against the 
government (Deegalle, 2004: 84). The government responded to the 
involvement of monks in protesting and rioting against the signing of the 
Indo-Lankan Peace Accord in 1987 by arresting a number of them and 
suggesting that many of them were "rebels disguised as monks” (Abeysekara, 
2001: 22), breathing life into theories that the government was attempting to 
suppress young monks.24  
 
The JVP sought to authorise the choice of "motherland or death" as an 
"authentic Buddhist" practice for monks and labelled Jayawardene as a 
“traitor”, the LTTE “terrorists” and the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) 
introduced to the island under the 1987 Peace Accord as "Indian invaders” 
(2001: 22). The discursive formation of a JVP "army of patriots" (deshprimi 
hamudava) was designed to portray the political Buddhist movement as 
reclaiming the glory of the Buddhist country and the rescue of a nation 
"betrayed" by the "unlawful" Jayewardene government (Abeysekara, 2001: 
27). The Jayawardene government, and his successor President Premadasa, 
came under attack by this rising movement as “illegal” governments, failing 
to protect the motherland, despite their pro-Sinhala policies, including 
President Premadasa’s establishment of a Ministry of Buddha Sasana 
(religion) to provide a strong link between the state and Buddhism in 1989 
(Imtiyaz, 2013; De Silva, 1993: 34). Moreover, in order to prove his devotion to 
the revival of Buddhist culture and tradition, President Premadasa appointed 
a Cabinet of twenty-two members who shared his rural and traditional 
Buddhist background (Imtiyaz, 2013). Neloufer de Mel (2007: 34) notes that 
the position of the monks vis-à-vis the state security forces differed 
depending on political sentiment and specific forms of localised nationalism. 
As Rajasingham-Senanayake (2009: 7) notes, Buddhism in Sri Lanka is not 
monolithic and there are various caste-based orders of the Sangha. Some 
                                                        
24 Bose (1994) describes the widespread popular protests against the Indo-Lankan Accord, 
considered an “Indian imposition” by Sinhala nationalists, and how it contributed to the JVP-led 
insurgency. 
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monks called for solidarity with the state security forces in the battle against 
Tamil separatism and the compromise of the Sinhala-Buddhist nation, while 
elsewhere on the island this monastic nationalism was aligned with the JVP 
and opposed to the UNP government. Within the latter manifestation of 
nationalism, the state forces were seen as “an instrument of state law and 
order that had to be opposed” (de Mel, 2007: 34).  
 
Abeysekara observes that it was in wresting the concept of “patriot” back 
from the JVP that Premadasa gained legitimacy against the JVP, which had 
become a powerful force in society. Premadasa, who opposed the Indo-Lanka 
Accord when it was signed in his position as Prime Minister, campaigned to 
send the IPKF back to India (Manoharan, 2008: 54). He framed this objective 
as his "Buddhist patriotic" quest and reduced the JVP to the status of an 
"armed man" that the "patriotic Buddhist" government could and had to kill 
(Abeysekara, 2001: 35). Though patriotism on the terms of Sinhala-Buddhism 
had become embedded, Premadasa managed to undermine the status of the 
JVP and their conception of a patriotic Buddhist identity, reducing them to 
‘terrorists’ - an illegitimate violent movement. The state in 1988 and 1989 
launched a campaign based on death squads, torture and prolonged 
detention to eradicate the JVP as a threat to power, while publicly stating that 
their “criminal” “violence” posed a threat to a particular kind of “Buddhist” 
Sri Lanka (2001: 36-7). The “Buddhist” identity of the monks linked to the JVP 
came into question (2001: 36). The state’s ‘patriotism’ was contrasted to the 
‘terrorism’ of the JVP. The violent suppression of the JVP uprising was 
justified in this manner, and the politicised monks - the faces of the movement 
- were stripped of their status.  
 
Performative acts of returning the monks to the laity demonstrated the 
impossibility of being both a monk and a member of the JVP. Monks were 
stripped naked, sometimes forced to wear bed sheets instead of robes, beaten 
in public and sometimes shot dead in their temples. A method of torture with 
Buddhist connotations was introduced, called the Wheel of the Dhamma. 
Abeysekara (2001: 37) draws on this practice to illustrate that “the 
punishment of torturing the JVP monks was part of questioning their 
Buddhist monastic identities, the punishment must necessarily be rendered 
‘Buddhist.’” This is reminiscent of the distortion of familiar and commonplace 
language that Feitlowitz (1998) found in Argentina. “Comforting past 
associations”, she asserts (1998: 49), were translated into pain, degradation 
and sometimes death. The methods of torture applied to the monks were 
framed in religious terms, leaving a scar on the language. Following the 
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defeat of the uprising, the state subjected the monks to a disciplinary process 
of “rehabilitation” in order to ordain them with new “non-JVP”, “non-
violent” and “disciplined” Buddhist identities (Abeysekara, 2001). Premadasa 
consolidated his popularity as a patriot who had destroyed “terror”, but this 
image was short-lived. After his death in 1993, Chandrika Bandaranaike 
Kumaratunga’s presidential campaign hinged on a promise to end the 
Premadasa “era of terror.” The discourse of “young, noble monks” returned 
in the post-UNP era, in the continuing reconfiguration of what “Buddhism” 
and “violence” mean in Sri Lanka (2001: 40). 
 
In the present day, many interviewees spoke of the degradation of the Sangha 
and their disappointment in Buddhist monks who make up the order. They 
are seen as opportunists, living day-to-day as careerists, relying on 
propaganda, fear-mongering, and governmental patronage to maintain status 
in society (PS, MS, YO, PK, 2012). Rather than preaching the principles of 
Buddhism, a Tamil political scientist PK (2012) argued, monks play an 
“alarming” role in stoking inter-ethnic animosity and promoting Sinhala-
Buddhist chauvinism and supremacist thought. In order to protect their 
position in the hierarchy of power in Sri Lanka, monks propagate the status of 
the Sinhala-Buddhists as first-rate citizens, superior to all minorities (PK, 
2012). Over the final years of war, a small but vocal group of nationalistic 
monks – described as a “handful” by one interviewee (SB, 2012) - publicly 
justified the war. Buddhist monks were described in interviews as 
“extremists” dressed in robes, ignorant of “the meaning of human rights or the 
principles of Buddhism” (PK, 2012) and certainly betraying the principles of 
their religion (MSP, YO, 2012).  
 
“They are dressed as such but they are not monks. They are very political, 
threatening the government at the top level. The president fears them because 




1.10 The Entrance of the Sangha to the Mainstream Political Process 
 
In 2004, the Sangha entered politics in an unprecedented and controversial 
way. A newly formed Buddhist monk political party, the JHU (National 
Sinhala Heritage Party), made history by fielding 200 Buddhist monk 
candidates in the April parliamentary election, resulting in nine monks 
becoming professional politicians in the Sri Lankan Parliament (Deegalle, 
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2004). The JHU, though it represents a minority of Buddhists, has entered 
politics and “re-shaped public religion in Sri Lanka” (Rajasingham-
Senanayake, 2009: 15). Venerable Athuraliye Rathana, the appointed media 
spokesman of the JHU explained the purpose of this enterprise:  
 
“…the Sangha has entered the arena of politics to ensure the protection 
of Buddhist heritage and values which had been undermined for 
centuries” (quoted in Deegalle, 2004: 47).  
 
The JHU relied on the legal status and patronage of the Sihala Urumaya (SU) - 
a political party founded in 2000 and registered in Sri Lanka - to contest the 
elections (DeVotta, 2007). 25 The JHU membership is primarily comprised of 
monks and they share the SU’s condemnation of Sinhala politicians they 
consider “opportunistic” and insufficiently ideologically committed. The two 
parties also perceive Tamil separatism and the presence of other ethnic 
minorities to be a threat to the Sinhala nation. The SU’s objective is to seek 
“political power for the Sinhalese” and to “rebuild the unique Sinhala 
civilization”, which leaves them open to accusations of extremism and racist 
nationalism in the media (Deegalle, 2004: 87). Neil DeVotta (2007: 26) states 
that the SU is “not only nationalist, it is patently racist,” encouraging violence 
against minorities by distorting history and promising the transfer of 
minority-owned businesses to the Sinhalese as part of their 2004 election 
campaign. Centred on a Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist critique of 
contemporary politics and endemic governmental corruption, the JHU and 
the SU state that politicians are “prepared to barter the sovereignty of the 
nation for the sake of power” and have also stood by and allowed “unethical 
conversions” to other religions to occur (Deegalle, 2004: 87; DeVotta, 2007). 
The JHU’s primary objective is to establish a Buddhist state; the elimination of 
the LTTE was central to that project (Rajasingham-Senanayake, 2009). It was 
opposed to any negotiations with the LTTE and campaigned for a military 
defeat, relying on violent discourse and seemingly unconcerned about the 
plight of Tamil civilians (DeVotta, 2007). The party arose in response to a 
perceived lack of real, “righteous” Sinhala-Buddhist representation in 
government and is seen in the context of a Buddhist social reform and revival 
movement, triggered by the death of a prominent and popular monk named 
the Venerable Gangodavila Soma (Deegalle, 2004; DeVotta, 2007). Drawing on 
                                                        
25 JHU signed a memorandum of understanding with the SU (Sinhala Heritage Party) that the lay 
leadership of the SU would refrain from contesting, leaving only monks of the JHU to contest the 
election.  
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conspiracy theories regarding his death that claim he was assassinated in an 
effort to undermine Buddhism in Sri Lanka, the JHU co-opted the popularity 
of the monk, who had joined the SU in 2002 to “unite the Sinhala nationalist 
movement in order to defeat the elements bent on separating the country” 
(Deegalle, 2004: 91; DeVotta, 2007). 26  Neloufer de Mel describes a poster 
released by the JHU in December 2003 that depicts Soma Thero walking in 
unity with the Sri Lankan armed forces, with the tag-line: “Let’s defeat the 
NGO mafia” (2007: 34). This formulation of the “enemy” of the Sri Lankan 
state as Western-Christian-NGO “conglomerates” was delivered in a 
campaign that emphasised the essential relationship between Buddhism, the 
military and the Sri Lankan nation (2007: 34-5). 
 
In 2005, the JHU and the JVP (who share political views but also compete for 
the same voter base) were drawn into a central government coalition with the 
ruling UFPA. Rajapaksa’s UFPA used the same nationalist platform as a key 
populist vehicle and “wrested patriotic authenticity” from the less powerful 
JHU and JVP, leaving them with no choice but to unite with the government 
or face increasing marginalistion (Rampton, 2011: 267). As key coalition 
partners, the JHU (and the JVP to a lesser extent) represents the “extremist 
fringe” which has been thoroughly integrated into the political establishment, 
ideologically permeating the UPFA administration and distorting its 
discourse (Jayatilleka, 2013; LG, 2012; SH, 2012). As a Muslim interviewee 
argued: 
 
“About 7 or 8 years ago, the Sinhalese extremist groups were not much. Now, 
they are so powerful. Day by day, they are becoming more powerful…power is 
with the extremist groups, including the President” (MA, 2012). 
 
This new trajectory in Sri Lankan politics - the acceptance of Sinhalese-
Buddhist extremists (as opposed to nationalists who maintain a veneer of 
moderation) into central government - represents the institutionalisation of 
the ideology (DeVotta, 2007). The integration of the ideological stance 
propagated by these parties limited scope for reform and reinforced the 
UFPA’s commitment to a unitary state. The ruling coalition was ideologically 
inclined to finish the war by military means rather than through a negotiated 
political settlement (Uyangoda, 2007). As Rampton (2011: 268) argues, the 
                                                        
26 The death of Soma Thero was the trigger for a spike in anti-Christian violence, as the monk had 
advocated against conversions and his followers claimed that the Christians were responsible for 
his murder, though his death was caused by a heart attack. See Neil DeVotta (2007: 42). 
 62 
hegemonic depth of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism consistently resurfaced 
throughout the conflict to undermine a political solution. The military victory 
brought the Sinhalese-Buddhist state into existence: a state won by conclusive 
defeat of the separatist group that challenged the unitary make-up of Sri 
Lanka, without negotiations or compromise (JU, 2012). The ultimate goal of 
the war, a Tamil politician argued, was “the making of a Sinhala-Buddhist 
nation” (MG, 2012). Interviewees were consistent in asserting that a hegemony 
based on Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism exists in government (PK, KG, MG, 
LG, 2012). For GK, a Tamil nationalist and lawyer, “Sri Lankan 
nationalism…equals Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism” and the post-war rhetoric of 
“one country, one nation” and the notion of a “Sri Lankan identity” ignores 
the exclusionary character of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism (KG, 2012). 
 
 
1.11 The Bodu Bala Sena 
 
Post-war and post-LTTE manifestations of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism 
propagated as patriotism include anti-Muslim and anti-Christian campaigns 
led by the extremist Bodu Bala Sena (BBS), a JHU-breakaway organisation of 
monks who advocate militancy and violence in protecting Buddhism. The 
BBS, formed in July 2012 by Buddhist monks Kirama Vimalajothy and 
Galagodatthe Gnasara, has built a support base campaigning for protection of 
the “Sinhala franchise” that brought Mahinda Rajapaksa to power (Bastians, 
2013). The BBS have spread conspiracy theories about the Muslim population, 
ranging from serpentine to absurd, and have carried out attacks on Muslim 
property and mosques (BBC, 2012; ColomboTelegraph, 2012). The initial rumour 
to gain traction in Sri Lanka was that Muslim shopkeepers were handing out 
sweets to Sinhalese women that would render them infertile, in an effort to 
stunt the growth of the Sinhala population (Francis, 2013). Rumours such as 
this have been spread in conjunction with an “anti-halaal” campaign, 
attempts to ban the burqa and the Islamic legal system, warnings of Muslim 
extremism and allegations that Muslim businesses were overshadowing and 
threatening the economic security of the Sinhalese (Sultana, 2013; Bastians, 
2013). Muslim shop-owners have faced accusations of the rape of Sinhalese 
girls (Francis, 2013). The growth of the BBS movement, Francis (2013) argues, 
is part of a larger strategy of establishing Buddhist supremacy over the 
minority communities. The Muslim population fears violence and the 
collusion and acquiescence of the police, as echoes of Black July cloud the 
collective memory (Dhanapala and Goonesekere, 2013). A Muslim politician 
named Azad Salley was quoted in early 2013 as saying: 
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'They just finished hunting the Tamils, without solving any of the 
issues, and now they are starting on the Muslim hunt. Virtually all 
minority communities are being threatened" (quoted in Francis, 2013). 
 
The Criminal Investigation Department (CID) subsequently arrested Salley on 
2 May 2013, under the PTA, following complaints that his pubic 
proclamations incited racial disharmony (Kannangara and Wickrematunge, 
2013). Salley was released on 10 May and immediately admitted to hospital, 
suffering from a fever induced by temporarily untreated diabetes 
(Wickrematunge, 2013). Civil society activists highlighted the hypocrisy of the 
episode, comparing the treatment of Azath Salley with the impunity allowed 
to the BBS in inciting and actively participating in racially charged violence 
(Wickrematunge, 2013). Civil society actors called on the Rajapaksa 
government to openly condemn the divisive discourse and activities of the 
BBS, to reassure the citizenry of their equal status under the law and the 
government’s obligation to ensure their security (Dhanapala and 
Goonesekere, 2013). Instead, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa has been seen to actively 
support the BBC. He was a chief guest at a BBS seminar in 2013, where he 
defended the group’s public profile: 
 
“The venerable monks always came forward to protect our country, 
race, religion and culture. This effort is to bring them to a correct 
course, not to spread hatred” (Rajapaksa, G., 2013).  
 
 
1.12 Sinhala-Buddhist Extremism in the Ruling Coalition 
 
In 2008, a controversial politician named Wimal Weerawansa was “ousted” 
from the JVP and formed a breakaway faction named Jathika Nidahas 
Peramuna, translated as the National Freedom Front (NFF) (Reddy, 2008). 
Weerawansa left the JVP with nine other party members, criticising the inner 
democracy of the party, the failure to fulfil the “real concerns of the nation”, 
and collusion with the UNP – an enemy of the JVP since the UNP 
government’s violent suppression of the JVP uprisings of 1971 and 1988 to 
1989. One interviewee stated that Weerawansa had, in fact, become “too 
chauvinistic” and was expelled from the party for this reason (LG, 2012). The 
NFF sought and received the blessings of senior Buddhist monks (BBC 
Sinhala, 2008), drawing heavily on this legitimation to enhance Weerawansa’s 
fierce, hard-line Sinhala-Buddhist reputation. The NFF joined the ruling 
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coalition, in line with the advice reportedly received from the monks, and 
supported the final military drive against the LTTE. Presumably aware of the 
emotive inferences, the NFF began its political activities on 14 May 2008, the 
anniversary of two important events. On this day in 1985, the LTTE attacked a 
pilgrimage at Anuradhapura’s Jaya Sri Maha Bodhi – a historical tree thought 
to be the Southern branch of the tree under which the Buddha gained 
enlightenment and therefore a sacred Sinhala-Buddhist place. Crucially, the 
Jaya Siri Maha Bodhi is believed to safeguard the sovereignty and the 
territorial integrity of Sri Lanka (MOD, 2008). Drawing on the memory of this 
attack in all its symbolism, this choice of date heralded the party’s position 
and objectives. 146 pilgrims were killed on the day of the LTTE attack. In 
1965, also, May 14th saw the formation on the JVP. The NFF suggests that the 
new party has assumed the true political role of the JVP, and created “a new 
patriotic path” (Weerawansa, quoted in BBC Sinhala, 2008). 
 
The NFF’s entrance to the ruling coalition has contributed to the shift towards 
extremist nationalism. His stance has been vocal rejection of investigations 
into the End by the UN, promoting popular defence of the “war hero” 
Rajapaksa government and military leaders. Weeramsa has, since the End, 
stirred up “patriotic” sentiments by framing the achievement of resolutions 
“against” Sri Lanka in the Human Rights Council as a “US-LTTE” conspiracy 
(Sunday Leader, 2012). Though he often draws ridicule, Weerawansa 
dominates the media with his theatrics and dramatic statements. In 2010, he 
and other members of the NFF led a protest outside the UN office in 
Colombo, threatening to hold the staff hostage in response to the 
announcement that Ban Ki-Moon, the UN Secretary-General, had appointed a 
three-member panel to investigate allegations of mass atrocity at the End 
(Groundviews, 2010). Weerawansa and a handful of other NFF party members 
began a “fast unto the death”, demanding the “withdrawal of the illegally 
constituted so called expert panel formed with the malicious intention of 
tarnishing the image of Sri Lanka” (quoted in Rajasingham, 2010). Performing 
their patriotism and demonstrating their credentials as “sons of the soil” the 
NFF members used their bodies as political tools and achieved huge media 
coverage (Rajasingham, 2010). In a highly publicised performance of 
compassion, President Rajapaksa attended the hunger strike on the third day 
and counselled Weerawansa to end the protest. Photographs widely 
distributed by the media show a gracious and gentle President kneeling over 
Weerawansa, who lies connected to an intravenous drip.27 With the help of 
                                                        
27 See Wickremasekara (2010) for photograph. 
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Weerawansa’s beautiful young daughter, President Rajapaksa tips some 
water into Weerawansa’s mouth, potentially saving his life in the face of 
warnings from a physician (Wickremasekara, 2010; The Hindu, 2010). In this 
“high drama”, (LG, 2012) the father of the nation becomes the saviour of the 
patriot, urging him to live another day for his daughter and for the 
“Motherland.” A Buddhist monk can be seen in the background, presiding 
over this public ceremony of patriotism. 
 
According to a Colombo-based Tamil politician, there is a “hierarchy of 
extremism in government” (MG, 2012). The extremists are monks within the 
JHU – particularly the leader, Patali Champika Ranawaka – and other 
outspoken Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists such as Wimal Weerawansa. These 
voices are representative of a small section of the political establishment but 
are projected disproportionately in the nationalist media (MG, 2012). The 
influence of these “elements” on discourse has been substantial, heightening 
the latent chauvinism in Sinhala society. Relying on Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalism as a populist tool has meant displaying commitment to that 
ideology to compete with politicians appealing to the same electorate on the 
same platform; shaping the ethnic politicking and “ethnic outbidding” 
between Sinhalese parties that continues to this day (DeVotta, 2003; Imtiyaz, 
2013). Timur Kuran (1998) coined the term a “reputational cascade” of 
ethnification. 28  The process, for Kuran, involves a realignment of societal 
norms due to competition between individuals to appear more adherent to 
tradition, or more committed to a political or ideological goal. Kuran argues 
that behaviour framed as ethnically meaningful can become necessary for 
social acceptance and pressure to conform to the new level of ethnic 
behaviour emerges, resulting in increased “ethnic” activity. Societal norms, he 
contends, are easily altered in this manner and ethnicisation on a large scale 
can be the result. This can lead to enhanced cleavages of difference between 
groups and the likelihood of tension and violence. Leadership is extremely 
important within this process, as ethnic entrepreneurs propel social norms 
towards amplified levels of ethnic identification. The associated “reputational 
cascade” described by Kuran (1998) stands to be instrumentalised by 
politicians and activists. The motivation for this ethnicisation is often 
inherently political and deliberately employed to garner support from the 
group in question: to actively create cohesion and to enhance ideological 
commitment. The process appeals to the individual’s self-understanding, the 
part that accounts for and refines a sense of belonging and identification with 
                                                        
28 This term is synonymous to ethnicisation.  
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his or her reference group (Dag Tjaden, 2012). Ethnic identity has been used 
in Sri Lanka as “a productive instrument to win elections” (JU, 2012). Daniel 
(1996: 61) argues that politicians use “modes of being” performatively: rituals 
that ordered moral life in the past are enacted in the service of political 
capital. The mainstream account of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism accepts that 
a process of elite-led instrumentalisation of ethnic identity has “Sinhalised” 
the character of the state (Rampton, 2011: 254; De Votta, 2004; Stokke, 1998). 
Stringent competition for political gain within the Sinhalese community and 
an urge to throw off the remnants of colonialism prompted this process in 
post-independence Sri Lanka. Mahinda Rajapaksa has marketed himself as a 
determined Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalist and a “man of the people” with great 
success (LG, 2012). 
 
The tactic of the Rajapaksas has been to centralise power in their ruling UFPA 
coalition, encouraging political parties to join them and attracting politicians 
from other parties. The Sinhala-Buddhist stance adopted by the government 
has signalled to careerist politicians that:  
 
“…if you have crossed over to the government, you have to continually keep 
pledging your allegiance. And the language you use to do it with is to be more 
racist than perhaps the government is” (SH, 2012).  
 
A Sinhalese media activist argued that within the competitive political 
system, many politicians: 
 
“…are just out to survive and would say things not necessarily because they 
believe in them but because it is important for them to be seen to be saying 
those things by those who are actually wielding the power in government. So 
one tries to out-do the other” (SH, 2012).  
 
The result is a government premised on performances of Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalism and insensitivity towards minority communities in Sri Lanka. 
Other interviewees contest this notion of “performance”, arguing that the 
coalition assembled by the Rajapaksa government is one “gelled together 
through this ideology of Sinhala supremacism”, gaining coherence and strength 
from this “ideology of national unification” (JU, 2012). The hegemony achieved 
on the basis of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism cannot be explained only by 
careerism. The Rajapaksas’ formation of a coalition was successful because it 
spoke to latent Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist inclinations in society. As 
Rampton states, the hegemonisation of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism means, 
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“it is no longer solely elites who share this social imaginary of Sri Lankan 
space as Sinhala-Buddhist or the state vehicle which drives nationalism” 
(2011: 254). He astutely notes that the populist effect of nationalism 
“frequently overflows its elite genesis” and that conceptions of Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalism are reproduced across diverse sites and social strata 
(2011: 256).29 The performance underway was more systemic: a discursive 
national identity process. The militaristic political campaign of Mahinda 
Rajapaksa and his brothers drew on “mass ritual discourse” (Dag Tjaden, 
2012) to reinvigorate the Sinhala nation’s collective identity and reinforce 
individual identification with the Sinhala-Buddhist nation.  
 
 
1.13 Mass Ritual Discourse 
 
Paul Gilroy (2000: 151-2) argues that there is a continuity between 
contemporary political culture and the aestheticisation and theatricality of 
politics of Fascist, totalitarian regimes. Performances of power are 
characterised by parades, flags, iconography and the branding and marketing 
of political figures by media specialists, political enterprises that both 
appropriate and influence culture and nationalisms (Guss, 2000). 
Interrogating the way in which a particular image of the nation is generated, 
Dag Tjaden’s (2012) ‘toolbox typology’ of mass ritual discourse is instructive. 
Dag Tjaden discusses four strategies of discursive control that are relevant in 
Sri Lanka: power and popularity; pride of leadership; realignment with 
tradition; and active society. These will be discussed in turn, to illustrate the 
discursive tactics underpinning the success of the Rajapaksa regime, both 
militarily and in terms of popularity. The mass ritual discourse formulated by 
the Rajapaksas (and by the Public Relations companies involved) is designed 
to ensure the public embrace of a highly militarised, state-centric national 
security paradigm (Rajasingham-Senanayake, 2009a). Mass rituals have been 
introduced with great fervour since the End, such as Victory Day, but the 
mass media has also provided an essential platform for public engagement, 
ideological dissemination and discursive production. It is worth noting that 
the process of “ethnic outbidding” that enhanced Sinhala nationalist zeal over 
the years of war undermined attempts to reach a political solution with the 
                                                        
29 Rampton’s analysis notes that the genesis of hegemony is difficult to establish and its breadth 
cannot be quantitatively established. He acknowledges that the power and effect of the state’s 
ideological apparatuses is impossible to quantify and that hegemonic ideas and practices on 
nationhood and ethnicity may not be hegemony at all but could be explained by other local 
motivations that “become encoded in or use the cover of the logic of ethnic discourse” (2011: 
262; Fearon and Laitin, 2000). 
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LTTE, for example the PA government’s Devolution Bill in 2000, under 
President Kumaratunga and the 2002-2004 Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) led by 
Ranil Wickremasinghe’s UNP (Rampton, 2011; DeVotta, 2003).  From election 
in 2005 to the End, the discursive tools employed by the Rajapaksa regime in 
advertising campaigns, election messaging and sites of popular culture 
delivered public support for a military solution. The nationalist platform 
underpinned rejection of the “liberal peace” framework and justified return to 
militarism (Rampton, 2011: 268). Post-war, the paradigm persists as a 
mechanism of power consolidation under the Rajapaksa brothers. Their 
political project of nation-building is one tightly tied to militarism.  
 
- Power and Popularity 
 
For Dag Tjaden (2012: 60), mass parades and public events celebrating the 
leadership’s military capabilities are a display of strength, order, and 
discipline. At such events, the “national muscle is ﬂexed proudly, and the 
public cheers in admiration and pride”. Additionally, consistent discursive 
support for the military has a similar effect. In Sri Lankan popular, culture 
militarism is entrenched, regular media reports herald military successes 
packaged in rhetoric of soldiers’ bravery and strategic genius of the military 
and political leadership. The display of military strength is important, as is 
“the general popularity of the forces as a representative of a strong nation” 
(2012: 60). Consequently, Dag Tjaden argues, “the image of military potency 
and popularity becomes a trait of the nation itself” (2012: 60). Neloufer de 
Mel’s (2007) book Militarising Sri Lanka describes the process by which 
popular culture in Sri Lanka has been saturated with military signifiers and 
favourable propaganda about the state military.  
 
In the year 2000, the dissemination of propaganda was revolutionised and 
reconstituted by the state’s recruitment of a PR agency named Leo Burnett 
Solutions Inc., a Sri Lankan branch of the Leo Burnett Worldwide advertising 
company (de Mel, 2007: 72). The company’s design team created military 
recruitment advertisements to salvage the image of life in the military 
following a period of military defeat, gruesome stories of the horrors of war, 
allegations of corruption amongst high army officials and the resultant 
desertions and depletion in military recruits. Drawing on the themes of 
“camaraderie” and “challenge”, Leo Burnett produced a campaign named 
Sinha Patawunge Paradeesiya (Lion Cubs Paradise) that emphasised the 
positive aspects of military life rather than “the horror and destruction of 
war” (de Mel, 2007: 72-3). The slogan of the People’s Alliance government that 
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preceded Rajapaksa’s SLFP presidency was “War for Peace” and during the 
2002-2004 ceasefire, the concept of peace itself was marketed by the 
advertising industry in “highly charged militaristic language” (de Mel, 2007: 
85). Conditions were primed, following the collapse of the peace process, for 
Rajapaksa’ presidential campaign, the rejection of the liberal peace framework 
as an internationalised effort unsuited to the Sinhala state, and leadership of 
the final military push against the LTTE.  
 
The 2007 advertising campaign employed by the Rajapaksa government to re-
brand military recruitment, in preparation for the final military operation, 
spoke directly to the militarisation of society. Neloufer de Mel reminds us that 
militarisation as a process generally occurs when a country’s military seeks 
political domination. Another scenario can also amount to militarisation: 
when civilian leaders put military powers to civil use “to save the nation” or 
to solve political problems (de Mel, 2007: 23). Under Rajapaksa’s presidency, 
the military became the institution bearing responsibility for ending the war, 
usurping the role of the political establishment and rendering political 
engagement and negotiations obsolete. This is problematic because of the 
inherently ethnicised nature of the military as a predominately Sinhalese 
force, occupying an “adversarial, ethnically defined role vis-à-vis Tamil 
dissent” (de Mel, 2007: 61). Mahinda Rajapksa assumed his role as leader of 
the Sinhalese, realising that Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism was his route to 
success and historical greatness. The defeat of the Tamil separatist threat 
could be achieved militarily, but this would require the support of the wider 
population, the entire establishment and international actors. The ideological 
tool available was the long-desired reclamation of the Sinhala-Buddhist 
nation. The most overt indication of the militarisation of society – the fact that 
every Sri Lankan in the south has a family member in the services or an 
alternate, close connection to the military – was exploited in the military 
recruitment drive for the final phase of the war.  The military’s campaign was 
designed by Sri Lankan advertising agency Triad. The organisation 
endeavoured to “spark a feeling of belonging and closeness” to the military 
(Triad, 2013). Under the slogan Api Wenuwen Api, translated as “We for 
Ourselves”, or “Be Together For All,” the recruitment drive exceeded 
recruitment targets for the military, the navy and the police force (the “Tri-
Service”). The slogan speaks to the militarisation of the entire society, an 
“insight” capitalised upon to emphasise the cooperation necessary between 
the state security services, civilians and corporations. Stating that military 
losses and the breakdown of the ceasefire were “dragging the hopes and 
 70 
morale of an entire nation down”, Triad illustrated that investment was 
required from the “entire nation” to win the war (Triad, 2013).  
 
Triad’s television advertisement and series of posters emphasised the array of 
roles played by the security services and naturalised the integration of the 
services into society. Triad’s online case study of the Sri Lankan forces 
“product” evoked images of downhearted soldiers laden with heavy gear, 
rained upon and muddy in retreat, as the “before” in the company’s 
marketing strategy. To create an “emotional hook”, the company decided to 
portray the soldier as “an endearing human being” in their television 
advertisement, living a life “like all other Sri Lankans” (Triad, 2013). 
Featuring actual service members, the advertisement includes video footage 
of male and female soldiers, Navy and police officers in a variety of 
communal scenarios: playing and engaging in affectionate conversation with 
children; guiding an old lady in a sari; sitting cross-legged and sharing food 
with a group of Muslim men; kneeling at the feet of Buddhist worshippers; 
being welcomed home by their families and being fed by their mothers. A 
solider kicks a football with children despite the burdensome bag on his 
shoulder, denoting the weight of responsibility that he wears with ease. A 
soldier dressed in camouflage approaches a woman sitting on a train. He 
stands above her with a stern expression and places his hand on her shoulder. 
Initially startled, her expression breaks into an open smile of recognition and 
she stands to embrace him. In this simple scenario, the advertisement conveys 
to the viewer that the anxious response often prompted by the uniform is 
misguided. The soldier is, in fact, “one of us.” This is the “creative idea” 
behind the advertisement, one that proved highly effective (Triad, 2013). The 
only difference between the soldier and the civilian is that of “service”: 
“Service to the nation. Service to all Sri Lankans” (Triad, 2013). These scenes 
were far from the horror and reality of warfare and were palatable to families. 
The advertisement effectively altered the reputation of the military and its 
members. Although no longer explicitly ethnicised like Leo Burnett’s “Lion 
Cubs” campaign, in the South its audience is the same: the primarily 
Sinhalese rural community. The “huge posters of army or navy personnel” were 
replete with tokenism for LG (2012), who described the concerted effort to 
attract the widest possible support base. They were images of soldiers 
“holding babies, chatting around a small camp fire with village people who would 
include a Muslim and a Tamil” (LG, 2012). 
 
The advertisement was regularly played on television and posters at large 
holding sites throughout the country carried slogans and still images from the 
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advertisement (LG, 2012; Triad, 2013). T-shirts, “special team” recruitment 
booths and Api Wenuwen Api calendars guaranteed regular interaction with 
the messages implicit in the slogan and images (Triad, 2013). So effective and 
popular were the television adverts that the Api Wenuwen Api campaign 
created by Triad was voted the “number 1 advertisement in the minds of Sri 
Lankans” at the Sri Lanka Institute of Media Nielsen People's Awards 2007 
and 2008 (Sunday Observer, 2008; Triad, 2013). A Triad employee declared in 
his acceptance speech that the award “is proof of the patriotism and national-
mindedness of Sri Lankans from all walks of life”, a conviction brought to the 
surface and made palpable by the campaign (quoted in Sunday Observer, 
2008). The Rajapaksa government also knew the value of personal interaction. 
A political scientist stated that the armed forces were strategically sent to visit 
villages in the south: “soldiers kissed people and ate with them” (PK, 2012). 
 
The recruitment drive took place alongside a campaign to attract deserters 
back to the ranks of the armed forces. In January 2007, media coverage quoted 
military spokesman Brigadier Prasad Samarasinghe offering a general 
amnesty to deserters, requesting that they re-join the army amid the “new 
chapter of civil war against Tamil Tiger rebels” and therefore avoid the 
penalties associated with desertion, including demotion and incarceration 
(BdNews24, 2009). Samarasinghe invited deserters absent from the military 
since 2003 or later (amounting to 17,000 individuals) to apply for their old 
positions “to refresh their training”, considered by the military to be easier 
than training new recruits (BdNews24, 2009). As mentioned in Triad’s “case 
study” of the Api Venuven Api brief and campaign, desertions were high amid 
a period of perceived defeat and hopelessness. The effort to re-energise the 
military and public support for the military, both material and moral, 
expanded into society in other forms. According to LG: 
 
“They encouraged civilians village societies, welfare societies and that kind of 
thing, or led by the temple monk, they encouraged elders and fit young men to 
donate blood for the soldiers. That was a very popular thing…to go and donate 
blood to the army. And Buddhist monks were in the forefront of that kind of 
thing” (LG, 2012). 
 
Media campaigns and advertising strategies were crucial in gaining popular 
support for the government to pursue the End. The conception of the Sri 
Lankan state as Sinhala-Buddhist in nature and necessarily unitary in 
structure was nurtured by the Rajapaksa regime; Mahinda ran for election on 
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this basis, as well as promising a military solution to the conflict (Mahinda 
Chinthana, 2005).  
 
The president’s brother, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, joined the armed forces as a 
career soldier in 1971 and spent over two decades in service. He holds a 
Master’s degree in Defence Studies from the University of Madras, India, and 
rose to the rank of Commanding Officer of the First Battalion, Gajaba 
Regiment before migrating to America (Ranjith Perera, 2011: 102). When 
Mahinda was elected, ‘Gota’ returned and was appointed by his brother to 
the position of Secretary of Defence. There he acted as a “military energiser” 
who “gave the military everything they wanted” (LG, 2012). He oversaw huge 
military expansion, appointed military commanders with battlefield 
experience, purchased new weaponry and instituted an accelerated 
recruitment drive that increased the numerical strength of the military by 30 
per cent (Ranjith Perera, 2011: 105). The Commander of the Air Force, Roshan 
Goonetileke (2011: 109) recalled: “whatever we ask, his approval has come 
quickly.” Gotabhaya was determined to succeed, having “witnessed for 
himself the frustration and the drop in morale of the Security Forces when 
they were stopped on the road to final victory in 1987, due to pressure from 
external forces” (Ranjith Perera, 2011: 105-6). The restoration of morale was 
identified by Gotabhaya as a crucial component of military victory and the 
Api Wenuwen Api campaign followed: a fundraising drive targeting domestic 
audiences, the corporate sector and expatriate businesses and communities, 
calling for contributions towards building homes for “those fighting for our 
motherland” (Triad, 2013). A collaboration between the Ministry of Defence 
and the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, the Api Wenuwen Api Fund aims to build 
50,000 houses for serving Tri-Service personnel.  
 
Gotabhaya realised the importance of discursive control and established the 
MOD website, which was intended to “defeat media campaigns to belittle the 
military victories and create misconceptions” (Ranjith Perera, 2011: 107). The 
brothers achieved public support for the war. According to Admiral 
Wasantha Karannagoda, Commander of the Sri Lankan Navy (2011: 109), 
“[n]ever in the history of this war…have we received such public support. 
His excellency the President and Secretary Defence motivated and galvanized 
the public and ensured their overwhelming support for us.” The ideological 
coherence garnered in the Rajapaksas’ time in power made it possible to win 
the war without internal critique or hesitance. One Sinhalese academic 
interviewee expanded on this concept, emphasising the collusion of the entire 
establishment in this final military assault: 
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“Winning of the war required a certain kind of an ideological potential. Not 
only for the ruling party, not only for the ruling family but also for the whole 
broad coalition that was put together to win the war. The military, the 
judiciary, the bureaucracy, the media, the intelligentsia, the Buddhist monks, 
the Catholic priests…everyone. There was a huge coalition. And that coalition 
was gelled together through this ideology of Sinhala supremacism” (JU, 2012). 
 
Neloufer de Mel (2007: 83) would add to this coalition the involvement of the 
corporate sector, for whom “a political solution to the conflict did not carry 
much influence” as the trade in arms, transport and military supplies and 
other military-related activities was intertwined with advertising and 
sponsorship of banks, motor companies and other businesses. The co-
dependency of the militarisation of society and the capitalist economy 
supported the discourse of military necessity to end the war. The power 
granted to the Rajapaksa government to pursue a military solution was 
entirely connected to the popularity of the military and the personal 
popularity of the brothers. Rampton explains this popularity by developing a 
concept of hegemony that acknowledges theories of elite instrumentalism of 
nationalism but also emphasises that the Rajapaksas’ ascendancy to power 
was underpinned by discursive and ideological support. Rajapaksa is “primus 
inter pares in the pursuit of a conception of a Sinhalese nation” (Rampton, 
2011: 268). He speaks to the hegemonic nationalism in Sinhala society because 
he is a product of that hegemony. In his politics, he “assumed the mantle of 
nationalist legitimacy” in faithfulness to Sinhala nationalist rhetoric and 
militarism at a time when parties adhering to the liberal peace were 
discredited (Rampton, 2011: 264). Rajapaksa’s rule is defined by a resurgence 
in Sinhala nationalist discourse and consolidation of power on that basis.  
 
In terms of mass ritual, the date of the LTTE’s defeat is now celebrated 
annually as “National Victory Day”, a celebration intimately connected to 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism. The fourth annual Victory Day, for example, 
was marked by a “grand ceremony” in central Colombo (MOD, 2013). The 
2013 “Victory Parade” saw the various branches of the state forces march 
along Galle Face Green, demonstrating numerical strength, discipline and 
order. Mahinda Rajapaksa and the watching crowd applauded from the 
shaded spectators area. Open-backed trucks towed heavy weaponry and 
surveillance drones through the streets, showcasing the country’s military 
force and technological advancement. Army helicopters and skydivers 
dominated the sky, proudly displaying the Sri Lankan flag. Navy boats tore 
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along the seafront. The state forces demonstrated ownership of the land, sea 
and air, united under the Sri Lankan flag. The gathered crowd observed two 
minutes of silence in memory of the 24,000 security forces personnel “who 
paid the supreme sacrifice in safeguarding the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of the country” (MOD, 2013). Soldiers disabled in the course of 
duty partook in the parade in their wheelchairs. In his Victory Day speech, 
President Rajapaksa stated that the entire world asked that Sri Lanka “give 
into the terrorists” at the End. The Government instead “chose to trust in the 
strength and courage of the country's youth” (Rajapaksa, quoted in MOD, 
2013). The forces marching in the parade, celebrating the victory of the nation, 
“actively took part in the final stages of the war against terrorism” (MOD, 
2013). Emphasising the state’s magnanimity towards the captured, “brutal” 
LTTE leaders, President Rajapaksa declared that they “had committed 
enough wrongdoings to be sent to the gallows, but the forgiveness afforded to 
them will not be received in anywhere else” (quoted in MOD, 2013). Not only 
is the state strong and united, he announced, it is gracious in victory, 
benevolent towards former enemies. The state is presented in this mass ritual 
discourse as possessing both moral and military strength, in contrast to the 
actions of the international community and the Tamil diaspora, who “did not 
come forward to aid the country's Tamil people” after the End (MOD, 2013). 
 
 - Pride of Leadership and Re-alignment with Tradition 
 
Dag Tjaden (2012) describes mass rituals presided over by leaders who are 
publicly and internationally well respected, rituals defined by the collective 
cherishment of the rich tradition of the nation and a realignment with 
national values. The Rajapaksa brothers know the value of performativity, 
staging Sri Lankan identity as leaders of the nation and thus both adhering to 
and transforming the meaning of that identity. In public appearances and 
ceremonies, the Rajapaksas refer to their Sinhala-Buddhist credentials, their 
“war hero” status and remind the population of the “meaningful event” that 
required and gave rise to a re-staging of national, Sinhala-Buddhist identity: 
the End. Though identified as mutually exclusive themes by Dag Tjaden, the 
pride of leadership cultivated in Sri Lanka is entirely connected to the 
hegemonic Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist culture and tradition that 
encompasses “tradition” in the south of the island. The pride invested in the 
Rajapaksas is inseparable from the reassertion of Sinhala-Buddhist supremacy 
that enabled the defeat of the LTTE, an ideology that has strengthened, 
proliferated and gained institutional approval in the post-conflict period.  
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The president’s personal popularity – termed “public adoration” by AS (2012), 
a UN staff member, was a key factor in bringing about the End. Asked to 
explain his popularity, civil society and media interviewees listed his 
affability, shrewdness, determination populism, perceived sincerity and 
photogenic appearance (JP, PK, MS, SH, LG, 2012). He is experienced, having 
been in politics for 40 years, and worked as a human rights lawyer before 
entering politics. During the years of terror in the late 1980s, as the UNP 
government forcefully countered the JVP uprising, Mahinda – as he is known 
in colloquial conversation – collected documentation on state-perpetrated 
abuses of human rights and attempted to bring this evidence to the UN 
Human Rights Council in Geneva. He was prevented from making the 
journey and the documents were confiscated (LG, VV, 2012). Several 
interviewees repeated this moment in his history, primarily as an ironic 
comparison to the regime over which he now presides, but also in the context 
of explaining his popularity. A background in human rights advocacy is a 
useful tool of denial, suggesting that Mahinda’s moral compass would not 
allow atrocities to occur under his purview. Particularly on the campaign trail 
and on the occasion of official public visits and events, as previously 
mentioned, Mahinda presents himself as “a man of the people” (LG, 2012). He 
creates an affinity with the rural Sinhala population through his clothing and 
footwear, open smile and jovial demeanour. In addition to this attractive 
public persona, Mahinda’s determined commitment to a military solution in 
pursuit of a unitary state structure and refusal to compromise with the 
“terrorists” indicated his Sinhala-Buddhist credentials and earned the support 
of the Sinhala-Buddhist establishment. A Jaffna-based academic noted his 
likeability and efforts to woo the Tamil population: “Mahinda Rajapaksa speaks 
nicely, he speaks in Tamil, but in practice is very poor [on Tamil issues]” (PSJ, 2012). 
 
The President’s personal qualities, noted by Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist, 
Media Consultant of the Ministry of Cultural Affairs and National Heritage 
Nihal P. Jayathunga (2010), are thought to include “patience, determination, 
equanimity, courage, valor, amiability and simplicity. They are of course 
Buddhist values.” His Sinhala-Buddhist credentials are recognised by the 
population; he performs in accordance with this identity, which is essential 
for majoritarian political success. Mahinda’s choice of dress is strategic and 
symbolic. While opposition leader Ranil Wickremasinghe is never seen in a 
sarong, Mahinda wears traditional dress and slippers, not shoes. 30 His white 
kurta and claret scarf are instantly recognisable in a crowd, particularly 
                                                        
30 “Slippers” is the local term for flip-flops – open shoes.  
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striking at meetings of world leaders clad in suits and dull colours. Brubaker 
and Laitin (1995) might describe this as a purposeful tactic of humiliation 
aimed at his domestic political opponents, in order to improve Mahinda’s 
image comparably. His hands are regularly clasped at his heart in a gesture of 
religious faith and gratitude and his speeches consistently close with a 
blessing, evoking the “noble Triple Gem”.  
 
Mahinda Rajapaksa contested the presidency in 2005 on a platform of “an 
undivided country, a national consensus and an honourable peace” (Mahinda 
Chinthana, 2005). As Imtiyaz (2013: 9) notes, “Sri Lanka’s fifth Presidential 
elections…provided a means to reinforce the tradition that linked the state 
with religion. Politicisation of Buddhism was one of the key agendas of the 
ruling UPFA in a bid to outmanoeuvre the UNP, which presented liberal 
agendas including proposed peace talks with the Tamil Tigers”. Mahinda 
praised Buddhist history, “waved flags”, promised to defeat the LTTE 
militarily, and blamed the West, particularly Norway, for the country’s 
current peace crisis (2013: 9). With an affirmed uncompromising stance on 
state sovereignty, territorial integrity and the unitary state structure, Mahinda 
criticised the negotiations that the preceding UNP government allowed 
external parties to “foist” upon the country (Mahinda Chinthana, 2005: 31). 
Rajapaksa presented himself as a man who cherished the country’s traditions 
and would oversee the reestablishment of national identity in a unitary state. 
A political agreement reached with the JVP and the JHU during his election 
campaign secured the support of the parties and assured his election over the 
UNP opposition candidate, Ranil Wickremasinghe (Imtiyaz, 2013: 4).31 This 
pact, despite his public rhetoric of seeking peace through “discussions”, 
indicated a renunciation of the peace process, even when viewed through the 
prism of electoral opportunism, as those parties were vehemently committed 
to militarism over the negotiations framework provided by the liberal peace. 
Drawing on Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist support for what a Tamil politician 
termed “his victory journey” (MG, 2012) and appealing to a primarily rural 
Sinhalese electoral base, his mobilisation strategy, as summarised by a 
Sinhalese sociologist, was to declare: “We have to finish this. We cannot leave it 
for another generation” (SHC, 2012). The opening caption of the Mahinda 
Chinthana, his 2005 Presidential Manifesto, reads:  
 
“This earth and its vegetation is yours. But they should be protected 
not only for your benefit but also for the benefit of future generations. 
                                                        
31 See Senaratne (2005) and BBC Sinhala (2005).   
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A ruler is only a temporary trustee and not an owner of your children’s 
heritage.” 
 
This quotation draws on Sinhalese-Buddhist defensive territorial nationalism 
and evokes the romanticised image of the rural Sinhala peasant as 
embodiment of this nationalism (Brow, 1988). Choosing the sub-title “Victory 
for Sri Lanka” for his manifesto, Rajapaksa’s intention to triumph militarily 
over the LTTE enhances the sub-text: he pledged to salvage the unitary state 
of Sri Lanka for the benefit of the Sinhalese people. His audience was 
extremely susceptible to this message, as the Sri Lankan army’s major 
recruitment base is the Sinhalese village in the South (Gamburd, 2004; SHC, 
2012;). Tired of sending their children to the front lines and receptive to the 
rhetoric of “finishing” the war, Rajapaksa “always had public support for a 
military push” (AS, 2012). There was a gradual shift from "war weariness" to 
"peace weariness" as the population grew increasingly cynical of the utility of 
negotiations with the LTTE and both sides perceived the other to be 
intransigent (Goodhand et al., 2005: 64; SHC, 2012). The brothers, along with 
General Sareth Fonseka, were portrayed in the media as strong, powerful 
men, taking tough decisions on behalf of the nation and “showing the political 
will necessary to take this war through” (SB, 2012). 32  Previous governments 
preferred to emphasise diplomacy and adherence to internationally accepted 
conflict resolution strategies, militarily attempting to stem the LTTE 
insurgency. The Rajapaksas, however, were “more gung-ho chauvinist” and 
knew the value of a “great victory” in terms of consolidation of power (LG, 
KG, 2012). Mahinda’s supporters at the End – the rural Sinhalese electorate 
and the Sinhala-Buddhist establishment – were not concerned about his 
methods in winning the war, a Sinhalese sociologist attested in interview 
(SHC, 2012). 
 
To mark the death of Prabhakaran, a “Kiribulten” (oil cake) celebratory 
ceremony was organised by ministers, Buddhist monks and government 
officials (MSP, 2012). The Sri Lankan state’s Buddhist identity was asserted in 
this ritualistic act, signalling the defeat of the separatist threat and the 
reclamation of territorial control by the Sinhalese. Mahinda’s connection to 
the Buddhist establishment was solidified as he participated in this official 
                                                        
32 The post-war downfall of Sareth Fonseka is a fascinating example of political “high drama” in 
Sri Lanka (LG, 2012). Described as a “black box” (MSP, 2012) of information regarding the End 
and the only opposition figure with a “hero” status to match that of Mahinda, he was perceived as 
politically dangerous following a split with the Rajapaksa brothers and was incarcerated on 
charges of treason on the basis of pursuing politics while in military service. See Haviland (2012). 
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ceremony. A Sinhala-Buddhist academic challenged this behaviour in light of 
Buddhist principles. MSP (2012) echoed Stanley Tambiah (1992), saying that 
the “end of war can be celebrated but the death of a leader…Death should not be 
celebrated, especially under Buddhism. It is cannibal behaviour, Buddhism betrayed.” 
Mahinda now oversees the annual “National Victory Day” described above, a 
celebration intimately connected to Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism and one 
that reaffirms his status as leader of the Sinhalese. Imtiyaz (2013: 11) names 
Mahinda as “the brutal face of Sinhalese hegemony”. 
 
A political economist described a pattern of politicians seeking a legitimising 
link with the past kingdoms, to enhance their Sinhala-Buddhist credentials 
with monarchic genealogy (SBP, 2012). For politicians from Kandy, this can be 
quite easy, as families hailing from this region have a rich history of elitism 
related to the last existing kingdom in Sri Lanka.33 Politicians hailing from 
outside this region are forced to rely solely on their visible commitment to 
Buddhism, marketing Sinhala-Buddhist identity through religion alone (SBP, 
2012). Mahinda Rajapaksa sought this legitimisation in an alternative way. 
Though he hails from a political family, elite political status was not a simple 
acquisition for a human rights lawyer from the karava fishing caste. His 
marketing strategy relied instead on an act as legitimation: the defeat of the 
LTTE. His promise to militarily destroy the LTTE, and his success in this 
historic endeavour, was elevated to an accomplishment of Sinhala-Buddhist 
destiny and equated to the mytho-history of King Dutugemunu (SBP, 2012). 
Mahinda Rajapaksa is regarded as a king by Sinhala-Buddhists and he courts 
this perception in his campaigns and personal branding. After the 2010 
presidential election, there were posters about the “Maharajanoh” (the king), 
who is hailed as the modern saviour of the Sinhalese-Buddhist land and 
people (PNB, JP, LG, PS, 2012). This act also invites and demands flawless 
loyalty from the population, as a UN staff member mused: “that is probably one 
reason why the people still support the government, because they probably feel ‘we 
still have to because they did this great thing’” (AS, 2012). 
 
The Rajapaksas relied on the militarisation of society and drew on an overt 
reassertion of hegemonic Sinhala-Buddhist ideals to forge the ideological 
coherence needed to gain public support to win the war by military means. 
The regime’s success in this endeavour has guaranteed enormous political 
popularity and power. By harnessing Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism in this 
                                                        
33 Sri Lanka’s traditional political families such as the Bandaranaikes and the Jayawardenes drew 
on their connection with the kingdoms of the past, on a royal genealogy (SBP, 2012). 
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powerful form, they are now at the mercy of the extremism that they 
promoted. Given the hard-line Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinist stance adopted by 
Mahinda since his election, interviewees concurred that implementing 
political reforms that could be perceived as a threat to that ideology – such as 
devolution of power to the North and East – would be met with fierce 
resistance from extremist forces. Any concessions on political power would 
“let down people so badly that they would be so angry – some people, hard-line 
nationalists…Any Sinhalese leader who tries to reach out to the Tamils runs that 
risk” (JP, 2012).  A Colombo-based academic referred to the Mahinda 
Chinthana and its insistence on a unitary state structure: “it clearly says ‘the 
state is a unitary state’ – that is part of his nationalism” (MT, 2012). Having 
achieved power on this basis, Mahinda “cannot move away from that…he can’t 
step back. Whatever solution is to be found, it is in the unitary state” (MT, 2012). A 
political agreement with the Tamils would evoke “a serious reaction against it” 
from the Sinhala-Buddhist establishment (SHC, 2012) and would run counter 
to the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism that, under Mahinda, “has now reached its 
peak” (MT, 2012). The government will “play it safe” and adhere to the 
ideology that brought it to power (SHC, 2012).  
 
Immediately post-war, there was an opportunity for Mahinda “to initiate 
togetherness” (MSB, 2012) and his popularity could have proved a vehicle to 
deliver improved minority rights and state-Tamil relations: “He won the war, 
he was so popular…he was in the perfect position” (MSB, YO, 2012). His staunch 
Sinhala-Buddhist stance could have afforded him some space to improve 
relations with the Tamil population. “People knew he would safeguard majority 
rights. They would not have perceived a threat” (MSB, 2012). According to Tamil 
civil society figures, the Tamils also, who had turned against the LTTE in the 
final phase, “could have seen Mahinda as a hero” (YO, RF, ER, 2012). Instead, he 
guarantees his political security by using Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism as a 
vehicle for power, capitalising on the great “act” of finishing the war. A 
Sinhalese political scientist doubted that “any previous government did to the 
same extent that this government is doing. This government knows the power of the 
ideology and the power of the media” (JU, 2012).  
 
For MG, a Colombo-based Tamil politician, the president’s “misconception” is 
that he still needs the Sinhala-Buddhist establishment: 
 
“I can understand, logically, that during the war he needed these Sinhala-
Buddhist extremists….Now, after the end of the war, he claims to be building 
peace. So he should have a new team. But the mistake is, he is trying to use the 
same old team as during the war…” (MG, 2012). 
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This “misconception”, however, is consistent with the “strong mental frame” 
(MSB, 2012) of Sinhala-Buddhist ideology and complements the uncritical 
support attained by the government in the south by defeating “terrorism” and 
securing the Sinhala-Buddhist nation, something that no government has 
managed to do in thirty years (KG, AS, 2012). Consolidation of power under 
the Rajapaksa family maximises on the “Sinhala fear of Tamil separatism,” a 
Sinhala civil society activist noted, and devolution of power to the Tamil 
minority areas would both undermine the power base of the Sinhala-
Buddhist establishment and actually dilute the power the government holds 
over the Northern Province (JP, 2012). To prevent that dilution of power, the 
government tows the Sinhala-Buddhist line and undermines Tamil politicians 
as pro-LTTE, drawing Western imperialist attention to Sri Lanka. Mahinda 
reminds the population, in the wake of economic discontent, “mine are the only 
true facts and I saved you from the terrorists” (AS, 2012). In the electoral 
campaign for the Northern Province elections (21 September 2013), posters 
appeared on the walls of Jaffna asking, “Are you voting for the TNA? Are you 
ready to go back to war?” 34  “Pro-government forces” are suspected of 
disseminating the posters (Guruparan, 2013). Evident in this reductive 
rhetorical question is the systematic transformation of Tamil political 
aspirations to remnants of terrorist separatist ideology.  
 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism is defined by Sinhala-Buddhist insecurity and 
fear of intervention and decimation by external forces (DeVotta, 2007). 
Reliance on a strong leader who does not bow to intimidation is appealing on 
an island with a “third world mentality,” which considers itself surrounded by 
enemies (PS, 2012). A Sinhalese academic interviewee stated that the Sinhala-
Buddhist people are attracted to the government’s defiant stance vis-à-vis the 
international community, projected in the Sinhalese media (MSP, 2012). The 
government “shows one face to the country and another to the international 
community” (MPS, 2012). Similar to the last of the “themes of selective 
memory” identified by Dag Tjaden - validation – “pride of leadership” sees 
President Rajapaksa promoted in nationalistic discourse as a recognised and 
respected leader, both domestically and internationally. Sinhalese critics LG 
and SHC argued that Mahinda is presented in Sinhalese language discourse 
as a powerful player on the world stage, dominating the UN Security Council 
                                                        
34 Photographs of the posters were circulated on twitter. Available at: 
https://twitter.com/Sivakami_R/status/381042793629491201/photo/1 [Accessed 29 June 
2014]. 
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floor and forcefully rejecting external interference in his country’s affairs. 
Hosting the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) was 
an important affirmation of his position as a powerful player in world 
politics, despite human rights concerns repeatedly raised by media and world 
leaders in attendance. The state media reported only the success of the event 
(see for example, Daily News, 2013a). 
 
 - Active Society: Performing Patriotism 
 
Dag Tjaden’s (2012) final theme of mass ritual discourse refers to displays of 
national identity that call on citizens to participate actively in the community. 
For Sri Lanka’s Sinhala-Buddhists, this requires performances of patriotism. 
Increasingly, patriotism equates to loyalty of the regime in power and overt 
adherence to Sinhala-Buddhist ideology. Violence in defence of the nation-
state was considered more than admirable: it came to encompass a duty, 
especially in the wake of federalist calls in the late 1940s and 1950s, demands 
of separatism from the mid-1970s (Samaranayake, 1991; Samarasinghe, 1984; 
De Silva, 1997), and the outbreak of the violent separatist movement in the 
1970s (Abeysekara, 2001). The advent of the Tamil militant separatist 
movement contributed to the evolution of a form of defensive patriotism 
within the Sinhalese community that has become a major theme in discourse 
and social practice. It is intimately connected to what interviewees termed 
“Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism” (LG, 2012), “extremism” (YO, 2012) and 
“supremacism” (JU, 2012), encompassing the majority’s oppression of 
minorities. Patriotism is generally understood as a combination of love for 
one’s country, ethnic group or race, and religion. However, the particular 
form of patriotism represented in the Sri Lankan media is defined along 
antagonistic ethno-religious terms, as a method of exclusion and silencing 
dissent (Perera, 2004: 13).  
 
The role of the active citizen – the patriot – in post-war Sri Lanka, is vocal 
defence of the Rajapaksa government in public demonstrations, protests and 
national celebrations. President Rajapaksa has urged the population to 
identify themselves as Sri Lankans in the first instance, to attribute less 
importance to ethnicity and other facets of identity. In his speech to 
Parliament immediately after the defeat of the LTTE, he stated:  
 
“We have removed the word minorities from our vocabulary three 
years ago. No longer are the Tamils, Muslims, Burghers, Malays and 
any others minorities. There are only two peoples in this country. One 
 82 
is the people that love this country. The other comprises the small 
groups that have no love for the land of their birth. Those who do not 
love the country are now a lesser group” (Rajapaksa, 2009).  
 
For minorities, this means assimilation within the majority Sinhala-Buddhist 
hegemonic framework of national identity. The definition of patriotism has 
been realigned in present day Sri Lanka to mean full political support for the 
Rajapaksa government. A Sinhalese academic and media spokesperson 
argued: 
 
“…with the use of the terminology ‘patriots’ and ‘traitors’, those who are with 
the government and not with the government. It could be irrespective of 
ethnicity, it could be a foreigner, it could be a Sinhalese, a Tamil – not with 
the government perspective is a traitor and anyone who endorses what the 
government says is a patriot” (MM, 2012). 
 
The journalist Tisaranee Gunasekara made this point in a 2013 column in the 
Sri Lanka Guardian, stating “Lankan patriotism is a Sinhala-Buddhist 
patriotism” (Gunasekara, 2013a). 35  In line with Rampton (2011) and Imtiyaz 
(2013), she argues that within “this hierarchical nation”, minorities can co-
exist with Sinhala-Buddhist only if they accept their subordinate position in 
the hierarchy (Gunasekara, 2013a). Loyalty to the “Ruling family” is the 
definitive characteristic of patriotism (Gunasekara, 2013a):  
 
“Since nation is equated with the Ruling family, a ‘traitor’ can become 
a ‘patriot’ instantaneously by becoming a Rajapaksa-votive; a ‘patriot’ 
will lapse into treachery the moment he/she leaves the Rajapaksa fold 
(thus, KP the Patriot and Gen. Fonseka the Traitor)” (Gunasekara, 
2013a).36 
 
                                                        
35 Gunasekara’s incivise commentary is delivered under a pseudonym to ensure her (or his) 
personal safety and space for free expression. 
36 “KP” is a former LTTE weapons and resource procurer. Following his arrest in 2009, he is now 
loyal to the government and runs three orphanages in the Northeast. He has not faced criminal 
proceedings and he speaks publicly on welfare and reconciliation. Sareth Fonseka, on the other 
hand, is a former “war hero”: the only four-star General on the island who is credited with 
masterminding the SLA’s victory in 2009. Fonseka served two years in prison, convicted of 
"spreading rumours and causing public disorder" for alleging in an interview that Gotabhaya 
Rajapaksa had ordered war crimes at the End. He claims he was misquoted. The Economist 
(2012) notes that his name has been “pointedly omitted from official commemorations of the 
war” and that his image has “subsequently been “disappeared” from official photographs.” 
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The state’s staging of nationalistic celebrations such as ‘National Victory Day’ 
and pro-government protests against international investigations into the End 
ought to be viewed as an invitation to publicly perform solidarity with the 
government. The primary purpose of these demonstrations is to provide a 
public outlet for nationalistic sentiment within the population, on the basis of 
loyalty to the current government.  
 
The demonstrations are, in turn, an attempt by the state to showcase the 
support they enjoy from the domestic population. As Cohen (2001: 112) 
argues in States of Denial, today’s political culture demands that accounts of 
events are negotiated in spectacle, simulation and stage management. Public 
and performative spectacles are strategic acts of interpretation and framing, 
strategised by governments to consolidate power and to deny allegations of 
wrongdoing. State-backed rallies in 2012 invited the population to signal their 
rejection of the UN Human Rights Council vote (Daily News, 2012 and The 
Hindu, 2012). President Rajapaksa’s strategy has been “to cajole and frighten 
his Sinhala-base into backing him unconditionally”, by referring to  
“prosperous futures or terrifying enemies” (Gunesekara, 2012). Participants 
were largely unaware of why they were protesting, as the LLRC report was 
not translated into Sinhalese and analysis in the popular state media coverage 
was selective and pro-government (Gunasekara, 2012; Perera, 2012; Höglund 
and Orjuela, 2013). The physical show of people gathered by the government 
was intended to deflect the imposition of any formal accountability or 
transitional justice mechanisms by the UN. The culture of patriotism on the 
basis of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism has fused with the culture of terror 
embedded in society over the years of war. Any failure to adhere to the 
expectations of the dominant narrative of the state is looked at with suspicion 
and can cause difficulties in everyday life. Flags must be hung on Sri Lankan 
celebratory days, milk rice must be prepared and eaten – every symbolic 
display of nationalism is indirectly coerced (CM, 2012; Wickramasinghe, 
2009). Neighbours, the military and police, and government informants are 
the audiences for whom these symbolic acts are carried out.  
 
The physical presence of participants was presented by the state as evidence 
of national support, in a display of physicality more persuasive than abstract 
legal practices. This mass ritual performance, though ineffective in preventing 
the resolution from being passed, had the benefit of increasing nationalistic 
fervour. Drawing on discourses of war heroism, national sovereignty and the 
image of a small country under siege, the protests were inherently infused 
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In Sri Lanka, the demographics of the country and the structure of the system 
allowed the primary ethnic group to build an ethnocentric system. The 
numerical advantage of the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka and the gradual 
hegemonisation of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism has meant that the rights 
and interests of the minority groups have been subjugated (Edirippulige, 
2004: 287-8; Rampton, 2011). Under the Rajapaksa SLFP government, Sinhala-
Buddhist dominance has been achieved and integrated into the state 
establishment. Under the control of ethnically driven political parties, “Sri 
Lanka systematically turned into a tyranny of the majority”: the primary 
cause of nearly four decades of civil war (Edirippulige, 2004: 289). Intra-ethnic 
outbidding was a powerful tool available to politicians to win elections but 
the “ethnicisation” of society that resulted from this process proved costly. In 
parallel with the discourse of terrorism that distorted the political aspirations 
of the Tamils (discussed in Chapter Four), the exclusionary nationalism of 
Sinhala-Buddhism undermined the calls of the Tamil minority for equal rights 
and, in turn, the demand for self-determination. To maintain personal 
popularity, Mahinda Rajapksa relies on mass ritual discourse of Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalism, a conception of patriotism that protects him personally, 
a subservient, nationalistic media, and the constant evocation of national 
security threats. Enhancing his power base through performances of Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalism and the continual extension of militarisation, Mahinda 





















Drawing on critical discourse analysis of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) 
website, this chapter describes the official conflict narrative, situated in the 
context of embedded, antagonistic social relations between the Sinhalese and 
the Tamils. This chapter explores the national security state consolidated 
under the current Rajapaksa government, characterised by techniques of 
denial and misrepresentation. This chapter begins with an analysis of national 
security exceptionalism to comment on the nature of the state, drawing on the 
work of Stanley Cohen and Giorgio Agamben. The concentration of power 
under Mahinda Rajapaksa’s Executive Presidency is examined, with attention 
to the mechanisms of social control in place, including media censorship 
through practices of coercion and terror, and the breakdown of the rule of 
law. Throughout the End, the state relied heavily on techniques of denial to 
avoid external investigations, interventions and condemnation; these 
techniques were adapted to a carefully crafted discursive framework 
developed throughout the war and augmented to support Rajapaksa’s 
determination to finish the war militarily. I argue that this determination 
necessitated a reliance on practices of state terror, to suppress dissent and 
induce support from the wider population. The state-sanctioned lexicon 




2.2 Themes Arising from Discourse Analysis 
 
Following Dag Tjaden (2012: 52), analysis of MOD website data and the 
speeches of Mahinda Rajapaksa from December 2008 to May 2009 revealed 
the prominence of themes of “national representation” or “selective memory” 
in state discourse.37 These themes underpin the authorship of the ‘national 
story’ of the End. The theme “exclusion and inclusion” denotes the state’s 
strategy of evoking historical memory that highlights the unique nature of the 
state and its marked differences from others, in order to enhance nationalistic 
                                                        
37 See Appendix One and Two for a list of the news articles and speeches in question. 
 86 
pride and coherence. “Legitimisation” seeks to frame the state’s warfare as a 
righteous cause, necessary and unquestionable “to save its nation, restore 
order, and defeat the enemy that threatened their sovereignty” (Dag Tjaden, 
2012: 52). The “heroisation” of the state forces is another theme noted by Dag 
Tjagen, where nationalist discourse romanticises the stories of war heroes, 
particularly their sacrifices for the nation. Dag Tjaden’s theme of “continuity” 
suggests linearity in the development of the nation: the idea of the nation is 
presented as an historical, ethnic, and inevitable truth which has realised itself 
through time. Personification of the country – for example, the use of the term 
“Mother Lanka” - is an act of emotionalisation described by Dag Tjaden, a 
process of infusing political and military issues with intimate personal 
sentiment (2012: 57). Dag Tjaden describes this theme of national 
representation as: 
 
“…a personiﬁcation of the nation, a transcendental, collective nation 
with one personality, one conscience, one birthday, one life, one 
liberty, and one glorious future, fought for and loved…” (2012: 57).  
 
In a similar vein, Dag Tjaden notes that the state stands to benefit from 
proposing that “integration” has resulted from the war. The violence of the 
past is portrayed as necessary to effect a “coming together” of the nation 
rather than a “falling apart” and fragmentation. The hardships endured by 
the population and the actions carried out in their name, the state suggests, 
have ensured that a coherent national identity would arise from collective 
suffering and the efforts of those committed to the nation state. Dag Tjaden 
recognises the use of “the nation” here as a justificatory framework. 
Commitment to the nation guarantees the legitimacy of action: “The actions 
don’t matter as long as it is assured that they have been committed in the 
name of the nation” (2012: 52). As discussed in Chapter One, “validation” is 
an important aspect of national representation, both domestically and 
internationally. The head of state is presented as a powerful player in world 
politics, affirming him as a leader worthy of pride.  
 
The MOD website data reveals legitimisation in the prevalence of nationalistic 
language of humanitarianism couched in counter-terror discourse, designed 
to justify the pursuit of military warfare and to undermine the possibility of a 
negotiated settlement: “Eradicating terrorism forthwith is the only way to save 
civilians under Prabakharan's jackboot” (MOD, 19 February 2009). The official 
discourse repeatedly draws on the horrors attributed to the LTTE, both 
current and historic, as a form of legitimisation for warfare. The adjectives 
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that accompany and support the identification of the LTTE as a terrorist 
organisation include “brutal,” “savage”, “barbaric,” and “evil,” consolidating 
the ethnicised process by which “inclusion and exclusion” was determined 
(Dag Tjaden, 2012). The LTTE are portrayed as increasingly desperate and 
violent towards the civilian population, contrasted with the government’s 
humanitarian actions and preparations. For example, on 13 January 2009, 
while the “Tigers” and “LTTE terrorists” manipulated the metal in hospital 
beds to construct fortified bunkers and used trapped civilians as human 
shields, government officials made “arrangements to provide shelter for the Tamil 
escapees after providing them with meals, medical treatment and other necessities.” 
The hospital bed becomes a metaphor for intent. This discourse strand 
emphasises the honourable behaviour of the state in contrast to the LTTE and 
thereby establishes its own righteousness, drawing “legitimisation” from their 
position as saviours of the Tamils (Dag Tjaden, 2012). The state, the discourse 
suggests, provides for its citizens – the Tamil civilians – in an admirable and 
organised fashion as they escape the conflict zone. Months later, while 
fighting continued in the Vanni, concerned and patriotic Sri Lankan 
expatriates would donate hospital supplies including mattresses and 
wheelchairs “for the use valiant soldiers who [were] disabled while serving in the 
battlefront” (MOD, 5 May 2009).  
 
Molly Wallace (2010: 159) notes that President Rajapaksa, in an April 2008 
speech, identifies the LTTE as brutal towards both the Tamils of the North 
and the country as a whole, using the possessive “our” to describe the Tamil 
youth used as “cannon fodder”. Wallace rightly argues that this phrasing 
seeks to emphasise the Sri Lankan government’s pride in the island’s multi-
ethnic identity, thus representing itself as a democratic and tolerant state that 
upholds human rights. It also legitimates the use of military force in the 
North: “to save fellow Sri Lankans (Tamils who live in the North) from the 
“savagery” of the LTTE” (Wallace, 2010: 159). The LTTE’s depiction as “evil” 
and “barbaric” necessitates force against them, as they will not respond to 
reason and negotiations. While Sri Lankan troops have been “manning their 
defences” in order “to provide the maximum protection to the civilians escaping the 
terror clutches”, the “LTTE has been busy with building command bunkers and other 
fortifications…knowing the possibility that civilians may escape their rule in large 
numbers” (MOD, 9 April, 2009). 
 
Related to the theme of legitimisation are references to “heavy damages” and 
“maximum damages” inflicted upon the “terrorists” by Sri Lankan troops, who 
are reported to have sustained “minor damages” in “intense fighting” (MOD, 22 
 88 
December 2008).  The LTTE are “fighting with their backs to the wall and 
cornered” (MOD, 4 May 2009). While the supremacy of the Sri Lankan forces is 
established regularly in the reports, references to the heavy weaponry, mines 
and arms found on the dead bodies of “terrorists” or abandoned in disarray by 
“fleeing terrorists” ensure that the LTTE are still appreciated as a viable 
military threat, to be defeated by force (MOD, 31 January, 2009). “Terrorists” 
and “Tigers” are the only terms of description for the LTTE, removing the 
political aspect of struggle from discourse. The word “war” is never 
mentioned by official sources, or the phrase “military offensive.” The reader 
instead is provided with updates on the “humanitarian operation” or 
“civilian rescue mission.” 
 
The consistent successes of the Sri Lankan Forces over the LTTE are 
highlighted with adventurous and nationalistic language, suggestive of a pre-
determined reclamation of territory under the unitary state model, the 
“integration” of the nation after a long process of coming together, marked by 
“continuity” (Dag Tjaden, 2012). 2009 is hailed as “the true Year of Heroism” for 
the Sri Lankan army (MOD, 22 December 2008), who are “braving” the 
“heavily fortified” and “heavily mined” conflict zones to “capture” LTTE 
strongholds (MOD, 4 May 2009). The heroic troops were making “decisive 
inroads” into LTTE territory on the 19th of February 2009, “making all efforts to 
secure safe passage for the people fleeing from the LTTE enclaves towards the 
liberated areas.” The adventurous narrative describes the Sri Lankan troops as 
“steadily advancing” towards the trapped civilians, “amidst all obstacles posed by 
the LTTE” (MOD, 4 May 2009). The heroisation of the state forces is achieved 
(Dag Tjaden, 2012). The Tamil civilians, for their part, “sought protection with 
security forces following a desperate escape made from the LTTE Wanni [Vanni] 
hellhole” (MOD, 22 December 2008). Desperate to “escape” the “LTTE's grip,” 
the civilians were “seeking safety for their lives” in “the government controlled 
area” (MOD, 13 January 2009). The Sri Lankan soil presided over by the state 
is described as safe and secure, while LTTE-held areas are places of death, 
instability and destruction. 
 
Interrogating the narrative presented in official discourse, we see the bright-
line distinction drawn between “Sri Lankans” - including the Tamil civilians 
in the North – and the LTTE. What defines a Sri Lankan in this conception, the 
definition of “inclusion” or “exclusion” in Dag Tjaden’s terms - is 
victimisation or potential victimisation by the LTTE. Reports emphasise that 
“civilians”, “hostages”, “commuters”, “villagers”, “political leaders” and “child-
soldiers” were killed, assaulted and “kept in slavery” by the LTTE (MOD, 5 May 
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2009). A Sri Lankan is defined against the ‘anti-Sri Lankan’ figure of the LTTE 
cadre and the feared “terror chief”, LTTE leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran. 
Mahinda confirmed this definition in the post-conflict phase, claiming that 
there are no minorities in Sri Lanka any longer, only those who love the 
nation and those who do not (Rajapaksa, 2009). Sri Lankans demonstrate love 
for the “motherland” through faith in the unitary state and unfaltering support 
for the government (MOD, 13 February 2009).  
 
The current Presidential Advisor on Reconciliation Rajiva Wijensinha accused 
international actors of “throwing meat to Tigers” by seeking a ceasefire at the 
End, which would have halted the enormous violence being perpetrated 
against the Tamil civilians (MOD, 5 May 2009). The imagery evoked here is 
interesting and noteworthy. The LTTE are portrayed as animalistic, savage 
and greedy, awaiting sustenance from outside. The metaphor reflects their 
conflict position: trapped in a small area, with diminishing resources and 
strategic options.  
 
The state forces, we are told repeatedly in an extension of “heroisation” in 
tune with humanitarian tropes, are disciplined, humane and literate in human 
rights law and the laws of armed conflict. If the LTTE were to surrender to the 
armed forces, they would be “readily accepted and humanely treated” (MOD, 2 
February 2009). The President asserted that those who had surrendered in the 
East of the country were treated as such: they were “given a warm and rousing 
welcome by our well disciplined Armed Forces who had even offered them king 
coconuts" (MOD, 2 February 2009). The ‘humanitarian operation’ the state 
describes is one defined by restraint. Every stage of the conflict narrative is 
replete with portrayals of the Sri Lankan troops “advancing with utmost 
restraint” despite “the continuous and provocative LTTE mortar and direct roll 
artillery barrages” (MOD, 5 May 2009). On the 9th of February, for example, the 
MOD reported that an LTTE suicide bomber had self-detonated as “a 
gruesome reprisal against civilians for defying the LTTE orders.” Not only was the 
organisation attacking the people under its charge, the report suggested, the 
act was also a “desperate attempt to trigger a backlash.” The LTTE, this 
representation suggests, attempted to provoke violence from the Sri Lankan 
forces that would also be directed towards the Tamil “civilian hostages held at 
gunpoint” (MOD, 5 May 2009). Rather than carry out reprisal attacks against 
Tamil civilians in response, the army consistently “acted with restraint without 
falling into the LTTE's trap” (MOD, 10 February 2009).  
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The adventurous narrative of the heroic Sinhala-Buddhist armed forces - 
tasked with achieving the destiny of the Sinhalese people by re-unifying the 
state - is a powerful account of the End that appeals to the hegemonised 
“social imaginary of Sri Lanka space as Sinhala-Buddhist” and has 
contributed to the post-war domination of the Tamil population of the North 
and Eastern Provinces (Rampton, 2011: 254). The “heroic” armed forces 
commit to the nation with their lives, and therefore represent model citizens; 
they are responsible for securing the future of the Sinhala-Buddhist nation, 
honouring the legacy of the nation’s glorious past and reclaiming an ancient 
dignity lost during the years of colonisation, terrorism and incompetent 
leadership (Rajapaksa, 4 February 2009). Memories of the glory of the ancient 
Sinhalese kingdoms are evoked as a transcendent destiny, subjugated in the 
recent past but reclaimed by Rajapaksa’s government. He traces the narrative 
of nationhood from the ancient past to the present day, drawing a comparison 
between the President and the ancient Sinhalese kings as a powerful tool of 
“validation” which enables this narrative of an inevitable and natural 
nationhood (Dag Tjaden, 2012). Post-war, those who do not love Sri Lanka are 
those who agitate for investigations into the End and continue to advocate for 
political rights for the Tamil minority. These individuals are equated with the 
demonised LTTE, excluded as ‘terrorists’ intent on dividing the state. State 
discourse has nurtured the conception of unity among ‘real’ Sri Lankans as 
victims or potential victims of the LTTE.   
 
 - The Politics of “Restraint” 
 
In this complex story of violence and contested narratives, the state rhetoric of 
military restraint, propagated in the MOD news reports, is striking. 
Substantial evidence of mass atrocity, civilian deaths in the tens of thousands, 
and sexual assault of female LTTE cadres dispute the veracity of this narrative 
(UN, 2012; Channel 4, 2011, 2012). The rhetoric of restraint benefits the state in 
a number of ways. Firstly, it is a tool of denial. The model of the disciplined 
soldier, adhering to the principles of international law, pre-emptively deflects 
allegations of wrongdoing. On the 21st April 2009, the UN called on the Sri 
Lankan government to exercise “maximum restraint” to protect the lives of 
the civilians trapped in LTTE-controlled territory (IRIN news, 2009). The state 
officially propagated its obedience, despite the profusion of conflicting 
reports at the End. 
 
Scott Straus (2012: 344) defines factors of restraint in armed conflict as “ideas, 
interactions, and institutions that prompt leaders and/or citizens to abstain 
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from or moderate the use of extensive violence against civilians”. The Sri 
Lankan government presents an image of an army operating faithfully to a 
policy of restraint. But there is something unsettling about this rhetoric, 
besides the plethora of evidence recorded in video, photographs and 
eyewitness accounts, documented in reports that expose it as simply untrue 
(UN, 2012; Channel 4, 2011, 2012). In an historical and socio-political context, 
there is something meaningful in the self-congratulatory tone, in the 
publicised military restraint and benevolence towards Tamil civilians. I 
would argue that it is a sentiment originating in racism and Sinhala-Buddhist 
supremacy. ‘Restraint’ speaks to in the inherent belief that Tamils do not 
belong in Sri Lanka and that it is gracious of the Sinhalese to allow their 
presence. In other words, violence towards Tamils is conceived as the natural 
response to LTTE violence and political agitation. The Sinhalese, by showing 
‘restraint’ and suppressing this urge, ought to be praised.  
 
Sinhalese ‘restraint’ is a thematic thread that arises in reference to the absence 
of Sinhalese mob violence against the Tamils since Black July 1983. This 
atrocity saw members of the Sinhalese community turning on their Tamil 
neighbours in retaliation for the murder of 13 Sri Lankan soldiers by the 
LTTE, an event that crystallised rising anti-Tamil sentiment brought on by the 
formation of violent Tamil separatist groups. The wave of violence began in 
Jaffna in the Northern Province, the site of the attack on the soldiers, and 
spread countrywide to Sinhalese-dominated areas. Tamil homes were burned 
down, Tamil businesses were looted and Tamil property was destroyed. 
Tamils were beaten, stripped, publicly humiliated and killed. Mob members 
were furnished with electoral lists to confirm ethnicity, prompting allegations 
of Sinhalese governmental involvement in the pogrom (Bloom, 2003: 63). 
Identity cards were demanded by Sinhala mobs armed with lighter fluid and 
Tamils were set alight in the streets. The Sinhala participant saw the attacks as 
morally appropriate: punishment for the collective guilt of the Tamils 
(Spencer, 2000: 122-3). Casualty estimates range from the official death toll of 
380 to 3,000 Tamil citizens. Following the week of terror, 700, 000 Tamil 
individuals are thought to have fled the country in fear (PACT, 2013).38 
President Chandrika Kumaratunga, offering an official apology to the victims 
on the 21st anniversary of Black July, stated that the event “radically changed 
the entire fabric of Sri Lankan society.” She viewed this event as the 
                                                        
38 Bloom (2003: 65) cites an exodus of 100,000 Tamils to Tamil Nadu alone, and notes the 
parallel movement of Tamils from the South of the country to the North and Eastern Provinces. 
The violence of 1983, therefore, forged strong ties and political complexities with Tamil Nadu 
and strengthened the Tamil claim to a traditional homeland of Eelam.  
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introduction of violence as a “major tool of socio-political behaviour” in Sri 
Lanka (Kumaratunga, 2004). The LTTE leader, however, saw the pogrom as a 
pre-orchestrated incident of anti-Tamil racial violence, incited by the racist 
elements within the Sinhalese government and a continuation of a pattern of 
periodic violence against the Tamils (Prabhakaran, 1984).  
 
The discourse of the “tolerance and greatness of the Sinhala people in not 
enacting another July 1983″ is widespread (Jeyaraj, 2010). The suggestion that 
the restraint of the Sinhalese is admirable is an indication of the supremacist 
attitude amongst the ethnic group, as well as the dehumanisation or 
“derealization” of the Tamils (Butler, 2004). The lack of group violence since 
1983 is presented as evidence that the Sinhala participants in atrocities against 
Tamils have learnt their lesson (Jeyaraj, 2010). Violence against Tamils, 
however, was merely manifest in different forms in the years of war that 
followed 1983. Institutionalised and legitimised by warfare and “emergency” 
and counter-terror legislation, ethnic profiling saw Tamils face torture, 
disappearances, indefinite detention and extrajudicial killings. The war 
devastated Tamil culture and socio-economic capability and caused mass 
displacement, migration and death. Far from restraint, what we have seen in 
Sri Lanka is relentless persecution of the Tamil minority.  
 
 - Discourses of Victimhood at the End 
 
The category of “victim” has been used strategically in Sri Lanka, in politics 
and in discourse surrounding the conflict, to further the military and political 
goals of the LTTE and also to legitimise the continuing military assault led by 
the Sri Lanka state forces. Antze and Lambek (1996: xxiv) warn that an 
identity of victimhood that ought to be “necessary, sufficient and compelling” 
can actually serve to “subjugate and immobilize victims in the very act of 
recognizing their suffering”. In Sri Lanka, the state and the LTTE have 
trafficked in claims and counter-claims of victimisation: to sustain identities 
of victimhood and to seek political gain and international legitimacy. While 
inscribing personal stories into public discourses “often obscures their 
richness and moral complexity” and the narratives of “victims” are presented 
to support political agendas (1996: xxv), the narrative of “victimhood” also 
speaks to the configuration of Tamil resistance in a historical trajectory that 
has been couched in wider international discourses and operationalised as a 
tool of political agency. The LTTE presented the Tamil population as victims 
of state persecution to pragmatically advocate for international intervention. 
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The discourse of Tamil victimisation by the Sinhala state was not originally 
fashioned by the LTTE, however. It is inseparable from the long post-
independence process by which a Tamil national identity was formed and the 
adoption of a political framework based on the principles of national 
liberation and self-determination.39 Discourses of victimisation and national 
liberation are inherently interrelated. For example, the Federal Party 
employed this amalgamated discourse in the 1950s: it underpinned acts of 
civil disobedience in the immediately post-independence period (Manogaran, 
1987). Tamil politicians, civil society and international actors advocated 
during the war for a ‘political solution’ based on Tamil victimhood. The 
‘victim’ and the categories of rights and ad-hoc benefits that correspond to 
that status in international liberal discourse and human rights law, however, 
did not prevent the people’s rights being overlooked and obliterated by 
powerful stakeholders to the conflict, especially at the End.  
 
The discourse analysis reveals the consistency with which the Sri Lankan state 
represented the final military assault on the LTTE as a ‘humanitarian rescue 
mission’ to save the Tamil population from the LTTE. The Sri Lankan 
government shrewdly crafted a narrative in the final stages of the war that sat 
comfortably with internationally accepted discourses of counter-terrorism 
and humanitarianism, one that did not fundamentally depart with the “war 
for peace” policy begun under President Chandrika Kumaratunga in 1995 
(Uyangoda, 2007). 40 Both the state and the LTTE utilised the victimhood of 
Tamil civilians to justify their actions and seek validation, solidarity and 
assistance from the international community at the End: the Sri Lankan 
government pledged to rescue the Tamils from the LTTE, while the LTTE 
implored the international community to intervene and protect the Tamils 
from a persecutory state. The official state narrative fused recent projections 
of the conflict as a ‘humanitarian’ ‘civilian rescue mission’ with Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalist rhetoric, thus ensuring the support of the majority 
Sinhalese-Buddhist community. Crucially, this state discourse – portraying 
                                                        
39 The Tamil “national question” is analysed in great detail with regard to international principles 
and Conventions by Helena J. Whall (1995) and the development of that political claim is 
discussed in Chapters Three and Five. 
40 Kumaratunga, of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, was elected President in November 1994, 
sitting as Prime Minister and head of the People’s Alliance political coalition since August that 
year. She was immensely popular with all communities and her initial stance of attempted 
conciliatory relations with the LTTE was widely welcomed. As these attempts soured, however, 
she adopted a more hardline position based on military action. In an assassination attempt by the 
LTTE in 1999, she lost her sight in one eye. She continued as President until 2005, despite losing 
her position as Prime Minister to the UNP’s Ranil Wickremasinghe in 2001.   
 94 
Tamils as victims of the LTTE – was tightly woven with that of territorial 
integrity, defeating terrorism and the ultimate goal of majority rule. This 
‘victim’ narrative was loaded with the principles of Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalism, the trajectory of which is discussed in Chapter Four.  
 
 - Propaganda and Derealisation 
 
Shifting the focus from the “theatre of violence and suffering” in the conflict-
affected Vanni region described by UNICEF official James Elder, “the relentless 
campaign against Sri Lanka” coordinated by the LTTE and its proxies is 
foregrounded as the primary battle (MOD, 5 May 2009). Relying heavily on 
the proposition that the Tamil diaspora are an extension of the demonic, 
persecutory LTTE, state discourse dismisses all international agitation against 
the military operation as propaganda. The real attack, the state suggests, is the 
propaganda attack on the Sri Lankan state by the LTTE, orchestrated by its 
international “proxies”, representatives and supporters (MOD, 5 May 2009). In 
this way, the state attempts to, in Judith Butler’s terms, “derealize” the 
conflict, to render it abstract, to deny and conceal atrocity. Butler (2006: 146) 
interrogates the processes by which the media contributes to the “evacuation 
of the human through the image” and the broader normative schemes that 
operate to define the human, a liveable life and a grievable death. The 
schemes operate, Butler argues, either by producing a symbolic identification 
of the face in question as inhuman or through radical effacement:  
 
“Sometimes they produce images of the less than human, to show how 
the less than human disguises itself…But sometimes these normative 
schemes work precisely through providing no image, no name, no 
narrative, so that there never was a life and there never was a 
death…There never was a human, there never was a life, and no 
murder has, therefore, ever taken place” (Butler, 2006: 146-7). 
 
By rejecting actual violence as propaganda and minimising the extent of the 
Tamil people’s suffering, the conflict reality is distorted. This discourse 
undermines the proposition that a ceasefire is appropriate on the basis of 
international principles of civilian protection and casts doubt on the 
credibility of international actors such as the UN, human rights organisations 
and Western media.41 Civilians are not dying, the state tells us, only terrorists 
                                                        
41 The voices of Tamil journalists, it is worth noting here, were silenced by the international 
media institutions that did not deem their reports “credible” (TAG, 2014).  
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(MOD, 12 February 2009). There is no food crisis; in fact the state is supplying 
food to the conflict zones (MOD, 5 May 2009). The state forces are not shelling 
the No-Fire Zones; in fact they are not using heavy weaponry at all (MOD, 5 
May 2009).  
 
 - Inclusion and Exclusion, ‘Good’ versus ‘Evil’ 
 
A ‘good versus evil’ narrative is strengthened by delivering the flattering 
portrayal of the ‘restrained’ armed forces alongside depictions of the LTTE 
loaded with negative adjectives and connotations. The armed forces, we are 
told, flawlessly pursued the ‘rescue mission’ with maximum concerns for 
civilians, whereas the LTTE deliberately brought violence upon them. The 
state, with its sizeable influence on discourse, proclaims this essential 
difference between the state forces and the LTTE. It robs the LTTE of political 
legitimacy by depicting an organisation that slaughters at will, strategically 
and ruthlessly, in a self-serving manner. The organisation’s actions, the MOD 
declares, are designed for self-protection of its leaders rather than securing 
rights for the Tamil people. Again, the state tells us, the people of Sri Lanka 
are united against the LTTE. The only relationship one can have with the 
LTTE is one of domination, exploitation and suffering. The state forces, on the 




2.3 The Counter-terror Paradigm and the Concentration of Power 
 
Mahinda Rajapaksa’s executive presidency is popular, powerful and 
increasingly entrenched (Jeyaraj, 2012). Rajapaksa’s ascendancy to power and 
continuing popularity can be explained by his personal embodiment of 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, which is confirmed and completed by his 
defeat of the LTTE (Rampton, 2011). In the post-conflict environment, the 
Rajapaksa regime is expected to pursue economic development with the same 
determination and ruthlessness. In his 2010 election manifesto, Rajapaksa 
acknowledged that, “the people of our country are now awaiting the victory 
in the ‘economic war’, in a manner similar to our victory in the war against 
terrorism” (Mahinda Chinthana, 2010: 1). The Eighteenth Amendment to the 
Sri Lankan Constitution, introduced under Rajapaksa’s purview, removed the 
limitations on consecutive terms of power granted to the Executive President 
and is one example of the concentration of power under his presidency and, 
even more problematically, his family unit. The Eighteenth Amendment 
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removes most of the few remaining checks on the President’s powers and 
provides the Rajapaksa family dynasty with the means to keep the Executive 
President in power indefinitely. The amendment also confers powers on the 
Executive President to personally appoint members of the judiciary and the 
“independent” commissions on police, human rights, elections, corruption 
and bribery, finance, and public service (Crisis Group, 2011: 21). Two other 
Rajapaksa brothers hold offices of high authority in the current state 
structure: Basil is an unelected MP and the Minister for the Economy and 
Gotabhaya (often referred to as the most powerful man in Sri Lanka) is the 
Secretary of Defence. President Rajapaksa’s son, Namal, is a young MP 
already representing Sri Lanka on official state visits, notably his debut trip to 
Libya in January 2011 to meet Muammar Gaddafi (The Economist, 2011a). 
Chamal Rajapaksa, a cousin of the brothers, is a Speaker in Parliament. The 
family appear to have set the stage for dynastic rule (Hogg, 2011; Crisis 
Group, 2011).  
 
Over the years of war, successive governments referred to the ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ produced by ‘terrorism’ and open conflict within Sri Lanka to 
introduce repressive and draconian counter-terror measures. An official State 
of Emergency was declared in 1971, relying on the Public Security Ordinance 
of 1947, and the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) was introduced in 1978. 
The Emergency Regulations (ERs) and the PTA were introduced on a 
temporary basis, falling within the ‘derogation’ model permitted under the 
international legal framework. This model, in times of “public emergency,” 
permits a temporary diversion from the normal responsibility of the state to 
respect certain fundamental rights.42 Notions such as “states of exception” 
and ‘states of emergency” are used at the domestic level to describe special 
crisis situations that prompt the availability of “exceptional, special, and 
emergency powers” to the state authorities (Svensson-McCarthy, 1998: xxiv). 
While derogation is propagated as necessary to regain order in a situation of 
disorder, the derogation model in practice “creates a space between 
fundamental rights and the rule of law” (Hickman, 2005: 659). A basis is 
enacted within the law for the state to transgress individual rights. The ERs 
were extended almost continuously for thirty years and the PTA has simply 
never been amended or repealed (Ganeshalingham, 2009). The routine and 
excessive use of the emergency regulations from 1971 to 2011, in parallel with 
                                                        
42 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR; entered into force 1976), 
Article 4 and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR; entered into force 1950), Article 
15. 
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the PTA, resulted in a complex and intricate legal framework, where the 
various measures could be applied to a suspect consecutively, simultaneously 
and retrospectively, allowing for self-incrimination and in practice blurring 
the distinction between normal and emergency laws (Wedagedara, 2011; 
Pinto-Jayawardena, 2010). The ERs and the PTA have been criticised by 
human rights organisations and other international entities as over-stepping 
the state’s right to invoke security-related exceptions (AI, 2011; ICJ, 2009; 
European Commission, 2009).  
 
The state’s counter-terror measures include vague and broad definitions of 
‘terrorism’ and activities related to terrorism. The elasticity of these terms has 
led to arbitrary application over the years of ‘exception’. Innocent trade 
transactions, communications and meetings could be deemed ‘terrorist’ and 
prosecuted according to this label. The state authorities took advantage of the 
emergency provisions with alacrity. Official abuse led to a significant 
imbalance of power between state and citizen and an unwarranted intrusion 
into the private lives of individuals (CPA, 2011). The expansive powers 
granted to the state authorities amounted to arbitrary search, arrest, detention 
and prosecution, and media and individual censorship. The measures, again, 
were operationalised with an ethnicised logic and, used disproportionately 
against the Tamil population, have been “the gateway to systematic abuse of 
human rights, giving rise especially to gross ethnic discrimination in its 
implementation” (CPA, 2013a). As Pinto-Jayawardena argues, “exceptional 
powers facilitated an enabling environment for gross violations such as 
enforced disappearances” (2010a: 25).  
 
The legal measures were accompanied by illegal practices such as 
disappearances, incommunicado and arbitrary detention, institutionalised 
torture and killings. These practices, over the course of the protracted conflict, 
became embedded in the normal functioning of counter-terror operations and 
policing, as well as carried out by officially unrecognised armed factions 
(Fernando and Weerawickrame, 2009: 7; UN, 2011; ICJ, 2009).  
 
 
2.4 The Breakdown of the Rule of Law 
 
Kishali Pinto-Jayawardena (2007) argues that the core political objective of 
subverting the rule of law has led to the deterioration of the criminal justice 
system and ordinary law enforcement processes in Sri Lanka. The exploitation 
of institutional weakness by successive governments and the attendant slide 
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into state crime and state terror not only allowed the unchallenged 
perpetration of human rights abuses, it also directly contributed to the scale 
and longevity of the war. Pinto-Jayawardena (2010) notes that the subversion 
of the rule of law is not a tactic unique to the Rajapaksas, and has followed an 
ethnicised logic under the majoritarian state structure. Marginalisation of the 
Tamil population can be part-attributed to the impossibility of seeking 
institutional redress for attacks and human rights violations suffered on 
grounds of ethnicity, as the ethnic conflict intensified in the North and East of 
the country in the 1980s. The perpetrators of brutal human rights abuses were 
agents of the state itself; atrocities were in response to violent acts carried out 
by militant Tamil groups - a minority within the Tamil population (Bloom, 
2003). As political engagement and legal processes of seeking justice were 
blocked by the aggressive and ethnocratic state structure, aggrieved Tamils 
looked to a violent separatist ideology as the only means of redress (Pinto-
Jayawardena, 2007).  
 
The most recent display of executive dominance over all over branches of 
state was the removal of Chief Justice Sharini Bandaranayake in 2013, an act 
widely condemned as politically motivated and throwing the system of 
checks and balances into disarray (ICJ, 2013).43  
 
Relations between President Rajapaksa and Bandaranayake soured in 
September 2013 following a ruling by the Chief Justice with political 
implications. She ruled that the nine Provincial Councils must support a bill 
submitted by the president's younger brother, Basil Rajapaksa, proposing an 
80 billion-rupee development budget, including the Northern Provincial 
Council (Reuters, 2013a). The Divineguma Bill was a centralising Bill, bringing 
devolved power back to Colombo: power allocated to Basil Rajapaska, 
including new powers to invade privacy and obtain information about 
citizens (Robertson, 2013: para. 31). Bandaranayake ruled the Divineguma Bill 
unconstitutional because of the failure to attain approval from all councils. 
She angered the government “by invalidating legislation that was important 
to its agenda” (Robertson, 2013: para. 36). The process of impeachment on 
non-related charges began within days and is overwhelmingly considered as 
an act of political persecution (Robertson, 2013; ICJ, 2013).  
 
                                                        
43 ICJ (2013) reported that the Bar Association of Sri Lanka publicly vowed that it will not 
welcome a new Chief Justice and that the Lawyers Collective, a judiciary activist group, called on 
the Supreme Court and the superior judiciary to not recognise the newly appointed Chief Justice. 
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2.5 A State of Exception, A National Security State 
 
Corinna Mullin (2014) succinctly defines the anti-democratic trends often 
associated with the “national security state” paradigm: the centralisation of 
power in the hands of the executive (at the expense of accountability and 
transparency normally derived from the separation of state powers); 
increased invocation of the state secrecy prerogative; use of surveillance, 
problematic jurisdictions and violations of due process guarantees; an 
expanded role for the military and various intelligence agencies in civil life; 
and increased restrictions on individual rights of liberty, speech, association 
and privacy. Further, institutionalised violence and terror can flourish within 
the national security state. Sri Lanka is a state of exception; emergency laws 
have governed the state for thirty years. Giorgio Agamben defines the state of 
exception as the threshold between the ‘normal’ situation and chaos, the 
inside and the outside, where the distinction between the two becomes 
complicated. According to Agamben (1998: 19), as “there is no rule that is 
applicable to chaos,” chaos must first be included in the juridical order 
through the creation of a zone of indistinction. This zone of indistinction, 
Agamben posits, is increasingly the political foundation in the modern age. 
The state of exception is becoming the rule (1998: 20).  
 
With the extension and transformation of the derogation model into 
systemised atrocity in Sri Lanka, a state of exception was established. 
Agamben argues that the sovereign nomos (the spirit of the law) is the 
principle that, joining law and violence, threatens them with indistinction 
(1998: 31). Sri Lankan authors have suggested that the unfettered use of 
violence in everyday life, carried out by state authorities and by unidentified 
individuals and groups associated with the state, is indicative of a state of 
exception in Sri Lanka (Wedagedara, 2011; Pinto-Jayawardena, 2009). The rule 
of law and the protective functions of the state are undermined by violence 
perpetrated in the service of the Rajapaksa regime. The impunity granted to 
the perpetrators through lack of investigation into criminal activity and 
human rights violations, and the absence of prosecutions, demonstrates that 
the rule of law has failed and extrajudicial violence has been accepted into the 
normal functioning of the state (Pinto-Jayawardena, 2010). Discourses of 
terrorism and counter-terrorism have been operationalised over the years of 
war to legitimise exceptional measures that form the basis of a “militarized, 
state-centric national security paradigm” (Rajasingham-Senanayake, 2009a). 
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Rajasingham-Senanayake (2010) draws on Jack Nelson-Pallmeyer, who 
defines the national security state with reference to seven characteristics 
summarised below. His definition resonates closely with Feitlowitz’s analysis 
of life under the Argentinian junta and the ideological tools employed by the 
generals who assumed power in the “Gentleman’s Coup” of 1976 (1998: xi). 
The country, Feitlowitz argues “was exhausted and more than anything 
wanted order” (1998: xi). The generals, in a time of political upheaval, “were 
reassuringly calm” and, in an eloquent fashion, infused official rhetoric with 
“all the traits we associate with authoritarian discourse: obsession with the 
enemy, triumphal oratory, exaggerated abstraction and messianic slogans” 
(1998: xi). The first characteristic of a National Security State, Nelson-
Pallmeyer (1992: 35) asserts, is that the military is the highest authority and 
not only attends to state security but also dictates “the overall direction of 
society,” including the enjoyment of substantial power over political and 
economic affairs. Such states can “maintain an appearance of democracy” but 
ultimate power rests with the military or the security establishment. These 
states rely on ideology that preserves the concentration of capital under the 
military and elites associated with the security establishment, communicated 
in the language of “freedom” or “development” (1992: 35). Additionally, 
Nelson-Pallmeyer argues, National Security States are characterised by their 
obsession with ‘enemies of the state,’ against whom any means can be 
justified: “Defending against external and/or internal enemies becomes a 
leading preoccupation of the state, a distorting factor in the economy, and a 
major source of national identity and purpose” (1992: 35). Nelson-Pallmeyer’s 
sixth feature is the restriction of public debate and participation in political 
life by means of “secrecy or intimidation”: by sowing fear, restricting and 
distorting information, and implementing secretive policies “through covert 
channels and clandestine activities” (1992: 35).  
 
The state’s actions are packaged in vague appeals to “national security” and 
rhetoric of a “higher purpose” (1992: 35).44 For Feitlowitz, Argentina under 
the Generals was a terrorist state, one that created two worlds: “one public 
and one clandestine, each with its own encoded discourse” (1998: xi). The 
junta employed a logic by which theirs was the ‘absolute truth’ and ‘objective 
reality’: nobody else could be trusted and certainly language itself could not 
                                                        
44 Nelson-Pallmeyer adds a sixth feature of the National Security State, which refers to the 
complicity of the Church establishment: the church is expected to mobilise its financial, 
ideological, and theological resources in service to the National Security State. Though the 
Catholic Church in Sri Lanka is a powerful and organised institution, it is the Buddhist Sangha’s 
support that provides much legitimacy to the state.  
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be trusted. Admiral Emilio Massera, a leader of the Coup, warned his 
audience to beware of words: “Unfaithful to their meaning, words perturb 
our powers of reason” (1998: 19). He described words as “unfaithful”, capable 
of betraying the unsuspecting and destroying the innocent. “The only safe 
words are our words” (Feitlowitz, 1998: 19). The warning leveled by the 
Admiral was surreal, for it captured exactly what Massera himself was doing: 
“spinning an intricate verbal web to ensnare his audience and perturb [their] 
powers of reason” (1998: 19). Language is central to the establishment of a 
National Security State. 
 
 
2.6 State Terror and Denial  
 
Paul Gilbert defines repression as a blanket term for methods that 
governments deem indispensible in suppressing dissent (1994: 156). State 
repression usually takes the form of harsh security measures, curfews, limits 
on civil and political rights and freedoms, and ‘exceptional’ legislation. Where 
dissent is not quelled by these measures, the state can resort to extra-legal 
means in an attempt to silence opposition through intimidation and fear. The 
term “terrorist state” can be applied to a state which systematically uses terror 
and is defined, to an extent, by the long-lasting and relentless deployment of 
practices of terror against its citizens (Primoratz, 2005). The introduction of 
seemingly random and disorientating violence such as massacres, enforced 
disappearances, torture and arson are characteristic of a state ruling by terror 
(Green and Ward, 204: 106). The creation and sustenance of cultures of terror 
are based on silence and myth; fear and uncertainty are tools of power and 
domination (Taussig, 1987).  
 
The monopoly of organised violence held by the state is typically considered 
appropriate for an entity identified as “guardian of law and order” (Weber, 
2004: 328). Applying the label of “terrorism” is a discursive practice that 
designates a certain form of violence as illegitimate, evil and morally 
reprehensible (Weber, 2004: 328). The label of terrorism has largely become a 
tool in the state’s arsenal to facilitate and justify heightened security measures 
and the establishment of a national security state. However, there are 
indications that a “critical turn” is taking place in scholarship, with analysis of 
state terror identified as an academic imperative and a call for more research 
to be carried out on the topic as “a matter of fundamental social, political and 
intellectual importance” (Mickler, 2010: 28; Jackson et al., 2010; Green and 
Ward, 2004). State terrorism and violence termed “non-state terrorism” are 
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markedly different in methods, aims and results (Jackson et al., 2010: 5). In 
terms of the scale of atrocity committed, “anti-state terrorism pales into 
relative insignificance comparison” to state terrorism (Sluka, 2000: 1). The 
harm caused by the “international terrorism” of states as opposed to the 
“retail terrorism” of non-state actors, a term coined by Chomsky (2002: vi), is 
incomparable, as the former results in large-scale devastation that non-state 
groups usually do not have the resources to inflict. In terms of aims, non-state 
actors may see their struggle as a form of “revolutionary terrorism”, the aim 
of which is to replace the current, oppressive order with a new one more 
suited to the interests of the population (Gilbert, 1994: 22-23). The aim is to 
achieve, through violent pressure, a restructuring of the current political 
order. State terror, on the other hand, maintains the status quo as its primary 
objective (Sluka, 2000): to suppress opposition and resistance.  
 
Essential to the power of state terror is the disorientating, bewildering effect 
of seemingly random and indiscriminate violence on the population at large. 
As Zulaika and Douglas (1996: 11) argue, the true impact of an event can be 
measured in the collective imagination. Terror can trigger public exclusion 
from political engagement, allowing political power to become more 
centralised and governance increasingly authoritarian. Political leaders 
manipulate legal provisions and expand their powers to an extreme and 
draconian extent, employing the existence of “terrorists” as the “negative 
justification” for national security measures (Weber, 2004: 329). Unidentified 
militia groups or un-named and unaccountable security forces operate 
outside the law on behalf of the government; state institutions become 
instruments of denial.  
 
 
2.7 State Terror in Sri Lanka 
 
As Margo Kleinfield (2003, 2005) argues, state-perpetrated violations of 
human rights in Sri Lanka have been termed “state terror” since 9/11, as the 
LTTE adapted ‘War on Terror’ discourses for its own purposes.45 The use of 
the term ‘terror’ in relation to state practice is in the ascendancy in academic 
circles, but its application to the situation in Sri Lanka is not new. The 
commonplace occurrences of disappearances, massacres and unlawful 
killings during the JVP Sinhalese rural uprising in 1989 were collectively 
                                                        
45 The adaption and domestication of ‘War on Terror’ discourses is addressed in greater detail in 
Chapter Two’s analysis of the state’s adaptation of transnational discourses. 
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termed “the terror,” in which state-perpetrated atrocity was deliberately 
ineffectively investigated by the police (Hughes, 2013; Pinto-Jayawardena, 
2010: 128). With the LTTE’s launch of “Tamil Eelam War II” in 1990, the 
government responded by employing “scorched earth” policies, achieving 
military defeat by means of brute numerical force. Official death squads were 
sponsored to contribute to the terror and “show killings” were performed for 
the purpose of terrorising the population (Bloom, 2003: 69). Large-scale 
human rights abuses were reported in the north and east, assaults were 
launched by air and sea, and activists claim that governmental violence was 
manifest in a systematic campaign of disappearances, rape, torture, massacres 
of entire villages, and the dehumanisation of Tamils through counter-terrorist 
surveillance methods such as checkpoint searches (Rajasingham-Senanyake, 
2002).  
 
Abductions and disappearances by “white van” are commonplace. TAG 
(2013: 4) notes that “white van” networks “are part of a cluster of cooperative 
partnerships with other State instrumentalities – such as the judiciary, the 
prisons, the defense establishment, hospitals” and “paramilitaries, private 
criminal gangs and government military personnel”. White vans are “an 
instrument of State machinery which beats at the heart of Sri Lanka’s culture 
of impunity” and the networks are “an embedded element of Sri Lankan 
democratic politics” (TAG, 2013: 4). U.S. Ambassador to Sri Lanka in 2006, 
Robert O. Blake, noted in a memo released by Wikileaks that the 
government’s use of paramilitaries for abductions and killings kept critics 
afraid and also gave Colombo “a measure of deniability” (quoted in Kumara, 
2010). 
 
In March 2012, during my fieldwork in Sri Lanka, a Tamil businessman was 
bundled into a white van and disappeared outside the Colombo law courts, 
just blocks from my interview with a human rights organisation (BBC, 2012; 
CM, 2012). Later in my fieldwork period, a crowd detained a group of 
individuals identified as off-duty military personnel, recorded them on 
camera phones and brought them to the police station after a failed abduction 
attempt. SLFP Chairman of the Kolonnawa Urban Council, Ravindra 
Udayashantha, called the police when he perceived that four men were 
attempting to abduct him – one month after his younger brother was 
abducted – and the crowd demanded that the men be taken in for 
questioning. The men were released without charge and the officer in charge 
of the Wellampitiya Police station at the time, Ranjith Samaranayake, was 
transferred soon after (Abeywickrema, 2013). KD, a Tamil political 
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commentator, noted that, with this incident, “for the first time ever as they have 
names, ranks, video clips that the government is behind the white van abduction” 
(KD, 2012). The state reinterpretation apparatus quickly formulated an 
explanation: military Spokesperson Brigadier Ruwan Wanigasooriya denied 
the claim and stated that the men were in the area to apprehend army 
deserters (Abeywickrema, 2013). Impunity for these atrocities is embedded in 
the functioning of the state. 
 
The state forces have also systematically perpetrated (and continues to 
perpetrate) rape as a tool to punish and spread terror amongst the Tamil 
community (AHRC, 2012: 46-7; HRW, 2013). The Asian Human Rights 
Commission (2012) states that military superiors and government officials 
explicitly encourage rape as a method of persecution. Rape in custody – 
where detention is usually under the auspices of the PTA - promotes fear and 
nourishes a culture of terror. A mass of documentation has been produced by 
human rights organisations and NGOs that comprehensively attest to the 
spiral of violence and repression instigated by the state to suppress the 
separatist movement and intimidate dissenters to majority rule into silence 
(AI and Forrest, 1996; Somasundaram, 1998; AHRC, 2012; Wickrematunge, R., 
2009; Pinto-Jayawardena, 2007, 2010). The reports list torture, threats and 
intimidation, disappearances, killings and the destruction of property as the 
forms of political violence fielded by the state forces. Torture is 
institutionalised and used disproportionately and punitively against Tamils 
(Fernando and Anderson, 2009; HRW, 2013).  
 
 
2.8 Executive Power, Denial and Commissions of Inquiry 
 
Fernando and Anderson (2009) offer an illustrative conception of “phantom 
limb” institutions in Sri Lanka. Institutions to serve the population, such as 
Human Rights Commissions and the Judiciary, ought to exist, they give the 
appearance of being in existence, but their purpose is merely to project 
democratic functionality and provide an avenue of denial for the government 
(Fernando and Anderson, 2009; AI, 2009). The Executive Presidency, brought 
into being under the 1978 Constitution, assigns the president the 
simultaneous roles of head of state, head of the executive, head of the 
government, and commander in chief of the armed forces. He is, by virtue of 
Article 35, unanswerable to the courts, or to any other public body. His 
powers include the appointment of all public ministers and the control of all 
ministerial bodies. Placing the Executive President outside the jurisdiction of 
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courts, the AHRC (2010: 16) argues, removed the judicial ability to protect 
individual liberties, offering him immunity from judicial action “as the driver 
of national objectives through various development and security projects, like 
anti-terrorism activities”.  
 
President Rajapaksa holds the power to personally appoint commissions of 
inquiry into wide-ranging issues of public concern, for example corruption 
and conflict-related disappearances, and he exercises this power regularly 
(CPA, 2013; Crisis Group, 2011). Interviewees in the South referred to a 
general faith among the population in commissions of inquiry, despite the 
lack of results arising from state-instigated investigations into human rights 
abuses and atrocity (SBP, MM, JU, 2012).46 The reports of these initiatives are 
often handed personally to the President, with no information released to the 
public on content or outcomes (CPA, 2013). A Sinhalese academic stated that 
governments in Sri Lanka have adopted a regular strategy of “appointing 
commissions to divert public attention and to manage the situation…once the 
commission report has been submitted to the President…it is forgotten” (JU, 2012). 
He asserted that establishing commissions is a way of manipulating the 
system, “in order to divert attention and also to reduce tension and ultimately not to 
do anything, after spending a lot of money on the commission” (JU, 2012).  
 
The entire system of governance in Sri Lanka is based on terror and denial of 
that terror. As the state waged war on the LTTE ‘terrorists’, a double 
understanding of daily life came into play. The state actively denies 
responsibility for, and complicity in, atrocities, yet citizens are aware that the 
state forces and other illegal proxies are the perpetrators. Investigations 
launched never result in prosecution, especially not self-prosecution of 
members of the security apparatus (AI, 2009; Pinto-Jayawardena, 2010). State 
terror includes violations of the rights of the population at the civil, political 
and personal integrity level and these violations are carried out with 
impunity, as institutional redress is impossible. 
 
 
2.9 State Terror and the Media 
 
                                                        
46 The CPA has compiled a full list of the various Commissions of Inquiry established under the 
Rajapaksa government, available at http://www.cpalanka.org/a-list-of-commissions-and-
committees-appointed-by-gosl-2006-2013/ [accessed 25 May 2014], demonstrating the lack of 
transparency involved in these processes. There is little information made public with regard to 
conclusions, outcomes and the actual functioning of these commissions and committees, 
including whether they are actually still in existence.  
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State terror inflicted upon the population continues today, with 
disappearances and killings being conducted openly, often in broad daylight, 
and disproportionately targeting minorities (MRG, 2011). The political 
assassination that has received the most media coverage in recent years is the 
murder of Lasantha Wickrematunge, editor of the Sunday Leader newspaper 
and open critic of the government. Masked men on motorcycles shot him 
dead on a weekday morning, as he made his way to work in central Colombo 
in January 2009 (Thottam, 2009). A posthumous editorial entitled “And Then 
They Came For Me” (inspired by the poem of the German theologian, Martin 
Niem”ller) asserted that his killing would be at the hands of the government: 
“When finally I am killed, it will be the government that kills me” 
(Wickrematunge, 2009). One of the most powerful aspects of the editorial 
describes the environment in which journalism is pursued in Sri Lanka: 
 
“We find ourselves in the midst of a civil war ruthlessly prosecuted by 
protagonists whose bloodlust knows no bounds. Terror, whether 
perpetrated by terrorists or the state, has become the order of the day. 
Indeed, murder has become the primary tool whereby the state seeks 
to control the organs of liberty” (Wickrematunge, 2009).  
 
Self-censorship in the journalistic profession reached new heights with this 
high-profile killing. The Committee to Protect Journalists recorded the 
murders of 25 journalists in Sri Lanka between 1992 and 2009; most of these 
killings took place between 2004 and 2009 (CPJ, 2012). The media watchdog 
Journalists for Democracy in Sri Lanka (JDS) states that 39 media workers 
have been killed or disappeared since the present government took office in 
late 2005, including non-editorial staff (JDS, 2012). An Amnesty International 
report documents the deaths of 14 journalists, most of them Tamil, between 
2006 and 2010 (AI USA, 2010). Tamils Against Genocide (2013) emphasise that 
the killings, intimidation and assaults are ethnically targeted and occur 
largely in the context of advocacy for political rights for the Tamils. The 
Rajapaksa government has overseen hundreds of disappearances and 
extrajudicial killings. According to a joint report carried out in 2007 by three 
reputable oganisations, the Civil Monitoring Commission, Free Media 
Movement and the Law and Society Trust, 662 killings and 540 
disappearances occurred from January to August 2007 (MRG, 2011: 25).  
 
The Sinhala-language print media is a crucial site for political and ideological 
struggle and the systematic manufacturing of consent and support for 
warfare (Chaaminda, 2011). The Asian Commission for Human Rights (2010: 
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6) argues that the Sri Lankan state “has learned to excel at creating and 
controlling a single, official version of the truth. Society, for its part, has 
largely accepted the state’s self-anointed role as arbiter of truth and 
falsehood.” The AHRC quotes Basil Fernando, who summarises the situation 
in Sri Lanka:  
 
“Those who run the media also usually comply with demands to 
reproduce and disseminate government propaganda. Those who do 
not comply are threatened” (2010: 6).  
 
The media has been disciplined and subjugated by years of intimidation and 
harassment (AHRC, 2010: 6) and as a result of state nepotism, clientelism and 
networks of patronage and media ownership (LG, SH, SB, 2012; Chaaminda, 
2011; TAG, 2013; Nadarajah, 2005). In a context where “journalists have been 
killed – it is a very real threat” (PK, 2012), the media adheres to the official script 
and alternative narratives are discredited as “pro-Tiger” or the work of 
“traitors” (AS, SH, 2012). State terror has been operational for decades, to 
silence opposition and critical or independent reporting in the country, 
ensuring that the official line is maintained (Hattotuwa, 2009; IPFFEM, 2008; 
UTHR-J, 2009; AHRC, 2010). TAG reminds us that this process targets Tamil 
media workers almost exclusively, and that being “critical of the Government 
of Sri Lanka (GoSL) is less pertinent as a risk factor than being critical of the 
government’s conduct pre, during and post-war, towards the Tamil 
population” (TAG, 2013: 1). The state forces are assumed to be responsible for 
these atrocities.  
 
Interviewees in 2012 were consistent in describing the silencing of voices 
critical of the government or the final military operation by attacks and 
intimidation. According to a range of media workers and civil society 
activists, questioning the strategy of militarism and non-negotiation with the 
LTTE was, at the End, equated to supporting terrorism and betraying the Sri 
Lankan ‘motherland’ (AS, LG, SH, 2012). In the early 1990s, the government 
began to restrict the media presence in Sri Lanka, to “prevent negative 
publicity in the West” and avoid condemnation of its human rights record 
(Oberst, 1992: 130). Though official censorship, which was periodically 
imposed over the years of war, was abrogated under the Rajapaksa 
government, interviewees spoke of official silencing through terror, threats 
and intimidation, resulting in pervasive self-censorship in the media and 
adherence to the state narrative by both state and independent media (SB, SH, 
LG, YT, PJ, 2012). Tamil newspapers in Jaffna tread carefully, reporting based 
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on a careful equation: “50% based on truth, 50% based on security services news” 
(YT, 2012). The media were prevented from visiting battle zones unless as 
part of officially conducted tours, accompanied by the military (Athas, 2008; 
LG, 2012). “The media have to depend on hand outs from the military” 
(Athas, 2008; YT, PJ, LG, 2012).  
 
Journalists in the North live in fear of “threats, killings, attacks” (YT, 2012) and 
white van abductions (PJ, 2012). Journalists from the Tamil community and 
within the more independent and critical media establishments spoke of the 
fear of “white van” disappearances, regular visits from the security forces to 
the offices of media organisations and the self-censorship implicit in Sri 
Lankan journalistic practices (KD, SB, SH, LG, 2012). Journalists are expected 
to repeat the official line uncritically: “if the defence media or spokesman said that 
he saw a white crow flying, we would have to say it too” (PJ, 2012). However, LG 
(2012) argued that the government is more concerned with Sinhala discourse 
than English or Tamil as it is the Sinhala language news that reaches its 
electoral base. Journalists are “regularly reminded of the threat” of violence, 
which guarantees the widespread practice of self-censorship and the 
dominance of state-owned and pro-government news outlets (Crisis Group, 
2011: 18).  
 
“Journalists publishing in Sinhala publications are attacked for much less 
than those publishing in the English language. Social legitimacy in the 
country keeps the regime afloat, based on popular support of the ordinary 
Sinhalese” (LG, 2012). 
 
 
2.10 The Media and the End 
 
 In early 2009 as the state military closed in on the LTTE stronghold in the 
Vanni, mainstream media could do little else but regurgitate the news 
provided by the state through the Ministry of Defence Website and the Media 
Centre for National Security (SB, 2012). “Information at that point was available 
from state sources and from pro-LTTE and LTTE websites” (PJ, 2012). Bias was 
assumed in Tamil reporting, as noted by TAG (2013), and mainstream news 
sources in English – domestic and international – were reluctant to carry the 
Tamil narrative. For English-speaking media outlets to stray from the official 
discourse and offer alternative, critical narratives would lead them to 
vilification: “lumped with the NGOs and the Western agenda” (SB, 2012) and 
portrayed by the state as being embroiled in an anti-Sri Lanka conspiracy and 
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persecution of national ‘war heroes.’ In parallel, “it was difficult getting people to 
speak” at the time (SB, 2012). Journalists often could not do much more than 
actually report the narrative supplied by the state and “try to justify it in a way 
as saying ‘at least we are keeping this issue on the agenda.’ We are reminding people 
that there is… a human dimension” (SB, 2012). Alternative sources of 
information were inaccessible at the time and “it became difficult to get another 
point of view.” The UN was strictly minimal with public statements and most 
often the government narrative was unchallenged (SB, 2012). 
 
In Jaffna, the Tamil media described being reliant on “three sources at the end of 
the war: the government, through press conferences, the media ministry and defence 
ministry – these give the government side; websites; and news from the Vanni” (YT, 
2012). Websites were presumed to be run by LTTE-affiliated groups in the 
diaspora (PJ, 2012). News filtered from the Vanni through relatives with 
mobile phones who were trapped there (PJ, YT, MTJ, 2012). Information was 
primarily passed through the diaspora as, “it was cheaper to call abroad under an 
LTTE phone scheme than it was to call locals in Sri Lanka” (PJ, 2012). While the 
atmosphere in the South was one of fear and silence, “Jaffna was terrorised at 
the time, nobody was speaking. You can’t imagine” (YT, 2012).  
 
 
2.11 Sri Lanka’s State of Denial 
 
Methods of denial have been used with dexterity by the Sri Lankan state to 
avoid international condemnation at the End, as well as routinely rebuffing 
allegations of atrocity in the decades of conflict. The mechanisms used by the 
state to issue denials in various forms are remarkably consistent with the 
models described by Cohen (2001). Whether fashioned for the benefit of the 
domestic population or spun for the international community, the rhetoric of 
the Sri Lankan government has represented events and state-community 
relationships using denials, reinterpretation and implicit justifications to suit 
the political landscape and to achieve its goals with a minimum of dissent or 
criticism. The state’s recourse to methods of denial actively created the 
conditions for the End: an unparalleled atrocity in Sri Lanka’s long war. 
Cohen refers to the work of the recently deceased Israel Gutman - a Holocaust 
survivor and witness-testifier at the Eichman trial - to illustrate the state’s 
potential to act with duplicity (2001: 97). As Gutman (1985: 85) stated with 
devastating simplicity, “the Holocaust was already being denied as it 
happened”. While pursuing nefarious actions, the state apparatus is put to 
work, laying the foundations for denials. In Sri Lanka, the “open secret” of the 
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atrocities committed at the End was acknowledged in varying ways by the 
Sinhalese population in the South and decried by the Tamils (and sections of 
Sinhalese society), though activism was limited by the media blockade, 
censorship and dearth of information deemed “reliable” (TAG, 2013). As 
Cohen (2001: 79) argues, such an “open secret” does not necessarily mean 
collective responsibility but it does imply that there are gradations of 
collective knowing. It is not, for Cohen, just how much is actually known by 
the population, but rather how much is acknowledged.  
 
Over the years of war in Sri Lanka, the state discourse included “not just self-
righteous rhetoric for justifying atrocities” but “a re-arranged truth, a 
mythological reality” (Cohen, 2001: 83-4). Atrocities such as torture, 
disappearances in “white vans”, killings, destruction of property, beatings 
and intimidation are part-acknowledged by the government as “happening,” 
always using a linguistic technique that removes the subject-perpetrator from 
the description of events. Extra-legal practices “happen” regularly but are 
vehemently distanced from the actions of the security forces, though rumours 
of death squads within the MOD have been prevalent. Police spokesman, 
Superintendent Ajith Rohana, for example, said in 2012: "There are 
abductions. It happens. But generally we are conducting investigations into 
the matter" (quoted in BBC, 2012). But prompted by the journalist to comment 
on death squads, he responded, "We don't have them. We totally deny that 
allegation. We don't have any type of squads like that" (BBC, 2012). During 
the time of the 1987-89 JVP uprising, death squads were officially 
unacknowledged but certainly at least condoned by the state (Samaranayake, 
2007: 114; Blake, quoted in Kumara, 2010). The illegal groupings were 
allegedly made up of off-duty police officers and military personnel (Oberst, 
1992: 128; Samaranayake, 2007: 115).  
 
Government-backed death squads have been responsible for thousands of 
killings and disappearances (HRW, 2008). Crisis Group (2007: 9) argues, “it is 
clear that the problem goes beyond a few undisciplined soldiers or out-of-
control paramilitaries and is part of a policy devised and conducted by senior 
military officials.” Under Mahinda Rajapaksa’s presidency, disappearances 
rose exponentially. Human Rights Watch in 2008 described this development 
as the “return of a haunting phenomenon from the country’s past”. Activists 
in northern Sri Lanka declared that pro-government paramilitaries and the 
security forces – forming groups of “shadowy gunmen” – “go about in white 
vans and with masks on motorcycles and are by now unconcerned about 
hiding their affiliations” (UTHR-J, 2006; Crisis Group, 2007). At the official 
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level, there is systemic impunity and a lack of investigation into these 
atrocities. Statements by government officials suggest that no 
“disappearance” crisis exists and dismiss claims as LTTE propaganda (HRW, 
2008: 9, 11). Contrasting reports from officials suggest that the crisis is fuelled 
by the acts of LTTE fighters and common criminals, not the state security 
forces or their proxies (HRW, 2008: 9).  
 
In a 2013 interview, President Rajapaksa dismissed the “white van” 
phenomenon as anti-government propaganda. Laughing, he asked the Al-
Jazeera reporter, “why not use a black van or a blue van? This is all 
propaganda” (Rajapaksa, 2013a). In Sri Lanka, he declared, in contrast to 
other countries, if “incidents” occur the blame is directly allocated to the 
government. He asserted that this assumption of state involvement in 
violence was unfair, premised on pro-LTTE propaganda and the international 
community’s haste to “bully” a small country (Rajapaksa, 2013a). A pro-
government journalist added a complementary explanation: undocumented 
migration. “When you talk about abductions and white vans, people tend to believe 
the armed forces are abducting Tamil civilians and somehow those people who were 
abducted turned up in Australia, Canada and America” (SF, 2012). 
 
Despite official flippancy and denial based on claims of propaganda, Human 
Rights Watch (2008) documents at least 9 commissions of inquiry set up to 
address the disappearance phenomenon. Mandates, timeframes and results 
have not been made public and certainly have not resulted in prosecutions or 
systemic reforms (HRW, 2008; CPA, 2013). In response to international 
attention on this issue, the Sri Lankan state conformed to two of Stanley 
Cohen’s forms of denial. Firstly, the state has “intensively lobbied 
international organizations and bilateral partners, emphasizing 
improvements in the human rights situation and its willingness to cooperate 
with UN officials and human rights specialists” (HRW, 2008: 12). Following 
Cohen’s (2001: 113) “path of partial acknowledgement”, the state has sought 
the patience of the international community and presents itself as under siege 
by a disembodied phenomenon, struggling to improve the human rights 
situation and, in its sincerity, prepared to accept assistance. In parallel, and 
inconsistently, the government has launched fierce attacks on its critics, 
including the very same UN representatives, accusing them of being “at best, 
ignorant of the situation and, at worst, LTTE sympathizers” (HRW, 2008: 12). 
This “counter-offensive”, in Cohen’s (2001: 112) terms, attempts to undermine 
and discredit the statements of critics. A situation now exists in Sri Lanka 
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where atrocities are normalised, partly acknowledged, denied, attributed to 
the enemies of the state or criminals, and ultimately uninvestigated.  
 
While Cohen (2001: 84) recognises that external criticisms can actually make 
“the denials stronger and the ideology more sacrosanct”, the ability to invoke 
literal denial on the world stage through control of the media allowed the 
government space to wage the war against the LTTE with impunity. Greater 
international visibility and transparency in the modern age have made literal 
forms of denial more difficult to sustain but the unavailability of ‘reliable’ or 
known media sources means that foreign audiences who are unsure of the 
‘complexity’ of the situation are less willing to condemn the state. President 
Rajapaksa (2013a) emphasises the importance of seeing the “background” 
circumstances that have caused “incidents” in the post-conflict phase. The 
implication is that if outsiders were less biased, less hasty to lay the blame at 
the feet of the government, the incidents could be legitimately explained. The 
government relies heavily on the rhetoric of “traitors” and “pro-Tiger” critics 
launched attacks human rights activists and NGOs, accusing them of pro-
Tiger bias.  By undermining the “reliability, objectivity and credibility of the 
observer”, literal denial is effective (Cohen, 2001: 105).  
 
The state’s pattern of denials has relied heavily on the language of national 
security and counter-terrorism; ‘necessity’ is provided as a justification for the 
establishment of a national security state. Repressive legislation was framed 
as ‘counter-terrorism’ legislation and upheld as a necessary response to the 
threat to national security. The PTA and ERs existed primarily to provide the 
maximum amount of social control and impunity possible to the executive 
government, and to silence dissent. The ERs were finally withdrawn in 2011, 
after much advocacy by human rights groups (AI, 2011; HRW, 2011). The 
primary purpose of these tools was to concentrate power under the Executive 
President and to facilitate practices of state terror that have quelled activism 
and free speech and amounted to mass violations of rights (Pinto-
Jayawardena, 2007, 2010). The ethnic nature of the conflict and the ‘terrorist 
threat’ informed the practices of counter-terrorism. A suspect community, 
comprised entirely of Tamils, was constructed and policed. Cohen (2001: 96) 
describes an ideologically rooted process of “denying the victim”, in which 
melodramatic narratives of heroes, victims, conquest, defeat and revenge are 
evoked to blame the “Other”, relying on “history” to prove that the “victims” 
actually “started it” and deserve to be punished. Sri Lanka’s specific mytho-
history, contained in the Mahavamsa Buddhist chronicles, has been 
promoted, utilised and appropriated by Sinhalese-Buddhist political actors in 
 113 
contemporary politics. Violence against the Other – the Tamil – is justified 
with reference to historical battles between the Sinhalese and Tamils and the 
victimhood of the Sinhalese people. The political consciousness of Sri Lanka’s 
majority population is underpinned by what Cohen (2001: 97) terms a 
“supremely sentimental nationalism,” one that authorises violence against the 
Other as necessary to fulfil the destiny of the Sinhalese people: to protect the 
island for Sinhala-Buddhists. Media restrictions and counter-terror measures 
were coupled with the continuing rhetoric of the ‘unreasonable Tamil 
terrorist.’ This proved devastating to inter-community relations and created a 
Sinhalese population unsympathetic to the plight of the Tamil people.47 
 
In 2009, the Sinhalese population, conditioned by years of discursive 
habituation, brutalised by war, and convinced of the righteousness of the 
state’s battle against the ‘Tamil terrorists’, had become psychologically (and 
geographically) distant from the Tamil struggle and the violence committed 
against the population at the End. The overarching prerogative was national 
security, to be rid of the threat violence posed by the LTTE. A Sinhalese-
Buddhist newspaper editor explained how socio-economic circumstances 
ensured healthy conscription to the military, yet there was little faith in 
leaders prior to ‘Mahinda’:  
 
“The war did not happen in the north and east, the war was happening all 
over the country, people were dying. Not just through and by suicide attacks 
and bomb explosions. [W]ho were the people who were fighting? Children of 
poor parents who didn’t have a job, so they had to go and fight. And they were 
fighting a war that was not being fought, because politicians were just 
playing. So in 2005 there was a difference…[Mahinda Rajapaksa] had a very 
clear policy about how to deal with it and he got the people behind him and 
they went and did it” (MS, 2012). 
 
Before Rajapaksa came to power, MS argued, futile negotiations illustrated 
the inefficiency of politicians. On-going insecurity and the violence of the 
                                                        
47 Robert Oberst (1992: 131) noted even in 1992 that the island’s population was “increasingly 
numbed by the carnage” and that life, particularly in Tamil areas, was “brutalized.” The 
University Teachers for Human Rights, Jaffna, a group who steadfastly documented and reflected 
upon the violence in northern Sri Lanka’s over the years of war, describe the brutalisation of 
society: “Violence dehumanises and brutalises the user. Once the hands are soiled with blood, as 
it were, the usual inhibitions and taboos that operate internally are broken. With this lack of 
restraint and loss of control, comes a feeling of power -absolute power. A marked intolerance for 
difference of opinion, a fanatic faith in ones own view or a blind obedience to leadership, a 
conviction of infallibility, and a casual indifference to pain, suffering and life, manifest 
themselves.” (UTHR-J, 2001: chapter 7)  
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LTTE justified the return to war. “They didn’t go the extra mile, they went about 
100 miles, successive governments. So there was no way there could be any other kind 
of end to it other than military confrontation” (MS, 2012). The majority 
population, Tamil academics asserted, engaged in “a kind of knowing self-
deception” at the End, uncritically accepting the official narrative and ignoring 
reports of state perpetrated atrocity (KD, 2012). “Whatever the government did 
was in the highest interests of the people. That’s the perception they had” (MM, 
2012). 
 
2.12 Civilian Casualties and Denial 
 
As an illustrative example of Cohen’s literal denial, the government has 
contested claims by human right organisations and the UN that the state 
forces killed a disproportionate and “unacceptably high” number of civilians 
at the End (Ki-Moon, 2009). Official statements have declared that because a 
policy of “zero civilian casualties” was in place, the state forces did not spill a 
single drop of civilian blood in the final military operation against the LTTE 
(MOD, 2011). Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, the Secretary of Defence, described to Sri 
Lanka’s Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC, described in 
Chapter Three) how the President introduced the “major concept” of “zero 
civilian casualties” to all operational orders from the Army, Navy and 
Airforce Headquarters. He insisted that although this concept might be 
construed as only a “sentence in operations”, the message reached all 
battalion levels that “it is very important to plan to avoid civilian casualties”. 
This strategy, he maintained, was implemented flawlessly by the disciplined 
armed forces (Rajapaksa, G., 2010). Within Cohen’s (2001: 107-8) framework 
of denial, Gotabhaya’s statements would fall within the category of “magic 
legalism”. The language of legalism, and in this context, the language of 
policy, provides a powerful basis for interpretive denial. “Magic legalism” 
Cohen (2010: 108) asserts, “is a method to ‘prove’ that an allegation could not 
possibly be correct because the action is illegal.” The state adheres faithfully 
to the tenets of international humanitarian law and a policy of civilian 
protection, therefore, no civilian casualties could possibly have occurred. 
Also, the military strategies employed were informed by a humanitarian 
disposition:  
 
“ [P]arallel to the military plan we had a plan for humanitarian 
assistance whether it is for the no fire zone, the policy level, the zero 
civilian casualties, restrictions on use of heavy weapons, the training of 
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soldiers, all these were done to prevent civilian casualties” (Rajapaksa, 
G., 2010).  
 
With such training, monitoring and policies in place, Gotabhaya asks, how 
could the allegations of ‘unacceptably high’ civilian casualties be true?  
 
This rhetoric of magic legalism and efficient policy was accompanied by a 
dearth of official and verifiable information on this issue, which “has led to 
widely varying figures of civilian casualty estimates by different entities, 
media organizations and authorities” (LLRC, 2010: ix, x). Over the course of 
the Sri Lankan conflict, both the state and the LTTE deployed misinformation 
on casualty figures to promote their own political and strategic military 
agendas. The state has been said to downplay civilian casualty figures to 
maintain the political support of the majority population and to mitigate the 
damage to their human rights record internationally (Athas, 2008). The LTTE 
and the politicised Tamil diaspora have also been accused of quoting higher 
death figures in order to garner sympathy and outrage in the international 
sphere, exaggerating the human tragedy underway to enhance the narrative 
of a “trauma drama”, as described by Laleh Khalili (2007; Reuters, 2011).  
 
In the context of a fierce propaganda war, the state has instrumentalised the 
prevalence of disinformation and contested accounts of casualty figures to 
undermine criticisms by the media, civil society groups and human rights 
organisations. These organisations, and officials within the UN and ICRC, 
have been framed as complicit in an anti-Sri Lanka movement, funded by 
pro-LTTE groups or misled by the LTTE propaganda machine. There is, 
according to the MOD website, a “long list of global I/NGOs waging a 
propaganda war against Sri Lanka” (Mahindapala, 2012). For example, 
“Appalling Journalism”, a 2011 ‘Sri Lanka Media Watch’ publication 
produced to counter the claims of a Channel 4 documentary named “Sri 
Lanka’s Killing Fields” laments the absence of independent witnesses in the 
final stages of the war and describes “the virtually insurmountable difficulties 
in ascertaining simple facts.” The publication, hosted on the MOD website, 
attacks the impartiality and credibility of the video footage and eyewitness 
testimony contained in the documentary. While questioning the motives of 
contributors and of Channel 4 itself, the report glosses over the fact that the 
absence of available information was due to a state-enforced media blockade. 
The reports conclude that accounts of the End are “permeated…with ruthless 
propaganda, disinformation and deception,” benefitting from the LTTE’s 
“efficient propaganda and political operation...in dozens of countries amongst 
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the million-strong Tamil diaspora” (Sri Lanka Media Watch, 2011; Weiss, 
2012). Mahinda dismissed allegations of war crimes in his 2013 interview with 
Al-Jazeera, claiming that the army “didn’t do it”. The army are well trained, 
he asserted, “this is all propaganda work.” If there were any evidence, he 
claimed, there would be official inquiries. Instead, the President conjured up a 
narrative of benevolence and charity, the image propagated in the MOD and 
state media of Tamil civilians fleeing from the LTTE to the armed forces: “the 
army helped them, gave their water, gave their food to these people” 
(Rajapaksa, 2013).   
 
The UN Panel on Accountability in Sri Lanka – personally appointed by UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon to investigate best practice with regard to 
accountability in the Sri Lankan context - estimated that the civilian casualty 
figure runs into tens of thousands in the final months of the war. The figure of 
40,000 deaths has gained authority in international NGO and activist circles 
(UN, 2011; Sri Lanka Campaign, 2013). Tamilnet documented events on a daily 
basis, describing incidents and providing casualty figures from sources in the 
Vanni, but these reports were presumed biased and challenged on that basis 
by the state. 48  The LTTE were known for wearing civilian clothes and 
blending into the population, used the state-designated ‘No Fire Zones’ to 
organise themselves militarily, and forcibly conscripted a large number of 
people from the civilian population (UN, 2011). 49  Pro-LTTE interviewees 
conceded that the wholesale forced conscription of civilians at the End was a 
“mistake” (YT, 2012) while activists and academics called it a “betrayal” (AS, 
KD, SH, 2012). Exploiting this uncertainty, the Secretary of Defence told the 
LLRC: 
 
“It is very difficult to identify civilian casualties and if the military had 
suffered 6,000 killed in action and nearly 30,000 injured at various 
degrees you can imagine how much of LTTE casualties would have 
occurred but nobody talks about the LTTE deaths and injured. They 
put all these figures into civilian casualty figures. Nobody talks about 
the LTTE cadre casualties…[H]ow can you identify a civilian and a 
combatant?” (Rajapaksa, G., 2010) 
 
                                                        
48 This website has, however, been praised by the freedom of speech NGO Article 19 (2007) as a 
dependable alternative source of information to the government controlled media, operating in a 
very difficult situation.  
49 See the Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation, November 
2011, p.137-147. 
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There was no official recognition of civilian deaths in the last phase of the 
conflict until a statement by Gotabhaya Rajapaksa on 24 November 2011. The 
“zero civilian casualty” policy adopted by the military in the final 
“humanitarian operation” was clung to in a literal sense for two years 
following the defeat of the LTTE (MOD, 2011a, 2011b).50 A Sinhalese media 
worker elaborated on the progression of discussions of “zero civilian 
casualties”: 
 
“…it was interesting because it went from the literal – Mahinda 
Samarasinghe in 2009 saying, literally, that there was not a drop of blood shed 
and then many others saying that there were literally zero civilian casualties. 
51  [To that point] they implied that there was a policy of zero civilian 
casualties, with these [statements in 2011] then they accepted that there might 
have been civilian casualties” (SH, 2012). 
 
While atrocities “happened” at the End, the human cost is contested and 
denied by pro-government commentators:  
 
“I am sure atrocities were committed – but to say that it was systematic and 
in the numbers that they say, it is utter rubbish. The numbers don’t add up 
like that” (MS, 2012). 
 
A Census report named “Enumeration of Vital Events, Northern Province, Sri 
Lanka 2011” was quietly released into the public forum in January, containing 
results of a household survey carried out by civilian officials in the Northern 
Province. In this report, the official “zero civilian casualty” stance was finally 
discarded and deaths in 2009 were categorised into “natural deaths” or “other 
deaths”, the latter including “deaths due to accidents, homicides, suicides, 
acts of terrorism etc.” (2011: 20). The year 2009 shows a large jump in the 
number of deaths in the Northern Province, with 7,934 categorised as “other 
deaths” and the cause of 715 deaths “not stated”. In comparison, 1,349 “other” 
                                                        
50 The state-produced documentary “Lies Agreed Upon” served to rebut allegations of mass civilian 
deaths and quotes data collected by various agencies on the population numbers present in the Vanni 
area at the End. The quoted numbers are as follows: the UN Residential Coordinator estimated that 
180,000 were present in the Vanni; UN OCHA used the figure of 150,000; the UN Under-Secretary at 
the Security Council used 190,000; the World Food Programme quoted 230,000; the Government 
Agent in Vanni stated that the population at its highest was 305,000; and various INGO and UN 
Agencies in January are quoted as using a figure of 250,000. The documentary used these figures to 
display the difficulty in assessing the population figure, while positing the impossibility of mass deaths 
having occurred in the final stages of the war and underlining the intention of the government to meet 
humanitarian aid need to the extent suggested by population figures available.  
51 Samarasinghe was the Minister of Disaster Management and Human Rights at the time. 
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deaths were caused in 2008, 751 in 2007, 687 in 2006 and 311 in 2005. The rise 
is substantial. In the Northern Province since 2005 also, the report shows that 
4,156 persons have been deemed “untraceable”, in effect, “missing.” Again, 
2009 shows an increased instance of people being rendered “untraceable”, 
with 2,635 of the 4,156 persons falling under this category being reported in 
that year (EVE, 2011). With this breakdown of casualty data, the official 
casualty figure of roughly 8,000 deaths in early 2009 emerged. The deaths, 
however, are not categorised as civilian or combatant.52  Despite this, the 
discrepancy between the government’s initial stance and this eventual 
calculation is striking. 
 
The LLRC (2011: 137) “gave this matter the highest priority given the 
conflicting nature of statements made by various persons including media 
reports” and because the “need to have an estimate of casualties was also 
crucial to the mandate of the Commission in addressing the question of 
possible violations of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 
Law during this period.” Representations on the topic of civilian deaths were 
heard from military officials, Ministry of Health and medical officers and the 
general public, particularly eye-witness accounts from ex-LTTE cadres and 
individuals who were detained in IDP camps. NGOS and INGOs were 
invited to submit information but the International Crisis Group, Human 
Rights Watch and Amnesty International refused to submit information to the 
Commission due to concerns about the impartiality of the members and their 
direct appointment by the President (See LLRC, 2011, Annex 4.17). The 
Commission, in its attempts to gain information on the casualty figures 
collected during the final phase of the war, carried out interviews with 
civilian officials, though some submitted that they were not in a position, 
under the circumstances of conflict, to carry out any assessment whatsoever 
of civilian casualties and failed to provide any figures, either verified or 
estimated (LLRC, 2011: 157). The LLRC’s conclusions on this matter 
recognised that civilians were killed in the crossfire between the state forces 
and the LTTE (including in the state-designated “No Fire Zones”), which the 
                                                        
52 While the initiative of recording civilian causalities by the government must be welcomed as a 
necessary development and the fulfilment of a state obligation, this census data and methodology must 
be analysed in comparison with other such work being carried out both domestically by NGOs and 
international agencies, and internationally. Information from other sources must be pooled together and 
cross-checked in order to build as clear a picture as possible of the identities of the dead and also to 
avoid duplication in numerical counts. A census of this kind must be added to the existing incident-
level data, which has been gathered by NGOs and will aid in the verification process (EveryCasualty, 
2011; Breau and Joyce, 2013). 
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government, at the time of the LLRC report’s release, had publicly denied.53 
The Commission concludes that it can be assumed that any estimate of 
casualty figures would include a significant number of LTTE cadres. In sum, 
the Commission “notes with regret that there is no official record or a post 
conflict estimate of civilian casualties either by the civilian administrative 
authorities in the area or by the defense authorities” (LLRC, 2011: 145).  
 
 
2.13 A National Security Lexicon: 
 
Interviewees offered explanations of how words and phrases were 
institutionalised, popularised, forbidden or associated with ‘terrorism’ and 
unpatriotic behaviour towards the End. LG cautioned against the mere 
allusion to human rights: “We cannot talk about human rights now. Or peace. That 
is also a dirty word. Reconciliation – that is the word you can use now, or recovery” 
(LG, 2012). He stated that NGOs and academics seeking to work quietly and 
without publicity avoid the vernaculars of human rights and peace. Adopting 
these vernacular frameworks has the potential to restrict access to particular 
communities and provoke state surveillance. ‘Human rights’ as a concept is 
depicted in state discourse as connected to international accountability 
processes, now portrayed as essentially anti-Sri Lankan, interventionist and 
imperialist. The international system of human rights housed within the UN 
system and fronted by organisations such as Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch is demonised as pro-LTTE. State representatives 
denounce the reports produced by these organisations as “unacceptable and 
unwarranted…to be considered as interference in the internal affairs of a 
sovereign state" (Kunanayakam, 2011). This portrayal is fundamentally linked 
to the state’s efforts to avoid accountability for atrocities at the end of the war. 
It also serves to inflame nationalistic fervour associated with protecting the 
“motherland” from external threats, as described in Chapter One. State 
discourse, primarily sourced from official speeches, the MOD website and the 
Media Centre for National Security (MCNS), supplied this lexicon and 
demarcated its boundaries to the Sri Lankan population. 
 
‘Peace’ is associated with the breakdown and failure of the peace talks held 
with the LTTE and facilitated by the Norwegians between 2002 and 2003 
(Walton, 2010; Lewis, 2010). As David Lewis (2010: 653) notes, the “Sri Lankan 
peace process failed in a particularly dangerous way, unwittingly fuelling the 
                                                        
53 See LLRC (2011, Para. 4.389 iv.). 
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success of pro-war elements, while serving to delegitimise more conciliatory 
positions.” The agendas of local NGOS working towards emancipatory peace-
building were increasingly blurred with more interventionist and 
conservative models of peace-building favoured by states and 
intergovernmental organisations (Walton, 2010: 21). The word ‘peace’ is now 
viewed with suspicion and associated with failure and a meek, ineffective 
approach to dealing with ‘terrorism’.54 ‘Peace’ became an unacceptable term 
in nationalist political circles and was associated with sympathy for the LTTE. 
NGOs actively avoided using terms like ‘peace’ and ‘peace-building’ for fear 
of appearing too partisan or encountering opposition from nationalist 
movements (Lewis, 2010: 656). The coalition of peace-builders envisioned by 
liberal peace-builders clashed with the nationalist agenda and came to be 
termed ‘traitors’ or LTTE sympathisers (Walton, 2010: 21; Höglund and 
Orjuela, 2013). The ‘humanitarian operation’ was therefore depicted as the 
only realistic route to success over the LTTE, rather than the ‘soft’ approach of 
negotiation associated with the ‘liberal peace’.  
 
Researchers, academics and NGO staff interviewed in Sri Lanka 
acknowledged these linguistic taboos, especially with regard to applications 
for state and military approval for projects of a humanitarian or social work 
nature, and academic events. Proposals for NGO projects must be framed 
within the parameters deemed acceptable by state in order to secure the 
required permissions, a process that includes attaining the approval of the 
military. At the project planning stage “you have to provide all information to the 
Government Agent” (NR, 2012) – the state’s administrative head of public 
services at the Divisional Secretariat level. In practice, NGO workers adopt 
the state lexicon in order to improve the chances of having a project 
approved, thereby perpetuating and reinforcing that lexicon. Civil society 
organisations “phrase things the way they want – for example ‘economic 
development’ rather than ‘leadership’” (NR, 2012). One INGO worker stated that 
she “can’t get past page two (of the state newspapers) without laughing at the 
ridiculous representations. But it is useful to see the language the government is 
                                                        
54 The vilification of organisations involved in peace-building, particularly liberal international 
peace-building NGOs arose after 2005, Walton (2010: 20) notes, as mainstream political 
discourse in Sri Lanka became increasingly critical of NGOs and the liberal peace-building 
paradigm they were seen to represent. The newly elected Rajapaksa government relied instead 
on nationalistic rhetoric and ‘War on Terror’ discourses, unlike the previous UNF government, 
which drew much of its legitimacy from its commitment to achieve progress in the peace process. 
This included a rejection of devolution in favour of the unitary state and concession to nationalist 
parties, who vocally decried the involvement of international actors (Walton, 2010: 21; Lewis, 
2010).  
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using in order to have things pushed through at work” (AH, 2012). Another local 
Tamil NGO worker stated that, “creativity is needed, to show the programme in a 
different way to the state, in order to get permission” (SMB, 2012). Similarly, 
academics working on human rights, particularly in relation to the conflict, 
are restricted in open discussions on the topic. Though a Tamil Colombo-
based lecturer claimed that the classroom is a relatively safe place for 
discussion on these issues (MT, 2012), some senior Tamil academics were 
unwilling to even meet privately where the request to meet was couched in 
human rights terminology. Broaching this issue with regard to a particular 
academic in conversation with LG, his answer was unequivocal: “Of course. 
He is a Tamil”. The insinuation was that, by virtue of the academic’s Tamil 
ethnicity, repercussions were more foreseeable and potentially more punitive 
if he were to associate with a foreign researcher interested in interrogating the 
country’s human rights situation (LG, 2012).  
 
Where non-state organisations, the media and institutions such as universities 
feel compelled to adopt the language of the state, the lexicon is compressed 
and the narrative pattern defining events is restricted to a state-approved 
interpretation and perpetuation of frames of meaning. These examples 
illustrate the manner in which the use of particular discourses supports the 
state’s position and the consolidation of the national security state. From 
interviews, it became clear that non-state actors such as civil society groups, 
academics and journalists acknowledge the state’s lexicon as a fraudulent and 
disorienting construction, fashioned in the pursuit of denial. However, these 
actors operate in an atmosphere of repression, where free speech is greatly 
restricted by fear. Rather than challenging the lexicon, these actors in Sri 
Lanka rely on their ability to reproduce it in order to work within the country. 
It is undoubtedly a decision made under difficult circumstances, in the 
pursuit of honourable ends, but one with far-reaching implications. To 
perpetuate ‘double discourse’ is to gloss over atrocity and violence that 
continues, to leave issues hidden and unaddressed.  
 
Marguerite Feitlowitz quotes the novelist Julio Cortazor to elucidate this 
point: “Under authoritarian regimes language is the first system that suffers, 
that gets degraded” (1998: 61). After a period of repression and atrocity, she 
argues, language may be the last system to recover (1998: 61). To adopt the 
state lexicon is to perpetuate and internalise “aberrations” and “ravages” of 
the language, the scars inflicted by the regime on language (1998: 62). In Sri 
Lanka, examples of this profound alteration in language relate to euphemisms 
for atrocity and Tamil linguistic techniques designed to survive Sinhala mob 
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violence:55 the “white van” represents disappearances and state-sponsored 
abductions (Manimekalai, 2014), the “white flag” incident refers not to 
surrender but to the execution of LTTE leaders and cadres who attempted to 
surrender at the End (UTJR-J, 2009, White Flags, 2014); the Sinhalese word for 
‘bucket’ – baldiya – is associated with Sinhalese mob violence. Tamils learned 
to pronounce the word during periods of violence in the early 1980s, as mob 
members held a bucket high and demanded that individuals name it, in order 
to establish ethnicity (Jeganathan, 1998: 99). For Feitlowitz, such ravages of 
the language are manifestations of atrocity, evidence that “in some sense it 
happened to everyone. Or, at least, many people – on the evidence of the way 
they speak – have internalized that part of…history” (1998: 62).  
 
 
2.14 Media Self-censorship: Adhering to the Lexicon 
 
The MOD was the primary source of information for the mainstream press, as 
access for independent journalists was highly restricted. As a senior journalist 
for a television station stated in an interview: 
 
“…that was the source of information. I was checking it every morning for 
instance because you get a sense of the government and their view on the 
whole battle and military focus…at that time, it was a way to actually keep 
track of what they were doing, or what they said they were doing” (SB, 2012). 
 
The majority of media outlets merely recycled the information posted to the 
MOD website in the final stages of the war, with exact replications of 
wording. Straying from the approved lexicon was an unusual and dangerous 
undertaking in a culture of media self-censorship born of both fear and 
clientelism in the profession. The repetitive and singular nature of the news 
was also a symptom of the lack of access to conflict zones granted to 
independent journalists. The same Colombo-based journalist demonstrated 
the ways in which pressure was felt to maintain the lexicon managed by the 
government. She stated that references to ‘the war’ and criticism of the war 
were acceptable while negotiations with the LTTE were on-going in 1994 and 
1995. When the peace talks stalled and the slogan under Chandrika 
Bandaranaike’s government became “War for Peace” (from 1995 – 2002), 
media organisations began to feel that the word ‘war’ in a negative sense was 
taboo: “it was a bit much for us to keep saying ‘no war, no war’ when it  [the official 
                                                        
55 The author acknowledges that these examples are available to her only in the English 
language lexicon and that language issues restrict further analysis. 
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rhetoric] was ‘war for peace’” (SB, 2012). The term ‘humanitarian operation’ was 
the term favoured by the government, communicated through the MOD 
updates. This phrase gradually came to dominate the frame of understanding 
around the conflict.  
 
Intimidation and fear based on very real incidents of reprisals against 
journalists contributed to the decision to call the war by another name in line 
with state discursive practices: “…it was the week that Lasantha (Wickrematunge) 
was killed…we changed the name...” (SB, 2012). Lasantha – previously an 
advocate for free speech and direct challenges to the government - is now a 
symbol of terror and impunity. Media activist Sunanda Deshapriya stated 
that “[whoever] decided to kill Lasantha wished to silence the dissenting 
voices in this country. This is therefore is a symbolic killing, not an 
individual's killing alone” (quoted in Handunnetti, 2009). Nobody has been 
prosecuted for Lasantha’s murder. In his last editorial, he decries the use of 
“euphemism” and states that his newspaper refused to seek “safety by 
unquestioningly articulating the majority view” (though “that is the way to 
sell newspapers”) and directly addresses Mahinda Rajapaksa as he describes 
how journalists “walk in the shadow of death that your Presidency has cast 
on the freedoms for which you once fought so hard” (Wickrematunge, 2009). 
At the Sunday Leader, he proclaimed, “we say it like we see it: whether it be a 
spade, a thief or a murderer, we call it by that name” (Wickrematunge, 2009). 








This chapter has offered a portrayal of the state of terror existent in Sri Lanka, 
the atrocities perpetrated throughout the war and at its End, and provided an 
introduction to state techniques of denial and reinterpretation. 
Exceptionalism, counter-terror legal mechanisms and clandestine methods of 
eliminating and silencing dissenters have contributed to the Rajapaksa 
family’s enjoyment of complete impunity. The state of exception established 
in Sri Lanka is defined by structural violence against ethnic Tamils. Within 
the national security paradigm created under the Rajapaksa brothers, we have 
seen militarisation of society, expansion of the power of the Executive 
Presidency and nepotistic appointments to powerful positions – political and 
otherwise, abuses of power, impunity for wrongdoing, attacks on the 
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judiciary and the rule of law on political grounds, and institutions such as the 
Human Rights Commission exposed for their dormancy.  
 
The narrative of humanitarianism, counter-terrorism and Sinhalese triumph 
put in place at the End is sustained in the post-war period. What are the 
implications for the Tamil community and Sri Lanka’s political future? 
Marguerite Feitlowitz, in her work on the legacy of Argentina’s Dirty War, 
explores the relationship between violence and language and offers a set of 
questions pertinent in the Sri Lankan context: 
 
“When history has been erased, can it be recovered? When known 
torturers are said to be heroes, what happens to the minds of those 
they injured? When the language itself has been tainted, what must we 
do in order to speak?” (Feitlowitz, 1998: xi?)  
 
With an eye to the future, Feitlowitz’s (1998: 62) contention that “repression 
lives on in such aberrations of the language, in the scars it left on the 
language” seems relevant. By examining the historical and politically 
expedient development of national discourses in Sri Lanka, this thesis 
interrogates the “contamination of history” (1998: 90) and the struggle of the 
Tamil community to author their own stories “in relation to representation 













This chapter explores the post-war landscape from the perspective of the 
Tamil minority. Beginning with the initial post-war ‘screening’ process, where 
victim-survivors of the final six months of the war (‘the End’) were detained 
in ‘welfare camps’ by the state, the following argument relies on interviews 
describing the militarised environment inhabited by the Tamil population in 
the Northern Province. The state is re-marketing the armed forces in the post-
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war phase as a benevolent, positive presence in the North, involved in 
infrastructure development, economic growth and the ‘rehabilitation’ of ex-
LTTE cadres (Satkunanathan, 2013). This chapter problematises this discourse 
by drawing on the narrative of the Tamil people interviewed, who experience 
post-war life as a military occupation designed to suppress Tamil political 
and cultural life. International advocacy and political engagement demands 
that the Sri Lankan state pursue accountability measures for war crimes 
committed at the End and a genuine reconciliation process. This chapter 
interrogates state action in this regard as a performance – both in discourse 
and praxis – with militarisation and denial at its core. Adopting a view ‘from 
below’ through the narrative of the Tamil population, this chapter argues that 
post-war developments indicate the evolution of a national security state. 
Post-war, the hierarchy of power has been reconfigured and reproduced with 
Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism at its peak, reinforced by a new logic of 
triumph over terrorism. The marriage of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism and 
militarism continues, borrowing heavily from discourses of reconciliation and 
development designed to pacify the ‘international community’ and appeal to 
actors implicated in global governance and aid frameworks. The impact of 
international forces on the local logic of ‘securitised development’ (Goodhand 
et al., 2011) in the post-war environment are described and analysed. 
 
 
3.2 After the End: Detention in “Welfare Villages” 
 
Witness-survivors of the End were immediately processed, screened for links 
to the LTTE and held for up to three years in military-run “welfare villages” 
(MOD, 2009). David Keen (2013: 10) argues that this was “a dramatic practical 
expression of the fact that the Tamil population as a whole was considered 
suspect.” He notes that mass detention was also a form of state propaganda: 
the detention and screening process could itself be taken “as evidence of the 
intensity of the threat” in order to justify the measures as ‘necessary’ (2013: 
10). INGOs likened these temporary structures for the internally displaced 
Tamils to “internment” or “detention” camps (HRW, 2009a: Amnesty, 2009; 
Crisis Group, 2010) and international critics equated them with concentration 
camps (Schalk, 2009; Roy, 2009). Interviewees critical of the government 
described the Tamil people as being “herded into camps” (AS, 2012) described 
as “prisons” (AHB, 2012) and “hell on earth” (SH, 2012).  More muted critics 
described how “the camps were unable to cope” (SB, 2012) and that although 
they were “an administrative horror”, they were “not a horror story” (MS, 2012). 
Demonstrating “the continuing crisis of engagement between the Sri Lankan 
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state and humanitarians”, many governments expressed concern over the 
lack of access granted to the UN; INGOs and human rights observers argued 
that this internment was a violation of human rights and illegal under 
international law (Harris, 2010:8). The state’s response was that detaining the 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) was legitimate as a national security 
measure, entirely defensible under international humanitarian law and a 
necessary, albeit unpleasant, condition of post-conflict transition (2010: 8). 
Laleh Khalili (2013: 66) argues that confinement in counter-insurgencies relies 
on the idea of the law as a constant: a trope that liberal warfare relies upon in 
making, unmaking and shaping counterinsurgency detentions. Khalili (2013: 
66) argues that this trope and the complex and dialectic ways in which it is 
invoked “conjure legitimacy out of atrocity”. The internment of civilians is 
allowed under international humanitarian law as a legitimate security 
measure during periods of armed conflict (Brav at al., 2007). Walter Kälin, the 
UN representative on the human rights of internally displaced persons, 
reiterated this point during a visit to Sri Lanka in September 2009. He 
emphasised that it was necessary to strike a balance between security 
concerns and IDP rights (Harris, 2010). Preventive detention and the 
comprehensive ability of the Sri Lankan forces to arrest and detain was legally 
constituted under the state’s domestic emergency framework.56 Invoking this 
framework, the state created ‘High Security Zones’, forcing individuals into 
displacement and restricting their movement, and legally justified the mass 
internment of Tamils as potential members of the LTTE (IDMC, 2011).   
 
Harris (2010: 8) argues that assessments of legality must ask whether Sri 
Lanka’s internment of Tamil civilians was a justifiable response to a genuine 
security threat, with due regard to the standard of protection mechanisms. 
Khalili (2013: 66) contends, however, that the legal basis of spaces of detention 
such as these camps illustrates the differential application of law in line with 
the contours of power. 57  She argues that legal definitions in 
counterinsurgencies create “fictive or concrete legal liminal spaces”; the 
attendant legal techniques define categories of people to whom the law 
applies or not, and the spaces defined by law are characterised by detainees 
who are rendered “invisible and inaudible to law” (Khalili, 2013: 66). In 
liberal warfare, the language of legalism is adopted to replace legal 
                                                        
56 Made up of the Emergency Regulations and Prevention of Terrorism Act. 
57 Keen (2013: 11) argues that while aid workers such as Simon Harris seemed to support the 
mass internment, that support was possibly the result of being “’socialised’ into a highly coercive 
environment”, an argument that is supported by the UN self-critical report of its humanitarian 
operations in Sri Lanka at the End (UN, 2012). 
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procedures with exceptional administrative procedures, an instrument of 
legitimation alongside military power that can become a malleable tool in the 
service of the state (Khalili, 2013: 67). The Sri Lankan state, in an act of 
‘interpretive denial’ that relied on legalism (Cohen, 2001), couched the 
establishment of detention camps within the language of humanitarianism. 
The final phase of war created 280,000 internally displaced persons, with 
humanitarian needs.58 These ‘welfare villages’ also drew their legitimacy from 
the emergency framework and discourse of counter-terrorism. The camps 
were spaces of preventive detention as the state screened for LTTE cadres, 
spaces devoid of transparency and accountability, and marked by terror, 
insecurity and poor hygiene (SH, AS, 2012; Amnesty, 2009). A psychosocial 
worker described the effectiveness of the government’s propaganda and 
interpretive framing, which was capable of suppressing the horror 
experienced by the detained IDPs:  
 
“There were very few photographs coming out of the camps, and an incredible 
disjuncture between the conditions in camp and the projected image by the 
government. Very poor physical conditions – toilets, cramped spaces, etc. But 
also the experience of being imprisoned, the betrayal by both groups, the 
separation of families, the sense of being dehumanised; these experiences were 
not represented in NGO reports” (AB, 2012). 
 
The Asian Human Rights Commission (2010: 10) described the camps as a 
manifestation of the current reality in Sri Lanka: citizens are not subject to the 
rule of law but only to the political power of the Rajapaksa government. On 
25 September 2012, Menik Farm, the largest of the camps, was officially closed 
(UNHCR, 2012). Though the government has pointed to this closure as a 
centrepiece of post-conflict efficiency and commitment to resettlement, the 
lack of reliable information on the number of IDPs, their locations, and their 
access to displacement-related needs and rights has masked a “hidden 
displacement crisis” (IDMC, 2012). 59  The presence of the military in the 
Northern Province has complicated this crisis, as “High Security Zones” are 
                                                        
58 The UN (2012: 18) noted this figure was unexpected: the state’s underestimation “buttressed 
arguments against increasing humanitarian convoys and was later used to rebut reports of high 
civilian casualties”. The number of actual IDPs was “an indication of the scale of inaccuracy in the 
national Government’s figures.” 
59 IDMC reported in October 2012 that 115,00 people were still displaced. 11,000 people 
displaced before April 2008 were living in camps, more than 1,000 IDPs displaced after April 
2008 were in transit situations in return areas, unable to go back to their places of origin and 
more than 103,000 people displaced both before and after April 2008 were staying with host 
communities (IDMC, 2012). 
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maintained, “Economic Development Zones” are established and the military 
benefits from land formerly inhabited by Tamil residents (Crisis Group, 2012; 
WAN, 2013; IDMC, 2012). 
 
 
3.3 Militarisation: Economy and Security in the Post-war North 
 
Sinhalese political scientist Jayadeva Uyangoda (2003) delineates between a 
‘positive peace’ and a ‘negative peace’ and argues that cultivation of the 
former requires a more critical engagement with the connection between 
politics and economics. While a ‘negative peace’ is the mere absence of war 
and involves “basically a conflict management, pragmatic approach”, a 
‘positive peace’ would involve “the eradication of conditions that produced, 
and may reproduce, the conflict” (2003: 5). The transition from war to ‘peace’ 
in Northern Sri Lanka has been defined by a state policy of ‘securitised 
development’: “a combined package of military containment and economic 
growth” with which the government has attempted to placate the Tamil 
population (Goodhand et al., 2011: 16). Merging projects of reconciliation, 
development and militarisation, the government’s vision for the future of the 
Tamil-dominated areas was announced immediately post-conflict in 2009, in a 
statement from the Northern Security Forces Commander: "security forces in 
the North will be engaged in a new role of developing the region" (quoted in 
Satkunanathan, 2013). It is indicative of the militarisation of society in Sri 
Lanka that the military’s reach into economic and social life in the post-war 
Northern and Eastern provinces has gone largely unchecked, a pattern not 
unique to Sri Lanka. Kennedy (2012: 164) observes that today’s militaries “are 
linked to their nation’s commercial life, integrated with civilians and 
peacetime government institutions, and covered by the same national and 
international media.” For Neloufer de Mel (2007a: 241-2), insufficient 
academic attention has been paid to how militarisation in Sri Lanka is 
embedded in institutional and ideological structures that shape factors both 
on the battlefield and beyond. This is problematic in the North and East 
particularly due to the military’s ethnic make-up as a primarily Sinhala 
institution (de Mel, 2007: 61). 
 
The ideology of militarism, de Mel (2007a) argues, has seeped into daily life in 
a manner that has brought naturalisation. As the most visible entity 
associated with the defence of national security and a primary recruiter to this 
cause, the military “occupies the public mind” at a time of war (de Mel, 2007: 
58). The Sri Lankan state has employed advertising agencies over the years of 
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war to draw the youth to military service and, in the process, disseminated 
the ideology of ‘just war’ to the population and supported the ‘War for Peace’ 
security paradigm.60 Drawing on flattering and aspirational virtues to attract 
the male Sinhala youth, recruitment drives for the military contained 
justifying narratives in support of warfare against the ‘demonic’ and 
‘warmongering’ LTTE. 61  In advertisements and docudramas aimed at 
potential recruits, the war was framed as necessary because the LTTE only 
spoke the language of destruction and terror. The Sinhala armed forces, 
therefore, although they follow the Buddhist teachings of peace, were 
presented with no alternative but to uphold their civic responsibility to 
counter this demonic force and protect innocent civilians (albeit of their own 
ethnic kind) by summoning their bravery, manliness and patriotism (de Mel, 
2007: 66). Military advertising promoted the “myth of the war and the 
military as transformative, uniting, sacred” (2007: 88). Militarisation is 
viscerally embedded in the average Sri Lankan’s experience of daily life (de 
Mel, 2007). 
 
The “colossal” military expenditure over the years of war has left the country 
in debt, yet the post-war military budget has increased and further 
recruitment to the defence forces ranks was announced and pursued (Bopage, 
2010: 358; Lindberg and Orjuela, 2011; Keen, 2013). National security, 
including preventing the re-emergence of armed rebellions, is one motivation 
cited for these increases. There is, “virtually no data published on the extent 
of military employment, and consequently very little analytical or policy 
discussion of its repercussions” (Venugopal, 2011: 72). Venugopal (2008, 2009) 
argues that the state has relied on war and high levels of military mobilisation 
to defuse social tensions, particularly in the south. The employment 
opportunities offered by the military counterbalances the lack of alternative 
employment, as the labour market has failed to keep pace with progress in 
education and neoliberal economic reforms (Venugopal, 2009). Including the 
police force and paramilitaries, the security sector increased tenfold from 1982 
to 2002, from 15,000 to 150,000 (Venugopal, 2011: 72). This expansion of the 
security forces has economically benefited the majority Sinhalese as this 
groups makes up 97 per cent of military employees (Santhirasegaram, 2013). 
An estimate of troop figures is unavailable, and contested by civil society 
                                                        
60 “War for peace” was the slogan adopted under the Presidency of Chandrika Bandaranaike’s 
People’s Alliance government. 
61 The recruitment advertisements were, from the 1980s to the End, primarily in the Sinhalese 
language, illustrating the ethnically charged and homogenous make-up of the ranks since the 
1983 anti-Tamil pogrom (de Mel, 2007). The singular language of the notice is a loaded silence.  
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organisations and the state, but sixteen of the military’s nineteen divisions are 
deployed in the Tamil-dominated regions (The Hindu, 2012). A moderate 
estimate based on division strength would suggest that 85,000-86,000 soldiers 
are deployed at present in the North and East (exclusive of the Navy and Air 
Force). There are seventy military camps established in the Northern 
Province, all highly visible to the local population from the region’s primary 
roads (BTF, 2014).  
 
Post-war, the size, resourcing and presence of the military are justified as 
necessary for “development work”, particularly infrastructure (Rajapaksa, G. 
2009). Budget expenditure for the year 2013 allocated 290 billion rupees 
($US2.2 billion) to the Ministry of Defence and Urban Development, 
representing a 26 per cent increase from 2012: the country’s highest-ever 
military expenditure (WSWS, 2012). The expansion of the military in the 
North has included taking on reconstruction and development projects, 
opening businesses, sequestering large tracts of land from local owners, 
undertaking the institutional rehabilitation of ex-LTTE cadres and monitoring 
the reintegration of those individuals into society, and overseeing all 
economic and social activity in the region unofficially and in positions of 
civilian administration (PJ, YO, MR, AH, RF, KD, 2012; IDMC, 2012; Crisis 
Group, 2012). Since May 2009, the state forces have forcibly occupied more 
than 7,000 square kilometres (37%) of the land owned by the Tamil people of 
the North (Sumintharan, 2011). 62  The state’s Lessons Learned and 
Reconciliation Commission Report (discussed below) identifies the 
establishment and maintenance of ‘High Security Zones’ as detrimental to 
reconciliation and the achievement of justice for the Tamil population 
displaced from their local areas (2011: para. 6.11). Yet, the post-2009 trend has 
been to consolidate the militarisation of the North.  
 
The astonishing number of military camps dominating the Tamil areas also 
contributes to the theory that the government has a long-standing plan to 
change the ethnic composition of those areas, thereby undermining Tamil 
separatist claims (LG, JP, KG, 2012; Lindberg and Orjuela, 2011). While Tamil 
interviewees expressed concern about the prospect of state-sponsored 
Sinhalese colonisation of the Northeast (YT, KG, SP, ST, 2012), the state’s 
response has been to emphasise the right of any ethnic group of Sri Lankans 
                                                        
62 In a report submitted to Parliament, the TNA MP and lawyer stated that, "out of a total land 
mass of 65,619 sq km, Tamil people inhabited 18,880 sq km of land in the North and East, but 
after May 2009, the defence forces have occupied more than 7,000 sq km of land owned by Tamil 
people” (quoted in Perera, 2011).  
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to settle anywhere in the country. 63  The Chairman of the Resettlement 
Authority, Buddhi Passaperuma, asserted that Sinhalese families being settled 
in the North were previous landowners from the region who were displaced 
by the LTTE in their drive to create an ethnically pure region in the North. 
Drawing on a rhetoric of ‘charitable reconciliation’, he stated that:  
 
“The government does not want to make resettlement of displaced 
Sinhalese an issue. When we have done so much for the Tamils after 
liberating them from the clutches of a ruthless terrorist organization it 
is a pity to note that the same Tamils are accusing the government of 
attempting to Sinhalise the North” (Passaperuma, 2013). 
 
 The land redistribution policies orchestrated in favour of the state and 
military contribute to ethnic and religious repression; the meaning of the 
territory is altered and minority communities are politically marginalised. 
The logic of national security and normalised militarisation is redesigning the 
local landscape and depriving the people of their land. The process is an 
assault on both the private property rights of the individuals involved and on 
the Tamil community’s historical claim to the Northeast as their homeland. 
Further, the military is deeply implicated in the process by which NGOs are 
registered and controlled by the state, an administrative arrangement that 
illustrates the centralisation and securitisation of civil society initiatives and 
the level of surveillance faced by associated actors. The NGO Secretariat 
monitors the activities of such organisations. In a “simple change of 
administration” in 2010, the NGO Secretariat was moved from the Internal 
Affairs Ministry to the Ministry of Defence and Urban Development 
(Hullugalle, 2010). The expansion of this Ministry’s purview into 
development and civil society surveillance is consistent with the logic of the 
national security state. The military’s jurisdiction in this regard is naturalised 
at the praxis level: “Each Divisional Secretary division has a monthly meeting with 
the military – they speak about budget, activities, programmes – [NGOs] have to get 
permission for everything” (NR, 2012). Further, “the Government Agent can change 
the mandate and restrict activities. It is hard work to have a programme implemented 
as planned – they [the state] are scared of training, workshops. Everything has to be 
reported” (NR, 2012). There was consensus among Tamil interviewees in 
                                                        
63 The problem for the Tamil population of the North, according to Sinhalese activist 
interviewees, is the perceived official policy of Sinhalese settlement and the political implications 
of such a policy, rather than individual families of Sinhalese people choosing to settle in the North 
(JP, RF, 2012). 
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Jaffna, Trincomalee and Batticaloa that no public events whatsoever can be 
organised without military clearance (FY, MR, MSB, AHB, NR, YO, PSJ, SM, 
SP, 2012). A political science academic in Jaffna explained that it is an effort to 
suppress civil society initiatives: 
 
“Civil movements in Jaffna are powerless. They exist in namesake but cannot 
go beyond a certain limit. We have to get permission from the government to 
hold any kind of function…including cycle races and that kind of thing – they 
had to get permission of the army and the army attended and watched. They 
wanted to make sure that nothing else was going on” (PSJ, 2012).  
 
AH, a international NGO worker in Batticaloa contended that the state has no 
legal right to demand detailed submissions on NGO activity to the military: 
“the NGOs shouldn’t be doing it, although they are requested to do it and feel they 
don’t have an option. Every NGO has to make its own decisions in this regard” (AH, 
2012). The state security apparatus, she asserted, is “attempting to build a 
picture of the histories of all NGO staff, building profiles and surveillance networks” 
(AH, 2012).64 Again, jurisdictional lines are blurred and the military’s powers 
are expanded in the name of national security.  
 
Interviewees in the North were quick to declare that though the war is over, 
the conflict continues in a different form: “There is still no political solution. The 
situation is getting worse and worse” (PJ, 2012). “The dynamics of violence are still 
there, below the surface” (MSB, 2012). For AHB (2012), a journalist and social 
service provider, the war constructed a “big machine” that continues to operate 
in society: “the police, the military, the economic system, and we are all under the 
grip. People are grasped by the machine, they have no relief after the war.” The deep 
structure of militarisation that has taken root in Sri Lanka relates not only to 
the employment of soldiers and the arms trade but has also supported “a 
wide variety of constituencies and characters – politicians and political 
parties, traders and entrepreneurs, military and guerrilla groups active in the 
protracted conflict itself” (Uyangoda, 2003a: 8). There is a hidden economy 
operating under the surface of the overarching military structure, consisting 
of multiple actors such as arms dealers and businessmen who profit from 
warfare (Rajasingham-Senanayake, 1999: 57-59). The existence of these actors, 
Uyangoda (2003a: 8) explains, was “intimately linked to the economic and 
material gains they make in, and by means of, war and conflict”; these 
                                                        
64 See the Law Library of Congress (2014) for a summary of Sri Lanka’s NGO legal 
framework and purported changes. 
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contributed to the conflict’s perpetuation. Sri Lanka has not had a formal or 
systematic demobilisation or disarmament process. Consequently, illegal 
small arms and light weapons are prevalent throughout society and are a 
major cause of insecurity, particularly for women (ICAN, 2013). The war 
economy has been upset by the transition to ‘peace’, throwing up an 
underground economy and black market in violence (LG, MSA, 2012) and 
corruption in construction contracts, tourism and development projects (MR, 
AH, FY, AS, PK, TA, YO, 2012). Reconciliation and reconstruction projects 
“became a beggar’s wound for the government” (MR, 2012) in attracting 
international aid. Interviewees spoke of endemic corruption in the allocation 
of such funds (AS, YO, PJ, 2012). Transparency International Sri Lanka stated 
in 2007 that its investigations had revealed a gap between the amounts 
disbursed by foreign aid agencies and what was spent on relief and recovery 
projects since the 2004 tsunami, calculating a missing sum of Rs 53,597,253,625 
- roughly US$535 million (IRIN News, 2007).  
 
The post-war economic system is ethnocratic: the system facilitates ethnic 
control of power and resources, constituting a process by which the Tamil 
minority are oppressed and dispossessed by “the tyranny of the majority” 
(Yiftachel, 2014). As noted by Woost and Winslow (2004: 203-4), development 
can “open up new spaces for violence and political manipulation as new 
resources become the object of desire up and down the hierarchy of agency.” 
Ethnicity is the key to power and resources, causing distress and hardship for 
the local Tamil population (MT, FY, YO, MR, 2012). The creation of ‘High 
Security Zones’ - blocking access to land and sea - and the military’s 
involvement in economic life undermine crucial forms of livelihood and food 
security (VV, 2013; FY, 2012; MRG, 2010: 14; Yiftachel, 2014; Adnan, 2014). 
Sinhalese business people from the south (and international capital) have 
attained control of the finances of the Northern Province: “The whole of the 
rural economy is gone out of the grip of the rural population” (MR, 2012). 
Militarisation is at the centre of the economy. A senior Tamil civil servant 
argued that the state wants “to create a self-sustaining, self-financing army; that is 
the strategy” (MR, 2012). While military-run and Sinhalese businesses flourish, 
FY (2012) described the laborious paperwork process that local Tamil 
fishermen must undertake, one that “makes them feel like they are under military 
surveillance.” “It is discrimination” (FY, 2012). The procedures mean that it is 




Pakiasothy Saravanamuttu, a prominent Colombo-based civil rights activist 
and the head of the Centre for Policy Alternatives, stated in June 2013 that his 
“concern is that the trajectory of developments, since May 2009, has largely 
been in the direction of the sustenance and reproduction of the roots of 
conflict” (Saravanamuttu, 2013). Interviewees spoke of the ‘Sinhalisation’ of 
the region by the government, with the military as its proxy in the North (FY, 
LG, JP, MG, RF, 2012). The term ‘Sinhalisation’ encompasses occupation by 
the primarily Sinhalese army; demographic change by settling Sinhalese 
families in the North; re-naming roads and areas in the Sinhalese language; 
and building Buddhist stupas in traditionally Hindu or Christian areas (SP, 
TA, KG, ST, PJ, 2012; RD, 2013; Majeed, 2012). These actions are acutely 
symbolic in nature, directed by Sinhala-Buddhist coalition politicians, 
primarily from the Sinhala Heritage Party (the JHU). Champika Ranawaka,  
for example, is alleged to have abused his ministerial powers as Minister of 
Environment to secure land allocations for Buddhist temples (Majeed, 2012). 
These practices demonstrate the continuing suppression of Tamil cultural 
modes of being in favour of Sinhala-Buddhist practices. The changes in the 
region since the End are viewed by local Tamils as cultural decimation and 
exercises of colonisation. Physical landmarks support the Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalist project (LG, EV, RK, 2012). It is symbolic that the soldiers 
themselves provide the manpower in constructing triumphant war 
memorials. State officials interviewed described how the armed forces are 
literally building the new Sri Lanka, constructing memorials and Buddhist 
stupas and working on infrastructure and housing projects (LH, BP, 2012). 
The Sinhalese-dominated army that defended the nation from separatism and 
‘terrorism’ is physically carving out the ‘reborn’ Sri Lankan nation. A 
particularly striking feature of the process is the “rediscovery” of ancient 
religious and historical sites of Sinhala-Buddhist import in Tamil-dominated 
areas, described by Adnan (2014: 10) as “a state sponsored rewriting of 
history, re-categorising, something that you call re-territorialising.” The influx 
of archaeological teams to the Northern Province since the end of the war has 
furthered the Sinhala-Buddhist state’s project of destroying the concept of a 
traditional, historic homeland of Tamil Eelam.65 While these studies may be 
authentic, they are politically appropriated in the service of Sinhala-Buddhist 
domination. 
 
                                                        
65 See for example the study carried out by Jinadasa et al. (2013) of the Department of 
Archaeology that found “recently discovered archaeological sites showing evidence of Buddhism 
in Mullaitivu district.” Out of 87 sites examined by the study – accessible only in the post-war 
period, 42 sites revealed the evidence of Buddhism.  
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The size of the military, in terms of the number of soldiers employed and 
deployed, is justified in the post-war phase by the forces’ involvement in 
development work. The state claims that the huge task of reconstructing the 
Northern Province can only be handled by the military in a disciplined, 
efficient and structured operation. As stated by a senior Tamil UN policy 
worker, “to justify it, what they say is efficiency. The military is much more efficient, 
the military is not corrupt” (AS, 2012). Noting that the military is heavily 
involved in civilian operations, a senior international aid official argued that 
though the military might be “more efficient…this is not good enough and not 
valid four years after the war. This is problematic for reconciliation” (RD, 2013). The 
same argument of efficiency was made in relation to the management of the 
IDP camps immediately post-war. A Sinhalese-Buddhist newspaper editor 
agued that “only an institution like the army” could manage the large 
population of displaced persons contained there (MS, 2012). The state has 
built up the military to be the most powerful, well-financed institution in the 
country, with unrivalled resources and manpower. The fear psychosis 
generated by national security rhetoric justifies the growth of the military and 
feeds on the fears of a war-weary and terrorised population, to the benefit of 
the increasingly powerful Secretary of Defence, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, and his 
brother, the President. In 2010, the Rajapaksa brothers, including a third 
brother – Basil, the Minister for Economic Development - were estimated to 
be in control of about two thirds of the national budget (DeVotta, 2010: 335). 
The expansion of the army serves to “enhance the power of military 
commanders and the Defence establishment, which would otherwise be 
reduced in peacetime” (Hensman, 2009).  
The structural violence facing the Tamil population under the ‘securitised 
development’ policy (Goodhand et al., 2011: 16) includes “violent attacks, 
crimes of mass atrocities, demographic changes, militarisation of Tamil 
territories, forcible evictions, internal displacements, extinction of cultural 
values of Tamils, denial of food and other livelihood disasters” (BTF and 
APPGT, 2014). The system of surveillance includes special registrations of 
people, requiring notice to the security forces of impending guests or public 
meetings, including religious meetings (Sumanthiran, 2011; MT, PJ, YT, 2012). 
Perera (2011) describes the impunity surrounding state or military officials 
accused of wrongdoing in the Tamil-dominated areas. The Tamil community 
have no avenues of legal redress available to them, nor strategies to counter 
the military domination of social and economic life. In this context, Tamil 
interviewees emphasised the fallacy of a discourse of ‘reconciliation’ (FY, SP, 
MT, 2012). The unofficial military occupation of Northern Sri Lanka, and the 
encroachment of the military into every sphere of civilian life, is portrayed by 
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the state as benevolent, progressive and natural. This portrayal attempts to 
civilise the violence and repression inherent to occupation.  
 
Pressure to withdraw the military increased in 2013, as the community, 
groups of lawyers and human rights organisations raised awareness of the 
issue. Newly established ‘citizens committees’ have orchestrated the peaceful 
storming of the office of the Governmental Agent to demand inquiries into 
land grabs (VV, 2013), and rights groups have filed cases in court to contest 
the military occupation of land (WAN, 2013; CPA, 2013; Colombo Telegraph, 
2013). In May 2013, a group of Jaffna-based lawyers and Colombo-based 
lawyers contested in the courts an order issued by the government, seeking to 
legally (re-)acquire land owned by the petitioners which was seized as a High 
Security Zone during the conflict. Jaffna-based lawyer and activist, 
Guruparan Kumaravadivel, speaking at a press conference in Jaffna on the 
topic of the legal actions, said that a writ-application had been filed by the 
TNA and a group of Colombo-based lawyers on behalf of “around 1474” 
petitioners, requesting that the Court of Appeal halt the government’s 
attempt to legally acquire lands in the Valikaamam North area, pursued 
under the Land Acquisition Act (Guruparan, 2013). This legal action 
demonstrates local opposition and resistance to militarisation. It showcases 
the community’s rejection of the logic of national security and normalised 
militarisation that has redesigned the local landscape and deprived the 
people of their land. 
 
 
3.4 A Charitable Peace, a Benevolent State 
The official state and military rhetoric is one of benevolence towards the 
Tamils, a discourse of humanitarianism and ‘helping’ the people to rebuild 
their lives, where the military plays a “a symbiotic role with the community” 
(Peiris, 2013). This discourse masks the violence of occupation and displaces 
the language of social, political and economic rights. It is an extension of what 
David Keen (2013: 5) terms the “pervasive language of care” employed by the 
state at the End, a language that proved entirely consistent with the large-
scale killing of civilians. Post-war, an international aid worker posited in an 
interview, the armed forces may “have good intentions…they are acting out of 
charity but people don’t want charity, they want equality” (RD, 2013). He spoke of 
the “unhelpful” attitude within the military and government of “we’ll give you 
this and that – you should be grateful” (RD, 2013). In this national security 
paradigm, the Tamil people are reduced to recipients of the state’s gracious 
gifts to them, not individuals with rights to whom the state has a 
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responsibility. The Tamil war-affected population are, in turn, expected to 
respond with gratitude and servility (Satkunanthan, 2013). RD (2013) termed 
the process “a charitable reconciliation.” However, just as the “language of care” 
provided a “smokescreen behind which massacres could be carried out” at 
the End (Keen, 2013: 5), the Tamils experience the military’s role in 
reconciliation as violence.  
 
Ambika Satkunanthan argues that the militarisation of the Northern 
population - including military involvement in education, the establishment 
of cadet corps in schools, encouraging recruitment into the army and offering 
employment in the Civil Defence Force – is core to the state’s reconciliation 
strategy. 66  Drawing the youth of the North and East into the military’s ranks 
is a method of remedying the problem of unemployment in the region. 
Employment within the Sri Lankan armed forces has long been a respectable 
and relatively well-paid option for the rural Sinhalese youth (Lindberg and 
Orjuela, 2011; Gamburd, 2004). The civil war, Venugopal (2011) notes, 
perversely became an important source of livelihood diversification, asset 
accumulation and poverty alleviation for the rural Sinhalese population. The 
government’s economic plan for the country continues to rely on the military 
as a major employer. In 2000, Sri Lankan Tamils made up 1.4% of the military 
(World Bank, 2000). The Ministry of Defence has, post-war, recruited 
‘rehabilitated’ ex-LTTE cadres and women in the Northern Province for roles 
in the Civil Defence Force and army administration. The Women’s Action 
Network has raised concerns about the coercive and misleading recruitment 
of Tamil women to the military (WAN, 2012). This coerced recruitment can be 
understood as an aspect of performing reconciliation for the international 
community. Recruitment of Tamils to the armed forces in the North and East 
has propaganda value for the state. It also serves to undermine war crimes 
claims against the state forces. In an army news report in December 2013, the 
“passing out” of 45 Tamil women was described: 
 
“Endorsing the concept that Sri Lanka runs as ‘One Country - One 
Nation’, the recruitment of Tamil woman soldiers to the Army, marked 
a new turning point in the history towards further strengthening of 
ethnic harmony, reconciliation, co-existence and broader 
                                                        
66 The Civil Defence Force offers employment in agriculture and other vocations but is managed by 
the Ministry of Defence. It was originally organised as a voluntary ‘village protection’ force in the 
1980s but revitalised by Gotabhaya Rajapaksa from 2006 (Rajith Perera, 2011) 
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understanding among both Sinhalese and Tamils” (Sri Lanka Army, 
2013). 
 
The message to be surmised from filling the ranks of the Sri Lankan army 
with Tamils is clear: would Tamils join an institution that committed mass 
atrocity against its own people? It is a powerful demonstration of 
reconciliation in fitting with the state’s policy of glorifying and exonerating of 
the military.  
 
 
3.5 The Military and Rehabilitation 
 
The ‘rehabilitation’ of ex-cadres in military-run camps is a cause for concern 
raised by several human rights organisations (AI, 2012; Crisis Group, 2011; 
ICJ, 2010). The military’s remit in this regard has precedent in the period 
immediately post-tsunami in 2004. Under the Miscellaneous Provisions (Part 
11) of the Public Security Act, the military was deployed to Tamil-dominated 
regions to run welfare camps and distribute aid to the affected populations 
(de Mel, 2007). The same Act allowed for the appointment of military 
personnel to disaster-related task forces and provided the military with 
power to undertake police functions. Symptomatic of the state of militarised 
exception, the military has maintained this role. In line with Mullin’s (2014) 
definition of the national security state, jurisdiction and the civil-military 
divide is blurred. Emergency Regulation 22 provides for “rehabilitation” and 
requires either a written statement by the person indicating that the surrender 
is voluntary or a Court Order mandating rehabilitation following conviction 
of a listed offence (quoted in AI, 2013). 67  The detainees subject to 
rehabilitation have been subject to no criminal trials that might legally 
authorise their detention.68 Amnesty International raised these concerns in its 
2013 “Locked Away” report. The International Commission of Jurists (2010: 3) 
describe the rehabilitation programme as perhaps the “largest mass 
administrative detention anywhere in the world”. Arguing that “[p]olitical 
expedience and secrecy have tended to take precedence over legality and 
accountability”, ICJ (2010: 3, 4) problematise the state’s reliance on 
“emergency regulations and counter-terrorism legislation that fall short of 
                                                        
67 In case of a voluntary surrender, ER 22 does not provide for legal representation. Where the 
rehabilitation is Court Ordered, the person is entitled to legal protection. 
68 The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka ruled in 2011 that lawyers must be given access to clients in 
the camps, in response to a fundamental rights petition filed on behalf of an individual detained 
for rehabilitation in the Boossa camp (BBC Sinhala, 2011).  
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international law and standards” and effectively consign detainees to a “legal 
black hole”.69 According to Crisis Group (2011), 11,696 LTTE cadres were 
immediately detained in these centres. The majority of those detained have 
now been released, with 232 remaining in detention at the time of writing, 
according to General Jagath Wijethilake, the army's top rehabilitation official 
(quoted in the Times of India, 2013). Prolonged and indefinite administrative 
detention without charge, ICJ (2010) warned, may amount to individual and 
collective punishment without charge or trial, contrary to Article 9 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 70  External 
monitoring of the camps was restricted; while the ICRC was allowed access, 
private meetings with ex-LTTE cadres were not permitted (TAG, 2014). There 
has been no domestic outrage over the lack of due process afforded to the 
detained individuals (Valkyrie, 2010). This is an indication of how “the 
assumption of extraordinary powers and measures by the State have become 
normalised as a part of everyday life” in Sri Lanka (Welikala, 2008: 237). 
 
Officials speak with pride about Sri Lanka's “success story” of rehabilitating 
ex-terrorists as an appropriate model to be adopted by other countries with 
similar conflicts (Hettiarachchi, 2012). The programme has six distinct 
components: religious and spiritual rehabilitation; educational rehabilitation; 
vocational rehabilitation; social and family rehabilitation; recreational 
rehabilitation; and psychological rehabilitation (Abeygoonasekera and 
Gunaratna, 2012). The process of rehabilitation consists of education 
programmes, meditation and spiritual guidance, artistic projects, sports, 
counselling and practical vocational training while in detention (Selvakumar, 
2013). The rehabilitation centres were entirely run by the military. It is a 
programme set out and administered by the victors for the defeated (TAG, 
2014). The Sri Lankan media suggests that gratitude is the appropriate 
response from the detainees: the state spared their lives and provided access 
to vocational training and other services (Valkyrie, 2012). Rather than 
executing the “terrorists” “on the presumption that they cannot be reformed 
and rehabilitated”, as happens in other countries, the Bureau of the 
Commissioner General of Rehabilitation declares, the state realised that “the 
terrorists are human beings whose minds were distorted, and hence 
                                                        
69 ICJ (2013: 4) note that the Prevention of Terrorism Act No. 48 (1979) (PTA) provides the 
substantive grounds for detention, authorising preventive detention “under patently vague and 
overbroad grounds for up to 18 months (s.9) and indefinitely pending trial”. This is the legal 
basis relied upon where the detainee is merely suspected of association with the LTTE rather 
than of committing offences. 
70 The ICCPR was ratified by Sri Lanka in 1980 and its Optional Protocol in 1997, holding that 
“no-one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention” (article 9). 
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misguided, could be reformed and could be rehabilitated to enlist their 
services as useful citizens of the country” (BCGR, 2013: 2, 3). 
 
Concerns were raised within Tamil groups regarding the nature of spiritual 
and counselling programmes for detainees in rehabilitation centres. These 
were designed with “a view to changing their destructive ideology and mind-
set which they had acquired due to being brainwashed by the LTTE” 
(Hettiarachchi, 2012). The programmes sought to “inculcate human qualities 
in them” and prepare them for reintegration into their communities and into a 
unified Sri Lanka (Hettiarachchi, 2012). This language of bringing the 
“terrorists” back to humanity is an extension of the state’s demonisation of 
the LTTE,  which has consistently rejected and undermined the separatist 
ideology and political goals of the organisation. Brigadier Hettiarachchi refers 
to Tamil “discipline” as an important outcome of the rehabilitation process. 
On release, the Bureau is “confident that they will think twice before they 
take a decision to go against people” (Hettiarachchi, 2012).71 Civil society 
groups have construed the spiritual and disciplinary streams of rehabilitation 
as efforts to “break” the LTTE cadres and to forcibly eradicate their separatist 
ideology (IRBC, 2011; TSA, 2013). TAG (2014) construes the process as one of 
“pacification”: “one aspect of a coordinated plan of different actions aimed at 
the destruction of essential foundations of the life of the Tamil people of Sri 
Lanka.” ICJ (2010: 12) reports that Buddhist meditation formed part of 
rehabilitation activities, despite Tamil observance of Hinduism or 
Christianity. The rehabilitation process is presented as humanitarian and 
altruistic, overseen by a President “guided by the Buddhist principles of 
forgiveness and compassion“ (BCGR, 2013: 3). Critics have described the 
rehabilitation as "systematic ideological indoctrination in Sinhala nationalism" 
(interviewee quoted in IRBC, 2011). A commentator on the Groundviews 
citizen journalism site asks:  
 
“…in the absence of a transparent and comprehensive plan and 
monitoring by experts, are we to assume these programmes were 
formulated and implemented by the Brigadier who has no 
demonstrable expertise in the area? In which case, how can the 
                                                        
71 See the Social Architects (2012) - a group of writers, intellectuals and working professionals 
(both Sri Lankan and otherwise). They analyse a questionnaire issued to detainees prior to 
release from each rehabilitation camp. The content of the questionnaire, TSA argue, is seemingly 
to assess “if a former LTTE member has even a strand of ideology, even a glimmer of independent 
or assertive thinking” (TSA, 2012). For TSA, this demonstrates that the state uses terror, 
intimidation and threat of detention in “rehabilitation” to submerge separatist ideology (TSA, 
2012a).  
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government state with confidence that the programmes adhere to 
international standards and address the needs of the persons at these 
centres?” (Valkyrie, 2010) 
 
The state proclaims that ex-cadres emerge from the camps healed of LTTE 
“brainwashing” (Hettiarachchi, 2012). The notion that reconciliation is 
premised upon rejection of the LTTE’s separatist ideology is indicative of the 
dominant force of the unitary state narrative. The political space for dissent is 
non-existent, loyalty to the state is forcefully imposed upon the ex-cadres in 
the ‘rehabilitation camps’ run by the armed forces and the ‘rehabilitated’ 
individuals are monitored closely on release into society (YO, ER, RF, 2012; 
RD, 2013; Amnesty; 2012; Crisis Group, 2012; TAG, 2014). The state narrative  
is one of rehabilitation and redemption, managed and orchestrated by a 
triumphant military. The objective of the process is to pacify the Tamils, 
politically and militarily (TAG, 2014). TAG (2014) collected evidence from 
seven interviewees who underwent torture in the rehabilitation camps, both 
physical and psychological, arguing that such treatment was systematic. In 
theory and execution, TAG (2014) argue, the rehabilitation process amounts 
to:  
 
“a systemic abuse of human rights, the scale of which has been masked 
by GoSL propaganda, the checks on independent access, and the fear, 
inculcated into those who have been put through rehabilitation – not to 
defy the State by speaking out” (TAG, 2014: 17). 
 
By positing that Tamils can be ‘rescued’ from the LTTE’s separatist ideology 
(as opposed to the violent practices of the organisation), the distinction 
between the LTTE and the Tamil community is emphasised. This distinction, 
initially drawn in the language of humanitarianism at the end of the war – the 
Tamil civilian ‘victims’ and the brutal, animalistic LTTE cadres – continues to 
be drawn upon. The distinction departs from the Othering that took place 
over the years of war, by which the Tamils, in counter-terror discourse and 
practice, were collectively considered suspect due to their ethnicity. Most 
Tamils, a state media representative declared, “wanted to come back” to normal 
life; they had not voluntarily joined the LTTE and wanted to return to their 
families and resume education (LH, 2012). Aside from the higher level LTTE 
cadres, who “brainwashed” the rest of the cadres or forced them to fight, the 
Tamils were “very cooperative” with the rehabilitation process and willing to 
return to normal society (LH, 2012). Faced with the problem of reconciliation, 
the state draws attention to what it purports to replace: the authoritarian rule 
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of the LTTE. The Tamils capable of ‘rescue’ from this ideology and willing to 
adopt the conflict narrative propagated by the state are the individuals 
welcome to partake in the national unity of Sri Lanka.  
 
Creeping societal militarisation can be seen clearly in the process of 
rehabilitation. It is an extension of the government’s reliance on military 
exceptionalism and an invasion of Tamil social life and private space. This 
strategy of nation building establishes the power base of the Rajapaksa 
brothers and cements their status as ‘war heroes’ in the continuing public 
deification of the military. Redefining the role and activities of the military as 
societal purveyors of care, charity and opportunity, the state justifies its 
disproportionate presence in the Northeast and infiltration into social and 
procedural life. According to a Sinhalese lawyer and political commentator, 
state-driven reconciliation processes are non-existent and the government’s 
antagonistic actions, suppressing the interests and cultural integrity of the 
Tamil people in the post-conflict phase, are radicalising the Tamil youth (DD, 
2013). While draconian security measures and the establishment of militarised 
spaces of exception have helped quell Tamil resistance, Keen (2013) predicts 
that these will inevitably fuel resentments in the longer term. 
 
 
3.6 Military Intrusion into Private Life 
 
The military’s reach into everyday life is not restricted to institutional seizure, 
surveillance and occupation of the physical space. Controlling movement, 
association and expression, the military suppresses separatist ideology and 
commemoration of the separatist movement. The mechanisms of social 
control adopted by the state post-war have also included insertion of the 
military into familial and community cultural practices, such as weddings 
and religious ceremonies – a practice to which Pushpi Weerakoon of the 
Office of the Presidential Advisor on Reconciliation alluded with pride (PW, 
2012). A religious civil society figure in Trincomalee noted that two army 
officers were helping with school band practice, as a “battle of the bands” 
competition between the schools would host Basil Rajapaksa later in the 
month (FY, 2012). Another striking example is the military-orchestrated mass 
wedding in a Vavuniya rehabilitation camp in June 2010, where 53 ex-LTTE 
couples were married (Haviland, 2010). With financial assistance from NGOs 
- the Hindu Congress, the Council for National Unity and the Rehabilitation 
Commission, the couples were then moved to private houses in a ‘Peace 
Village’, beginning married life together under rehabilitative detention 
 143 
(Paranamanna, 2010; Haviland, 2010). Ensuring maximum publicity for the 
event, Bollywood film star Vivek Oberoi attended the ceremony and acted as 
witness to the weddings. Congratulating the newlyweds, he termed the 
ceremony “a celebration of humanity” and an indication of the government’s 
dedication to rebuilding the lives of ex-LTTE cadres (Oberoi, 2010). Former 
Rehabilitation Commissioner Major General Daya Ratnayake announced 
plans to provide support to the couples to live independently on release, to 
include vocational assistance and financial aid. This assistance will come at 
the cost of “at least three years” surveillance for the couples, framed in 
benevolent terms as monitoring “how these couples are progressing in 
building their lives” (Ratnayake, 2010). The military in this instance 
orchestrated wedding ceremonies for the detainees - emotional, religious and 
highly personal occasions – within the walls of the rehabilitation camps. The 
value of this event for the state was the gratitude sought in return from the 
newly married ex-cadres, expanded control over social life and the 
normalisation of military involvement in the private affairs of citizens. The 
propaganda value of this event was sizeable. The story gained considerable 
news coverage domestically and internationally (Paranamanna, 2010; 
Haviland, 2010). Pro-government commentators interpreted the ceremony as 
an illustration of the “unique” nature of Sri Lanka’s rehabilitation process 
(One Sri Lanka, 2011). The wedding ceremony was less an altruistic move in 
the government’s politics of reconciliation than a further re-casting of the 
military as conveyors of family life and social recovery.  
 
Sinthujan Varatharajah (2012) argues that Sri Lanka's post-war environment 
has seen the redefinition of the military and its activities to that of “carriers, 
protectors and preserves of civil society”. The military has “invaded the land 
and intimacy of a people” by becoming involved in cultural ceremonies and 
re-narrativising its role in society to that of “a contributor towards the 
upliftment of a people” (Varatharajah, 2012). Overseeing the marriages of 
Tamils, the military intruded upon a traditional ceremonial performance of 
Tamil culture, an intrusion that should be seen as a “ceremony of possession” 
indicating “socio-political, socioeconomic and sociocultural occupation, 
colonization and oppression of Tamil land and people” (Varatharajah, 2012). 
In his analysis of the inclusion of a Sri Lankan military helicopter in a 
traditional Tamil ceremony at the Nallur Hindu kovil72 in Jaffna, Varatharajah 
depicts the cultural assault underway by the military. Dropping rose petals 
on the population gathered at the kovil (as opposed to bombs over the course 
                                                        
72 A kovil is a Hindu temple with Dravidian architecture. 
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of the war), the military helicopter overshadowed the ceremony with a 
symbolic act of domination, a striking example of what Jegananthan (1998) 
would term a “shadow of violence”. The “sacred and intimate space of 
devotion and worship” of the kovil was intruded upon, representing an effort 
to suppress cultural traditions and to promote “shared worship” 
(Varatharajah, 2012). This form of religious practice is compatible with the 
Sinhala-Buddhist history of such practice in Sri Lanka, with the minorities 
historically in a weaker position in these arrangements (Varatharajah, 2012; 
Walters, 1995). Varatharajah explains the symbolic importance of the 
ceremony: a symbol of the continuity of Tamil Hindu culture in the island. 
Jane Derges (2012) isolates the same ceremony as an embodied expression of 
rage and despair, a resistant performance of Tamil identity in an environment 
of fear and silence. The military helicopter’s involvement is a demonstration 
of power, military might and a will to overwhelm Tamil culture. The invasion 
of this space of resistance is representative of the military’s threat to Tamil 
cultural and political space. 
 
3.7 Denial, Retributive Justice and Reconciliation 
 
Weinstein and Stover (2004) note the inferred relationship between justice - 
understood narrowly as trials and legal mechanisms of accountability - and 
reconciliation. Although the link between justice and reconciliation is 
suggestive rather than definitive (Nesiah, 2005) and not proven empirically, a 
legal process of accountability is the route demanded by international 
agencies and INGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch who see the defeat of impunity as the primary prerogative (Gloppen, 
2005). It is important to problematise the conception of justice promoted by 
the so-called international community in the Sri Lankan case, in order to 
examine the purposes for which ‘justice’ is being sought. In the pursuit of 
retributive justice against the Rajapaksa government for state-perpetrated war 
crimes at the End, the giants of the human rights industry and the organised 
Tamil diaspora are powerful actors, fluent in the workings of international 
justice mechanisms. These actors represent what Dillon and Reid (2001) 
describe as a “network” of social and political organisation. The form of self-
orchestration embodied by this ‘international accountability movement’ is 
precisely what global governance seeks to encourage and, as described below, 
its innovative advocacy has certainly influenced the post-war trajectory. 
Traditional notions of sovereignty and the nation-state in international 
relations and international law have been significantly altered by the 
emergence of transnational actors on the world stage, including private sector 
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entities such as multi-national corporations, NGOs and activist networks. 
Global governance encapsulates cooperation and interdependence between 
this network of state and non-state actors, “with the intention of tackling 
problems that transcend traditional nation-state boundaries” (JSIA, 2012: 6). 
 
But within international justice-seeking, what do the Northern Tamils stand 
to benefit? Have the priorities of the global liberal order eclipsed their specific 
justice claims? Rajagopal (2003) argues that extant approaches to international 
law do not address the elemental question of for whom international law 
exists. Third World interaction with international law has illustrated, he 
argues, that a statist paradigm cannot persist as a framework of analysis. Nor 
can a liberal rights framework, as it is also statist, and both overlook the 
importance of social movements (Rajagopal, 2003). What other avenues could 
offer a deeper form of justice to the Tamil community? David Kennedy (2005: 
4) reminds us that the international human rights movement “acts as if it 
knows what justice means, always and for everyone” and presents the 
adoption of a rights framework as the solution to justice claims. Justice, he 
argues, is not like that. It must be built anew every time; people must imagine 
it and struggle for it (2005: 4). Stokke and Uyangoda (2011) ask whether 
internationally supported elite-crafted liberal peace can ensure social and 
political inclusivity. Can Tamil justice claims be satisfied through 
international measures to ensure accountability for war crimes committed at 
the End and political reforms within the unitary state? To this end, this 
section interrogates developments in the international sphere with reference 
to post-war Sri Lanka, particularly in the UN Human Rights Council (HRC); 
the international monitoring and management of the reconciliation process; 
and the “performative” actions offered by the Sri Lankan state, I argue, as 
tokens of obedience to the global liberal order, including the Lessons Learnt 
and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC). This section exposes the disjuncture 
between these ‘performances’ and the state discourse of anti-imperialism and 
hostility towards ‘Western’ pressure.  
Interviews for this thesis were carried out in early 2012, a fraught period; a 
UNHRC Resolution ‘against’ Sri Lanka was adopted on 25 March. This 
resolution was the first of three. Dharisha Bastians (2014) argues that the 
regularity with which these processes have occurred means “as far as the 
Government is concerned, [Geneva 2014] is just a hurdle it needs to cross as 
an annual practice.”  
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3.8 Reconciliation: Appropriating Transitional Justice  
Some semblance of social and political normalcy is intimated by the adoption 
of a “reconciliation” framework in Sri Lanka, in fitting with state projections 
that a process of transitional justice is underway. The transitional justice 
paradigm “has come to dominate debates on the intersection between 
democratization, human rights protections, and state-reconstruction after 
conflict” (McEvoy, 2007: 412). A transitional justice “template” or “toolbox” 
has emerged, from which government officials and nongovernmental 
advocates can consider which measures will promote ‘justice, peace, and 
reconciliation’ in the specific transitional environment. The International 
Centre for Transitional Justice (2009) lays out these measures as “prosecuting 
individual perpetrators; offering reparations to victims of state-sponsored 
violence; establishing truth-seeking initiatives about past abuse; reforming 
institutions like the police and the courts; and removing human rights abusers 
from positions of power.” Transitional justice has emerged from its 
historically exceptionalist origins to become something which is normal, 
institutionalised and mainstreamed (McEvoy, 2007). 
 
Sri Lankan progress in this regard is propagated by the state at great 
expense. 73  Richard Gowing (2013) argues that while the government has 
appropriated the language of transitional justice, the normative content of the 
paradigm has been stripped in its application. The discourse serves political 
goals; it operates in the service of consolidating the authority of the regime, 
concealing the continued domination of the Tamil population, and deflecting 
international calls for accountability (2013: 6). Gowing (2013) notes that Sri 
Lanka is a peculiar case for the transitional justice paradigm, given that the 
“transition” is under the auspices of the incumbent regime and the 
underlying causes of the conflict have not been addressed.74 After the End, 
restitutive measures to restore “normalcy” such as the resettlement of IDPs, 
the improvement of infrastructure in war-torn areas and, belatedly, a political 
settlement with the Tamil community were projected as the highest priorities. 
                                                        
73 For example, the Thompson Advisory Group, a Washington-based advocacy and strategy 
group, was hired by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka to make a documentary named ‘Sri Lanka: 
Reconciling and Rebuilding’ as part of a contract that costs the state-run institution $ 66,600 (Rs. 
8,337,600) per month as part of Sri Lanka’s international “charm offensive” coming up to Geneva 
2014 (Groundviews, 2014) and to influence US policy-makers and politicians (Bastians, 2014).  
74 Gowing acknowledges, however, that scholars have examined the application of transitional 
justice mechanisms in the unchartered terrain of “non-liberal transitions” and “non-transitions” 
and argues that these conceptual shifts are designed to reflect an emphasis on justice-seeking 
and examination of the past that occurs regardless of specific political environments.  
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The country’ focus has been an economic one, based on physical 
reconstruction of conflict-affected districts and countrywide development 
(Anonymous, 2011). The ubiquitous presence of the military ensures that this 
development is “securitized” (Goodhand et al., 2011: 16) and stable, 
undisrupted by local resistance to a process experienced as colonisation.  
 
 
3.9 International Pressure 
 
The so-called ‘international community’ has “encouraged” progress in 
reconciliation and post-war reform through the medium of HRC resolutions 
pertaining to Sri Lanka in 2012 and 2013. 75  Calls for reconciliation have 
occupied centre stage in international diplomatic action on Sri Lankan post-
conflict recovery though, as Tamil politicians and activists maintain, 
“structural genocide, not reconciliation, is the phrase which most accurately 
describes what is going on” (Ponnambalam, quoted in Miller, 2013; 
Guruparan and Rajamanoharan, 2013). 76  Five years since the End, the 
international community is slowly adopting a more forceful position on 
accountability, impelled by continuing advocacy by media and human rights 
groups, Tamil and otherwise, and prompted by slow progress in recognisable 
terms of reconciliation (The Guardian, 2013; EU, 2013). The accountability 
movement, Gowing (2013) and Thiranagama (2013) remind us, is strongly 
contingent on the strategic interests of global powers, and also, in particular, 
the posturing of states on issues of sovereignty and judicial intervention on 
matters of counter-insurgency. A 2014 UNHRC resolution explicitly called for 
an international investigation, the details of which (at the time of writing, 
June 2014) remain unclear.   
 
In March 2013, the UN HRC adopted a resolution that welcomed the call 
made by the High Commissioner of Human Rights, Navi Pillay, for “the 
establishment of a truth-seeking mechanism as an integral part of a more 
comprehensive and inclusive approach to transitional justice” (OHCHR, 
2013). The National Peace Council (2013a) has also advocated for the 
establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission in Sri Lanka. Beth 
                                                        
75 The content of the Geneva Resolutions is described below, outlining the process by which the 
Sri Lanka “situation” has been managed in the global institutions of justice. 
76 Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam is President of the Tamil National People's Front, a breakaway 
faction of the TNA. Ponnambalam was one of the only political representatives of the Tamil 
ethnic minority in Geneva, as the TNA chose to stay away from the proceedings for fear of 
repercussions at home (TNA, 2012).  
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Rushton (2006) identifies the political will of the government or agency that 
chooses to establish the commission as the most serious limitation on its 
success. Political restraints often dictate the choice to establish truth 
commissions, which are viewed as a “middle path between doing nothing or 
embarking on politically-charged prosecutions” in transitional justice contexts 
(McGinn, 2000: 163). The scope and mandate of the commission, and the 
manner in which logistical and security concerns are dealt with, will 
determine the success of the endeavour.77 McGinn (2000: 167) agues that the 
public ritual of a truth commission has the potential to signal an “important 
new start”: to improve inter-ethnic relationships and transform the political 
culture of violence and animosity in Sri Lanka. Bar-Tel and Bennink (2004: 11) 
argue that inherent to any process of reconciliation is the need for a “new 
narrative” to replace the respective collective memories of the groups in 
question, placing truth and memory at the very centre of the process. 
“Particularly crucial in such a process are the public and private rituals and 
narratives that sustain collective and individual memories of the history, 
causes and course of mass crime” (Pouligny et al., 2007: 12). It is crucial to ask, 
however, whether the post-war environment in Sri Lanka is conducive to a 
meaningful process of truth-telling. State policy to this point has been to 
suppress narratives that attribute any responsibility for war crimes to the 
state forces. The Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (discussed 
below) can be viewed as a vehicle of memory to an extent, though this 
mechanism was not established in the mould of a truth and reconciliation 
commission.  
The resolution also “calls upon the Government to conduct an independent 
and credible investigation into allegations of violations of international 
human rights law and international humanitarian law” during the End 
(UNHRC, 2013). The United States has said that the patience of the 
international community is "wearing thin" (AP, 2014) with the government’s 
failure to investigate outstanding allegations and to accommodate Tamil 
interests in the reconciliation process, the subject of a UNHRC Resolution in 
March 2012. The 2013 resolution notes continuing reports of human rights 
violations and the government’s failure to engage in dialogue towards a 
political solution. The resolution “encourages” the Sri Lankan government to 
                                                        
77 Success, of course, is also a contentious term for truth commissions. Authors are divided on the 
objectives of truth commissions. Do they aim to establish an official “truth” and history of events 
and consolidate a “usable past” (Nesiah, 2005)? Or ought the value of a truth commission lie in 
the process by which the “truth” of each individual story is officially acknowledged (Humphrey, 
2002)? 
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seek technical assistance from the UN infrastructure, including Navi Pillay’s 
Office of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights.  
 
Navi Pillay’s visit to Sri Lanka in August 2013 was a publicity disaster for the 
state. In media interviews following her visit, Pillay described the state as 
heading in an authoritarian direction. She referred to erosion of the rule of 
law and threats to democratic structures, military surveillance and 
harassment, the “dismal” history of domestic commissions of inquiry and the 
continuing suffering of the Tamil people with regard to the high number of 
missing persons: “I have never experienced so many people weeping and 
crying. I have never seen this level of uncontrollable grief” (Pillay, 2013a, 
2013). Gotabhaya Rajapaksa responded to these public assertions by claiming 
that Pillay was influenced by propaganda from elements of the international 
pro-LTTE lobby (The Hindu, 2013). The Secretary of Defence framed Pillay’s 
visit as “another instance” of international attention that has as its aim “the 
division of Sri Lanka and the establishment of a separate State for Tamil 
Eelam” (Rajapaksa, G., 2013a).  
 
 
3.10 The Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission  
 
The state’s nationalistic and defensive discourse in response to this “external 
interference” has led to an attitude of resentment towards the “homegrown” 
Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC), which has been 
adopted as the centrepiece of reconciliation-based pressure in the Geneva 
Resolutions. 78  The LLRC was initially established in reaction to Ban Ki-
Moon’s appointment of a UN Panel on Accountability in Sri Lanka; it was 
propagated as the sovereign state’s fulfillment of a satisfactory investigation 
into the events of the End, thereby rendering the “vehemently unwelcome” 
international initiatives obsolete and intrusive (Anonymous, 2011: 40; 
Thiranagama, 2013). Immediately post-war, before the LLRC was instituted, 
Vasuki Nesiah (2009) asked whether a state-led initiative in the spirit of a 
truth and reconciliation commission would, in a context of continuing 
repression and insecurity, “enable Sri Lanka to unpack dominant ‘truths,’ 
track command responsibility and redress legacies of abuse, or, instead, if it 
would prop-up national myths, cover up the responsibility of those in power 
and legitimize a repressive regime.” Nesiah notes that Sri Lanka’s history has 
shown how commissions of inquiry can be manipulated into instruments of 
                                                        
78 See for example Lakshman I. Keerthasinghe (2013). 
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suppressing dissent. By channelling criticisms of human rights violations into 
institutions, interviewees argued, the government relies on procedures of 
inquiry to avoid actual accountability and reinforce impunity (SB, LG, GK, JU, 
2012). As stated in Chapter One, the state regularly suppresses the outcomes 
of these commissions and prosecutions for human rights violations and 
institutional reform are not forthcoming (CPA, 2014), thereby betraying the 
justice aspirations of participants (Nesiah, 2009). Though it followed a 
succession of ultimately fruitless Presidential commissions and was therefore 
estimated to be structurally and historically flawed (Keenan, quoted in 
Zuhair, 2011), the LLRC has not faded into memory or served only as a 
politically useful ploy in the service of impunity. The report’s resonance has 
developed and transformed, largely due its international appropriation 
(relied upon by the UNHRC resolutions as a vehicle by which to monitor 
“progress”) and the collective courageousness of the 5,000 individuals who 
came forward to give testimony. 
President Rajapaksa set up the LLRC as the primary inclusive reconciliation 
initiative in May 2010. The mandate of the LLRC included inquiry into the 
failure of the 2002 peace process and sequence of events leading to the End, 
with a view to isolating the individuals responsible for notable events and 
failures during this period. The mandate provided for interrogation of the 
past in order to draw lessons for the future, including institutional and 
administrative reform to mitigate potential future disaffection and the 
reemergence of armed militancy. The LLRC was instructed to provide a 
framework for the promotion of national unity and reconciliation of all 
communities; a ‘methodology’ for restitution to the war-affected; and any 
other recommendations accommodated within its framework (LLRC, 2011: 
para. 1.5). The LLRC report, on its release in 2011, pleasantly surprised 
commentators and critics, offering progressive recommendations on political 
dialogue and devolution, language policy reform of the public service and 
education system, land disputes, de-militarisation and strategies for conflict 
memorialisation.79 The Commission saw fit to consider these issues, brought 
to its attention in submissions from the public, “in the context of 
                                                        
79 Memorialisation has been termed commemoration in this thesis to emphasise the communal 
nature of the practices in question. In traditional Tamil culture, a priest told me, “mourning is a 
community event, not private” (ER, 2012).  The etymological roots of ‘commemoration’ are found 
in the late 16th century, coming from the Latin ‘commemorat’ - brought to remembrance, the 
verb ‘commemorare’ from com (altogether) and memorare (relate) and from memor (mindful). 
This suggests togetherness in a way that ‘memorialise’ does not. ‘Memorialise’ finds its roots in 
late Middle English: from the late Latin ‘memoriale’ (a record, memory, monument), from the 
Latin memorialis (serving as a reminder), and from memoria (memory). 
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reconciliation and building amity and national harmony” (LLRC, 2010: para. 
8.3). Analysis of the adequacy of the final report produced by the LLRC 
should be separated from critiques of the procedural aspects and limitations 
of the LLRC. In terms of the expectations created by the government, the 
Commission was a disappointment on several registers, discussed below. As 
an effort to launch a reconciliation process and a “framework for action”, 
however, the recommendations of the LLRC, if implemented, have the 
potential to dramatically improve inter-group relations and state institutions.  
While the LLRC has been criticised for avoiding the issue of accountability at 
the End, especially regarding the actions of the Sri Lankan military, 
international investigations are on the horizon (UNHRC, 2014). Considering 
allegations of atrocity, the report found that “there was no deliberate 
targeting of civilians by the Security Forces” although some questions remain 
“whether the action of the Security Forces of returning fire into the No Fire 
Zones (NFZs) was excessive in the context of the Principle of Proportionality” 
(LLRC, 2011: Para. 4.283). With regard to specific incidents where alleged 
military actions led to the deaths of civilians, without casting judgment, the 
Commission acknowledged that “there is a duty on the part of the State to 
ascertain more fully, the circumstances under which such incidents could 
have occurred, and if such investigations disclose wrongful conduct, to 
prosecute and punish the wrong doers” (LLRC, 2011: 4.286).  Prosecution was 
outside its mandate – another criticism leveled at the proceedings (de Mel, 
2012), though it could recommend further investigations. The President 
personally appointed the members of the committee and the TNA have 
criticised the make-up as biased and pro-government (TNA, 2011). The LLRC 
was comprised of a “fairly representative and respected group, though 
admittedly many of them are former public officials” (Anonymous, 2011: 41). 
They could be expected to be, at best, “conservative in their findings” (2011: 
41) and at worst impartial, given that some commissioners, in their capacity 
as public officials, had publically defended the state military actions during 
the war (de Mel, 2012). A revealing passage of the LLRC Report (2011: 4.476), 
dealing with indisputable army violations, states that, “offences, if any, of a 
few cannot be allowed to tarnish the honor of the many who upheld the finest 
traditions of service.” The state’s violence, the Report suggested, was 
inherently in defence of the larger principles of the nation-state, in marked 
contrast to that of the LTTE, and therefore ought not be held to account 
(Thiranagama, 2013). Rather than recommending individual accountability, 
the Commission placed the responsibility on “the Government and all 
political leaders” to “manifest political will and sincerity of purpose to take 
the necessary decisions to ensure the good-faith implementation of the 
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Commission’s recommendations” (LLRC, 2011: Introduction). A political 
solution to the conflict is, the report acknowledged, crucial to future peace 
and stability: 
“the success of ending armed conflict must be invested in an all-
inclusive political process of dialogue and accommodation so that the 
conflict by other means will not continue” (LLRC, 2011: Introduction). 
 
3.11 The LLRC: Procedural Limitations and Archival Value 
As a process of inclusive inter-community dialogue on the past, the LLRC’s 
scope was limited, though the forum was utilised to its full potential by 
women in particular (de Mel, 2012; Thiranagama, 2013). The archives of 
testimony in the form of written submissions and transcripts from hearings, 
made public in the interests of transparency, transformed the LLRC into a 
vehicle of memory. This was not, however, the expected or intended objective 
of the LLRC and its value lies elsewhere, in its recommendations for political, 
institutional and social reform.80 The LLRC process was quick and primarily 
Colombo-based, receiving submissions from members of the public, military 
personnel, government officials, the media, civil society groups, academics, 
religious leaders, former members of the LTTE and other armed groups and 
victims of the conflict, among others (LLRC, 2010: Para. 1.14). 81  The 
Commission’s visits to the “field” – areas affected by the conflict - were 
considered supplemental to the public sittings in Colombo. “Field visits”, a 
Sinhalese Catholic activist contended, included 3 or 4 days in each district in 
the Northern and Eastern Provinces (RF, 2013). The visits were in the spirit of 
outreach, acknowledgment and symbolic inclusion rather than providing a 
forum for ascertaining or discussing the “truth”, as the Report insinuates:  
“…in order to ascertain first-hand the ground realities, it was 
imperative to have public sittings in situ. This was also with a view to 
reaching out to the people in the affected areas and to enable them to 
highlight their grievances…Through this process the Commission was 
able to acknowledge the suffering of the people in the affected areas 
                                                        
80 The demonstrated lack of political will to implement these recommendations, however, is 
discussed in the next section. 
81 The Commission commenced its public hearings on the 11th of August 2010 and continued 
until the 31st of January 2011. Written representations were also accepted until the 13th of June 
2011 (LLRC, 2011: 1.10, 1.20). 
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and provide an opportunity for them to tell their stories in familiar 
surroundings. This approach focused on the restorative dimensions of 
the Commission’s Mandate” (LLRC, 2010: 1.15). 
This Reconciliation Commission cannot be compared to processes elsewhere, 
such as the South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The purpose 
was not to provide a national form of catharsis to victims of the conflict in line 
with the TRC’s slogan of “revealing is healing” (Hamber, 2009: 65). The 
mandate and timeframe granted to the LLRC could not support an endeavour 
of this kind. It was primarily a forum for Colombo-based elites to postulate on 
the causes of the conflict and offer their ideas for reform that would support a 
process of reconciliation. 
 
The Commission’s presence in the Northeast was not well advertised, 
meaning that people did not know what the purpose of the Commission was 
or did not know of its existence (RF, 2013; de Mel, 2013; Thiranagama, 2013). 
It did not “penetrate society, capturing the attention of all its segments”, 
which Gibson (2006: 416) argues is a necessary characteristic of a truth and 
reconciliation commission. The Report asserts that the hearings and the public 
attention generated, particularly through the provincial media, “resulted in a 
substantial increase in public awareness and interest in the work of the 
Commission” (LLRC, 2011: 1.19). The seemingly unexpected interest in the 
forum placed pressure on the Commission, which was “not equipped to hear the 
stories in the way the people were telling them – crying and talking about the virtues 
of their loved ones” (RF, 2013). Submissions were reported to be rushed and 
people who arrived to tell their stories were asked to submit their complaints 
in writing (RF, 2012; LLRC Vavuniya, 2012). For the families of the missing, a 
Sinhalese activist reported, despite confusion about the LLRC’s purpose and 
objectives, it was “another forum for them to tell stories” (RF, 2012). People came 
forward to the LLRC because they “still expect results from storytelling” and 
“thousands would come” to “any group that seems to have any legitimacy – and 
actually any group, because they are desperate” (RF, 2012).  
 
The Commission received over 5,000 submissions from individuals and 
groups airing grievances arising from the conflict, suggesting that such a 
forum was welcome and necessary. Many sought information on the 
country’s thousands of missing persons and sought justice for the loss of land 
and property. Narratives of victimhood and persecution were forthcoming 
despite the lack of witness protection measures (TNA, 2012; Thiranagama, 
2013; de Mel, 2013). Neloufer de Mel describes how the women who publicly 
attested to their losses at the LLRC did so in the spirit of pragmatism: “as 
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their best chance of getting their detained loved ones back” (2012: 11). For 
these women, the LLRC was the outcome of “a strategic, political agreement 
that injustices had occurred during the war”, a forum by which they would be 
recognised as victims of war with stories to tell (2013: 11). It was also a place 
to present themselves to the state as “victim-survivors” deserving of 
information and compensation, to communicate directly with the state and 
demand information on the missing and their safe return (de Mel, 2013; 
Thiranagama, 2013).  
 
De Mel (2013: 12) notes that the women emphasised their desire for restitution 
– especially the return of loved ones – rather than retributive justice. She 
argues that the women were strategic in their requests, conscious of living 
cheek-by-jowl with the military and vulnerable as a result. This vulnerability 
was underpinned by their status as Tamil minority women. Also, drawing on 
Veena Das (2006), she argues that the women’s way of coping with violence 
was focused on “repair”; “the careful daily management of affect and 
emotion, including keeping their trauma subdued” (2013: 12). They accepted, 
de Mel (2013: 16) contends, a “realizable justice” – agreement on what is just, 
based on a “ranking” of available principles and modes of justice. She draws 
on Amartya Sen (2009) to explain that the “ranking” means accepting the 
incompleteness of the project; it is collated at the intersection of priorities 
presented by stakeholders and attuned to urgency. It can result in a call for 
justice “that can be agreed upon” though, as de Mel concludes, the arising 
justices “may not satisfy many people” (de Mel, 2013: 16). Women 
appropriated the LLRC: demanding status as victim-survivors; calling for 
information on the missing and safe return of the detained; and ensuring that 
it became a vehicle of memory and a stage to perform their agency 
(Thiranagama, 2013). The Commission, in terms of enforcing justice, however, 
held out a promise that “it could not possibly keep” (de Mel, 2013: 16).  
 
 
3.12 Performing Transition: Reconciliation and the LLRC 
 
Thiranagama (2013) offers an interpretation of the LLRC as a state 
performance where no meaningful regime transition has occurred. The 
process is a spectacle, she argues, to resymbolise and restage the state’s 
capacity to endure and reform. The LLRC was instituted to reinvest the state 
with legitimacy and to whitewash state conduct on the issue of accountability 
(Thiranagama, 2013). As Alan Keenan (2013) points out, the government has 
been attentive to international pressure on accountability and reform and has 
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“stepped up its public relations game in response,” concealing ongoing 
repression and impunity in myriad ways. Kumar David argues that the LLRC 
was, in fact: 
 
“…the government’s primary means of deflecting pressure for an 
international investigation into credible allegations of grave violations 
of international humanitarian and human rights law by both 
government forces and fighters of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) in the final stages of the long civil war” (David, 2012).  
 
Both the domestic population and the international community were assured 
that the Commission’s report would fully address demands for 
accountability, in line with promises President Rajapaksa made to UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on his visit to Sri Lanka in May 2009, shorty 
after the End (David, 2012; Perera, 2014). The LLRC report did not satisfy 
international commentators, Tamil representatives or civil society groups in 
Sri Lanka with regard to accountability (HRW, 2011; Crisis Group, 2011a; 
TNA, 2012; UNHRC, 2012). It did, however, provide a framework of 285 
recommendations for reform that have been widely praised as progressive 
and workable, echoing previous advocacy by political parties and civil society 
groups (de Mel, 2013; LLRC, 2010). The “National Action Plan” (NAP) on 
reconciliation, brought into being in response to the 2012 HRC resolution and 
introduced in November 2012, is predicated on the implementation of the 
LLRC recommendations. The NAP is a process set in motion for international 
consumption: a government-appointed team drew up a supporting document 
for the NAP, detailing designated implementing agencies and key 
performance indicators for each recommendation adopted. The NAP was 
adopted in Cabinet in August 2012 and the UN Human Rights Council was 
informed of the establishment of a Task Force to oversee the implementation 
of the NAP, as well as a Land Commission to look into resettlement (Yusuf, 
2013, de Mel, 2013). Critics, including the TNA and the UNHRC in a March 
2013 follow-up resolution, have pointed to the failure to incorporate the 
entirety of recommendations into the NAP (TNA, 2011; UNHRC, 2013). A 
lack of political will is signaled by the delay in implementation; the absence of 
key issues (such as initiatives on missing persons and the disappeared) from 
the NAP; and the reliance on existing mechanisms and commissions to 
deliver justice, despite their ineffectiveness in the past (de Mel, 2013; Perera, 
2012; CPA, 2013).  
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The LLRC serves as a powerful illustration of the way in which transitional 
justice practice and rhetoric can be instrumentalised by elites in pursuit of 
political goals, which Gowing (2013) articulates with great clarity. The 
mandate itself sought to politically benefit the Rajapaksa regime. By equating 
its goals of promoting reconciliation and avoiding future violence with 
scrutiny of the UNP-initiated peace process and its breakdown, the state 
constructed a narrative about the past that both allocated the entirety of the 
blame for creating a situation requiring “reconciliation” to the opposition 
UNP and helped to sustain the impression that the return to military 
operations in 2006 was an inevitable outcome (Gowing, 2013; LLRC, 2011: 1.5 
- 1.6). The militarisation of peace discourses, reflected in the very conception 
of “war for peace” under the Chandrika Kumaratunga government from 1995 
to 2001 (Uyangoda, 2007; de Mel, 2007), meant that a military solution was 
always a potentiality, though it was not popularly considered possible until 
Mahinda Rajapaksa’s ascent to office. The LLRC’s mandate, further, was not 
to assess state accountability but rather relies on a framework of assessing 
state “failure to protect its citizens from [LTTE] terrorism” (Thiranagama, 
2012: 99). The process avoided apportioning any accountability whatsoever to 
the Rajapaksa government for the escalation of the conflict at the End and the 
associated violations of international law. It is, in this sense, reminiscent of 
previous commissions of inquiry that appeared to be “motivated by political 
ambitions to slander members of the opposition at the time (who were 
members of the sitting government over the periods that were under 
investigation)” (Anonymous, 2011: 39).  
 
Gowing (2013: 17) argues that the state’s “ostensible commitment to 
transitional justice” follows a “performative logic”, in line with 
Thiranagama’s (2013) reading of the LLRC as a response to international 
pressure and the observation of Anonymous (2011: 32) that the LLRC was 
“[p]ossibly in anticipation of the UN’s move” to establish the “Panel of 
Experts” inquiry. The establishment of the LLRC was announced in May 
2010, one month before the Panel of Experts. Transitional justice mechanisms 
such as the LLRC, Thiranagama (2013: 94) argues, should be analysed as a 
“state performance in the midst of a deep and ongoing violence rather than as 
a process to bring about reconciliation”. Timed in anticipation of the 2012 
UNHRC resolution on Sri Lanka, the Sri Lankan Army’s establishment of a 
panel of inquiry to investigate human rights abuses in March that year 
appears to be another result of pressure from international actors. A civil 
society memorandum noted in March 2014 that the appointment of a new 
‘Presidential Commission to Investigate into Complaints on Missing Persons’ 
 157 
was publicised “just ahead of the visit of the High Commissioner Navi Pillay 
last August” (CPA, 2014). Gowing (2013: 17) acknowledges that the “precise 
effect of international pressure is difficult to quantify” but that the timing of 
the initiatives mentioned suggest that “it has been an important factor in 
incentivising Sri Lankan elites to pursue such measures”. Through the 
appropriation of the language of transition and the “performative” 
establishment of reconciliation mechanisms, Sri Lanka attempts to deflect 
international calls for accountability.  
 
While Thiranagama (2013: 102) notes that “the state has to continually 
perform itself as such through spectacles and languages of stateness”, 
‘transitioning states’ also have to perform themselves as such by appearing to 
adhere to the framework of liberal transition. Neloufer de Mel (2012: 1) notes 
that the LLRC received an overwhelming response from the public. The 
participants were not, however, motivated by a desire to bear public witness 
to atrocity in the interests of recording experiences, asserting dignity and 
celebrating the exceptionality of survival, in line with the typically expected 
benefits of post-atrocity truth commissions (Hayner, 2001; Agamben, 2002). 
Participation was, in fact, a risk taken, in a repressive environment of 
militarisation and enforced silences, seeking very specific outcomes. Though 
signaling compliance with the increasingly standardised “toolbox” of 
transitional justice (ICTJ, 2011), the state uses that lexicon and processes to 
conceal ongoing violence and deflect accountability. As Höglund and Orjuela 
(2013) assert, the assumption that “transition” has occurred in Sri Lanka, 
manifest in the mechanisms of reconciliation, obscures continuities of 
violence. Post-war, human rights reports continue to document atrocities and 
human rights abuses perpetrated by the state authorities, primarily against 
the Tamil community, suggesting a continuing logic of ethnic persecution 






3.13 ‘Oneness’: Writing Self-determination out of Transition 
 
The LLRC’s fundamental conception of reconciliation as a goal is based on the 
eradication of difference and the achievement of a national “oneness”: 
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“[reform] should essentially promote greater harmony and unity and 
not disharmony and disunity among the people of the country. The 
promotion of this ‘oneness’ and a common identity should be [its] 
principal aim” (LLRC, 2010: 8.217).  
 
This conception is consistent with both the ‘Sinhalisation’ of the country’s 
institutions and an ongoing centralisation of power that implies a state-
building project based on Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist hegemony (Gowing, 
2013; Höglund and Orjuela, 2013). The very language of reconciliation here is 
imbued with a nationalist tendency to suppress minority interests. The LLRC 
therefore can be interpreted as a vehicle of domination, appropriating the 
mechanisms and discourse of transitional justice in the service of this project. 
The state’s discursive reliance on notions of “localised” justice, in a context of 
“victor’s justice”, ignores the asymmetry of power between the Sinhalese state 
and the Tamil minority (Höglund and Orjuela, 2013; Gowing, 2013). The 
process of reconciliation is in the service of Sinhala-Buddhist nation-building, 
a “peace” founded on domination. 
 
“You see the Western, or liberal, notion of reconciliation is based on the 
resolution of a conflict through negotiation and through compromise and 
through finding a middle ground. But the way in which the conflict ended – or 
rather the war ended – in 2009, is very different. So therefore the Sri Lankan 
government’s notion of reconciliation is very different from that Western, 
liberal notion of reconciliation” (JU, 2012).  
 
This notion of reconciling conceptions of reconciliation, offered by a Sinhalese 
Colombo-based political scientist, chimes with the literature, where many 
authors agree that the “amorphous nature of the term” has simply been 
assumed to naturally fit in an array of different contexts (McGregor, 2006: 
156). In fact, when utilised strategically the term “can allow governments to 
hide behind a policy of reconciliation” without actually attempting to counter 
the effects of past violence and human rights abuse (McGregor, 2006). 
Sinhalese-Buddhist hegemony sits atop discourses of counter-terrorism and 
victory, bolstering the popularity of the Rajapaksa government. In this 
situation, the state sees no reason to accommodate the interests of the 
“vanquished” Tamil minority (JU, 2012). The state’s decisive military victory 
means that it is the author of justice and reconciliation initiatives; the state is 
authoring a “victor’s peace” (JU, 2012). The choices that are made about the 
narratives as well as the parameters of a reconciliation process, Schubert 
(2013: 4) reminds us, are political choices: the “political imperatives of 
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establishing, legitimising and stabilising control over a post-war nation-state” 
are the foremost concern for governments in power.  
 
Interviews with state officials revealed an implicit assumption that the 
‘transition’ from war to peace involved the righting of political injustices, 
namely the existence of ‘terrorism’, though the End did not mark a transition 
“from a militarised society to a non-militarised society” nor “from an 
undemocratic to a democratic society” (Höglund and Orjuela, 2013: 307). A 
state media spokesman explained: 
“although people are talking about reconciliation and reunion, we don’t have 
such a huge problem because now this – we had a issue with a terrorist 
problem, we never had a communal problem” (LH, 2012). 
The state expects a commitment to the improvement of infrastructure and 
facilities in the war-torn areas in the North and East to fulfil its 
responsibilities towards the Tamils. Northern-based interviewees stated that 
there is little or no understanding of the needs and perceptions of the people, 
that development work is embarked upon without local consultation or 
consideration for local sensitivities (MR, MTJ, RF, 2012). Goodhand (2010: 
344) notes that the value-loaded nature of programmes promoting 
development, peace and stability in Sri Lanka’s post-war context must be 
recognised as “hegemonic projects at the heart of which lie questions of 
politics and power and whose definition of peace and stability prevails”. The 
process of reconciliation put in place by the state, including the establishment 
of bodies such as the National Unit on Reconciliation (the Unit) and Sri Lanka 
Youth Reconciliation Forum (SLYRF), is undermined by a lack of political will 
to provide justice to the Tamils, least of all social and political rights.82 The 
Unit receives no government funding but relies on partnerships with 
organisations in the private and NGO spheres, reaching out to potential 
partners to help them implement programmes (PW, 2012). The Unit assumes 
that a “natural processes of reconciliation” is engendered by the end of 
conflict, with the increase of movement and improvement in the general 
security situation (SLYRF, 2011; PW, 2012). The Unit’s coordinator, Pushpi 
Weerakoon, is “in the field and with the beneficiaries”, meaning that she gets to 
“know what they need...where it is needed and how to do it” (PW, 2012). The 
                                                        
82 President Mahinda Rajapaksa set up a National Reconciliation Unit on 4 October 2011. The 
Unit facilitates the work of Professor Rajiva Wijensinha, the Presidential Advisor on 
Reconciliation, whose early terms of reference include monitoring and reporting to the President 
on progress with regard to the Interim Recommendations of the LLRC, and promoting 
appropriate activities for this purpose through the relevant Ministries. 
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implementation of social and economic programmes on this ad hoc, 
seemingly depoliticised basis, perpetuates the asymmetry between the state 
and the abject Tamil population of the Northeast in the language of ‘helping’ 
and ‘upliftment’: the charitable peace.  
 
A senior member of an international agency argued that process of dialogue 
with the Tamil people has not been sought by the state (RD, 2013). One 
academic elaborated: 
 
“the government does not consider that they [the Tamils] have also very deep 
wounds. The government’s line is that the economic development is enough 
for the Tamils. The government does not seem to recognise that they are a 
people with their own sense of self-respect, pride. They are a community, they 
consider themselves as a nation but the government has no sensitivity 
whatsoever – the government gives utmost priority to…national security and 
economic development” (JU, 2012). 
For JU (2012), the state is “demonstrating quite explicably…its incapacity to 
manage the political component of the conflict”.  
 
Transitional justice is a highly politicised process and “the forms of 
transitional justice developed speak practically and symbolically to precisely 
what kind of transition (if any) is actually occurring” (McEvoy and McGregor, 
2008: 7). Donna Pankhurst and Luk Huyse both argue in favour of a 
minimised role for the international community in promoting reconciliation. 
Reconciliation for Pankhurst is “more of an internal affair” (Pankhurst, 1999, 
239) and Huyse posits that “[l]asting reconciliation must be home-grown 
because in the end it is the survivors who assign meaning to the term and the 
process” (Huyse, 2003: 23). However, Lorna McGregor (2006) argues that this 
approach fails to take into account the potential problems posed by a 
domestic policy of reconciliation, particularly where the society in question 
fails to embody democratic traits. Also, as Christine Bell asserts, official 
processes of reconciliation require the victim to “buy-in” to an official social 
narrative of the conflict and impose expectations on victims to “give up 
retributive desires in favour of reconciling narratives” that  “may not 
contribute to their ‘healing’ at all” (Bell, 2003: 1095). McEvoy and McGregor 
(2008) contend that the voices of those most affected by conflict are not always 
heard or accorded adequate weight when institutionalised international 
justice arrives, and describe how actors “from below” such as community, 
civil society and non-state groups can mobilise and resist the powerful 
hegemonic political, social and economic forces embodied in the formal 
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institutions of transition. Drawing on Rajagopal’s (2003) critique of the 
imperialist tendencies of international law, they argue that: 
 
“the realization of rights struggles, or indeed effective methods of 
dealing with the past in transitional contexts, is marked not simply by 
the deliberation of major legal institutions or landmark cases, but by 
the individuals and groups involved in social and political struggles 
which placed them on the agenda in the first place” (McEvoy and 
McGregor, 2008: 4).  
Rajagopal argues for the inclusion of movements “from below”, particularly 
social movements in the Third World, in the history of struggles for human 
rights and justice. While international law, he argues, has been shaped by 
Third World resistance, it has repressed and excluded these movements from 
the story of its formation (2003: 5). Rajagopal observes, also, that only certain 
forms of resistance – primarily those couched in the framework of human 
rights – have been granted legitimacy. The exclusion of the Tamil political 
narrative of self-determination is illustrative of the state’s hegemonic project 
and is worth considering here. 
 
Oliver P. Richmond (2002: 393-4) notes that ethnic actors such as the LTTE 
utilise the concepts and structure of the international system to “reconstruct 
their status in diplomatic language” and package their claim to self-
determination in the language of sovereignty. The appeal for self-
determination is on the basis of human rather than state security. The 
problem, he argues, is that the international system dictates the inadmissibility 
of claims for “ethnic sovereignty” on the basis of non-intervention and state 
sovereignty, while the international community, with its discourse of self-
determination, human rights, basic freedoms and political equality appears 
less adamantly against conceding legitimacy and sovereignty. Richmond 
identifies the tension between established states and internal (ethnic) groups 
claiming sovereign rights as emerging from clearly contradictory positions on 
territorial claims in international law.83 Interrogating these contradictions, he 
concludes that: 
 
“Ethnic sovereignty is derived from within ethnic groups themselves, 
rather than bestowed from the outside according to mandatory 
                                                        
83 See Richmond (2002) and Whall (1996) for a detailed overview of international measures on self-
determination. 
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conditions. It is endorsed by implication by the humanitarian norms to 
which international society aspires. It is this to which the international 
community needs to respond in order to allow the expression of ethnic 
sovereignty as a legitimate, rather than a rebel, form of negative or 
quasi sovereignty, and one which can coexist with other claims 
legitimately, rather than compete illicitly. The days of absolute 
and exclusive sovereignty are indeed over, if they ever existed” 
(Richmond, 2002: 400). 
 
Sri Lanka’s contemporary history is defined by competing claims to 
sovereignty: the state’s existence as an internationally recognised political 
unit, centred on the Sinhala-Buddhist foundations that necessitate the 
maintenance of a unitary state, and the Tamil claim to ethnic sovereignty, 
based on cultural identity claims and human security in the face of a 
persecutory state. Sri Lanka’s rhetorical reassertion of state sovereignty at the 
End was strategic (even as it regained full sovereign power in Sri Lanka), as is 
its sustenance of this discourse in the face of proposed international 
investigative measures. The domestic reconciliation process emphasises social 
and economic rights over the political aspirations that have defined the Tamil 
separatist struggle, a struggle that sought to “reproduce the logic of the 
national state to gain security, welfare, and legitimacy” in the international 
system (Richmond, 2002: 387). By associating Tamil political agitation entirely 
with the “terrorist” LTTE – projected as an “illicit” and “rebel” political 
project, in Richmond’s words - and pursuing state-directed reconciliation 
initiatives emphasising “oneness” within a unitary state, the state attempts to 
override the Tamil claim to self-determination and write it out of history. The 
rhetoric of “oneness” is essentially exclusionary, as a Tamil academic 
explained. Within this state structure, state leaders “don’t consider minority 
rights. They say ‘one community of Sri Lankans.’ This means ‘we are Sinhalese’” 
(MTJ, 2012). A campaign against human rights defenders and civil society 
activists in the state media and public statements by politicians before the 
2012 Geneva Human Rights Council meeting drew on the rhetoric of 
“oneness” to undermine activism on accountability and political and human 
rights. Where “(e)thnic communities have no separate regions…(t)he entire 
country belongs to all ethnic communities”, discussions in pursuit of a 
political solution for the Tamils are antithetical to “patriotic sentiments” that 
ought to be directed towards “the supreme task of building a country in 




3.14 “Local” Reconciliation: Deflecting Accountability 
 
The emphasis on the LLRC’s “homegrown” nature and the prerogative of 
reflecting indigenous “Sri Lankan” values, Gowing (2013: 16) rightly asserts, 
is an “attempt to neutralize accountability issues by balancing the demands of 
justice against alternative social goods.”84 It also contributes to deflecting calls 
for accountability, which are domestically weak and exist primarily in the 
international sphere. Shaw and Waldorf (2010) argue that “localized justice” is 
often defined by state elites, while silencing or ignoring minority groups or 
those affected by atrocity. Proclaiming the influence of the Tamil diaspora on 
foreign observers, the local nature of the process is presented as crucial by 
state elites. President Rajapaksa announced in 2012 that:  
 
“the country would not benefit by trying to please selfish groups who 
receive foreign funds. Similarly solutions cannot be obtained by 
implementing the proposals of extremist groups of whatever 
persuasion. What is required today is the formulation of policies based 
on a vision that is commonly applicable to the whole country” 
(Rajapaksa, 2012). 
 
The LLRC, through the UNHRC resolutions, has become a “homegrown” 
vehicle of international pressure, pushing Sri Lanka to implement the report’s 
recommendations as a basis for reconciliation. The March 2012 UNHRC 
Resolution called on the Sri Lankan government to implement the 
recommendations of the LLRC and to report back on progress (UNHRC, 
2012). This approach was also criticised as intrusive and imperialist in intent, 
as Pushpi Weerakoon of the Reconciliation Unit explained:  
 
“The war was homegrown – the problem, the issues – and the war was won by 
the president with a homegrown solution and now we are also trying to 
implement it [reconciliation], making use of all these resources we have. So it’s 
the same principle – ‘who are you to police us?’” (PW, 2012)  
The UN has integrated the LLRC (a mechanism of localised justice) into a 
process of internationalised transitional justice. In response, pro-government 
actors now dismiss the LLRC recommendations as non-indigenous and 
describe the commissioners as “not real Sri Lankans” (Höglund and Orjuela, 
2012). As the local is transposed to the international, with the implications for 
                                                        
84 This point is elaborated upon below in the section on ‘Accountability versus “Unique” Sri 
Lankan Justice’. 
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accountability measures and commitment to political reform that can be 
expected to follow, the state has become hostile to the recommendations of its 
own ‘localised’ reconciliation initiative, particularly the international 
community’s monitoring of implementation measures. The state’s selective 
interpretation and use of the practices and language of the transitional justice 
paradigm has occurred simultaneously to its rejection of the legitimacy of the 
international norms and institutions from which the paradigm emerges 
(Gowing, 2013). The simultaneous deployment of transitional justice rhetoric, 
a strong narrative vilifying international involvement in Sri Lanka’s affairs, 
and the continuing violence perpetrated by the state against the Tamil 
population exposes the state’s hostility to the norms it purports to value and 
uphold. The UN Panel of Experts, for example, was constructed as evidence 
of the UN’s double standards, which “allow Western and West-backed states 
with egregious human rights records to escape the UN’s accountability radar” 
(Anonymous, 2011: 40). The Panel members, internationally hailed as 
transitional justice advocates, were portrayed as external enemies to Sri Lanka 
(Höglund and Orjuela, 2013). International institutions of justice, from which 
transitional justice as a prominently “Western” phenomenon arises “are seen 
as part of a political agenda which serves the self-interest of the West” 
(Höglund and Orjuela, 2013: 309). Despite official proclamations that the 
government wants “to be enriched by the collective insight of the 
international community,” Sri Lanka alleges that instruments of international 
pressure are unfairly biased against the government (Peiris, 2012).  
 
Gowing (2013: 18) astutely notes that Sri Lankan elites have endeavoured to 
favourably compare the state’s initiatives to the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, both to signal Sri Lanka’s commitment to the 
positive values popularly associated with the initiative and to adopt a 
conception of reconciliation that serves the interests of those elites: one based 
on localised and restorative justice, with a focus on material, economic 
reparations as opposed to accountability and retributive justice”. The 
international community is currently encouraging Sri Lanka to establish a 
truth and reconciliation commission, and discussions between Sri Lankan and 
South African representatives on the “success” of the country’s post-apartheid 
reconciliation process have been reported in the media (AP, 2014). Colombo-
based civil society networks appear to have adopted the South African TRC 
as the paradigmatic case of the ideal transitional justice model (Antekell, 
2013). The benefits accruing to Sri Lanka from this engagement include 
diplomatic and economic gains: on an official visit to South Africa in February 
2014, Sri Lankan officials signed a Bilateral Air Services Agreement (BASA), 
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further strengthening diplomatic relations between the two countries (Global 
Times, 2014; AP, 2014). Trade relations were important item on the agenda, as 
South Africa assured the delegation that it would not support “policies that 
would divide Sri Lanka imposed by the international community” (De Silva, 
quoted in Global Times, 2014). The possibility of a truth and reconciliation 
mechanism was publicly courted by the Sri Lankan state in the months prior 
to the 2014 UNHRC resolution, seemingly hoping to deflect calls for 
international accountability by offering another ‘localised’ option.  
 
 
3.15 Sri Lanka and the Global Liberal Order 
 
Kennedy (2005: 13) describes international affairs as “a conversation amongst 
players about the legitimacy of state behaviour”, arguing that the political 
assertions made in the process come “armed with little packets of legal 
legitimacy”. The “international community”, he contends, composed of 
professional humanitarians, is in effect “a stand-in for the views of the 
broader public”, “a proxy for the CNN effect” (2005: 13). International actors 
such as the United States and the United Kingdom have publicly called for a 
credible and independent investigation into war crimes at the End, riding on 
the wave of condemnation created by the Tamil diaspora and the human 
rights industry. Those same states were complicit in violence against the 
Tamils by supporting Sri Lanka during the war, not least through the 
weapons trade and the legitimising discourse and practical measures 
associated with the ‘War on Terror’ (Kleinfield, 2003; Gowing, 2013; PPT, 
2013). The rejection of “international intervention” is a strong nationalist 
mobilising force harnessed by the Rajapaksa government, one that must be 
understood in light of the West’s previous engagements in Sri Lanka, 
including the supply of arms during the conflict (Keen, 2013; Höglund and 
Orjuela, 2013).  In the aftermath of the violence of the End, those states have 
expected to shape Sri Lanka’s transitional justice responses, with a view to 
reestablishing moral standing and to draw Sri Lanka back into the framework 
of liberal transition expected of post-conflict states. Facing Sri Lanka’s 
resistance to reform, increasingly “authoritarian” propensities (Pillay, 2013), 
and triumphant anti-Western rhetoric, international powers have sought to 
remotely manage the reconciliation process through the HRC resolutions. The 
Western powers championing political reform and accountability are seeking 
obedience from Sri Lanka and asking for a demonstration of commitment to 
the global liberal order. Analysing the interests of the Western powers, we 
need to view transitional justice as a global project aimed at reconstructing 
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Third World states in Western liberal democratic terms (Lundy and 
McGovern, 2008). 
 
For Duffield (2001), post-conflict peace-building strategies by international 
actors are an attempt to impose the “liberal peace” on the state in question. 
This embodies “a new or political humanitarianism that lays emphasis on 
such things as conflict resolution and prevention, reconstructing social 
networks, strengthening civil and representative institutions, promoting the 
rule of law, and security sector reform in the context of a functioning market 
economy” (2001: 10–11). Oliver P. Richmond (2005: 4) observes that the 
spread of democracy, assumed now to be “ a standard form of conﬂict-
avoiding polity,” has been “universalised as a strategy for ending war by the 
liberal hegemony of the world’s most powerful states and their organisations, 
institutions and agencies.” This project is at its core “a form of global 
governance, if not government” and while it is largely perceived as 
benevolent, even progressive, Richmond (2005: 4) warns, “it may also 
engender unintended consequences”. The liberal peace framework has seen 
the marriage of development and poverty reduction objectives with security 
policies in the operations of international organisations, donor countries and 
the UN. Duffield (2001) critiques this marriage as an attempt by the powerful 
to contain, stabilise and ameliorate the effects of violent conflict in the Third 
World.  
 
Ikenberry and Wright (2008: 10) argue that the post-World War II order is 
more thickly institutionalised and open than its predecessors, crediting 
institutions such as the United Nations, the IMF and the World Bank for 
forming an unprecedentedly rule-based structure for political and economic 
relations. The institution-based global liberal order is less susceptible to 
power shifts and upheaval, and tussles over power are more likely to take 
place within those institutions, rather than in open warfare (JSIA, 2012). The 
power exercised in these institutions is increasingly articulated in the 
language of humanitarianism, which has become the vocabulary of global 
governance (Kennedy, 2005), but is also subject to norm entrepreneurialism, 
as emerging powers gain voice and weight within international institutions 
(JSIA, 2012).  The system is subject to reformist agendas that are not especially 
radical or disruptive to existing geopolitical systems (JSIA, 2012: 4).  
 
The palatability of Sri Lanka’s move to reassert the principles of sovereignty 
and non-intervention must be understood in the context of a global 
movement of power towards multipolarity. Inherent to this is a will to expose 
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double standards in institutions that “rhetorically preached equality of all 
sovereign states but which were largely handmaidens or instruments for 
deepening hierarchical structures in international society” (JSIA, 2012: 6). The 
state’s rebuke of calls for international investigations into war crimes sits 
comfortably with this movement, as the claim of ‘double standards’ resonates 
with the wider order of states. Kennedy (2005: 17) argues, however, that the 
UN world of independent sovereigns is “an increasingly dangerous fantasy”, 
reminding us that through economies, governments, international financial 
institutions, the media and humanitarian agencies, regimes across the world 
are entangled with the West. Further, through the notion of “development”, 
which provided the motivation for nation-building in the post-war period, 
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are carriers of a 
dangerous ideological enterprise, serving the global elites who run the world 
economy and marginalising the most vulnerable in society (Rajagopal, 2003: 
12). The universal assumptions underlying “peace-building” attempts (which 
have become a central imperative in transitional justice processes), Richmond 
(2004: 88) reminds us, “are themselves indicative of a liberal hegemony which 
may also lead to structural forms of violence”. Indeed, by casting an eye over 
policy documents on peace, democracy and development produced by the 
UN, “what has run through all attempts to make peace and create order has 
been an attempt by hegemonic actors to preserve their own value systems and 
to freeze the world’s cartographies in their favour” (2004: 88). 
 
Post-war, Sri Lanka has ensured that it does not overly rely on the West 
economically. The government neutralised the EU’s control over its domestic 
policy by deepening its trade relationship with China and continuing to 
benefit from Japanese and Indian aid. The island can withstand the impact of 
the EU’s withdrawal or suspension of preferential trade privileges (Hogg, 
2011). Both Britain and the US abstained from the board discussion that saw 
the IMF grant a loan of $200m to Sri Lanka in 2009, to aid recovery from the 
war and the global financial crisis (Hogg, 2011). This loan was supposedly 
contingent on significant reductions in military expenditure and the creation 
of social safety nets for people displaced by the war. Through this abstention, 
these states indicated their disapproval of the manner in which the war 
ended, though the broader geopolitical trends suggest a keenness to invest in 
Sri Lanka and the international arms trade supports the militarisation of the 
state. The second tranche of the IMF loan was processed in 2011, despite 
sustained military expenditure. Many EU member states, China and Pakistan 
continue to sell weapons to Sri Lanka and the US Department of Defense is 
reportedly keen to open up a military relationship. The US provided arms to 
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Sri Lanka during the civil war (Keen, 2013; Bateman, 2011). It is worth noting 
that Sri Lanka’s post-war financial support comes from donor countries that 
are “noninterventionist about matters deemed sovereign or by new donors 
who are less vociferous about accountability issues” (Anonymous, 2011: 47). 
The countries issuing the strongest demands for accountability have offered 
comparatively meagre financial assistance to Sri Lanka (2011: 47), and 
therefore exercise very little control over the government’s actions. In July 
2011, for example, the US House Foreign Affairs Committee approved a ban 
on all US government funding to Sri Lanka with the exceptions of 
humanitarian aid, demining and activities to promote democracy and 
governance (Hogg, 2011).  
 
The assertion of international political influence on post-war Sri Lanka is geo-
political in the sense that Sri Lanka has defied the conflict resolution methods 
associated with the “liberal peace” framework, which purports to privilege 
democratic values and universal understandings of human rights over the 
state’s monopoly on security (Lewis, 2010). Groups mobilising against state 
repression under this model are often offered parity of status in negotiations 
with the state. Under Mahinda Rajapaksa’s Presidency, Sri Lanka reiterated 
the privileged status of the sovereign state, withdrew state support for 
conflict resolution based on changes to territorial integrity, undercut the role 
of external parties to conflict resolution and refused to recognise the LTTE as 
the sole voice of the Tamil community (Lewis, 2010). The End demonstrated 
that insurgencies can be defeated militarily rather than through peace talks, 
and exemplified the success of leaning on geopolitical actors such as China for 
resources. Therefore, as Thiranagama (2013: 95) argues, international pressure 
for transitional justice and post-war reform in the UN forum is less about 
victim’s rights and more related to recuperation of Sri Lanka’s “scorched 
earth tactics” for other conflicts. In his analysis of the shifting form of the laws 
of war - “a confusing mix of principles and counter-principles, of firm rules 
and loose exceptions” - David Kennedy (2012: 165, 161) reminds us that the 
“legalization of the last war’s outcomes presses itself on the legitimacy of 
future combat”. If reconciliation and development can be built from the ashes, 
it could be the global example of our new century (Thiranagama, 2013: 95). 
 
 
3.16 Accountability versus “Unique” Sri Lankan Justice 
 
The Rajapaksa government’s emphasis on restorative and economic justice is 
a self-serving performance in the shape of a transitional justice process, one 
that deflects accountability for war crimes as disruptive and unnecessary, a 
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concern that is overwhelmed by “the need to maintain order and promote 
national cohesion” (Gowing, 2013: 16).  Welikala (2011, 2011a) contends that 
there is a tension between potential international justice mechanisms and 
national stability and democracy, problems that are situated at the interstices 
of the legal and the political. Welikala (2011) astutely notes that in the context 
of President Rajapaksa’s popularity in the South, “the spectre of international 
intervention…unintentionally creates the space for the regime to burnish its 
anti-terrorism, anti-western and ‘patriotic’ credentials, and thereby shield 
itself from democratic scrutiny and normal politics.” He argues that electoral 
and intellectual defeat of the regime is preferable; immediate accountability 
for human rights violations at the End risks defeat and also risks nourishing 
the domestic reification of the Rajapaksas on Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist 
terms (Welikala, 2011). The US Ambassador to Sri Lanka predicted in 2010 
that lobbying by the Tamil diaspora and advocacy for international 
accountability “would seem to play into the super-heated campaign rhetoric 
of Rajapaksa and his allies that there is an international conspiracy against Sri 
Lanka and its ‘war heroes’” (Butenis, 2010). The streets have, in fact, been 
overrun with protestors as “every community and organisation, which 
depend or want the government to do them a favour, are falling over one 
another to join in” (The Hindu, 2012). State officials sustain palpable rage 
directed against the UN mechanism and the Sri Lankan civil society activists 
who support it (Jayasuriya, 2012).  Where the immediate security of these 
activists, and the wider Tamil population and other minorities, is at risk in 
this atmosphere of heightened Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, the 
accountability measures being pushed in Geneva seem abstract in terms of 
achieving justice. The annual hurdle erected for the government in Geneva 
currently provides an opportunity to stoke nationalist sentiment and engage 
the population in anti-UN, anti-Western protests. 
International accountability has been a point of advocacy since the End for 
Tamil civil society, diaspora and human rights groups, and the 2014 Geneva 
Resolution called for the establishment of an international investigation into 
the End (UNHRC, 2014). For what purpose is this outcome being pursued by 
the Western powers, and what do such efforts mean for domestic justice 
claims? Accountability manifested in institutional mechanisms such as trials, 
criminal investigations and prosecutions are, in the legalistic, normative 
approach, seen to “honor and redeem the suffering of the individual victim” 
(Weschler, 1990: 244) and to support the “path of recollection and 
affirmation” that recognises the suffering of victims and affirms their 
common humanity (Minow, 1999). Minow sees the ‘performance’ of justice for 
victims as an affirmative and inclusive act that promotes reconciliation. Osiel 
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(1997) also frames trials as a ritualistic performance by which national 
memories can be consolidated and inscribed. Allowing victims a voice in 
trials, despite the adversarial nature of such a forum, is thought to 
symbolically invite victims inside the process of justice (Skaar, Gloppen and 
Suhrke, 2005). Though often believed to embody a symbolic break from 
impunity and abuse of the rule of the law associated with repressive regimes, 
critics of retributive justice postulate that trials can also promote victor’s 
justice and entrench divisions within society (Skaar, Gloppen and Suhrke, 
2005). These readings of accountability measures refer to situations where 
‘transition’ has occurred, from authoritarianism to democracy, or from 
conflict to ‘peace.’ In Sri Lanka’s post-war environment, however, the 
potentiality of war crimes trials, targeting the country’s leaders and revered 
military, gives rise to an alternate form of ritual: pro-government protests 
founded on nationalistic, Sinhala-Buddhist infused rhetoric that can be 
interpreted as mass rituals in defence of the military and state leaders. 
The National Peace Council notes that the international community’s “narrow 
focus on the last phase of the war” as the purported period of investigation, 
and the state forces and commanders pinpointed as the persons who will end 
up in the dock, is seen by “many in Sri Lanka, and not only its government, as 
a partisan intervention to punish it for defeating the LTTE” (Perera, 2014). The 
Sinhalese majority community perceives the accountability movement as a 
“call for punitive justice for its own sake, rather than for reconciliation” 
(Perera, 2014). Pursuing both accountability and reconciliation would, a 
lawyer and political commentator argued, cause a “situation of paradox” and 
would “not deliver anything but anger” (DD, 2012). The immediate priority 
ought to be reconciliation: “we need to not suppress but hold these accountability 
issues” (DD, 2012). He elaborated that: 
“…pressuring the government on the war crime accountability issue draws 
the anger of the patriots who hail the military victory over the LTTE and 
respect the contributors to that victory as “heroes”, regardless of international 
concerns” (DD, 2011). 
 
Pursuing retributive justice against the Rajapaksa government, Colombo-
based, Sinhalese interviewees stated, has the potential to be extremely 
divisive (DD, JP, SH, JU, 2012). This potentiality is fostered by a state intent 
on avoiding accountability mechanisms and pursuing consolidation of power 
on the foundations of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, a nationalism that feeds 
on the rhetoric of sovereignty and anti-imperialism. The narrative crafted by 
the state is one of a small country that has defied all odds to defeat a terrorist 
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threat, only to find itself under siege by misinformed, powerful and pro-LTTE 
groups in the international sphere. A documentary produced by the Ministry 
of Defence named “Lies Agreed Upon” (2011) challenged the allegations 
against the state forces as “baseless” fabrications by pro-LTTE forces and an 
international community “jealous” of Sri Lanka’s defeat of terrorism. Calls for 
accountability and investigations are framed as efforts by the “LTTE rump” 
and elements within the Tamil diaspora to “tarnish the image of this country, 
sow discord amongst our people, and drag Sri Lanka back into the past” 
(Rajapaksa, G., 2011). The international agenda, the state proclaims, is to 
reignite terrorism in Sri Lanka. Advocacy for accountability “is detrimental to 
the recovery process of a nation that suffered greatly due to terrorism” (MOD, 
2011a).  
 
Kennedy (2005: 15) notes that in the “international community” ideas about 
sovereignty and the limits of the UN Charter, core humanitarian 
commitments to the renunciation of empire, and the vocabulary of power 
politics “all render the desire to change regimes indiscussable.” However, 
there are other, subtle ways of bringing pressure to bear on domestic politics, 
and both the state and its supporters are attuned to that possibility. The state 
projects external intervention and regime change as potential outcomes of 
international interference, necessitating popular solidarity with the 
government. Pushpi Weerakoon described “interferences” by foreign 
stakeholders as efforts to “play with our political system” (PW, 2012): both 
imperialist in intent and misinformed. She argued, echoing Rajiva 
Wijensinha’s public pronouncements, that outsiders come to Sri Lanka with a 
prejudiced and negative attitude (often informed by the priority of electoral 
advantage in their own countries, in the case of politicians) and spend too 
little time in Sri Lanka to understand the progress underway (PW, 2012; 
Wijesinha, 2013). These ‘interferences’ are projected as designed to derail the 
reconciliation process underway. Lalith Weeratunga, the Permanent Secretary 
to President Rajapaksa, stated in January 2014 that an international inquiry 
would bring “huge chaos” to Sri Lanka, contending that judicially examining 
the actions of the “armed forces that liberated the country from terrorism” 
would upset the “delicate process” of reconciliation and “reduce the morale 
of the army” (Weeratunga, 2014). The nationalistic fervour encouraged by the 
state pivots on protecting “war heroes” from unwarranted harassment and 
investigation. Resisted by the majority, a moderate Sinhalese civil society 
actor argued, an international accountability mechanism would undermine 
stability and reconciliation (JP, 2012).  
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The state’s rhetorical logic of prioritising stability over retributive justice is a 
method of avoiding the “inconceivable” approach of prosecuting war 
criminals (Anonymous, 2011: 49). This includes LTTE cadres and LTTE 
figureheads, as prosecution of such figures could spark discussions about 
broader post-war accountability issues and the culpability of the state forces 
(Anonymous, 2011: 49). Sri Lanka’s ‘unique’ and benevolent approach in 
‘rehabilitating’ and ‘reintegrating’ LTTE cadres is therefore situated in a 
context of fear of recrimination: the “Sri Lankan state, emboldened by its 
decisive victory, has little compulsion to go down the road of sincerely 
dealing with the past, especially if this entails reckoning with its own 
complicity” (2011: 49). Though no explicit amnesties have been offered to 
former LTTE leaders – a controversial but established option in the 
transitional justice “toolbox” – some have been integrated into government 
positions and are now loyal to the Rajapaksa government (Höglund and 
Orjuela, 2012). A powerful, if bewildering, symbol of leniency and faith in 
rehabilitation, this move is in fact an example of the politicisation of justice 
measures, an illustration of the manner in which the government grants 
impunity at will, where it is deemed useful (Höglund and Orjuela, 2012).  
 
3.17 Tamil Calls for Accountability 
In January 2014, the Northern Provincial Council – the establishment of which 
was perceived as a positive move towards a Tamil retrieval of political agency 
and power – passed a resolution calling for an international investigation into 
war crimes at the End and over the course of the conflict (The Hindu, 2014).  
The term “ethnic cleansing” was chosen over “genocide” after several round 
of debate (The Hindu, 2014).  Reporting the details of the resolution, the state-
run Daily Mirror depicted the move as the TNA “mustering its fullest possible 
strength to authenticate such calls by sections of the international 
community” (Daily Mirror, 2014). Jehan Perera (2014) asserts that the 
“international demand has now been supplemented by the demand from 
within the country…[in] these circumstances it is best for the government to 
be proactive about a credible and independent investigation.” The 
establishment of the NPC (discussed further in Chapter Five), though 
expected to be a toothless governing body, has become a powerful tool of 
advocacy and has contributed to the reconfiguration of Tamil resistance and 
political agency on the international stage. 
As the NPC gains confidence and settles into a pattern of administration, 
however, this resolution ought to be considered as the settlement of a policy 
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position, not a cheap political move aimed at discrediting the government 
internationally. The TNA and human rights groups have, since the End, 
consistently called for accountability as a crucial prerequisite for 
reconciliation, locally and within the diaspora (TNA, 2012; BTF, 2013; Sri 
Lanka Campaign, 2013). Tamil activists in the country’s north have publicly 
demanded an impartial investigation into the End as a requirement of any 
political solution and reconciliation process (Guruparan and Rajamanoharan, 
2013). The TNA supports international involvement in this regard and seeks 
retributive justice against the government leaders for the alleged atrocities 
(TNA, 2012). The NPC has granted the TNA a legitimate constituency and a 
measure of protection in voicing, discussing and collectively confirming these 
aspirations. Previously, as recognised in a January 2010 confidential 
diplomatic cable by the US Ambassador Patricia Butenis, Sri Lanka-based 
Tamil politicians such as TNA leader R. Sampathan were restrained from 
vociferously demanding accountability by fear of retaliation: 
“…they believe themselves vulnerable to political or even physical 
attack if they raise the issue of accountability publicly…A few have 
suggested to us that while they cannot address the issue, they would 
like to see the international community push it” (Butenis, 2010). 
 
 
3.18 The Discursive Conflict: Propaganda and Public Relations 
 
The conflict continues in discursive form between the Sri Lankan government 
and the pro-accountability lobby in the international sphere, made up of 
Tamil diaspora organisations, human rights groups and media bodies. The 
state continuously resists the internationalisation of the “Sri Lanka issue” and 
rejects evidence of war crimes by the state forces as pro-LTTE propaganda. 
State officials explain the proceedings against Sri Lanka in the HRC as a war 
by other means: “They are using the HRC as a forum to win what they lost 
four years ago on the battle ground” (Mahanamahewa, 2013). Dr. 
Mahanamahewa of Sri Lanka’s Human Rights Commission told media 
sources that the Sri Lankan mission was working overtime to counter the 
malicious LTTE propaganda, briefing state officials at the HRC in Geneva. He 
named the British Tamil Forum, Global Tamil Forum and Tamil National 
Action Group of the US, Canadian Tamil Congress and the Transnational 
Government of Tamil Eelam as leaders of the “anti-Sri Lanka lobby”: “They 
have been providing millions of dollars to disseminate the misinformation 
and disinformation campaign against Sri Lanka to create a negative HR 
image” (Mahanamahewa, 2013). Labelling these groups as “extremist 
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elements”, he argued that they would settle for nothing less than a separate 
state and would not support a political settlement. 
 
As described earlier, the purpose of propaganda is to render the ideology of 
the propagandist accepted by the people. The state apparatus has a near-
monopoly on propaganda, derived from power and economic control. 
Systematic media repression and regulation allows the Rajapaksa government 
to control discourse and present itself both domestically and internationally 
as a small state under siege by the transnational ‘network’ of pro-Tamil lobby 
groups. The NPC resolution on accountability was timed to precede and 
inform the March 2014 UN Geneva Human Rights Council meeting, in fitting 
with the advocacy strategy adopted by international media and human rights 
groups in previous years. This strategy is performative: it is aimed at the 
international community, particularly the voting countries at the UNHRC, 
and uses visual media as a lobbying tool for maximum emotive effect. The 
“Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields” documentaries produced by Channel 4 News, for 
example, were screened at side panel events in Geneva in 2011 and 2013, in 
order to influence diplomats (Jeyaraj, 2011; Reuters, 2013). The Sri Lankan 
Ambassador argued in 2013 that the provision of a platform for this film 
before the vote was "part of a cynical, concerted and orchestrated campaign 
that is strategically driven and aimed at influencing debate in the council on 
Sri Lanka" (Aryasinha, 2013). As discussed in Chapter One, by labelling the 
materials produced and concerns voiced by human rights advocates and 
diaspora groups as propaganda, the state attempts to undermine the 
credibility of both the issues raised and the groups in question. Minister of 
External Affairs G. L. Peiris stoked scepticism in the run-up to Geneva 2014: 
“this kind of material has a habit of surfacing at a politically critical moment; 
on the eve of something that is happening that is significant for Sri Lanka” 
(quoted in Colombopage, 2014). 
 
The capability to produce propaganda and control information flows is more 
sustainable for states. They are globally competitive in terms of information 
technology, which elucidates the complex strategic relation between capital, 
liberal relations of power and the liberal way of war (Dillon and Reid, 2001: 
64). An examination of the state’s contracts with public relations corporations 
reveals the nexus between power, capital, liberal humanitarian discourse and 
the denial of atrocity in Sri Lanka’s post war “global communications effort” 
(Qorvis, 2014). The professionalisation of Sri Lanka’s post-war discourse 
contributes to the explanatory framework offered by Thiranagama (2013) and 
Gowing (2013). Sri Lanka’s adoption of the discourse of transitional justice 
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and the establishment of transitional justice measures such as the LLRC are in 
fact performative means of obviating international calls for accountability and 
disguising ongoing abuses and the consolidation of authority over the Tamil 
population. Feitlowitz quotes Adolf Hitler as once saying, “without 
loudspeakers, we never could have conquered Germany.” In the Fuhrer’s 
time, she argues, radio was the key technological advance that facilitated 
social control. For the Argentinian “Process” under the junta, it was public 
relations (PR) (1998: 41). A “PR giant” was hired to improve the country’s 
international image, issuing reports and magazine supplements and 
welcoming international journalists to visit Argentina (1998: 41). On their 
arrival, they were treated with great indulgence amid explanations of “what 
really happened” in the country (Feitlowitz, 1998: 42). Sri Lanka’s use of PR is 
comparable. 
The Head of the Media Centre for National Security (MCNS), Lakshman 
Hulugalle granted a highly illustrative interview. When asked to describe the 
main purpose of the media centre, he stated that it was originally set up “to 
counter the propaganda done by LTTE diaspora from the various countries and false 
propaganda”. Since the end of the war, that objective has been supplemented 
with another task: “to educate the people as to what the Defence Ministry and the 
forces are doing for the reconciliation and also for the country’s development” (LH, 
2012). The MCNS, previous to its closure in mid-November 2013, was 
concerned with positively marketing the contributions of the armed forces to 
the reconciliation process. 85 Post-war, while individuals within the 
Reconciliation Unit posit that the failure of the government to properly 
engage in “marketing” the activities and successes of the reconciliation process 
is the reason for international pressure (PW, 2012; Wijesinha, 2012), the state 
has actually relied heavily on public relations corporations, namely Bell 
Pottinger, Qorvis and The Report Company, to manage its public image in 
various forums, particularly in pursuit of improved trade relations with the 
US.  
Bell Pottinger, a UK based PR company, told undercover reporters in 2011 
that they were responsible for writing the speech that President Rajapaksa 
delivered to the UN General Assembly in 2010 (Newman and Wright, 2011). 
The company was reportedly was paid £3m a year to enhance the country’s 
image internationally (Pathirana, 2010). Media reports suggest that Bell 
                                                        
85 The MCNS was closed, according to the Colombo Telegraph (2013c) because of Hulugalle’s 
misuse of state money and the power associated with his office in his private life, including his 
“illicit affairs”.  
 176 
Pottinger staff were also involved in pro-Sri Lanka lobbying efforts in the UN, 
the EU and with the UK government to counter “what the Sri Lankan 
government says is propaganda by pro-Tamil Tiger groups in the influential 
Tamil diaspora” (Pathirana, 2011). Bell Pottinger were employed to influence 
the foreign media in favour of the Sri Lankan government, and reportedly 
pitched several articles to the UK’s The Guardian newspaper, which were 
refused (Newman and Wright, 2011). In late 2009, Bell Pottinger sub-
contracted its work in the United States to Qorvis Communications, “one of 
the largest privately owned digital and PR agencies in the world” (Qorvis, 
2013)86; the corporations appear to have worked together in concert on the Sri 
Lanka project, with representatives from both corporations co-signing official 
letters. Qorvis placed an article penned by President Rajapaksa in the 
Philadelphia Inquirer in December 2009 entitled “How Sri Lanka Defeated 
Terrorism” (Newman and Wright, 2011). In the piece, President Rajapaksa 
suggested that Sri Lanka’s defeat of terrorism had provided a “workable 
model” from which the international community could gain “valuable 
insight” (Newman and Wright, 2011), thereby promoting its conflict 
resolution model.  
Qorvis’s contract with the Sri Lankan government includes managing the 
country's reputation online, including “media and blogger relations, online 
grassroots, Web support, outreach to opinion leaders, and research and 
polling” (Lee, 2009). Reportedly, the contract between the state and this 
corporation has a monthly budget of $45,000 (Lee, 2009). The communication 
services provided by Qorvis and Bell Pottinger have also included preparing 
press releases and distributing “information materials” “on behalf of the 
government of Sri Lanka” to the US Department of Justice, explaining the Sri 
Lankan government’s position on the reconciliation progress and initiatives 
and defending its actions regarding anti-UN protests in Colombo, for 
example (POGO, 2010). These documents were designed to elevate the 
reader’s opinion of Mahinda Rajapaksa by including “highlights” of his 
speeches, promoting the narrative of economic prosperity, peace and 
reconciliation, and emphasising the country’s defeat of “terrorism.” Qorvis 
also reached out to news organisations such as the National Press Club and 
research centres such as the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in 
Washington to organise public events for Sri Lanka’s visiting Foreign Minister 
G. L. Peiris  (POGO, 2010). Further, illustrating the corporation’s involvement 
                                                        
86 Qorvis was purchased by PR giant Publicis in January 2014 and is now part of the public 
relations arm, MSL Group, under the name Qorvis MSL Group (Ho, 2014). 
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in promoting not only Sri Lanka’s positive media image but also the country’s 
economic and trade ties with the US, letters were delivered by Qorvis’s 
Director for Communications to a range of US Members of Congress, and 
trade representatives in particular, requesting a meeting with Governor Ajith 
Navard Cabraal, the head of Sri Lanka’s Central Bank (POGO, 2010).  
 
3.19 Marketing Reconciliation 
The tourism industry and advertising agencies employed to promote the 
country as a post-war peaceful haven have become a medium of propagating 
the success of the reconciliation process to the outside world. Under the 
branding slogan of “Sri Lanka: the wonder of Asia”, the country’s tourist 
industry employs the concept of “missed opportunities” to convince tourists 
to participate in the country’s long-overdue blossoming (The Report 
Company, 2012; Fernando et al., 2012). This opportunity was not overlooked 
by the government and the Sri Lankan Economic Development Ministry 
launched the “Tourism Development Strategy 2011 – 2016” with private 
sector participation (Fernando et al., 2012; Ministry of Economic 
Development, 2011). International interest in the country is manifested in the 
form of tourism, foreign investment and humanitarian and development 
investors (Fernando et al., 2012). State discourse of “come and see” directly 
supports the tourist industry as an idenified post-war development strategy 
as well as publicly refuting the charges levelled against it. In President 
Rajapaksa’s 2013 Independence Day Speech, he merged the state’s parallel 
interests:   
“We respond to the publicity against Sri Lanka carried out abroad by 
inviting foreign countries to come to Sri Lanka. We have seen that the 
best answer to false publicity and propaganda carried out in foreign 
countries is development and reconciliation in Sri Lanka. Do not 
believe something just because it is said, because you have read 
reports, critics have said it or the media has published it. We tell the 
people of the world – Come! Come Over and See for yourselves!” 
(Rajapaksa, 2013) 
The Report Company, hired by the state, produced a supplement in the UK’s 
The Guardian newspaper in 2012, inviting tourists and foreign investment to 
Sri Lanka, a country keen to “prove to its people – and to the world – that 
national reconciliation is healing old wounds, to the relief of all afflicted by 
the war” (2012: 4). The Report Company’s focus is economic, allowing state- 
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and corporate-affiliated interviewees to “dispel misconceptions about their 
nation’s brand whilst exploring how best to manage perceptions at an 
international level” (TRC1, 2013). The supplement describes the “holistic” 
process of reconciliation and development (TRC1, 2012: 5), though does not 
elaborate beyond emphasising the fertile ground for businesses and foreign 
investment, unhindered by the LTTE terrorist threat and supported by new 
infrastructure work. The conflict is “over” and Sri Lanka knows not to be 
“complacent” in facing its task: “rebuilding and reunifying the nation” (TRC1, 
2012). The accompanying image shows Sri Lanka as a puzzle, insinuating that 
the nation fits as a unified whole, the challenge being to keep the pieces in 
place. Reconciliation, unity and “oneness” is marketed to the supplement’s 
readership – a pool of potential economic investors, business partners and 
tourists – as “starting to pay off”, judged by multinational investment and its 
potential as a hub for international commerce (TRC1, 2012). The narrative 
projected in this weekend supplement was somewhat shattered by the 
newspaper’s headline news on the same day: “Tamils deported to Sri Lanka 
being tortured, victim claims” (Malik, 2012). In a serendipitous coincidence, 
the power of the tourist advertising industry clashed - within the one 
newspaper - with investigative journalism unearthing the institutionalisation 
of torture in Sri Lanka, a practice that continues in the post-conflict phase 
(HRW, 2013). The reconciliation and “complete cessation of violence” 
described in The Report Company’s supplement is exposed as purchased 
propaganda. The narrative of a reconciliation reliant on economic investment 
by international actors who are willing to support Sri Lanka’s “great future” 
is undermined by the newspaper article’s contents. The target audience of the 
supplement are encouraged to ignore Sri Lanka’s negative image and the 
“almost obsessive focus on the human rights issue” bemoaned by G L Peiris, 
the Minister of External Affairs (TRC1, 2012: 6). The newspaper 
simultaneously unearths heinous rights abuses, calling into the question the 
“facts not fiction” propagated in the supplement (Nonis, 2012).  
An elaboration of de Mel’s (2007) analysis of the corporate sector’s 
involvement in defining “peace” is relevant in this context, to illustrate the 
influence that corporations exert over international and domestic conceptions 
of current social and political dynamics. De Mel critiques the use of the 
“political economy of the sign of war” by advertising campaigns – using 
words and slogans such as “the only weapon you need is talent” and 
“Warning! Explosive idea inside!” – as maintaining a continuum between war 
and peace that kept a return to war as an acceptable recourse even throughout 
the peace process (de Mel, 2007: 85). Drawing on David Kennedy (2004), de 
Mel (2007: 81) notes that a common vocabulary has arisen in the professional 
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sectors of military, political and humanitarian actors. In the discursive 
framing of peace in Sri Lanka, the corporate sector and advertising industry 
have drawn on a lexicon related to embedded militarisation to promote their 
own interests. Domestic rejection of militarisation is difficult to imagine in 
this context, where the culture is saturated with militarism.  
 
3.20 Conclusion 
In post-war Sri Lanka, reconciliation is marketed via transnational public 
relations companies, for the purpose of boosting trade relations, as the 
international community housed in the UN Human Rights Commission 
monitors ‘progress’ in terms of implementation of the now-internationalised 
‘home grown’ LLRC. This chapter has sought to explain the nature of the 
narrative imparted through these forums and the performatives offered by 
the state in adherence to international expectations. To illustrate the lack of 
political will towards ‘reconciliation’ behind the state’s performatives, this 
chapter began from a description of the post-war lived experience of the 
Tamil people of the Northeast, based on interview material. An examination 
of the level of militarisation in the Tamil-dominated areas, alongside the 
LLRC’s project of reconciliation and nation-building built from a hegemonic 
Sinhala-Buddhist mould, elucidates the process of domination underway. 
This chapter has also detailed acts of resistance and agency undertaken by 
organic groups such as women submitting reports of their grievances to the 
LLRC and the newly formed Northern Provincial Council.   
Chapter Four 






The conflict in Sri Lanka has largely been understood internationally through 
the framework provided by the state: a “terrorist problem” rather than a 
conflict based on the grievances and separatist intent of a repressed minority. 
In the final phase of the war, the hegemonic framework of understanding 
applied to “Eelam war IV” was one of a humanitarian rescue mission, 
necessary to liberate the Tamil population from the LTTE terrorists. This 
chapter examines the lexicon developed, adapted and adopted by the Sri 
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Lankan state: a lexicon that borrowed heavily from global discourses formed 
by world powers and originating in international political institutions. The 
sources, content and linear development of the conflict “script” is described. 
The effectiveness of that script in mobilising the population and deterring 
international condemnation for the “final war” in the state’s favour is 
analysed. Beginning with an analysis of the construction of international 
discourses and their propensity for adoption and appropriation, this chapter 
will offer a critique of the “portability” of these discourses (Khalili, 2007: 12). 
The Sri Lankan example will illustrate the legitimising effect of global 
discourses as they spread across national boundaries, largely insusceptible to 
the particularities of a conflict situation. This chapter interrogates the ways in 
which transnational discourses are available to states as narrative building 
blocks. In Sri Lanka, speaking the language of the “international community” 
to achieve global sympathy, solidarity and support, these narratives informed 
the state’s conflict script. 87 
 
By offering analysis of the ways in which the Sri Lankan state operationalised 
frames of interpretation, this chapter draws attention to the state’s strategic 
choice of framework with respect to the various intended audiences: the local 
Sinhalese community, the Tamil population of Sri Lanka, the international 
community (housed in the UN, specifically) and potential allies in the 
international forum. As well as developing an understanding of how 
internationally legitimising discourses were sourced and adapted, and 
analysing the effect of this process, this chapter argues that Stanley Cohen’s 
(2001) framework of denial can explain the utility of transnational discourses 
in avoiding accountability for atrocity. With respect to the effect of 
government rhetoric, this chapter queries the extent to which the Sri Lankan 
state has used language in nefarious ways over the course of the war to 
“confuse, disorient, and terrorise” the population (Feitlowitz, 1998: ix), and 
also to deny the existence of state terror.  
 
The narrative of humanitarianism in the final stages of the war is the 
centrepiece of state denial of atrocity. Interviews with Sri Lankan academics, 
media personnel and political commentators, among others, described in 
Chapter One, illustrate the radical disconnect between the government’s 
assertions and the actual events unfolding in Northern Sri Lanka. A sharp 
                                                        
87 The LTTE were astute in appealing to international discourses and global sentiments also, 
appealing in the final phase of the war to what Khalili (2007: 33) terms the “trauma drama”. 
Chapter 4 on Tamil nationalism, memorialization and vehicles of commemoration will analyse 
this element of the strategy in garnering support for Tamil Eelam. 
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juxtaposition exists between the official conflict script and the reports of 
human rights organisations (HRW, 2010; Crisis Group, 2010), the UN (2010, 
2012), and a growing body of literature that challenges the veracity of the 
official script (Keen, 2013; Harrison, 2010; Weiss, 2010). The final section of 
this chapter describes the diplomatic efforts of the Sri Lankan Mission to the 
UN Human Rights Council in Geneva to reframe the End as a humanitarian 
war and to harness resistance to Western dominance in the UN to avoid 
condemnation and international investigations at the End.  
 
 
4.2 The Portability and Adaptability of Transnational Discourses 
 
David Kennedy (2004: 267) highlights the common vocabulary that has 
emerged amongst a global network of military, political and humanitarian 
professionals. He attributes the consolidation of this vocabulary to the 
codification of permissible rules of warfare as well as the emergence of 
international humanitarian law. He cautions that although “the military, 
humanitarian and political leaders increasingly speak the same language”, 
this “does not mean they say the same thing” (2004: 271). Laleh Khalili (2007: 
12) additionally points to the role of international institutions of security and 
justice, such as the UN General Assembly (UNGA), which she describes as 
“seedbeds for a particular nascent discourse and a meeting place for its 
practitioners”. Though also made possible by technological advances that 
quickly transmit information and ideas on a broad scale, both authors identify 
the rise of coherent discourses from within international institutions. 
Transnational discourses, Khalili asserts, are made up of both global 
discursive trends and discourses borrowed from neighbours and allies. They 
are “forged and borrowed, nurtured, translated and transformed across 
borders” (2007: 11). National narratives subsume these discourses, as local 
institutions communicate with transnational networks and institutions, 
selected to assert legitimacy and authority on the global stage. They are 
adapted wholesale or in selective fragments. Khalili (2007: 12) describes how 
these discourses lose their historical specificity and their concreteness as they 
globalise, becoming portable and abstract, available for flexible interpretation 
yet providing consistency with international “ways of imagining the world”.   
 
While the anti-colonial movement sought to challenge the extant political 
order by recourse to a narrative of “the universal human struggle for 
liberation”, the UN’s allocation of nationhood has resulted in state reliance on 
international representations of sovereignty rather than the formerly 
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prevalent discourse of liberationist struggle (Khalili, 2007: 21). The 
revolutionary narrative, after the formation of the state, is domesticated, 
appropriated and institutionalised; the transnational liberationist discourse 
“metamorphoses into the heroic narrative of nationhood” (2007: 22). States 
have sought legitimacy in the geopolitically established order of nations and, 
in turn, an emphasis on national security has arisen. The “celebration of 
armed struggle” gives way to obeisance to the “legitimate use of force” 
enshrined in the new state’s coercive apparatus (2007: 23). This shift in statist 
representations has paved the way for the birth of the national security state, 
based on the transnational discourse fashioned in the international 
institutions of politics and humanitarianism. Neloufer de Mel (2007: 81) notes 
that this vocabulary informs the entire apparatus of state coercion and 
repression because it is “shared by civilian and political leadership, as a 
standard grammar and component of the modern state.” In particular, “the 
embrace of a humanitarian vocabulary is central in the moulding of 
professional militaries” (2007: 81).  
 
The acceptable framework within which a state can wage war is increasingly 
one that draws legitimacy from the global ‘War on Terror’ launched by 
George W. Bush in the post-9/11 mission to reassert the position of the US as 
the world’s dominant superpower. Within this framework, conflict is 
justifiable in the pursuit of the destruction of ‘terrorists’ or in the name of 
‘humanitarianism’ – a military effort to rescue civilian populations from 
‘rogue states’ or ‘terrorists’. Central to international legitimacy in the global 
‘War on Terror’ is the nebulous boundary distinguishing non-state armed 
actors engaged in a liberation struggle from “terrorists” challenging the state’s 
position as “guardian of law and order” (Weber, 2004: 328). 
 
Weber (2004: 329) notes that the post-Cold War world, characterised by 
globalisation and transnational capitalism, required a new “enemy” to 
consolidate the role and legitimacy of the nation-state and the attendant 
global political order. The logic of counter-terrorism discourse and practice 
promotes the enhancement of the state’s “military-political-security 
functions” as the state’s power must match (or be seen to match) the power of 
the “terrorists” (Weber, 2004: 329). Correspondingly, the state’s civilian and 
civil functions are weakened. The ‘War on Terror’ included the logic of 
justifiable state-centric aggression and military force deployed against 
illegitimate challenges to established hierarchies of power, in addition to re-
asserting the supremacy of the US in international affairs. This logic has been 
adapted into localised conflicts worldwide, as states and liberation 
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movements sought to situate their respective positions within this 
overarching global narrative. As Khalili (2007: 13) argues, all discourses have 
an international audience in mind as well as a local one. Post- 9/11, the 
discourse of terrorism took root in an atmosphere of generalised fear 
receptive to the promotion of hardline counter-terror responses. “Counter-
terror” spoke to a widely deployed and institutionalised narrative of “specific 
moral and normative import”, available for localised adaptation (Khalili, 
2007: 13). In Sri Lanka, this international discourse “converged neatly with the 
story told by the Sri Lankan government: that the malevolent and ingenious 
Tamil Tigers, spawned by opaque or even metaphysical imaginings, was a 




4.3 Tamil Militancy as Terrorist 
 
Sri Lanka’s domestic narrative of counter-terror is longstanding. The terrorist 
label applied to the LTTE has been a central feature of Sri Lankan political 
discourse since the rise of militant groups in the late 1970s, irrespective of the 
scale of violent challenge to the state (Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah, 2005). 
Despite the political development of Tamil separatism (described below), 
“terrorism” as a conceptual framework was applied to Tamil groups 
immediately as they undertook sporadic acts of political killings and 
“relatively small acts of sabotage” in the early 1970s (Nadarajah and 
Sriskandarajah, 2005: 89). The PTA was modelled on the British Prevention of 
Terrorism Act 1974, and the state drew inspiration from anti-terrorism laws in 
Israel (Marcelline, 2011). Sri Lanka was the first state in South Asia to follow 
the course of anti-terrorism legislation (Marcelline, 2011). The language of 
terrorism was embedded and institutionalised with this official definition in 
Sri Lankan legislation. A state of emergency was declared in 1979. The Sri 
Lankan definitions of terrorism criminalised not only the commission of 
violent anti-state acts for political aims, but also advocacy in support of such 
methods (Marcelline, 2011). This indicated that “terrorism” was considered a 
state of mind to be erased, if the rule of law and public order was to be 
implemented (Wickramasinghe, 2006). 
 
The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) had in 1976 adopted the 
Vaddukoddai Resolution, declaring their intention to agitate politically for a 
separate state of Tamil Eelam. Noting that the post-colonial political system 
had reduced “the Tamil nation to the position of subject people” and placed 
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“the stamp of inferiority on the Tamils” under the majority Sinhalese, the 
Resolution laments the futility of engagement with Sinhalese leadership in 
attempting “to achieve the bare minimum of political rights consistent with 
the self-respect of the Tamil people” (Vaddukoddai Resolution, 1976). 88 
Providing a concise summary of attempts to reclaim Tamil rights by 
advocating political reform, the Resolution declares that:  
 
“restoration and reconstitution of the Free, Sovereign, Secular, Socialist 
State of TAMIL EELAM, based on the right of self determination 
inherent to every nation, has become inevitable in order to safeguard 
the very existence of the Tamil Nation in this Country” (Vaddukoddai 
Resolution, 1976).  
 
In 1983, following the riots of “Black” July, recruits to the Tamil militant 
groups multiplied dramatically and the 6th amendment to the Constitution of 
Sri Lanka was introduced, defining support or advocacy for the establishment 
of a separate state within Sri Lanka as a punishable offence (Marcelline, 2011). 
Involvement in furthering the cause of Tamil national liberation was 
criminalised. The 6th amendment provided that, under threat of criminal 
punishment: 
 
“No person shall, directly or indirectly, in or outside Sri Lanka, 
support, espouse, promote, finance, encourage or advocate the 
establishment of a separate State within the territory of Sri Lanka” 
(Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Article 
157A. (1)). 
 
The same amendment also prohibited any “political party or other association 
or organisation” that has “as one of its aims or objects the establishment of a 
separate State within the territory of Sri Lanka” (A. 157A (2)). If such an entity 
adopts this position, it shall be deemed “for all purposes to be proscribed and 
any member of such political party or other association or organisation who is 
a Member of Parliament shall be deemed to have vacated his seat in 
Parliament” (A. 157A (5) (a)) and all members “shall be guilty of an offence” 
under the amended Constitution (A. 157A (5) (b)). Further, the 6th amendment 
demanded an oath of allegiance to the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka as a 
                                                        
88 The resolution reminds the reader of previous attempts to protect the Tamil state from 
Sinhalese dominance. The process of marginalization and victimization leading to this point is 
detailed in Chapter Five.  
 185 
unitary state. The measure criminalised political challenges to the unitary 
make-up of the state and it led to the mass resignation of Tamil politicians, 
thereby excluding Tamil representatives from the mainstream political 
process. 
 
As argued by Nadarajah and Sentas (2013), the call for self-determination that 
came to the fore in 1976 revealed the reification of the Tamil homeland in Sri 
Lanka’s social relations. In response to the continuing Sinhala project of 
majoritarian nation building, “Tamil resistance turned on the defence of this 
territorial space, and Sinhala domination on its denial and dismantling” (2013: 
74). The call for self-determination voiced by the Tamil people in the 
traditional homeland of Tamil Eelam is based on a “history of independent 
existence as a separate state over a distinct territory for several centuries” 
prior to European colonisation, “their will to exist as a separate entity ruling 
themselves in their own territory” and the assertion that the Tamils inhabit “a 
nation distinct and apart from Sinhalese” (Vaddukoddai Resolution, 1976). 
The Tamil political movement is, in effect, founded on a concept of liberation 
from colonisation: the Sinhalese continued the colonisation of Tamil land 
when the British left Sri Lanka. It is a “national liberation struggle” 
(Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah, 2005: 88; Khalili, 2007). With the 
criminalisation of advocacy towards the Tamil political goal, the Sri Lankan 
state made explicit its definition of “separatism” as synonymous with 
“terrorism” (Nadarajah and Sentas, 2013: 74; Bartholomeusz, 2002). Real 
engagement with the political demands of the independence movement was 
rendered unnecessary within this framework. 
 
With the rise of non-state actors in the early 1980s (bearing in mind that the 
LTTE was still but one of a mosaic of armed groups at this point in history), 
the Tamil political project was immediately conflated with terrorism. The 
political project for self-determination still occupied centre stage and the 
“armed Tamil groups were in the shadows of the Tamil independence 
movement” awaiting the progress of the TULF (Nadarajah and 
Sriskandarajah, 2005: 90). Ethnicity was essentialised in post-independence 
ethnic polarisation, enabling the “Tamils” – a complex and varied community 
– to be construed as an ethnic “whole.” Tamil non-state armed groups 
challenging the state on political grounds were deemed “terrorists” rather 
than legitimate political actors (Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah, 2005; 
Kleinfield, 2003). Thus, Tamil political objectives under the principle of self-
determination were undermined and de-legitimised. Ethnic polarisation was 
set by the majority’s perception of politicised Tamil youth as a terrorist threat. 
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The UNP government of President Jayewardene framed the two separate 
issues of secessionist agitation and terrorism as one and the same and, in turn, 
“terrorism” in the late 1970s and early 1980s became conjoined with Tamil 
ethnicity (Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah, 2005). Political violence was 
conflated with terrorism and the political goals of the organisation were 
ignored and denied. Violence towards Tamils was institutionally approved. 
To quote a 1993 statement attributed to President Wijetunge, “there is no 
ethnic problem in Sri Lanka, only a terrorist problem” (quoted in Kleinfield, 
2003). This conception of the conflict remains ingrained and wholly 
explanatory for Sinhalese hardliners and moderates alike in the post-conflict 
phase. In an interview with the Head of the Media Centre for National 
Security, Lakshman Hullugulle, he asserted:  
 
“We had a issue with a terrorist problem, we never had a communal problem. 
Because the LTTE terrorists, they were not representing the Tamil 
community, they were a part of a terrorist organisation” (LH, 2012).  
 
As the “terrorists” were always ethnic Tamils, this led to the disproportionate 
application of counter-terror measures to Tamils: practices including 
draconian policing and detention and the institutional torture of Tamils 
(Pinto-Jayawardena, 2007; AHRC, 2010). Patricia Lawrence (2000: 228) 
provides a striking example of the manner in which the brutality of war 
progressed with an ethnicised logic. Enacting terrorist identity on the body 
through torture, torturers within the state security apparatus carved knife 
wounds in the shape of the letter 'L' as they branded LTTE “terrorists”. This 
dehumanising act was similar to the way in which goats and cows were 
locally branded with Tamil letters of their owners' names.89 Nadarajah and 
Sriskandarajah (2005: 93) assert that Tamils interpreted the violence inflicted 
on them by the Sri Lankan security forces as endorsed by the Sinhalese, just as 
the Sinhalese perspective saw militant violence as emanating from the 
popular will of the Tamils.  
 
The framework of terrorism had the effect of mobilising Sinhala sympathy for 
the UNP regime and its actions and, despite continuing international criticism 
of endemic human rights abuse, this strategy largely won approval and 
support abroad (Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah, 2005). The results have been 
threefold: increased securitisation and militarisation of the island state; 
ingrained ethnic polarisation and inter-community suspicion; and the growth 
                                                        
89 Lawrence offers the life experience of ‘Santhakumar’ as illustration of this bodily labelling.  
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of extremist discourse within the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist base. 
Terrorism, as a framework, also functions as a powerful signifier of conflict 
characterisation that allows one “emplotted solution”: to stamp out the terror 
and eradicate the terrorist (Kleinfield, 2003: 108). 
 
The conflation of terrorism and the political objective of self-determination 
undermined attempted negotiations between the government and Tamil 
militant groups. The 6th Amendment heralded the resignation and resulting 
political impotency of the TULF politicians. Tamil political representation fell 
to groups discursively framed as terrorists: the militant groups vying for 
recognition in the early 1980s.90  Political negotiations between the parties 
began in 1983 with the Round Table Conference, in the wake of Black July 
violence and under pressure from India. In 1984, the All Party Conference 
(APC) was held. The Thimpu peace talks of 1985 were orchestrated by India 
as negotiations between the Tamil militant groups and the Sri Lankan 
government. TULF politicians completed the Tamil delegation to Thimpu in 
Bhutan in July and August 1985. K. Padmanabha of the EPRLF expressed 
awareness that the Tamil delegation had not yet managed to “gain 
international recognition because of certain misconceptions and the lack of 
clarity about the nature of our struggle” (quoted in Marcelline, 2011). All of 
the militant leaders saw the Thimpu negotiations as a forum in which they 
could assert and claim their political legitimacy, realising that international 
credibility was crucial to success (Marcelline, 2011; Sahadevan, 2006). This 
legitimacy, justifying their resort to armed struggle, was based on exposing 
the Sinhala-Buddhist state’s resistance to reform and the intention of the state 
to defeat Tamil separatism militarily: 
 
“By going through the peace process initiated by the Indian 
government, we feel that the incapacity of the Sri Lankan government 
to resolve the fundamental grievances of our people and its real design 
to solve the problem through military means will be fully and 
decisively exposed” (K. Padmanabha, quoted in Marcelline, 2011).  
 
For the Sinhala political elite, the discourse of terrorism justified a minimalist 
position on state reform (Marcelline, 2011). Defining the Tamil militant 
groups as terrorists and a threat to the state precluded the possibility of a 
                                                        
90 The other groups in question were named the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students 
(EROS), the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), the Tamil Eelam 
Liberation Organisation (TELO) and the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF). 
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negotiated settlement on power sharing. Instead, peace talks became a “war 
by other means” for both the Sinhala and Tamil powers (Uyangoda, 2007: 11). 
The Sinhala political elite of the time, both in power and in opposition, 
advocated for the eradication of terrorism as a prior condition to state reform 
(Uyangoda and de Mel, 2013). The Tamil leadership, including TULF leader 
Amirthalingam in particular, were portrayed in the media as mere puppets in 
the service of the terrorist groups (Marcelline, 2011). Both parties lacked faith 
in a negotiation process, and the negotiations were perceived as a 
smokescreen, allowing time to prepare for war. Military engagement was 
expected to bring about more concrete outcomes (Marcelline, 2011).91 The 
“one-sided, no-options politics” of terrorism and counter-terrorism persisted 
(Kleinfield, 2003: 108). 
 
The construction of the irrational terrorist was transmitted via the popular 
media, particularly in the medium of the political cartoon. The Thimpu 
negotiations were constructed in the media as a forum where a legitimately 
elected government was forced to negotiate with terrorists due to external 
pressure. As the LTTE came to dominate Tamil politics in the mid-1980s and 
took over the exclusive mantle of Tamil representation,92  the media was 
provided with an easily caricatured figure to represent the entirety of the 
Tamil independence movement. Political satire played on the term “Tamil 
Tiger” to depict Tamil militants in dehumanised forms, with serious 
implications for the conflation of ethnicity and violence. One cartoon in The 
Island newspaper showed a tiger sitting atop a cannon, grinning comfortably 
with his arms crossed. A sign bearing the declaration “ready for peace talks” 
hangs from the nose of the cannon. 93  Another example is a cartoon 
undermining the legitimacy of the LTTE as political representatives of the 
Tamil people, illustrating a tiger with stripes doubling as bars of prison, 
encaging the Tamil civilians within. 94  These depictions promoted the 
predominant discourse of Tamil militants as animalistic, terroristic and 
committed to an agenda of violence. In turn, the Tamil moderate leadership 
was portrayed as a mere instrument of terrorism. The Tiger symbol was 
                                                        
91 This portrayal of the LTTE as insincere negotiators committed to militarism continued under 
Rajapaksa: “I even engaged in a discussion with the LTTE on the Ceasefire Agreement which was 
a threat to national security, the pride and sovereignty of the country... The response of the LTTE 
was to use the non-confrontational discussions to strengthen their war effort as done before” 
(Mahinda Chintanaya, 2010: 57). 
92 This process is described in Chapter Five on the development of Tamil nationalism. 
93 See http://www.island.lk/2001/05/12/cartoon.html  
94 See http://civil-war-conflict.blogspot.co.uk/ 
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adopted by the Tamil militant groups for three reasons: as an equally 
powerful counterpart to that of the Sinhalese lion; because of the animal's 
reputation for ferocity and fearlessness; and also with reference to the Tamil 
identification with the Indian Chola empire (850-1200AD), whose dynastic 
emblem was the tiger. The tiger symbol is an allusion to the military character 
of the Chola Empire, implying that the LTTE meant to recreate the 
“Tamilness” of the kingdom, in a manner that Whittaker (2007: 206) terms “a 
particular kind of militant quality of being”. 
Though the state continuously attempted to undermine the LTTE’s political 
legitimacy, Sri Lanka’s four largest Tamil political parties forged a coalition in 
2001, the TNA, with a manifesto recognising the LTTE as the “sole 
representatives” of the Tamil people. R. Sampanthan, then-chief candidate of 
the TNA, stated that the “wholehearted participation” of the LTTE was 
needed to find a political solution to the Tamil national question and called on 
the government to call a ceasefire as a precursor to talks (quoted in Tamilnet, 
2001). He further stated that third party mediation - the supervision of the 
international community - was necessary for negotiations. The April 2004 
parliamentary elections saw the TNA win a resounding victory in the 
Northeast, campaigning as self-acknowledged political proxies of the LTTE 
(Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah, 2005). While this outcome illustrates support 
for the LTTE, it must also be read in the context of LTTE ideological and 
physical control over the Tamil population and the complex interaction 
between Tamil nationalism, violence, cultural practices and community 
support for the LTTE’s political strategies (Thiranagama, 2011).95 Nationalist 
groups and the Rajapaksa government have pointed to disaffection of some 
Muslim and Tamil groups under the dominance of the LTTE as evidence that 
the conﬂict was not an ethnic conﬂict between the Tamil and Sinhalese 




4.4 Post-9/11 Discourses of Terror 
 
While both the Sri Lankan state and the Tamils have appealed to international 
institutions for support and legitimacy, the post 9/11 discourse of the ‘War on 
Terror’ further weakened the position of the Tamils in seeking a political 
solution to the conflict. Gordon Weiss (2011: 245) argues that the LTTE 
                                                        
95 See Chapter Five on Tamil nationalism and commemorative practices.  
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leadership was “simply out of touch with the way the rest of the world had 
changed since 9/11”. Margo Kleinfield (2003) offers a more nuanced analysis 
of the LTTE’s efforts to use the emergence of this powerful global narrative to 
distinguish themselves from the global “terrorists” as “freedom fighters”. 
President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s People’s Alliance 
government and the LTTE immediately began to use 9/11 as a new 
opportunity to impose the label of terrorist on the other. As argued by 
Kleinfeld (2003: 105), this labelling was now “invigorated with the emotional 
intensity and moral certitude attached to the events in the United States and 
the global response.” While the state and Sinhalese nationalists “became 
euphoric in light of the new global war on terror”, the opportunity to position 
Sri Lanka as a “frontline state” in the global assault on terrorism did not arise 
as expected (Kleinfield, 2003: 111). The complexities of the local context were 
ignored in state rhetoric, keen to situate the Sri Lankan situation in the arising 
transnational networks of solidarity, sympathy and material support that 
would bring global relevance to their battle. Hopeful of a prime place in 
George W. Bush’s global alliance, the state and its supporters were incensed 
when the US Embassy spokesperson in Colombo broke the news that the 
LTTE would not be a target of this alliance. This announcement negated the 
government’s attempt to associate its own ‘terrorist problem’ with the new 
global paradigm. Kleinfield (2003: 112) describes how media reports argued 
for the “globality” of the problem, the interconnectedness of all terrorist 
networks and the LTTE’s explicit links with al-Qaeda. The US exclusion of the 
LTTE as a target in the global ‘War on Terror’ caused outrage and was 
considered hypocritical. While nationalists ridiculed “terrorist groups that 
masqueraded as liberation movements” and scorned the possibility of 
negotiating with terrorists, a US official in Sri Lanka emphasised that 
negotiations with the LTTE were instigated by President Kumaratunga and 
attempted to “uncouple the Sri Lankan situation from September eleventh 
and the snowballing issue of global terror” (Amselem, 2001).  
 
Masters of definition, the LTTE also turned strategically to the international 
community, couching their struggle for political rights in the popular lexicon 
available for adaption to their cause. The organisation attempted to reject the 
terrorist label imposed on them by challenging the “narrow definition” of 
terrorism that “has erased the distinctions between genuine struggles for 
political independence and terrorist violence” (Prabhakaran, 2001, quoted in 
Kleinfield, 2003: 119). At a time when all Tamil parties were labelled as 
terrorist, Prabhakaran used 9/11 to clarify the status of the LTTE: 
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“Our struggle is based on the right to self-determination, a principle 
endorsed by the UN Charter. We are not terrorists. We are not 
mentally demented as to commit blind acts of violence impelled by 
racist and religious fanaticism. We are fighting and sacrificing our lives 
for the love of a noble cause i.e. human freedom. We are freedom 
fighters” (Heroes’ Day Speech, 2001, quoted in Kleinfield, 2003: 119). 
 
The US embassy’s position that the Sri Lankan government ought to negotiate 
with the LTTE implied that the organisation did not belong in the category of 
“terrorists”, with whom negotiation was untenable. Anton Balasingham, a 
Tamil nationalist intellectual leader and chief negotiator for the LTTE, decried 
the People’s Alliance government’s effort “to exploit the phenomenal tragedy 
faced by the American people to their own political advantage” in an LTTE 
leaflet circulated in Jaffna (Kleinfield, 2003: 113). The LTTE and its supporters 
recoded the narrative of the ‘War on Terror’ to identify the state as the “hate-
filled attacker” in the local context. The state, they asserted, was the terrorist, 
necessitating violence in self-defence from the Tamil people. Though this 
argument may, as Kleinfield concludes, have influenced voters to support the 
opposition UNP in the December 2001 elections, removing the PA from 
power and heralding a period of peace talks, the ‘War on Terror’ nevertheless 
disadvantaged the LTTE in the longer term (Weiss, 2011). The resulting 
vilification of “terrorist” movements worldwide, including the increasingly 
widespread practice of listing and proscribing terrorist groups, meant that the 
LTTE were successfully labelled as such in the international realm and 
isolated both politically and materially. The politics of naming the LTTE, as 
discussed by Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah (2005), undermined the political 
project of the LTTE by denying the organisation international legitimacy. 
They argue that the term “terrorism” was, in fact, redundant domestically and 
understood in the context of the state’s criminalisation of Tamil political 
agitation. The label, therefore, was deployed for the purpose of influencing 
international opinion and sat at the centre of the contest over the legitimacy of 
the struggle led by the LTTE.  
 
 
4.5 International Proscription of the LTTE 
 
The LTTE were widely proscribed as a terrorist group. In May 1978 in Sri 
Lanka, an Act of Parliament proscribed the LTTE and “any similar 
organizations” (Marcelline, 2011). By 2006, largely as a result of global 
hostility to ‘terrorism’ the organisation was banned in 32 countries. Weiss 
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(2011: 246) notes that the transnational narrative of the ‘War on Terror’ meant 
that the political costs of providing support to “murky national liberation 
movements” were too high and that, as Prabhakaran had argued in 2001, 
liberation groups were “conceptually too confused with terrorist causes” 
(quoted in Kleinfield, 2003: 119). Sri Lanka’s closest neighbour, India, was first 
to proscribe the organisation in 1994 following the 1991 assassination of Rajiv 
Gandhi, the former Prime Minister. The LTTE never officially accepted 
responsibility for the attack but Anton Balasingham expressed regret over the 
act in 2006, calling it “a great tragedy, a monumental historical tragedy” (BBC, 
2006a). His public statement fell short of an actual admission but came in the 
spirit of attempted reconciliation with India, in a context of increasing 
international isolation indicated by the spate of proscriptions that followed 
Ghandi’s murder.96 The US followed suit in 1997. The UK Terrorism Act 2000 
criminalised fundraising and mobilisation on behalf of the LTTE in Britain. 
These measures came into force in 2001. The military capability of the LTTE 
did not seem to be hindered by these restrictions; they progressively launched 
offensives against the state forces, captured territory and, in 2000 and 2001, 
demonstrated a significant new conventional military capacity. If the objective 
of proscriptive measures was to stunt the military, political and 
administrative growth of the LTTE, Nadarajah and Skriskandarajah argue, 
the regime was a “demonstrable failure” (2005: 95). They argue that the 
intention was instead to undermine the Tamil political project.  
 
However, as the ‘War on Terror’ discourse took root, the material difficulties 
and restrictions arising from proscription became apparent. The Sri Lankan 
government had formally de-proscribed the LTTE as a precondition for 
participation in the 2002 peace talks (Podder, 2006). After six rounds of talks 
held between September 2002 and April 2003, the LTTE unilaterally pulled 
out of the talks, though reiterating its commitment to uphold the Cease-Fire 
Agreement (CFA).97 The LTTE took this decision on the basis of its exclusion 
from the preparatory donors’ seminar that took place in Washington in April 
2003. As the LTTE was listed as a terrorist organisation in the US, 
representatives could not attend the seminar. The imparity of status 
demonstrated on this occasion led the LTTE to perceive itself as subject to a 
“tactical snub” by the Sri Lankan government and “cloistered by ‘an 
international security trap’” as the Sri Lankan state exhibited its international 
                                                        
96 The LTTE’s relationship with India, and the history between the two states, is complex. See 
Krishna (1999) for an examination of regional dynamics through the lens of postcolonial nation-
building.  
97 See Podder (2006) for analysis of the content and progress of the Peace Talks. 
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legitimacy in contrast to the organisation’s criminalisation (Podder, 2006: 
585).98 In May 2006, the European Union announced the LTTE’s listing as a 
terrorist group, requiring the 25 EU member states to freeze financial assets 
attributable to the LTTE, prohibit the provision of funds directly or indirectly 
to the LTTE and enforce a travel ban on LTTE officials (Council of Europe, 
2006). The EU framed this decision as a component of international pressure 
to bring the LTTE back to the negotiating table, as the 2002 peace talks had 
reached a stalemate. The EU proscription declaration expressly referred to a 
warning given to the LTTE in September 2005 that “it was actively 
considering the formal listing of LTTE as a terrorist organisation” (Council of 
Europe, 2006). Calling on all parties to resume negotiations, the EU urged 
them to show commitment and responsibility towards the peace process and 
to refrain from actions that could endanger a peaceful resolution and political 
settlement of the conflict.  
 
With mediation from Norway, peace talks were resumed and held at the 
mutually acceptable venue of Geneva in February 2006. The LTTE withdrew 
from negotiations in April 2006 on logistical grounds, stating that difficulties 
with transportation had thwarted their preparations. Sri Lankan officials told 
international observers that this was a delaying tactic and a signal of the 
LTTE’s unwillingness to engage with the talks (BBC Sinhala, 2006). The state 
forces, the LTTE and the unofficial paramilitaries associated with both parties, 
perpetrated on-going atrocities. The Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM) - 
an organisation formed under the CFA and staffed by internationals - was 
mandated to record incidents violating the CFA. Two high-profile 
assassination attempts are thought to have prompted the EU’s adoption of 
terrorist proscription of the LTTE – the successful attack on the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Lakshman Kadiragamar, in August 2005 and the attempted 
assassination of General Sarath Fonseka in April 2006. Also, due to high 
profile and devastating LTTE attacks in 2005 and 2006, the international 
climate had become extremely hostile towards the LTTE. The EU was careful 
to emphasise that “its decision is directed at the LTTE, and not at the Tamil 
people” (Council of Europe, 2006). 99  
                                                        
98 The LTTE understood from its inception and involvement in negotiations that parity of status 
with the state was necessary. In 1985, Anton Balasingham of the LTTE stated to the Financial 
Times that, “our aim is to shift the balance of military power in our favour so we can negotiate 
with the Government on our own terms” (quoted in Marcelline, 2011: 10).  
99 The death toll attributed to LTTE attacks in 2005 and 2006 was extremely high and included 
civilian and military targets. The Kebithigollewa massacre in June 2005 claimed the lives of 68 




Kadiragamar was instrumental in advocating for the LTTE’s proscription 
abroad. Kleinfield (2003: 119) names him as “the architect of the international 
anti-LTTE campaign” under the PA government. Speaking at the UN General 
Assembly following the 9/11 attacks, Kadiragamar sympathised with the US, 
contending that, “terrorism threatened the very foundations of human 
society” (Atugoda, 2013). Drawing a comparison between the attack on the 
US and the situation faced by Sri Lanka, Kadiragamar is credited with having 
turned the tide of international opinion against the LTTE (building on the 
counter-terror discourse developed domestically by the state and on the basis 
also of the mounting atrocities carried out by the organisation) and framing 
the conflict as a “separatist terrorist war” (Atugoda, 2013). International 
condemnation of the LTTE was re-formed around the concept of national 
security and counter-terrorism, glossing over the foundations of the conflict 
based on minority persecution and a call for self-determination. Kadiragamar 
sought international cooperation in blocking the LTTE’s financial support 
networks, stating at the First Ministerial Meeting of the Community of 
Democracies in 2000 that the resulting Warsaw Declaration, as “a 
demonstration of political will that sends a message to the terrorists of the 
world”, would ensure that there would be “no succour, no solace, no safe 
haven, no place to hide, no place to run for the terrorists of the world because 
all of us the democratic states will stand together and fight together” (quoted 
in Atugoda, 2013). The LTTE never acknowledged responsibility for the 
minister’s assassination but a colleague of his, Satharathilaka Banda Atugoda, 
recalled Kadirgamar as prophesising his death at the hands of the 
organisation: “Atu. I have walked a few more steps towards the LTTE bullet” 
(quoted in Atugoda, 2013). 
 
Proscription of the organisation did not initially diminish the LTTE’s support 
base in the Tamil diaspora and may in fact have consolidated the resolve of 
diaspora groups to support the LTTE, understood as representatives of the 
Tamil national movement (Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah, 2005: 97). After the 
EU’s listing of the LTTE, however, the criminalisation of fundraising may 
have contributed to a reduction in material support for the LTTE, as the 
diaspora were reluctant to engage in illegal activities such as donating to the 
LTTE through it’s front groups. The LTTE’s office in London closed down 
with the UK’s proscription of the group (HRW, 2006). Coinciding with the 
                                                                                                                                                              
attack targeted a convoy of military vehicles, carrying navy servicemen. The attack claimed over 
a hundred lives.  
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February 2002 ceasefire agreement signed by the LTTE and the Sri Lankan 
government, international fundraising from the Tamil diaspora waned; it was 
deemed illegal and personally risky, or unnecessary in light of new prospects 
for peace (HRW, 2006). However, the fundraising activity that continued, 
according to accounts recorded by Human Rights Watch (2006: 13), became 
more aggressive to compensate for the reduction in income. While many 
members of the Tamil diaspora had willingly contributed funds to the LTTE, 
identifying the organisation as legitimate representatives of the political 
interests of the Tamil people and expressing their faith in armed struggle, 
LTTE fundraisers engaged in widespread practices of pressure, intimidation 
and threats to obtain funds from the diaspora. Human Rights Watch describes 
the LTTE’s dependence on the Tamil diaspora for financial support to wage 
their militant independence struggle and suggests that the diaspora had a 
responsibility or a “unique potential” to influence the LTTE’s policies and 
behaviour, including its human rights practices (2006: 3). The report notes, 
however, that the LTTE assumed in their fundraising schemes that the 
diaspora had a responsibility to atone for their privilege, comfort and safety 
in foreign lands by providing financial support to the organisation. 
 
The report concludes that the LTTE’s “effective use of intimidation and 
extortion within the community” neutralised the potential of the diaspora to 
take the organisation to task with regard to the human rights implications of 
their military methods (2006: 3). But to what extent did the criminalisation of 
fundraising actually result in the rise of these coercive methods? By 
proscribing the LTTE, traditional channels of fundraising from the diaspora 
were cut off and following the breakdown of peace talks the LTTE’s ‘final 
war’ faced a resource vacuum. The culture of fear nurtured by the LTTE in Sri 
Lanka transferred into the diaspora; threats, intimidation and the language of 
“traitors” to the Tamil political cause (Thiranagama, 2012) were powerful 
tools of extortion. In the face of waning financial support for the 
organisation’s military endeavours, it relied evermore on coercion and 
violence.100 The LTTE’s rhetoric of means justifying ends was floundering and 
this was reflected in the community’s reluctance to offer support. The 
depletion of resources, and the leadership’s obdurate position, may have 
                                                        
100 The LTTE’s resort to these tactics of fundraising speaks to their increasing practices of forced 
recruitment and child recruitment in Sri Lanka:  a response to waning voluntary recruitment in 
Sri Lanka’s Northern Tamil community. Interviewees for the Human Rights Watch report 
referenced these practices in Sri Lanka as reasons not to donate money for the cause (HRW, 
2006: 37-8).  
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directly prompted the organisation towards coercion and violence directed 
towards its own people. 
 
Further, the proscription of the organisation immediately weakened the 
position of the LTTE position at the bargaining table and contributed to the 
breakdown of talks. The Permanent People’s Tribunal, an independent group 
of experts, came together in Dublin in 2010 to analyse the Sri Lankan 
situation. They noted that “the USA, UK and others have been accused of 
undermining the LTTE and its commitment to peace by repeatedly calling for 
a complete renunciation of violence ‘in word and deed’” (PPT, 2010: 12), 
thereby glossing over the violence perpetrated by the state and the political 
aims of the organisation. This, the PPT claimed, contributed to undermining 
its parity of status vis-à-vis the Sri Lankan state. The EU’s decision to 
proscribe the LTTE, the PPT noted, “has also been seen as a grave error”, 
leading to an imbalance in power between LTTE and state negotiators that 
ultimately thwarted the continuation of the peace process (2010: 12). The Sri 
Lankan government’s position, however, was that the LTTE's intransigence 
and unwillingness to enter into negotiations on core political issues could be 
attributed to “the continued flow of funds to its war chest from overseas” 
(MEA, 2007). 
 
The appropriation of the language of counter-terrorism and exploitation of 
the proscription resource by repressive states is a tool to weaken the capacity 
of non-state actors to wage a war in self-defence and for self-determination. 
The governments enforcing proscriptions of these organisations give “express 
support and authority to states who repress minority peoples in the name of 
counter-terrorism” (Sentas, 2010: 16) and thereby legitimate the violence of 
the state towards the group in question. Critics have argued that the EU’s 
decision to label the LTTE as “terrorist” relates predominately to its failure to 
heed the demands of the major world powers to return to the bargaining 
table, rather than as a result of the atrocities attributed to the organisation 
(Nesan, 2006). A senior US State Department official admitted that the Bush 
administration had pushed the EU to outlaw the LTTE:  
 
“We have encouraged the EU to list the LTTE. We think the LTTE is 
very deserving of that label. We think it will help cut off financial 
supplies and weapons procurement…” (Donald Camp, quoted in 
Nesan, 2006).  
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The political violence of the LTTE was long labelled as terrorism by the state 
and accepted as such by the international community, which was increasingly 
drawn into taking a position on the Sri Lankan conflict. The 
“internationalisation” of the conflict arose from the vocal lobbying of the 
Tamil diaspora, the engagement of Norway and India in facilitating 
negotiations and peacekeeping and the posturing of world powers with 
respect to ‘War on Terror’ prerogatives. Mahinda Rajapaksa was elected in 
2005, as the transnational discourse of the ‘War on Terror’ took root, and the 
Rajapaksa government’s military strategy to ‘counter the terrorist problem’ 
gained (at least tacit) international support. This particular political 
construction of the Sri Lankan conflict enabled the state to narrate the conflict 
as a “terrorist problem” (LH, 2012), in line with “the holy war against terrorism” 
(JU, 2012) launched in the US and other countries. The international 
legitimacy offered to the state over the Tamil militants, and the justifying 
rhetoric of the ‘War on Terror’, was exploited to achieve international 
solidarity in the final war against the LTTE. The discursive power of the ‘War 
on Terror’ overwhelmed the international community’s concerns over the Sri 
Lankan state’s human rights record and justified a military strategy to defeat 
the “terrorists”. Domestically, faith in the Norwegian-facilitated peace process 
plummeted under Rajapaksa’s remit and “peace” itself became an 
unacceptable term, identiﬁed closely with sympathy for the LTTE in 
nationalist political circles (Lewis, 2010; Wallace, 2010). Molly Wallace notes 
that Rajapaksa’s official speeches emphasised that the LTTE withdrew from 
negotiations on the “flimsiest of excuses” and returned to terrorism, 
“indiscriminately targeting innocent civilians” (Wallace, 2010: 166). He 
offered, in contrast, assertions of the government’s willingness to engage in 
negotiations. The government was, he contended, compelled to return to 
military action as a last resort (2010: 166). By 2007, defeating “terrorism” by 
return to a military strategy gained overwhelming support in the south and 
became the only “patriotic choice” (Lewis, 2010: 656). 
 
 
4.6 The Discourse of Humanitarianism and the End 
 
As noted by Laleh Khalili (2007: 34), a new transnational discourse has arisen 
with emergence of an international human rights and humanitarian ethos that 
“seeks to redress the distant suffering through transnational juridical means, 
and through appealing to the widest possible audience’s sense of pity and 
sympathy”. Khalili names this discourse the “trauma drama”. Narratives of 
suffering are maximised by NGOs and international agencies offering their 
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“non-political expertise” as they seek sympathy, attention and support from 
funders, thereby spreading the discourse of suffering and “redemption from 
suffering” and creating a “politics of pity” (2007: 34-6). The problem with this 
discourse, Khalili contends, is that the narrative of powerlessness and 
suffering actually perpetuates powerlessness and suffering in the same form. 
“Rather than addressing the man-made causes of suffering, the palliative 
quality of humanitarianism depoliticizes suffering and transforms it into a 
case for charity” (Khalili, 2007: 37). The rise of this discourse was not lost on 
President Rajapaksa’s government and the Ministry of Defence. The political 
usefulness of the language of humanitarianism was recognised; its meaning 
and intent was domesticated and employed within Sri Lanka’s particular 
political landscape.  
 
The military and the LTTE, over the course of the conflict, both vied “to cast 
their polarised propagandistic perspectives as the single version of the truth” 
(AHRC, 2010: 6). Under advice from “governmental spin doctors” (LG, 2012), 
the state euphemised the final military obliteration of the opposition as an 
“unprecedented humanitarian operation”, a “civilian rescue mission” to 
“save” the Tamil civilians from the LTTE (MOD, 2011). As described in 
Chapter Two’s discourse analysis, interviewees spoke of the state-generated 
echo chamber of humanitarian rhetoric in the months preceding the End, a 
rhetoric that ricocheted in the compliant state media and shielded the state 
from criticisms. Crucially, as noted by a progressive Sinhalese political 
scientist: 
“The state narratives of events are constructed in order to prevent legal 
consequences. Descriptions are constructed by lawyers - so that there would 
not be any clue to admission of guilt in the account…Narratives of events are 
written by people who are well-versed in international humanitarian law (JU, 
2012). 
The narrative of witness-survivors of the End illustrate that civilian protection 
was not a priority. Reports filtered out of the conflict zone describing how the 
armed forces launched shells into government-designated safe zones, 
targeting hospitals and other civilian structures (UN, 2011; HRW, 2009). 
Illegal tactics and war crimes by the Sri Lankan armed forces and the LTTE 
characterised the military onslaught at the End (Reddy, 2009; HRW, 2009; 
UN, 2011). The ICRC, in a rare public statement that illustrated the appalling 
circumstances facing the population at the End, described an “unimaginable 
humanitarian catastrophe” (ICRC, 2009). The Tamil population considered it 
“a deliberate and sustained assault on the civilian population of the Vanni” (EV, 
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2012). Interviewees, when asked to describe the event, used words such as 
“horrific” (KD, 2012), “massacres, genocide” (TA, 2012), a component of 
“eenaparikolai” or structural genocide (KG, 2012), “deliberate murder” (MG, 
2012) and “wholesale slaughter” (AH, 2012). Interviewees accepted as fact that 
the state deliberately re-framed events for international and Sinhalese 
consumption. One Sinhalese media worker described the state media strategy 
as “Orwellian” (SH, 2012). A Jaffna-based Tamil media worker argued that: 
“[t]here was a big difference between the way the government represented the 
conflict and what happened. They said that they were safeguarding the people, 
which does not match what was happening. Reality was different” (MTJ, 
2012).  
News of the atrocities occurring in the Vanni filtered out through media 
reports and personal interactions. As Sinthujan Varatharajah (2013) reminds 
us, information was in fact reaching the outside world. The problem was one 
of assumed “pro-Tiger” bias and a lack of international journalists who would 
be deemed more reliable and credible.  
Rejecting the state discourse of a “humanitarian operation”, media workers 
“knew the real situation. Relatives and friends were there, dying in bombings and 
shelling attacks” (PJ, 2012). The domestic media were “voiceless and helpless, and 
Jaffna was under military control” (PJ, 2012). The population “knew that people 
were dying in the Vanni. They hated the UN, thought they were doing nothing, they 
were angry when they left” (PJ, 2012). At the time, one INGO worker recalled, 
responsibility for the atrocities “didn’t matter. Everyone was dying. There were 
horrors committed by both sides, there is no doubt about that” (AH, 2012). 
The Tamil people were represented in state discourse as victims of the LTTE, 
seeking “liberation” from the militant group. This language was adapted to 
the state’s agenda in a discursive battle for international support and 
legitimacy. In response to the LTTE’s tactic of using civilians as human 
shields in the final phase, the state escalated the use of language of “civilian 
rescue”, telling a story of hostages and terrorists that was amenable both to 
international terrorism discourse and the language of humanitarianism 
(MOD, 2009; Rajapaksa, 2009a). The President’s personal humanitarian 
intentions necessitated the military push and characterised the manner in 
which it was carried out:  
 
“We can’t use heavy weapons. And we can’t do air attacks, because we 
are worried about the innocent people there…My heart would not 
allow any civilians to be killed by bullets” (Rajapaksa, 30 April 2009).   
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The President made explicit his armed forces’ commitment to human rights in 
his “victory” speech. In an extract repeated by a Sinhalese civil society activist 
(JP, 2012) and respected Sinhalese academic (JU, 2012) as illustrative of the 
government’s duplicitous propaganda, he proclaimed that the Sri Lankan 
armed forces defeated terrorism while: 
 
“carrying a gun in one hand, the Human Rights Charter in the other, 
hostages on their shoulders, and the love of their children in their 
hearts” (Rajapaksa, 19 May 2009).101 
 
His proclamations were contested by reports filtering out of the conflict zone 
(Philp, 2009; ICRC, 2009; UN, 2011). The stated concern for civilian life, and 
adherence to international humanitarian law, is set in marked contrast by the 
state to the strategies of the ‘barbaric’, ‘savage’ and ‘brutal’ LTTE. 
Unconcerned with civilian life or humanitarian law, the state announced, the 
LTTE “uses tanks to fire at these people”, it uses innocents as “hostages” and 
“human shields” (Rajapaksa, 2009a; Wallace, 2010). In response to an incident 
reported on the 21st of April 2009, military spokesman Brigadier Udaya 
Nanayakkara denied that the reported 1,000 civilians had died, stating that 
only 17 civilians were killed and that the perpetrators were the LTTE.  He 
publicly stated that: "Our troops are rescuing the trapped civilians. It's the LTTE 
which is preventing civilians from fleeing" (quoted in Krishan, 2009). A Tamil 
politician vehemently rejected this official conjecture: “The government were 
eliminating people, saying they were rescuing people” (SP, 2012). Tamil survivors 
of the End rushed to the “government side”, out of desperation and hunger, 
and despite their deep mistrust of the military arising from the years of war 
and indiscriminate shelling at war’s end (Harrison, 2012). President Rajapaksa 
interpreted this for the international community:  
  
“Nearly 180,000 fleeing from the clutches of the LTTE to the cleared 
areas clearly serve to demonstrate a feeling of security and confidence 
in our security forces” (Rajapaksa, 7 May 2009). 
 
Government photographers were on hand to photograph soldiers helping 
vulnerable Tamils to complete the journey, photographic evidence to support 
                                                        
101 As Molly Wallace (2010: 165) notes, Rajapaksa “must mean the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights here, though he could be conflating this with the UN Charter. This could also be an 
error in translation.” JU (2012) believed that he was referring to the UDHR while JP (2012) used 
the phrase “human rights manual” in recounting the speech.  
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the narrative of a ‘civilian rescue mission’. Adding to national engagement, 
personal identification and the sense of adventure associated with the 
“humanitarian operation”, the MOD website uploaded photographs regularly 
to document the progress of the mission.102  
 
 
4.7 Diplomatic ‘Outmanoeuvring’ in the UN Human Rights Council 
 
Dayan Jayatilleka was Sri Lanka’s Permanent Representative to the UN 
Human Rights Council in Geneva from June 2007 until late 2009. When 
Jayatilleka assumed his role in Geneva, he gathered his mission staff and told 
them the story of the three hundred Spartans at Battle of Thermoplyae, who 
“held on against incredible odds to provide the time and political space for 
the rest of the Greek Federation to mobilise and crush the aggressors” 
(Jayatilleka, 2013: 232). “This,” he told them, “would be our task, and should 
animate our work and attitude” (2013: 232). Jayatilleka officiously contended 
that the “heroic task” underway in Sri Lanka – defeating the LTTE – was 
theirs to protect within the UN. “The Tiger” (the LTTE), he states, was a 
“globalized creature” in its contemporary form, supported by the pro-LTTE 
diaspora, the Western governments acting as patrons and committed 
protectors of the LTTE and the Tamil Eelam cause, and Tamil Nadu, where 
political parties were pledging support to the achievement of Eelam. This 
“three-pronged campaign to save the Tiger” threatened to stall the domestic 
military campaign (2013: 312). As reports of the war’s toll on civilian life and 
the absence of civilian protection emerged in early 2009, the EU Parliament 
and Western governments lobbied UN member states to gain support for a 
special session on Sri Lanka (Smith, 2011). The desired outcome of this session 
would be a resolution requiring a “humanitarian pause” and “honourable 
exit” for the LTTE leadership, and the resumption of political negotiations 
with the group. To hold this session, 16 state signatures were required. For 
Jayatilleka and his team, the aim was to delay this session until the Sri Lankan 
forces could destroy the LTTE. They were ultimately successful, 
acknowledging that although there was “no possibility of preventing it… 
delay it we did” (2013: 319). The Sri Lankan people, Jayatilleka asserts, had 
relied on the international community before – in the form of the Indo-Lanka 
Accord of 1987 – and this time would resist such “coercive external intrusion” 
                                                        
102Available at: http://www.defence.lk/picturegallery/pic.asp?cat=ACHI [Accessed 29 June 
2014]. 
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in favour of achieving a military defeat over the “secessionist terrorist enemy” 
(Jayatilleka, 2013: 316-7). 
 
For the Sri Lankan mission, the goal was framed in terms of reclaiming Sri 
Lanka’s sovereignty and restoring territorial integrity. Mahinda Rajapaksa’s 
position internationally has been that “Sri Lanka is prepared not only to 
defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity but also, ―deploying all the 
resources of the State, to protect the people of Sri Lanka and their democratic 
way of life” (Rajapaksa, 14 May 2008, quoted in Wallace, 2010: 167). It was Sri 
Lanka’s “fate” and “destiny” to recover its status as a unitary state “by any 
means necessary” (Jayatilleka, 2013: 317). The narrative of heroism, sacrifice 
for the nation and defiant sovereignty draws on an internationally 
recognisable narrative of liberation and anti-colonialism, attractive to both 
Sinhalese nationalist sentiment and the political agendas of formerly 
colonised potential allies in the international community (Khalili, 2007). The 
EU adopted the liberal humanitarian view espoused by the Tamil diaspora, 
independent news sources, NGOs and the UN in Sri Lanka that international 
action or intervention was required to prevent a “bloodbath on the beach” 
(Holmes, 2009). Sri Lanka’s Mission to the UN, however, “returned to and 
refreshed” Sri Lanka’s “Non Aligned roots”, building alliances across the 
continents and positioning itself within the world order’s “emergent multi-
polarity” (Jayatilleka, 2013: 330). Appealing specifically to the countries of the 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM),103 Sri Lanka’s defensive campaign attacked 
Western dominance in the UN.  
 
Sri Lanka also sought solidarity within the South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which champions: 
 
“respect for the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, 
national independence, non-use of force and non-interference in the 
internal affairs of other States and peaceful settlement of all disputes” 
(SAARC Charter, 1985). 
 
Sri Lanka’s Mission urged a collective reassertion of these principles in the 
UN as it sought political space to finish the war. It stressed the danger 
presented to its sovereignty by purported Western interference and called on 
                                                        
103 The Non-Aligned Movement is a grouping of states formed in Belgrade in 1961 representing 
the interests of developing countries. It was an attempt to hinder and undermine the Cold War. 
The member states are conjoined by policy and practical collaborations based on their formal 
non-alignment with established power blocs in the world order.  
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member states to affirm the principle of non-interference in the domestic 
affairs of other nations. Sri Lanka reasserted the value of sovereignty norms 
against the liberal norms and conﬂict resolution practices that have 
characterised the “liberal peace” international agenda since the 1990s.104 The 
inviolability of state sovereignty was weakened under the framework of the 
“liberal peace”, as democratic values and universal understandings of human 
rights gained privilege over the state’s monopoly on security. This shift was a 
boon to groups self-identifying as victims of state repression and often offered 
parity of status in negotiations with the state. It was within the liberal peace 
framework that the LTTE were given voice on the international stage, with 
interventions in the form of negotiation facilitation from Norway and the 
support of NGOs and international institutions for the 2002-2005 Ceasefire 
Agreement.  
 
The Rajapaksa government, on election in 2005, rejected all of the explicit or 
implicit “liberal peace” principles of the peace process (Lewis, 2010: 652). 
Drawing on Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist terminology, the government 
reiterated the privileged status of the sovereign state, withdrew state support 
for conflict resolution based on changes to territorial integrity, undercut the 
role of external parties to conflict resolution and refused to recognise the 
LTTE as the sole voice of the Tamil community. The discourse of the ‘War on 
Terror’ was useful in this regard, as described above, and Rajapaksa labelled 
the LTTE as “the demonic forces of terror” (Rajapaksa, 2007), in contrast to Sri 
Lanka’s adherence to humanitarian law and liberal democratic principles. 
This discursive turn helped to justify the shift from the dominant conflict 
resolution model to a counter-insurgency framework. Sri Lanka propagated a 
reversion to a pre-1991 international model of conflict resolution, a shift 
supported by states such as Brazil, Russia, India, China (the BRICs), Indonesia 
and South Africa. This model promotes “maximalist understandings of state 
sovereignty and resisting norms that constrain particular ways in which force 
is used inside state borders” (Lewis, 2010: 658). A diplomatic cable from the 
US Mission to Washington in March 2008 noted the efficacy of Sri Lanka’s 
approach of nurturing NAM alliances and avoiding international 
accountability on that basis: 
                                                        
104 See Chapter Three’s discussion of the liberal peace. David Lewis (2010: 650) describes the 
“more interventionist model of peacemaking” that emerged in the 1990s as intrastate conflicts 
became more prevalent. These new models disseminated new norms and rule governing external 
assistance in conflict resolution. The institutionalised practices – liberal political and economic 




“…its latest public relations campaign in Geneva…reflects a strategy of 
appealing to NAM countries, to whom it argues implicitly (and 
probably explicitly, behind closed doors) that it is willing to stand up 
to the West, which is unfairly picking on it. That message resonates 
particularly strongly in the Human Rights Council, further 
complicating our efforts to use that body to pressure Sri Lanka on its 
human rights record” (US Mission Cable, 10 March 2008). 
 
Adopting a pro-active stance in Geneva in 2009, the Sri Lankan Mission under 
Jayatilleka held events “in debate mode” to present its position and welcomed 
NGOs and “pro-LTTE representatives” into discussions. Sri Lankan 
diplomats contested the liberal humanitarian norms ingrained in the UN 
system and actively pursued debate on alternative conflict resolution models. 
Lewis (2010) notes that Sri Lankan diplomats adopted a role of “norm 
entrepreneurs”, arguing that the Human Rights Council was a forum for 
contesting, rejecting and adapting norms rather than merely perpetuating the 
liberal norms on which the institution was built. The model the Sri Lankans 
championed, however, was a nefarious strategy of denial, paving the way for 
a domestic military campaign without international oversight: what the 
international media and UN insiders termed a “war without witness” (Foster, 
2009; Weiss, 2010; Buncombe, 2009). 
 
A pro-state journalist stated that until January 2009, the international 
community “believed the LTTE could stop the army” at the crucial strategic 
juncture of Kilinnochchi (SF, 2012). “But once the LTTE abandoned Kilinnochchi 
and retreated towards the Mullaitivu coast, they knew that they could not stop the 
offensive and they made a desperate bid to call for a ceasefire” (SF, 2012). In early 
2009, as a group of European countries lobbied to gather signatures for a 
special session in the Geneva Human Rights Council on Sri Lanka, the 
Mission countered that effort by presenting Sri Lanka as a sovereign nation 
unfairly under siege by Western “humanitarian interventionist” powers. The 
principles of NAM were in danger, Jayatilleka argued, in his role as 
Permanent Representative to the UN. The drive to persecute Sri Lanka, he 
contended, was not rooted in evidence but “carried on waves of mass 
demonstrations of diaspora protests” and personally led by David Milliband 
and Bernard Kouchner (Jayatilleka, 2013: 318). Foreign Ministers of the UK 
and France at the time, Milliband and Kouchner had visited Sri Lanka in 
April 2009 “to draw attention to the human suffering, to call for humanitarian 
aid and workers to be allowed in, and to call for the fighting to stop” 
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(Kouchner and Milliband, 2011). Concerns were being raised internationally, 
particularly in Europe, about the lack of civilian protection and the treatment 
of IDPs as the Sri Lankan forces closed in on the LTTE. The UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights called for an independent international 
investigation into the allegations of human rights violations, and the UN 
Secretary-General expressed concern (Smith, 2011; OHCHR, 2009). Sri Lanka 
presented itself as a victim of terrorist propaganda, facing a coordinated 
assault by Western powers influenced by pro-LTTE elements in the Tamil 
diaspora. The pro-LTTE Tamil diaspora, Sri Lanka declared, had successfully 
rallied a global movement: an enemy external to Sri Lanka and formidable in 
strength (Jayatilleka, 2013: 312-3). SF (2012) argued that the international 
community displayed their bias towards the LTTE by failing to demand that 
the organisation lay down its arms: 
  
“…they were basically asking the government to stop the offensive and to 
arrange a ceasefire which would enable the LTTE to control a part of the 
Vanni territory, which would have given them an opportunity to save its 
fighting cadre to fight another day” (SF, 2012).  
 
Sri Lanka assembled a coalition of allies in NAM, SAARC, Russia and China 
as proponents of non-intervention and sovereignty: “our natural 
constituency” (Jayatilleka, 2013: 327). As President Rajapaksa declared in his 
first speech following the defeat of the LTTE, Sri Lanka since independence 
had “followed a policy of non-alignment, manifesting a policy of good 
relations with all countries and enmity towards none” (Rajapaksa, 2009). At 
the End, Sri Lanka benefitted from “the harvest of a principled and active 
foreign policy practice” (Jayatilleka, 2013: 327). Support from these alliances 
assisted the state in avoiding international intervention and the 
implementation of investigations into alleged war crimes to date, though the 
UNHRC Resolutions of 2012, 2013 and 2014 have signalled a global turn 
‘against’ Sri Lanka.  
 
 
4.8 International Support: Before the End 
 
The international push for a ceasefire at the End was a sign of international 
duplicity and inconsistent double standards for LF, a pro-government 
journalist. Although, he stated, “America questions us, keeps on harassing us on 
human rights issues,” the Sri Lankan state over the course of the war received 
“tremendous support from the US government to destroy the LTTE” (LF, 2012). It is 
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well documented that Western powers including the US and the UK (as one 
of at least 16 EU countries) supplied weapons to the state forces, including 
heavy weaponry, up until 2008 (Keen, 2013). Noting that the UK government 
granted 34 arms export licenses to Sri Lanka from 1 April 2008 to 31 March 
2009, the Committees on Arms Export Controls (CAEC) recommended a 
review of all extant licences in 2009, asking the government to provide the 
Committees with an assessment of what “weapons, ammunition, parts and 
components” supplied by the UK were used by the state forces against the 
Tamil Tigers (CAEC, 2010). The government stressed to the CAEC that it 
“only issued licences for Sri Lanka that would not provoke or prolong the 
conflict or be used for internal repression” and that licences granted in 2006 
for armoured vehicles, machine gun components and semi-automatic pistols 
had been approved whilst a ceasefire was in place and were therefore not in 
breach of the relevant Criteria (CAEC, 2010).105 In preparing its 2010 report, 
the CAEC received evidence from UK government officials that a number of 
extant export licences allowing for arms supplies to be sold to Sri Lanka were 
revoked in October 2009 “in the light of changed circumstances” (CAEC, 2010: 
144). The final offensive raised “grave concerns” on human rights issues and 
the government’s review was marked by uncertainty as to whether the 
weapons and communication systems supplied by the UK were used or not. 
Though the government insisted that it was “very cautious” in issuing arms 
exports licenses to Sri Lanka due to longstanding human rights concerns, the 
review led to “lessons learnt” and the revocation of licences (2010: 148).  The 
CAEC concluded that, “in the case of Sri Lanka, arms were exported during 
ceasefire periods, which, in retrospect was regrettable.” The government 
ought to have taken a longer term view when authorising arms exports, 
CAEC claimed and ordered a review of the efficacy of the criteria in assessing 
the suitability of exports to “less stable countries and regions” on the basis 
that “it is the outcome of where weapons end up and the use that is made of 
them that is important” (CAEC, 2010: 150-1). Campaign Against the Arms 
Trade traces the UK government’s issuance of arms export licences and their 
value from 2004 to 2010, demonstrating the consistent supply of arms to the 
country, despite a dip in 2009 (CAAT, 2011). A CAAT spokesperson, Kaye 
Stearman responded to the release of Channel 4’s “Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields” 
documentary in June 2011. She argued that a “proper investigation of the UK 
government's own complicity in selling arms to Sri Lanka” is required, as the 
government knew “how they were likely to be used” (CAAT, 2011a). 
                                                        
105 CAEC noted that media speculation had suggested that these licences approved in September 2006 
were in breach of the Consolidated EU and National Arms Control Criteria. 
 207 
Stearman emphasised that “UK arms sales confer support and legitimacy on 
the Sri Lankan government” (CAAT, 2011a).106  
 
The Permanent People’s Tribunal (2013) determined that the healthy weapons 
trade benefiting Sri Lanka was a facet of international complicity in genocide 
against the Tamil people, particularly the US and the UK. In the West, David 
Keen acknowledges, the Sri Lankan government was in fact widely praised 
for its democratic nature and its developmental record despite the 
increasingly violent war. Keen (2013: 14) offers an Economist article published 
in April 2009, “when the killing was most intense,” as evidence of Western 
support for Sri Lanka, which is presented as a functioning democracy and 
potential economic power and partner. The article noted the country’s high 
economic growth outside the war zone, terming the conflict “’an increasingly 
anachronistic blot on a hopeful country’…a ‘stain’ that President Rajapaksa 
had ‘almost erased’” (quoted in Keen, 2013: 15; The Economist, 2009). The same 
April 2009 Economist report identified Pakistan as Sri Lanka’s main arms 
supplier. Other countries such as Iran, Libya and China provided financial 
and material resources to Sri Lanka during this period of high violence. 107 LF, 
who reported on the military’s progress for The Island newspaper stated, “we 
received a lot of support from Israel, Russia, Ukraine and India. China is out main 
arms supplier. Then Pakistan of course, always…Major armaments come from China, 
the aircraft from Israel” (SF, 2012). As JU, a political scientist asserted, “during 
the war, until May or June 2009, SL enjoyed a very friendly global environment, with 
the US, with the EU” (JU, 2012). This environment existed because “during the 
war, the Americans, the British, Europeans, Canadians, Indians, Japanese, 
Australians, all thought that the LTTE was the main obstacle to peace and 
development in SL” (JU, 2012). Defeating the LTTE was seen as “a necessary 
precondition” (JU, 2012), demonstrating an international embrace of terrorism 
discourse and acceptance of the state’s de-politicisation of the LTTE. Offering 
material and political support to the state over the “terrorist” group was 
expected to bring a democratic peace: “that’s what the government managed to 
convince the West in 2007 and 2008” (JU, 2012). The Sri Lankan state courted 
this conflict interpretation and succeeded in creating political space to finish 
the conflict militarily. 
                                                        
106 It is worth noting here that arms sales to Sri Lanka have resumed in the post-conflict period, 
though limited to “legitimate work countering the threat of piracy in the region” and granted to 
private companies, not to the state forces (Burt, 2013). Arms export licences are, as 
recommended by the CAEC in 2009, reviewed on a case-by-case basis (CAEC, 2010).  
107 Iran, the Economist article noted, was providing 70 per cent of Sri Lanka’s oil supply on credit 





4.9 Interpreting International Advocacy at the End 
 
Pro-government voices framed the 2009 movement as a persistent persecution 
of Sri Lanka, fuelled by Tamil diaspora hatred. Rajiva Wijesinha, for example, 
the former Secretary–General of the Sri Lanka Peace Secretariat (SCOPP) 
under the CFA and now the Presidential Advisor on Reconciliation, has 
publicly derided previous bids to field resolutions ‘against’ Sri Lanka in the 
Human Rights Council. In 2006 and 2007, Wijesinha argued Western nations 
made earlier attempts to “denigrate the Government” of Sri Lanka 
(Wijensinha, 2009). While these resolutions did not come to pass, he argued 
that “repeated criticism of Sri Lanka, from a few countries and from a 
plethora of Non-Governmental Organisations” persisted (Wijensinha, 2009). 
Both Wijesinha and Jayatilleka frame the movement “against” Sri Lanka in 
2009 as a continuation of this “inappropriate” and unnecessary action, rather 
than a reaction to reports of wartime atrocity filtering out of the Vanni region 
(Wijensinha, 2009; Jayatilleka, 2013: 329). The Western countries reignited the 
campaign, Wijesinha (2009) suggests, not because of concern over human 
rights and alleged atrocity but “because of the determination of David 
Miliband to stamp his mark upon British Foreign Policy”. He casts doubt on 
the sincerity of Western European concern, as they had “refused” an audience 
with the Sri Lankan delegation in March and suggests that they were acting 
primarily on the basis of “Tiger propaganda” which was “reaching fever pitch 
all over Europe and in America” (Wijesinha, 2009). Condemning NGOs and 
UN Special Rapporteurs who called for an independent inquiry into the 
situation in Sri Lanka, Wijensinha alleges funding-related bias and haste in 
attacking Sri Lanka publicly. He concludes that the predisposition of the 
Western states towards the interests of the LTTE rendered the campaign 
disingenuous, “nothing to do with humanitarian concerns but rather an 
obvious political ploy” that sought to selectively criticise Sri Lanka and 
demonise its allies (Wijensinha, 2009).  
 
Despite “general agreement” in the UN that Sri Lanka was effective in 
“playing off the West against less developed countries” (US Embassy cable, 10 
March 2008), the EU countries finally attained the requisite 16 signatures for a 
special session as the conflict came to an end. The Czech Republic, who held 
EU presidency, was active in gathering together a cross-regional group of 
states (Smith, 2011: 15). The EU circulated a draft resolution as a platform for 
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action, to communicate the actionable objectives to be sought at the proposed 
special session. On the 18th of May, Jayatilleka (2013: 324) recalls, the EU 
dropped the demand that the government “desist from final assault” and 
circulated a draft resolution calling for an international independent 
investigation and a special session at the Council. On the 19th of May, all the 
EU states on the Human Rights Council requested a special session on the 
“human rights situation in Sri Lanka.” Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Canada, Chile, Mauritius, Mexico, South Korea, Switzerland and Ukraine 
offered support (Smith, 2011). In the “backstage talks”, Jayatilleka describes 
the Western countries as “dogmatically insistent” that references to 
sovereignty be deleted and that international investigations be completed and 
a report presented to the Council within six months, with a view to informing 
an international accountability mechanism (2013: 320). Jayatilleka (2013: 320) 
“rejected such a sell-out of the Sri Lankan armed forces and citizens, our hard 
fought and finally won victory over secessionist terrorism, and the principles 
of the NAM”. The EU countries worked with the Group of Latin American 
and Caribbean Countries (GRULAC) to refine and finalise the text of a draft 
resolution to be tabled at the special session. Internal coordination was time-
consuming and while preparations were underway, Sri Lanka “took the 
initiative” and presented its own draft resolution, on the 22nd of May 
(Jayatilleka, 2013: 319; Smith, 2011). The EU filed its draft on the 25th of May. 
Under procedural rules, the Sri Lankan text, submitted first, would be 
considered first at the special session (Smith, 2011: 15-6).  
 
Sri Lanka’s text – itself a product of negotiations and collaboration with “a 
broad bloc of allies” in NAM and co-sponsored by 37 countries (Jayatilleka, 
2013: 319, 331) – framed the country-specific resolution in terms of “assistance 
to Sri Lanka in the promotion and protection of human rights”. Its content 
reaffirmed “the principle of non-interference in matters that are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of states”, congratulated the Sri Lankan 
government’s defeat of “terrorism” and welcomed its commitment to the 
protection of human rights, and urged the international community to assist 
by increasing financial assistance to the country. On the 27th of May 2009, this 
resolution was tabled and passed by 29-12, with six abstentions. The 
President of the Council, Nigerian Ambassador Martin Uhoimoibhi, 
announced that the resolution prepared by the EU would not be under 
consideration, as it dealt with the same issues (Jayatilleka, 2013: 319). The 
EU’s draft text, rendered impotent by Sri Lanka’s procedural astuteness, 
expressed concern about the loss of life and violations of international 
humanitarian law at the End, and called on Sri Lanka to cooperate fully with 
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Special Procedures to address the situation and investigate allegations of war 
crimes (Smith, 2011). The Sri Lankan Mission and its allies had 
“outmanoeuvred” the “ineffectual” EU (Pillay, 2009, quoted in US embassy 
cable, 25 June 2009; Weiss, 2010: 256). Human Rights Watch referred to the 
resolution adopted by the Council as “deeply flawed”, and criticised the 
Council for taking a “step backward” by ignoring calls for an international 
investigation (HRW, 2009a). The outcome demonstrated that a discourse 
emphasising the sanctity of sovereignty and the principle of non-interference 
“resonated strongly” amongst UNHRC members (Smith, 2011: 16; Jayatilleka, 
2013: 333). David Lewis (2010) suggests that this special session illustrates 
shifting power relations in the UNHRC, which Sri Lanka perceptively 





Sri Lanka has benefitted from astute diplomatic strategising and the shrewd 
and consistent adaption of international discourses of terrorism and 
humanitarianism by state officials and media. Though the ‘Sri Lankan 
situation’ is on the international agenda and monitored by the UN Human 
Rights Council, the predominant message delivered in the aftermath of the 
End is that insurgencies can be crushed militarily rather than through peace 
talks. The reasserted emphasis on state sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
the right of the state to counter threats to state power by force has challenged 
the conflict resolution formula of the past two decades: peace talks, inclusive 
political engagement and the reform of institutions (Lewis, 2010; 
Thiranagama, 2013). The ‘scorched earth’ tactics adopted by the state forces at 
the End have received worldwide attention and vocal criticism, though 
allegations are repudiated by the government and denials are focused on the 
‘humanitarian’ purpose and strategies of the ‘civilian rescue mission.’ The 
rhetoric includes consistent reminders of the impossibility of negotiating with 
‘uncivilised and irrational terrorists’. Building on the diplomatic success of 
2009, Sri Lanka is protecting its position by maintaining these alliances and 
touting itself as, in contrast to the US and Western countries who “bully” Sri 
Lanka, “the only country to have successfully defeated terrorism on its own 
soil” (Defence Seminar Website, 2014). The Colombo-based MOD conferences 
have become annual events since 2010, where Sri Lanka’s armed forces “offer 
valuable insights on local as well as regional security” to military leaders from 
nearly 40 countries, including China, Russia, the US and the UK.  In 2013, 
nearly 50 delegation representatives attended, including from the EU and 
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Palestine. Sri Lanka is touted as a ‘model counter-insurgency’ that might be 
emulated in India and elsewhere (Keen, 2013).  
 
The “norm entrepreneurs” (Lewis, 2010) responsible for Sri Lanka’s 
diplomatic escape from international scrutiny at the End both utilised and 
perpetuated this shift towards a more internal, state-focused (and potentially 
more violent) conflict resolution methods. An international inquiry into the 
events at the End has, at the time of writing in June 2014, finally been 
mandated in the HRC’s third Resolution on Sri Lanka. The arrangements of 
this investigation remain vague and the Sri Lankan government has 
renounced the resolution (HRW, 2014). Meanwhile, the government continues 
to court BRIC, SAARC and NAM countries and to propagate the ‘Sri Lanka 
model’ of defeating terrorism in military conferences and official speeches. 
The cost of Sri Lanka’s success in defeating ‘terrorism’ remains unclear. As 













































This chapter examines the collective memory of the End within the Tamil 
community. It describes the forms of commemoration available to the people 
in the post-conflict phase and the manner in which the state exercises violence 
and repression to subjugate narratives that contest its official account of the 
End. Archival records of atrocity at the End are few and contested, primarily 
stored online in images and mobile phone videos archived by journalists, 
activists and human rights documentary sources.  As it fades into the past, the 
End exists also in the individual and group memory of the Tamil survivors. 
Foucault (1989: 91-92) contended that “memory is actually a very important 
factor in struggle…if one controls people’s memory, one controls their 
dynamism.” He articulated the notion of “counter-memory”: memories that 
differ from and challenge dominant discourses. Winter and Sivan (1999) 
postulate that collective memory exists only in the form of commemorative 
practices. They privilege the term “collective remembrance” over “collective 
memory”, in fitting with an analysis that emphasizes the role of individual 
“memory workers” and, in particular, political or ethnic entrepreneurs who 
orchestrate memory practices in pursuit of a political or social project.  
Collective memory is something that is consolidated in an organised manner, 
usually within a framework of understanding sponsored by elite political 
players. In this conception, we can see memories as collectively performed. 
Following Maurice Halbwachs (1992), the literature on memory concurs that 
remembering is a dynamic, dialectic practice located in public praxis as well 
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as inhabiting private spaces. Halbwachs posited that virtually all events, 
experiences and perceptions are shaped by the individual’s interactions with 
others. Commemorative ceremonies, rituals, rallies, museums, war tourism 
and reconciliation projects therefore provide the framework of interaction 
within which memory work takes place. 
 
This chapter distinguishes between collective memory as a field of inquiry 
and “mnemonic practices”, public performances of rituals and narratives 
(Olick, 2003). Khalili argues that particular events are “remembered” as a 
shared basis of peoplehood (2007: 3). The term “community of memory” 
befits a community that does not forget its past, one that retells its story as its 
“constitutive narrative” (Bellah et al., 1985: 143). This chapter looks to the 
forms and content of commemoration that sustained Tamil nationalism 
within the LTTE’s project of nation-building. It traces the way in which the 
End has entered the Tamil community’s “constitutive narrative.” The End, the 
political Tamil diaspora contend, changed the nature of the struggle for the 
rights of the Tamil people (and the achievement of Tamil Eelam) 
(Rudrakamaran, 2012). It stands to be incorporated into the narrative of 
national struggle, a narrative based on persecution and victimhood, as this 
chapter will elucidate. Interviews with Tamil representatives sought to locate 
the End in the evolution of Tamil nationalism.  
 
 
5.2 Collective Memory and Commemoration 
 
Collective memories provide a context for identity and are powerful 
meaning-making tools for individuals and for the community (Pennebaker 
and Banasik, 1997: 18). Maurice Halbwachs (1992) describes collective 
memory as “the active past that forms our identities,” a shared memory that 
is collectively recalled, recognised, localised and reconstructed in a social 
process. This process is, where political and social space is granted, a dynamic 
social and psychological endeavour, an endeavour that consists of a 
continuous conversation about an event among affected individuals 
(Pennekar and Banasik, 1997: 4). This conversation is informed by both the 
needs and desires of the community in the present and the identity inhabited 
by that community. Identity, understood as an active project constituted and 
maintained by social practices, is based on narratives of the past that have 
been accepted by a community as its “constitutive narrative” (Bellah et al, 
1986: 143). The End cannot be separated from preceding events and 
perceptions that form the foundation of the Tamil collective memory of 
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suffering, persecution and victimisation. An ideology of victimhood also 
draws on history and myth within which the past is viewed as glorious and 
prosperous. The narrative of transformation and decay can reveal conditions 
of discrimination, socio-economic abjectness and suffering (Thangarajah, 
1995).108 The collective memory of victimisation, in Sri Lanka’s post-conflict 
phase, exists as a counter-memory to the official state narrative of 
humanitarianism and triumph over terrorism. It exposes the state’s attempt to 
impose a collective memory of the conflict from above, predicated on 
selective suppression of the past.  
 
Commemoration can take various forms: history-telling, monuments, 
ceremonies and public events, symbols, clothing and iconography. These 
sites, forms and practices are also established and maintained as markers of 
national and other identities (Olick and Robbins, 1998: 124). Commemoration 
has various purposes. Rituals and practices provide a social forum to support 
the cultural identity of a group, thereby affirming community (Winter, 1995). 
They can proffer visions of nationhood and possible strategies of cohesion 
and struggle (Khalili, 2007: 3). For Olick and Robbins (1998: 126), “[m]emory 
sites and memory practices are central loci for ongoing struggles over 
identity”. They recognise, also, that traditions - histories of commemorative 
practices - began to be seen as manipulations and mechanisms to political 
power with the popularity of Foucault’s “archaeological” approach (Olick 
and Robbins, 1998: 108). Foucault’s thought provided philosophical support 
for traditions to be desacralised, recognising that the politics of memory and 
history writing are inherently linked to power. Those with the power to 
impose their version also have the power to change memory traces 
(Somasundaram, 2010). The literature on memory studies will be briefly 
analysed in its relevance to the imposition and manipulation of memory in Sri 
Lanka, by both the state and the LTTE. The framework of memory studies 
allows us to understand how the Tamil “experiences of subjugation have 
filtered into the present” and how past losses and humiliations are revisited 
and relived in the present, triggered by political violence and the 
environment of terror (Derges, 2012: 4). Commemorative practices made 
“traditional” by the LTTE are also analysed here. These practices have been 
outlawed in the Northeast in the post-conflict phase, a development that has 
                                                        
108 Yuvi Thangarajah’s work on the indigenous Vedda community in the Eastern Province of 
Batticalao sets out a useful conception of victimisation as a refuge for the community, who were 
cast out of the monolithic identity of Tamilness promoted by the LTTE. Despite this, the Sri 
Lankan military did not recognise the difference between the Veddas and Tamils; the Veddas fell 
victim to the same searches, arrests and assaults as Tamils in the region. 
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restricted the public expression of grief and communal consolation. This is a 
form of violence in itself, justified under a paradigm that frames 
commemorative practices as glorifying terrorism. This chapter interrogates 
the effect of this restriction on the Tamil community, which naturally consists 
of “a sustaining support system, nourishing environment and network of 
relationships” (Somasundaram, 2010). Without cultural and traditional 
commemorative practices, how can “recovery” and “reconciliation” occur? 
 
Somasundaram (2010) asserts that “relationships, trust, cohesion, beliefs and 
ethical values” have declined, deteriorated or been destroyed among Vanni 
Tamils, a finding perhaps applicable to the Northeastern Tamil community 
more generally. Restrictions on access for psychosocial services, counselors 
and cultural healers compound the “unanticipated degree of distrust and 
ambivalence regarding the past, present and future” (Derges, 2012: 2; Crisis 
Group, 2012; Somasundaram, 2010). Story-telling and local practices of 
communication are subdued: testament to the suffering endured over the 
years of war. To speak openly of suffering, political aspirations and human 
rights is considered dangerous in an atmosphere of threat, surveillance and 
betrayal. Over the years of war, the Tamils have “learnt to keep within 
themselves their pain and loss in the face of denial and negation” (Derges, 
2012: 6). Derges traces the relationship between memories of violence and the 
corresponding practice of silence that has been a ‘protective shield’ and a 
method by which dignity and autonomy could be maintained.  
 
The potential for a coherent counter-memory to emerge exists in “the archive” 
(de Mel, 2007): a growing repository of media and new media reports, 
mediated accounts (often predicated on advocacy positions) and emerging 
recorded testimony from victim-survivors of the conflict. Archives of 
suffering have taken the form of narratives and films directed at international 
audiences and processes of accountability such as the UN Human Rights 
Council, seeking independent investigations into wartime atrocity (for 
example, the Channel 4 “Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields” documentaries and Leena 
Manimekalai’s “White Van” documentary). Elite Colombo-based advocacy 
workers, photographers, artists, activists, researchers, academics and 
architects have also curated memory projects. 109  These projects have a 
                                                        
109 For example, the ‘I am’ project at www.iam.lk beautifully compiles video footage and stories 
of Sri Lanka’s elders and the ‘HerStories’ archive at www.herstoryarchive.org collects the 
narratives of women across the country affected by the war. The Groundviews citizen journalism 
website also created a fantastic online archive of memorial material in relation to the 30th 
anniversary of Black July.  
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tendency to beautify the experience of suffering in order to attain the 
sympathies and interest of the elite classes and the international community. 
Though wonderfully presented, important and compelling, they are abstract 
from the lived experience of the Tamil people, and tend to depoliticise the 
suffering portrayed by speaking the language of “oneness”. Most projects 
require an online platform and are conducted in English, rendering them 
inaccessible to the destitute and war-affected Tamil-speaking population of 
the North. The value of these resources, however, is their potential to 
overturn the dominant state narrative in the post-conflict phase. In the 
international arena, the official narrative is considered unreliable and 
advocacy towards an international investigation into the End relies on sources 
of “counter-memory.” As Elizabeth Jelin states: “all policies for conservation 
and memory, by selecting which artefacts and traces to preserve, conserve or 
commemorate, have an implicit will to forget” (2003: 18). The completeness of 
collective memory can never be guaranteed. The manner in which narratives 
are officially collated illustrates a process by which some life is framed as 
“grievable” while others face exclusion from public mourning (Butler, 2004).  
 
 
5.3 Memories of Violence and Practices of Silence: Interviews and 
Restrictions 
 
The Tamils, beset by violence and war, have primarily embodied their 
memories rather than explicitly narrate their experiences. Carrying “secrets” 
within them, a “hidden or private transcript”, (Derges, 2012: 9) the Tamil 
community created an “authentic inner life” in order to survive (Bastin, 1997: 
400). The interviews carried out for this thesis were conducted with 
individuals spanning a spectrum of media, social support and advocacy 
work, with local staff and international workers, but not victim-survivors of 
the End themselves. This chapter, therefore, is necessarily based on mediated 
accounts. The interviews conducted in Jaffna, Batticaloa and Trincomalee, 
while providing essential accounts of life in the region, can be viewed as 
anomalous in a sense. Interviewees spoke as self-appointed representatives of 
a silenced population, grasping opportunities in the “post-conflict” 
environment to communicate the contradictions of this term. Faith in the 
power and moral rectitude of the international community and the UN 
system was damaged by their failure to intervene at the End. Post-war, the 
Tamil perspective of the responsibility of the outside world transformed: 
many interviewees voiced a perception that the international community 
must now correct the harms done to the Tamils and atone for their failures at 
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the end of the war by influencing post-conflict justice in their favour (MR, 
MSP, AHB, 2012). “A reasonable political solution: that is, I think, the responsibility 
of the international community. At least there is an opportunity for them to deliver 
justice now” (MR, 2012). 
 
These accounts served to describe the continuing subjugation of the Tamils 
and confirm the “voiceless” status of the people (AHB, 2012). The narratives of 
interviewees are recognised here as self-conscious stories and interviews are 
relied upon as “commentaries”, coming from particular social and political 
perspectives, which shed light on the lived experience of the war and its 
aftermath (Thiranagama, 2011: 5).  
 
 
5.4 Foregrounding a Counter-Memory 
 
Previous chapters have focused on the state’s imposition of its own narrative 
on the final phase of the Sri Lankan conflict, crafted specifically to draw 
support from the Sinhala-Buddhist majority, to avoid accountability for war 
crimes committed at the end of the war and to design the process of 
reconciliation according to the terms of the Rajapaksa brothers. This narrative 
has been imposed forcefully, through media domination and censorship, the 
astute appropriation of international discourses of counter-terrorism and 
humanitarianism, practices of professionalised denial, and the 
institutionalisation of state terror. This chapter, in contrast, offers a central 
role to conflict memory among the Tamils as a means of understanding the 
wider implications of the End. The Tamil people, interviewees suggested, 
understand the End as the logical conclusion to a persecutory war within 
which the Tamils have borne social, religious, cultural and personal losses. By 
attempting to trace a counter-memory in the accounts gathered since the End, 
a double intent is inherent in this work. As recognised by Elizabeth Jelin 
(2003: 29), counter-memory seeks to expose the “true” version of events, a 
pursuit that necessarily includes demanding justice on that basis. 110  In a 
population rendered “voiceless” - a word repetitively intoned by Tamil 
interviewees - one issue dominates discourse and advocacy for justice: the 
right of the families of the missing to information regarding loved ones.  
 
 
5.5 A Catastrophe 
                                                        
110 See Chapter Three’s discussion of “truth” in the transitional justice paradigm. 
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The experience of the Tamils at the end of the war can be considered to have 
caused a “profound sense of cultural disruption across the members of the 
community,” fitting the criteria of what Gray and Oliver term a “catastrophe” 
(2004: 7). Gray and Oliver (2004) argue that a catastrophe also produces new 
knowledge, causing a critique of current social and cultural norms. In 
conceptualising the End, the term is appropriate as it indicates a sense of 
limit; as argued by Aradau and van Munster (2012), a catastrophe allows us to 
examine the limits of our knowledge and capacity to react to the unforseen. A 
catastrophe can be seen as the limit of knowledge and the limit of 
governmental practice, an opportunity for new imaginings (Aradau and van 
Munster, 2012). The etymological roots of the word as an “overturning” are 
important too, as catastrophes can challenge and overturn the expected in 
practices of governance, politics, and security. The unpredictability of 
catastrophe can provoke new understandings and pioneering turns of 
imagination (Aradau and van Munster, 2012). Tellingly, the Palestinian term 
‘Naqda,’ describing the violence and enforced exile of 1948, translates from 
Arabic to ‘catastrophe’. Khalili’s (2007) work on commemoration of 1948 by 
Palestinians, and the ways in which that memory is constructed and 
reconstructed for the purpose of producing historical or national memory – 
and consequently national sentiment – is instructive here. 
 
Times of crisis are sites of struggle and a catastrophe can bring the conditions 
that support the work of ideology and institutional apparatus into question 
(de Mel, 2007). The event of a catastrophe is open to interpretation by political 
forces and other “memory-makers” such as civil society leaders, the media, 
archivists, storytellers and religious leaders. The state is often the dominant 
memory-maker, with resources to support the initiation of the national story. 
It can use commemorative practices, holiday cycles and particularly textbooks 
to establish a consensus view of the past (Khalili, 2007: 5). The state can also 
dictate the manner in which personal experiences and memories are 
considered significant, marshalling specific memories into the state narrative 
of the past while excluding others.111 These excluded memories are of interest 
here. Similar to the Palestinian case, the sizeable Tamil diaspora has been 
important in influencing the forms and content of commemoration 
internationally. In Canada and internationally, led by diaspora entities such 
                                                        
111 Penneker and Banasik (1997: 5) refer to “flashbulb memories”, where the meaning attached 
by an individual to personal memories around an event can be rendered inaccurate because the 
“collective” meaning of such event is established afterwards.  
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as the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE), commemorative 
practices have followed the schedule and form of the LTTE, though the 19th of 
May, the final day of the End (which occurred at Mullivaikal), is now also 
commemorated with demonstrations. 112  The diaspora contend that this day 
has left: 
 
“…an indelible mark in the national psyche of our people. Just as the 
word ‘holocaust’ holds a very special place in the collective memory of 
the Jewish people, the term Mullivaikal holds a similar place in the 
collective memory not only of Eelam Tamils, but of Tamils around the 
world”  (Rudrakumaran, 2012). 
 
In the face of erasure and state denial, the diaspora have chosen to 
commemorate this day “to bear witness to the mass atrocities that occurred in 
Mullivaikal” and “to ensure that there is “never again” a Mullivaikal” 
(Rudrakumaran, 2012). For the diaspora, and many Tamil activists such as 
Guruparan and Rajamanorahan (2013), the End should be remembered as 
evidence of genocide. This is reflected in the language chosen. Killed in their 
masses (by the use of disproportionate force in conflict) because of their Tamil 
identity, the political and advocacy groupings domestically and 
internationally contend that the “intent to destroy” criteria of the Genocide 
Convention has been met (Rudrakumaran, 2012; Guruparan and 
Rajamanoharan, 2013; TAG, 2010). For the TGTE, the End has brought 
coherence internationally, similar to the effect that Black July brought had on 
Sri Lankan Tamils in 1983: 
 
“Our narrative, our grief, the outrage of international civil society, our 
togetherness, the togetherness not only of Eelam Tamils, but of Tamils 
around the world is different from, makes us stronger than before” 
(Rudrakumaran, 2012). 
 
The battleground is different. The form of struggle for Eelam has been 
transformed into “a new democratic and diplomatic struggle” 
(Rudrakumaran, 2012). In this struggle, the End has created new and 
                                                        
112 TGTE are an elected body in the diaspora, mandated to “win the freedom of the Tamil people 
on the basis of their fundamental political principles of Nationhood, Homeland and Right of self-
determination” (TGTE-US, 2013). According a spokesman (in personal interview with author), 
they use the Tibetan model of ‘government in exile’ as a model to some extent. The TGTE see 
themselves as supporting the TNA rather than actually actively engaging in Sri Lankan politics. 
“They want to work with them, support them and get the diaspora perspective across to them and 
through them. TGTE do not want to be antagonistic, cause people to resent the diaspora” (VJ, 2012). 
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powerful allies internationally, though these allies  - human rights 
organisations, foreign governments such as the US, UK and Canada and 
media groups such as Channel 4 – are less concerned with the achievement of 
Eelam than state accountability for atrocity and the achievement of political 
and social rights for the Tamil people. 
  
While locally the End is remembered as a state-perpetrated atrocity, the LTTE 
were also responsible for great violence against the Tamils. The LTTE had 
been accepted as a normative force in Tamil-dominated areas (Derges, 2012). 
The presence of the LTTE in the lives of the people had generated “hope and 
terror, devotion and fear” (Derges, 2012: 8). The End was catastrophic for 
Tamil identity and has left the people in a state of uncertainty and political 
flux. How does this fall into the extant “constituent narrative” of Tamil 
nationalism? And how has it been influenced by post-war developments and 
state actions? This section introduces the historical foundations of that 
nationalism and the particular concepts that were identified by interviewees 
as defining the End: self-determination, persecution, victimhood and 
subsequent (re-)colonisation at the hands of the Sinhalese.  
 
 
5.6 Tamil Nationalist Thought and Separatism  
 
In their pursuit of autonomy and self-determination, the Tamil population of 
Sri Lanka has claimed the Northeast of the island as their own homeland of 
Tamil Eelam. This separatist assertion is founded on the history of the Tamils 
as traditional landowners in the area, where Tamil kingdoms existed up to 
colonial times (Emmanuel, 2000; Sabaratnam, 2010). Tamil history contests the 
claims of the Sinhala-Buddhist historical chronicles, the Mahavamsa, which 
claims righteous ownership of Sri Lanka for the Sinhalese. Instead, it presents 
the “rivalry” between the groups as between equal adversaries in a struggle 
for power over the regions of Sri Lanka (Sabaratnam, 2010). The Tamil people 
have been disadvantaged in their territorial claims because of the lack of a 
written history and religiously justified attachment to the island, as opposed 
to the documented strength of the Sinhalese nationalist contentions  
(Kleinfield, 2005; Thiranagama, 2013; Daniel, 1996). However, the Tamils 
contend that disproving their historical claim to the island is impossible.113 The 
                                                        
113 See E. Valentine Daniel’s (1996) distinction between the way that the Sinhalese and Tamil 
(particularly Jaffna Tamils) communities perceive the past, a difference that became important as 
adversarial identities crystallised. He argues that while the Tamils see themselves as a timeless 
people, living embodiments of tradition and Tamil heritage, the core of Sinhalese history is 
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Jaffna library, which stored up to 100,000 Tamil books and ancient documents 
and was the major repository for all known literary source material of the 
Tamil people (including some irreplaceable documents), was incinerated in 
1981 (Knuth, 2006; Nesiah, 2003). Eyewitnesses accused the state forces of 
acquiescence and complicity in this cultural decimation (Emmanuel, 2000; 
Peris, 2001). For the Tamils, this assault on their cultural and historical 
knowledge was “iconic marker of the physical and imaginative violence” 
visited on them by the Sinhalese (Nesiah, 2003).  
 
Kleinfield (2005) warns that Sri Lankan territorial claims based on history and 
original ownership of land can be considered whimsical, biased and 
sometimes simply false. Both the Sinhalese and the Tamils have used claims 
of seniority to support their respective territorial claims (Whall, 1996: 190). 
The territorial claims have a complicated, far-reaching and contradictory 
history, in which bias is extremely difficult to expulse (Kleinfield, 2005). As 
one Sinhala-Buddhist interviewee stated, “it boils down to where history starts 
for any particular person…and which part of history that you privilege” (MS, 2012). 
 
The claim of self-determination for the Tamils is based on fulfilment of the 
“test of nationhood” in an historical and territorial light: 
 
“…a historical past in this island (which is) at least as ancient and as 
glorious as that of the Singhalese, secondly by the fact of their being a 
linguistic entity different from that of the Singhalese, with unsurpassed 
classical heritage…and finally, by reason of their territorial habitation 
of definite areas which constitute over one third of this island” 
(Chelvanayagam, 1951, quoted in Emmanuel, 2000: 45-6). 114 
 
As Whall (1996: 187) argues, the Sri Lankan Tamils’ claim to self-
determination is not only based on the grounds that they are a distinct people 
with a distinct heritage, culture and language, who have suffered a marked 
discrimination, but also on the grounds that they occupy a contiguous and 
homogenous territory in the North and Eastern Provinces. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
rooted in a single historical event: the entrustment of the island to the Sinhalese by Buddha. The 
concept of the nation-state also contributed to the Sinhalese fixed notion of historical 
consciousness (1996: 46). 
114 Leader of the Federal Party, S. J. V. Chelvanayagam is considered the “father of Tamil 
nationalism,” whose contribution is described in greater detail below.  
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5.7 The Development of Tamil Nationalism 
 
At its core, post-independence Tamil politics has always presented itself as 
safeguarding the Tamils against the domination of the Sinhalese (Emmanuel, 
2000). The unique cultures of the two groups have been emphasised in 
support of Tamil nationalist claims, drawing on linguistic, religious and 
ritualistic differences that faced threat of destruction under Sinhalese rule. 
Under colonialism, firstly the Portuguese in 1591 and perpetuated by the 
Dutch and British, the existing Jaffna kingdom was annexed to Sri Lanka as 
one part of a larger political unit, never to recover its independence (Whall, 
1996: 196).115  
 
The reconstruction of a collective cultural Tamil consciousness had begun in 
the nineteenth century with the preaching of Arumuga Navalar (1822 – 1879). 
He sought to revive the Saiva Hindu traditions in the Tamil dominated areas, 
to undo the decay wrought by centuries of colonisation and to prevent further 
conversions to the Protestant religion introduced by the British colonisers in 
power during his lifetime (Satkunanathan, 2012; Sabaratnam, 2010). G. G. 
Ponnambalam, the founder of the All Ceylon Tamil Congress, played an 
instrumental role in the ideological development of Tamil nationalism in 
preparation for independence from the British in 1948. “He raised the 
consciousness of the Tamils to the point where they abandoned their sense of 
national awareness within an all-island polity and began thinking of 
themselves as having a separate identity” (Wilson, 2000: 80). He was an 
excellent orator and his rhetorical skills influenced and excited the youth. His 
words were more rousing than the constitutional debates on community 
representation underway at the time: “We were intoxicated with his slogan: 
Proclaim yourself a Tamil and walk with your heads held high” (Sabaratnam, 
2010).  
 
On the shoulders of this revivalist movement and political activism, a Tamil 
nationalism advocating for self-determination was developed in response to 
the “Sinhala Only” programme begun in the 1950s, a nationalism that arose 
from “the common experience of discrimination and an uncertain future” 
(Satkunanathan, 2012). The identity of the Tamils as pan-regional culture 
across the North and East of Sri Lanka began in the 1950s in response to 
                                                        
115 Some Tamil activists, seeing the success of Sinhalese identity consolidation by drawing on the 
past documented in the Mahavamsa, sought to emphasise the greatness of Tamil kingdoms of the 
past and write that “history” as a legitimising story of belonging (Daniel, 1996; Bartholomeusz 
and de Silva, 1998: 6-7). 
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discrimination and Sinhalese riots against the Tamils. The group was bound 
together by the perception that one was a target simply on the basis of Tamil 
identity, regardless of class, caste or geographical location (Tambiah, 1986). 
The threat of violence impelled the growth of Tamil nationalism in the 1950s 
and 1960s, a defensive nationalism generated in response to Sinhalese-
Buddhist nationalism (Rasaratnam, 2006; Satkunanathan, 2012; Wilson, 2000). 
Although ancient historical data is relied upon to support legal and political 
claims, Tamil nationalism is largely considered to be a modern phenomenon, 
originating in the nineteenth century (Satkunanathan, 2012).  
 
The defensive nationalism evolved to a separatist claim that became salient as 
an aspiration in the face of discrimination by the majority, anti-Tamil 
violence, poor economic conditions, and the unlikelihood of a power-sharing 
agreement coming to fruition (Kleinfield, 2005). The deepening of ethnic 
divides was prompted by the state-sponsored peasant resettlement schemes 
or “colonisation schemes” in the ‘Dry Zone’, which altered the demographic 
of the area in favour of the Sinhalese and was seen by the Tamils as 
encroachment into their traditional areas (Whall, 1996: 187).116 The separatist 
demand was also underpinned by the realisation that the North and Eastern 
Provinces could constitute a viable autonomous politico-economic entity 
(Whall, 1996: 203; Shastri, 1990). The Sinhala Only Act of 1956 cemented the 
requirement of autonomy for the Tamils. The TULF leader, Appapillai 
Amirdhalingam said, in a 1983 interview, “not until 1956 did we really 
believe that we were second-class citizens” (in Daniel, 1996: 158). The parity 
of status denied to the Tamil language was felt very keenly in terms of 
employment and contact with the national apparatus of administration. It 
spoke to a lack of recognition and dignity for the Tamils. Campaigns of Tamil 
political parties in the 1970s and 1980s tapped into the emotional element of 
this denial, calling on the people to “vote for Tamil” and for Thamil unarvu, 
which translates as Tamil emotion or sentiment (Satkunanthan, 2012: 620, 
footnote 26). Campaigns of civil disobedience began under the direction of the 
Federal Party in 1960 requesting parity of status in law for the Tamil language 
(Manogaran, 1987). The movement included the establishment of a parallel 
postal system, the peaceful blocking of governmental office entrances, and 
attempting to conduct business with Sinhalese government officials in Tamil 
(Clarance, 2007: 36).   
 
                                                        
116 The Dry Zone includes regions in the North Central, Northern and Eastern Provinces, within 
the land considered the traditional Tamil “homeland” (Whall, 1996: 187).  
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On the introduction of the 1972 Constitution, federalism – originally called for 
by the Federal Party under the leadership of the “father of Tamil nationalism” 
S. J. V. Chelvanayakam in 1951 (Emmanuel, 2000) - was discounted as an 
option by the government and, accordingly, Tamil politicians also. The 
policies adopted by the Sinhalese government led to a “gradual but steady” 
realisation amongst the Tamils that “living as one Sri Lankan multi-ethnic, 
multi-religious people” was not possible in the political environment 
(Emmanuel, 2000). Their safety and future development was seen as 
dependent on re-claiming their pre-colonial and traditional homeland. 
Discrimination under Sinhala-dominated politics seemed beyond 
transformation under the existing system. Tamil politicians were heckled and 
silenced in Parliament and peaceful Tamil protests, following Gandhi’s 
message of ahimsa, were met with state terror and mob violence (Emmanuel, 
2000). The 13th amendment to the Constitution incorporated the provisions of 
the Official Languages Act 1987, declaring Tamil as an official language, but 
the damage to ethnic relations had been cemented (Samaranayake, 1991). The 
political landscape was polarised between Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism 
supported and embodied by the government and Tamil calls for self-
determination.  
 
The self-identification of Tamils as victims of discrimination under majority 
Sinhalese rule drove the Tamil secessionist movement which officially began 
in May 1976 with the Vaddukoddai Resolution, adopted by Tamil politicians, 
which declared the goal of a separate state of Tamil Eelam (or Thāmilīlam) 
(Roberts, 2013: 59). Group violence against the Tamil population occurred 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s amid allegations of government involvement 
in the perpetration and organisation of this violence. The achievement of an 
autonomous state of Tamil Eelam was perceived as the only means of 
protection. Tamil politicians came together as the Tamils United Front (TUF) 
in 1972, renamed Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) in 1976, and declared 
the situation of the Tamils as a colonised people under Sinhalese rule: 
 
“…the Republican Constitution of 1972 has made the Tamils a slave 
nation ruled by the new colonial masters, the Singhalese, who are 
using the power they have wrongly usurped to deprive the Tamil 
nation of its territory, language, citizenship, economic life, 
opportunities of employment and education and thereby destroying all 
the attributes of nationhood of the Tamil nation” (TULF statement, 
1976, in Emmanuel, 2000). 
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In 1985, TULF in conjunction with the major Tamil militant groups at the time 
delineated the “Thimpu Principles”, which contained the aspirations of the 
Tamil political community:  
 
‘‘…recognition of the Tamils of Ceylon as a nation; recognition of the 
existence of an identified homeland for the Tamils in Ceylon; 
recognition of the right of self-determination of the Tamil nation; 
recognition of the right to citizenship and the fundamental rights of all 
Tamils in Ceylon” (quoted in Kleinfield, 2005 :290).  
 
The government rejected the Thimpu Principles as a violation of Sri Lanka’s 
sovereignty. The 6th amendment to the Constitution (discussed in Chapter 
Four), prohibited this violation and demanded an oath of allegiance from all 
politicians to the unitary state. On the resignation of the TULF MPs, who 
refused to take this oath, political discussions were considered hopeless. The 
nationalist agenda of the Sinhala leadership negated the possibility of 
compromise with the aggrieved Tamils. Combined with youth restlessness 
and economic struggle, sporadic mob violence against the Tamils, and the 
criminalisation of political advocacy for Eelam, conditions were primed for 
violent separatist agitation.  
 
 
5.8 The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
 
Frustrated with the political stalemate, the Tamil youth became more radical 
in their politics and resorted to tactics of violence as a form of political 
expression and pressure. The separatist campaign took the shape of roughly 
thirty-five disjointed violent groups (Clarance, 2007; Samaranayake, 1991). 
The blanket term “Tigers” was attributed to the members of this post-1972 
movement, the term by which the separatist movement has gained 
international recognition (Samaranayake, 1991). The fragmented groups were 
disorganised in their operation and communication with one another. As 
discussed by Wilson (2000: 131), the Tigers lacked a “properly formulated 
idea of national regeneration”, representing “essentially a nuisance to the 
Sinhala state, but beyond this could not be counted as political forces”. The 
LTTE, through a campaign of violent elimination and assimilation, emerged 
as the strongest of these militant youth groups. The LTTE came to represent 
the Tamil separatist movement and the interests of the Tamil community 
(Clarance, 2007, Thiranagama, 2011). The Tamils were impressed by the 
clarity of their political vision and the charisma of their leader, Velupillai 
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Prabhakaran  (Clarance, 2007; Samaranayake, 1991). They alone, Wilson (2000) 
argues, had a formulated policy and a constructive nationalist ideology. The 
other militant groups at the time focused on resistance to the centralised 
Sinhalese state and its oppressive practices. The LTTE presented itself as 
protecting the “heroic policies” of S. J. V. Chelvanayakam on the battlefield, 
rising up as “his heirs” and continuing his heritage, not allowing the progress 
he made to be “bartered away” (Wilson, 2000: 132: footnote 10). The LTTE 
embraced political violence in the pursuit of Tamil Eelam, initially targeting 
Sinhalese soldiers and political representatives. Over the course of the 
organisation’s existence, it’s own survival as the singular voice of the Tamils 
was ensured by the elimination and silencing of opposition Tamil politicians 
and voices (Brun, 2008: 420). In the 1980s, they began to target Sinhalese 
civilians, further prompting the government into repressive responses in the 
shape of harsh security measures and emergency legislation (Imtiyaz and 
Stavis, 2008: 11). The LTTE was responsible for thousands of civilian deaths, 
both Tamil and Sinhalese.  
 
The LTTE’s battle for self-determination within a Tamil nation was a 
homogenising, constraining, oppressive, and eviscerating process (Ismail and 
Jeganathan, 1995). Tamil nationalism espoused and defined by the 
organisation portrays the Tamil people as victims of the Sinhalese state’s 
oppression. Despite the LTTE’s heavy reliance on violence, the nonviolent 
background of the Tamil political movement is emphasised in literature on 
the development of the LTTE (Balasingham, 2004; Emmanuel, 2000). 
Separatist ideology holds that the Tamil people took up arms as a means of 
protection, that a resort to violence was necessary in response to state 
violence. Victimisation and the denial of Tamil rights by the Sinhalese state 
defined “Tamilness”. The LTTE succeeded in making the organisation itself 
the core of Tamil identity and ingrained itself in every aspect of life 
(Thiranagama, 2011). Wilson argues that the majority of the Tamil population 
supported or sympathised with the LTTE, despite their violent tactics. He 
maintains that those who asserted otherwise were guilty of “double-speak” 
(2000: 131).  
 
The LTTE’s violent tactics were met with violence and harsh repression by the 
Sinhalese-dominated state and its security apparatus. Daily life in the years 
that followed became a violent contest between the crude justice of the LTTE 
and the fierce and invasive practices of the Sri Lankan police, military forces 
and the various unofficial paramilitaries operating in Tamil-dominated areas 
(Somasundaram, 2010; Philipson, 2011). The Tamil ‘suspect community’ came 
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to face persecution under an anti-terror campaign couched in illegality.117 
Daniel states that every Tamil between the age of 16 and 40 was “considered a 
terrorist whose tactic was surprise” (1996: 170). Especially post-1983, 
discrimination was clear and openly discussed amongst Tamils; the brute 
realities of violence and discrimination brought with it high levels of 
politicisation (Daniel: 1996). From these beginnings, the conflict with the 
LTTE heightened to the status of a bloody civil war and this pattern of 
political behaviour – violence discursively framed as state terror and 
terrorism alike, but better understood as Sri Lankan state crime and Tamil 
resistance (Nadarajah and Sentas, 2013)  - continued for nearly three decades. 
Draconian counter-terror legislative measures combined with institutional 
racism against Tamils all over the island. Ethnicity was the basis for intrusive 
searches, disruptive prohibitions on movement, disappearances and 
institutionalised torture that became characteristic of the conflict.  
 
The LTTE controlled a “civil administration” in the North Eastern Province 
from 1987, which was to some extent parasitic on the Sri Lankan state, and 
established a ruthless and arbitrary system of justice (Philipson, 2011: 108). 
The LTTE were cultural purists and insisted on the strict adherence to 
traditional Tamil mores and societal structures. Digressions and dissent were 
dealt with on a spectrum of punishment – public, creative and harsh - with 
the prospect of execution an ever-present threat (Philipson, 2011: 108-9). The 
rule of the LTTE guaranteed that the sole representatives of the Sinhalese 
people and the Sri Lankan state in the North were soldiers. The Tamil ethnic 
identity, guided by myths, memories, values and symbols (Smith, 1986, 1999), 
was gradually appropriated and defined by the LTTE (Roberts, 2010). This 
identity was contrasted with that of the Sinhalese soldier. This was 
devastating for inter-ethnic relations, as “[y]oung Tamils in the North…had 
never met a Sinhalese person who wasn’t a soldier pointing a gun at them” 
(Harrison, 2012: 61). In the South, the Tamil population lived, as Pradeep 
Jeganathan (1998) describes, in the “Shadow of Violence” cast by the 
chronology of anti-Tamil riots, a string of dates giving rise to the constant 
state of “anticipation of violence”: “’56 ’58 ’61 ’74 ’77 ’81…” (1998: 99). 
Drawing on a play named “Rasanayagam’s Last Riot” by Ernest McIntyre 
(1993), Jeganathan draws out the impact of this periodic violence on Tamil 
identity in Sri Lanka and the “tactics of anticipation” that Tamils adopted in 
expectation of more violence; violence that exploded beyond the level that 
anyone had expected in July 1983 (1998: 99-100). The production of identity 
                                                        
117 Those discriminatory and repressive practices are described in detail in Chapter Two. 
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for Tamils in the South was in contrast to the Sinhalese in a different way: 
they learned repertoire of tactics to survive more violence (1998: 100). 
Persecution and victimisation were internalised and folded into Tamil 
identity. While the LTTE enforced Tamil unity and homogenisation, the 
greatest force behind Tamil solidarity and the fusion of disparate and divided 
groups in Tamil society was the force unleashed on the Tamils by the Sri 
Lankan state. Perceived as widely “anti-Tamil”, this force flattened the 
divides that previously segregated the Tamil community (Daniel, 1996: 164). 
After the violence of the 1983 riots, Tamils all over the island “had become 
brothers and sisters under the trauma of persecution, arrests, torture and 
death” (Daniel, 1996: 170). 
 
 
5.9 The Meaning of the End 
 
The End represented a phase of collective punishment for the Tamil 
population, fitting with the nationalistic narrative of persecution and 
resulting in a deep sense of victimhood. Post-event, the atrocity continued in 
mass imprisonment in “welfare villages.” The memory of betrayal by the 
LTTE and state forces alike, the separation of families, the sense of being 
dehumanised in camps, and the continued colonisation of Tamil land has 
compounded the Tamil perception of persecution and victimhood (AB, SM, 
FY, YO, 2012). The memory of the End, as a counter-memory to that of the 
official state narrative, is being enfolded into the Tamil nationalist narrative. 
The End has provided a new historic event, a catastrophe that strengthens the 
extant template of self-defensive nationalism. In Daniel’s words, it is a 
“nourishing ground” for nationalist thought, based on persecution and 
victimhood (1996: 50). In this sense, it fits a pattern of atrocity, discrimination 
and state crime, along with the anti-Tamil riots and brutal counter-terror 
practices. Black July in 1983 is the only comparable “rallying point” in Tamil 
history (Daniel, 1996), confirmative evidence of structural persecution by the 
Sinhalese state, amounting to genocide (Rudrakumaran, 2012; Guruparan and 
Rajamoranaharan, 2013; Kingsbury, 2011).  
 
In commemorative practices, such events are sites of production and 
reproduction, where memory can be historicised (Khalili, 2007). It is precisely 
in the face of the state’s counter-terror and humanitarian discourse that the 
Tamils fear erasure. The state’s post-conflict mechanics of repression place the 
Tamil memory of conflict under threat. Constraints on storytelling and 
commemoration through repression, the rhetoric of “glorifying terrorism” 
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and state terror contribute to the state imposition of a hegemonic conflict 
narrative in discourse and on the physical space.  
 
Humphrey (2000: 7-8) writes that “[t]he legacy of suffering persists in the 
individual victim as an uncertain balance between a continuing harm induced 
by the fear that the past can return…and a memory available for political re-
appropriation for further disempowerment or personal liberation”. Crucial to 
understanding the politics of memory in Sri Lanka is to recognise that “the 
context of retelling is crucial to the nature of the memory” (Kirmayer, 1996: 
174). Story-telling related to the End is a dangerous undertaking under Sri 
Lanka’s national security paradigm: a context of intimidation, harassment, 
violence and disappearances. The lived reality of repression and fear for 
victim-survivors and civil society representatives severely limits the space for 
narrating conflict memory and seeking recognition, accountability and 
reparations (as evidenced below). There are cultural obstacles also. Silence 
pervades Tamil culture in the former conflict zones: a result of the years of 
war, surveillance, suspicion, and the fragmented nature of the community 
(Derges, 2012; Thiranagama, 2011; Somasundaram, 2013). Different actors 
have attempted to reconstruct stories in the international sphere, in a 
necessarily mediated form (Olick and Robbins, 1998: 102).  While claiming to 
speak on their behalf, often with the best intentions and in pursuit of 
accountability, the appropriation of these accounts from the Tamil people 
amounts to “mining” stories for particular agendas, a practice that Razack 
terms “stealing the pain of others” (Razack, 2007). The ‘victim’ status of the 
Tamil population requires examination in the political implications of this 
identity, both internationally and locally.  
 
In line with Khalili (2007) and Thiranagama (2011, 2013), I argue that the 
‘national story’ of the Tamil people can be seen as something produced and 
performed rather than “natural” and pre-existing. A collective memory was 
nurtured and instrumentalised by the LTTE through commemorative 
practices based on the discourse of martyrdom, sacrifice and the destiny of 
the Tamil people: to return to the glory of the former Tamil kingdom, free 
from Sinhalese persecution. There are mechanics of production and elements 
of political performance to be examined here. Turning to the commemorative 
practices of the LTTE, we see the cultivation of these narrative threads of 
Tamil nationalism. Interrogating the narrative power of these practices, we 
can see how memory work and the suppression of commemoration inform 
Tamil nationalism and conceptions of loss in the post-conflict period. The 
“politically charged realm of commemoration” can tell us a great deal about 
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current state-Tamil dynamics and the reconfiguration of Tamil political 




5.10 The LTTE: Commemorations and Performed Nationalism 
 
The LTTE’s militant nationalism, emerging in the early 1980s, altered the 
Tamil identity in reference to loyalty to itself (Thiranagama, 2011). Now, in 
the post-LTTE era, the identity that bound the inhabitants of the nascent 
Tamil Eelam together has lost its centre. Under the LTTE’s mastery of 
definition in ideology, culture and politics, “Tamilness” came to pivot on the 
existence of the LTTE and one’s relationship to the organisation 
(Thiranagama, 2011). This realignment and production of identity was 
maintained through ritual, rhetoric and commemorative practices. The self-
promoted reification of the LTTE, maintained by fear and intimidation as well 
as fetishisation of themselves in propaganda and rituals, left the Tamil people 
reliant on them as representatives (Thiranagama, 2011). The emotional 
connection with the population was sustained with rituals such as Martyrs’ 
Day, described below.  Widespread forced conscription, as well as huge 
recruitment numbers in reaction to state violence, ensured the intimate 
infiltration of the LTTE into the community (UTHR-J, 2007).118  While the 
LTTE endured, losses could be justified to an extent as part of the violent 
struggle for separatism. Cultural coherence and the community’s faith in the 
organisation were crafted on the basis of a shared belief in the necessity and 
inevitability of Tamil Eelam. An ideology of victimisation and martyrdom 
was marshalled towards the achievement of Eelam as the source of safety and 
protection for the Tamil people. Agamben examines the links between 
martyrdom and witnessing, noting that the Greek the word ‘martis’ is derived 
from the verb ‘to remember’. “The survivor’s vocation is to remember; he 
cannot not remember” (1999: 26). The doctrine of martyrdom, he states, 
justifies the scandal of a meaningless death (1999: 27).119 Memories of loss and 
subjugation were co-opted into the separatist discourse and as the LTTE 
                                                        
118 UTHR-J describe the “harshness of the LTTE’s conscription regime” as leaving “a deep 
undercurrent of resentment and fear” amongst the Tamil population in the North. However, the 
campaign was “counterbalanced by the Government’s utterly irresponsible approach to the 
minorities.” It was relatively easy for the LTTE to “whip up” anger against the state forces 
because of their reactionary responses to LTTE violence, often perpetrated against civilians and 
entire villages (UTHR-J, 2007: 17:2).  
119 See Daniel Kent (2010) on the Sinhala-Buddhist justification of the deaths of soldiers, actively 
designed by monks to ease the suffering of families. 
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expanded their ideological and physical control over the population, 
“Tamilness” came to be measured by one’s “knowledge” of the LTTE and the 
possibility of its rule over you, no matter where you were (Thiranagama, 
2011: 26). 120  
 
The political nature of commemorations over the course of the war in Sri 
Lanka has been widely acknowledged (SM, AB, 2012; Thiranagama, 2011; de 
Mel, 2007; Perera, 2010). For the state, commemoration of the state forces war 
dead is a practice of identity building on the tenets of Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalism. For the LTTE, commemorative practices fed the “cult of 
martyrdom” (Spencer, 2000: 126) and thus ensured the longevity of the 
conflict, recruiting many willing Tamil youths on emotive terms. The 
population was constantly reminded of sacrifices made by LTTE cadres for 
the cause. Memories of violence perpetrated against Tamils, on the basis of 
ethnicity, reinforced belief in the exigency of the movement. The Tamil 
collective memory was formed around concepts of defensive war, 
glorification of martyrs and victimhood at the hands of the Sinhalese state. P. 
L. de Silva (1995: 179-180) states that commemoration practices and 
memorials institutionalized by the LTTE acted as “emotional shields”. These 
practices were brought into play in the organisation’s manipulation of 
symbolic systems to create order in the lives of the cadres.  
 
De Silva (1995: 179) outlines how images, symbols and language were used by 
the LTTE “as hiding places and a way of interpreting or mapping the world”. 
These tools were particularly apparent in staging ceremonies related to death 
and mourning. He mentions the use of the Tiger insignia, flags draped on 
coffins, small arms fire at gravesites, commemorative billboards and public 
notice boards bearing the names and images of fallen cadres, monuments to 
the dead and official photograph albums dedicated to LTTE martyrs as tools 
in the creation of a monolithic worldview.121 For De Silva, the LTTE depended 
on the support of the people: a populist, emotion-based support. By drawing 
on the emotional continuum - personal connections to lost cadres - the LTTE 
                                                        
120 “Knowing” here refers to the “shared secret” of the Tamils, regardless of geographical 
location, that the LTTE created through self-promotion and insertion into the lives of every 
family in the Tamil “homeland”. Sharika Thiranagama describes this knowledge as a 
reconfiguration of Tamil identity around an “ethnic cultural intimacy” maintained through 
surveillance and intra-community distrust (2011: 26-7). 
121 From 1983 to 1987, Daniel describes, the Tigers wrote the names of those killed by the armed 
forces on blackboards at major junctions. People would come and check the names on the board; 
it was a means of propagating martyrdom in an early form. When the IPKF arrived in 1987, the 
boards were wiped clean and stayed clean (Daniel, 1996: 145).   
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maintained faith in the “combat mode” they established over the years of war. 
The use of rituals and symbols based on martyrdom, personal loss and self-
defensive war were attempts to consolidate support from a population that 
cannot be considered homogenous in terms of culture or political ideology 
(De Silva, 1995: 182). His analysis demonstrates how the LTTE recognised the 
value of performing “Tamilness” on these terms. The organisation realised of 
the strength the movement stood to gain by being internalised into Tamil 
culture. Thiranagama (2011), Tambiah (1985) and Daniel (1996) agree that a 
“unified” Tamil identity was created before the establishment of the LTTE as 
a normative force. It was a defensive identity creation, in response to state 
and Sinhala mob violence. Their ethnicity condemned them to discrimination 
and violence, forging a Tamil identity based on victimhood. This unity was 
maintained, cultivated and enforced by the LTTE as they achieved dominance 
(Thiranagama, 2011, 2010).  
 
De Silva’s argument fits coherently with Bar-Tal’s understanding of 
memorials and rituals commemorating the conflict dead. He understands 
these practices as expressions of a culture of violence that becomes more 
entrenched with the passing years (Bar-Tal, 2003: 89). Physical monuments to 
the fallen and graveyards as sacralised space - spaces made sacred by ritual or 
commemorative practices (Schramm, 2011) - are manifestations of loss, pain 
and nationalism, held up publicly in an express demand for collective 
engagement and identification. For the LTTE, seeking emotional support from 
the population was based on propaganda pivoting largely around burial 
rituals, memorials and graveyards. In commemorative and community 
rituals, death and sacrifice were valourised (Schalk, 1997). The organisation’s 
operations also involved a process of “inclusion through exclusion”, a concept 
that Thiranagama (2011) explores with the use of Giorgio Agamben’s (1998) 
work on sovereignty. She describes the LTTE’s strategy of constructing unity 
through the elimination of “traitors” and the creation of “martyrs”. The 
organisation performed its power and demonstrated its position as sovereign 
by making “the administration of death its centre” (2011: 214). The martyr’s 
lives were of value only when sacrificed for the sovereign’s cause and, under 
these conditions, their lives were considered sacred. “Traitors” were termed 
as such and killed to eradicate dissent, to build the fear and intimidation on 
which the LTTE’s power relied. It also served to demonstrate the 
organisation’s position as the centre of Tamil identity. Traitors were simply 
erased, allowing the LTTE to build a selective memory of the conflict in which 
the organisation was unchallenged (Spencer, 2000).  
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The sovereign - the LTTE - created in its ranks a zone of exception in which 
there were different rules about death and dying (Thiranagama, 2011). Death 
was sacralised to the extent that entry to the organisation was marked with 
the promise of death: every cadre wore a cyanide capsule (kuppi) around his 
or her neck and was ordered to commit suicide on capture rather than betray 
the cause (Thiranagama, 2011; Roberts, 2007). The voluntary acceptance of 
death signified by wearing the kuppi came “to symbolise a sense of self-
sacrifice by cadres of the movement, their determination, their commitment to 
the cause, and ultimately, of course, their courage” (Balasingham, 1991). 
Transformation into heroes, maaveerar, was available only for conscripts, 
maintaining the zone of exception as a desired place for Tamils, tying honour 
to an oath of allegiance by which they committed themselves to the 
organisation’s punita cutantiram – the holy aim of liberation (Roberts, 2007). In 
exchange, cadres lost their kin ties, personal and family lives and dedicated 
themselves wholly to the cause (Schalk, 1997). The kuppi symbolised the 
prospect of a certain and honourable death; in offering control over life and 
death, it prompted fearlessness and tenacity: 
 
“The thought of certain death is a great trial. But to whom? Certainly 
not to us. Because we are married to our cyanide. Yes, our death lives 
with us. It sleeps with us. We carry it in our shirt pockets and around 
our necks. That makes us clear-headed and purposeful” (LTTE cadre, 
quoted in Wilson, 2000: 133). 
 
The LTTE claimed secularity, not wishing to alienate any religions, an 
outcome that would undermine the “unity” sought. The ideology of Tamil 
nationalism was based on a united defence of Tamils and Tamilness that 
could succeed only if internal differences were subsumed under 
representation of Tamils as homogenous and monolithic (Thangarajah, 1995). 
In the early 1990s, the LTTE began to bury its cadres rather than cremate them 
in accordance with Hindu tradition, the religion of the majority of Tamil 
militants. The official explanation for this shift in ritual, according to Mr Pon 
Thiyagam of the Maaveerar’s (Heroes) office in Puthukudiyiruppu in the 
Northern Province, stated: 
 
“Before 1991 we burnt [the fighters] according to Hindu rituals. If the 
parents asked for the ashes, we gave them. But Christians and Muslims 
…the parents didn’t want to burn them. A meeting of the leaders was 
organized and they decided to study what other countries like America 
and England did for their soldiers. They saw that they used to bury 
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their soldiers. Then they decided to proceed in the same way” (in 
Natali, 2008: 228).  
 
Natali (2008: 229) perceives this switch in ritual as unsurprising, given the 
LTTE’s insistence on its status as an army, not a terrorist group. Adherence to 
the funerary practices of Western armies is consistent with its self-
categorisation as an armed group, displaying conformity with international 
norms and reinforcing “combat mode” (De Silva, 1995). However, Natali 
found that the official explanation was neither significant nor acceptable to 
Tamil civilians, particularly for the relatives of the dead. Alternative 
explanations have gained purchase in the Tamil population: the need for a 
physical place of remembrance and the metaphorical attractiveness of 
burying the cadres in the soil that they died defending (Natali, 2008; Derges, 
2012). The practice is justified by the majority in the assertion that the burial 
practice exists within the mainstream of Hindu tradition (Natali, 2008: 291). A 
Tamil priest in Trincomalee contended that “heroes in Tamil history were 
buried…the LTTE followed these practices” (ER, 2012). Huge cemeteries were 
seen as a “resting place, withurail”, meaning that cadres “will rise again” (ER, 
2012). A practical theory relates to the impossibility of cremating the 
thousands of cadres killed in battle with the Sri Lankan army at Elephant Pass 
in 1991 (Derges, 2012). It is clear, however, that the LTTE deliberately became 
“masters of definition” (AB, 2012) and symbolism based on sacrifice and 
religion was incorporated into ritual practices in order to meld LTTE customs 
with Tamil traditions (Schalk, 1997; Thiranagama, 2011). The “Office of the 
Great Heroes of the LTTE” was established in the mid-1990s for precisely this 
purpose, dedicated to research on religious and mythological ideological tools 
(Schalk, 1997).  
 
With reference to the sacred nature of space, Michel de Certeau describes 
space as “practiced place” (Schäuble, 2011). The rituals practiced in a 
particular place render the geographical area in question sacred. Graveyards 
are highly important physical vehicles of memory. Holding the bodies of the 
dead and acting as a reminder of the cause for which they died, they are 
visited often by relatives and are the site of commemorative rituals and 
religious ceremonies. An LTTE fighter interviewed by Natali (2008: 291) 
referred to graveyards as “a place of memory”, asserting that burning the 
maaveerar would destroy the history of the place and the movement. Benedict 
Anderson (1983) stated that nationalistic ideology has the capacity to offer 
citizens a means of converting their own deaths into a shared immortality. 
Considering the separatist sentiment of the LTTE in the Sri Lankan conflict to 
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be inseparable from territory, the burial practices of the LTTE framed the 
dead bodies of the deceased fighters as “seeds” of the movement (Natali, 
2008). Because their bodies were buried, new martyrs would arise from the 
sacred land of Eelam. The idea of shared immortality also had a hierarchical 
aspect, as fallen cadres were considered to go to a different, superior heaven – 
Veera Sukarrkkam – as a reward for the sacrifice made for Eelam (Derges, 
2012). The family of the deceased martyr also received benefits in the form of 
material support and displays of respect. The discourse of earthly rewards 
relating to the actual achievement of Tamil Eelam and protecting Tamil rights 
was also regularly invoked (Derges, 2012). Jonathon Spencer refers to the 
emphasis on death as the pursuit of a politics of uncertainty. The unclear 
conception of heaven in LTTE ideology, where death is a “mysterious but 
unambiguous point of reference,” left the cadres to build a moral world and a 
sense of community on the very act of death (Spencer, 2000: 134). 
Prabhakaran, the mythologised and charismatic leader of the LTTE, spoke of 
the death of an LTTE cadre as a “miraculous event which bestows life,” “a 
lofty ideal” rather than a normal event of death:  
 
“The truth is that a liberation fighter – vitulai viran – does not 
die…Indeed, what is called “flame of his aim” which has shone for his 
life, will not be extinguished. This aim is like a fire like a force in 
history (vakalarru caktiyaka) and it takes hold of others. The national 
soul of the people (inattin teciya anmavai) has been touched and 
awakened” (Prabhakaran, quoted in Schalk, 1997: 79).  
 
The “national soul” of the Tamil people spreads in the act of death to others, 
tying the community together in mourning and bestowing meaning on the 
deaths of the cadres. The performance of rituals commemorating Maaveerar 
Naal (Great Heroes Day), the 27th November, spread the “national soul” 
amongst the diaspora, creating a “transnational martial community” on the 
basis of martyrdom (de Mel, 2007: 18). For the diaspora, commemorative 
spectacles enacting “performatives that keep the histories of oppression and 
martial success alive” have centred on the deaths of martyrs (de Mel, 2007: 
18). These performatives were consistent with the pervasive presence of death 
in the North, at the hands of the persecutory Sinhalese state: “Our houses 
became our graves…Our villages became our cremation grounds. The 
Sinhalese racist demons slowly take over our ancient lands” (quoted in 
Wilson, 2000: 133). On Maaveerar Naal, the LTTE held an annual day of 
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remembrance for fallen fighters.122 The date is significant as the anniversary 
of the death of Shankar, the first LTTE cadres to lose his life for the cause. As 
Prabhakaran’s birthday fell on the 26th of November, commemorations began 
at midnight. This can be viewed as an act of self-reference consistent with his 
strategy of seeking idolatry and personal loyalty. On this day, graveyards 
were the focal point of separatist sentiment and political rallying, with 
speeches from the LTTE leadership infused with ancient mythology amenable 
to Hindus and Christians alike, and Muslims to a lesser extent (Derges, 2012). 
Michael Roberts (2008) notes that Hinduism and Christianity are not 
irreconcilable as religious systems and that the notion of “karmic Christians” 
exists in Sri Lanka, while Peter Schalk (1997b: 1) emphasises the strategic use 
of iconography to enhance solidarity and to marshal the “familiar and 
successful tradition” of religion to imbue LTTE doctrine with meaning.  
 
 
5.11 Post War: The Erasure of Tamil Nationalist Commemoration 
 
The Tamils are now fighting for space both politically and culturally. The 
LTTE propagated apocalyptic visions of defeat and destruction of the Tamil 
people by the Sinhala state, presenting itself as the only viable protectors (de 
Silva, 1995). The catastrophe of the End, the mass deaths of Tamils, prolonged 
detention in camps and the post-war socio-economic and political abjectness 
have, for the Tamils, proven this propaganda to be true. Aware of the 
symbolic dimension, the state forces have destroyed LTTE graveyards and the 
“seeds” of separatism are buried under the concrete of Sri Lankan army 
camps in the Northern and Eastern Provinces (MTJ, JP, FY, YO, 2012). The 
state is uncomfortable with the documentation of this erasure, unless state-
delivered as Sinhala-Buddhist nation-building propaganda. A military sentry 
point opposite the entrance of an army camp built on the remains of the 
Kopai graveyard in Jaffna prevents passers-by in vehicles from taking 
photographs. 123 The LTTE, at the height of its rule, appropriated the bodies of 
                                                        
122 Other days of commemoration on the LTTE calendar include the 10th of October, the 
anniversary of the death of the first female LTTE cadre, named Malati day; the 23rd of October in 
commemoration of the deaths of the hunger strikers Thiyagi Thileepan and Annai Poopathy, who 
protested the Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987 and the violence of the state, the LTTE and the IPKF, 
respectively; and the 5th of July, Black Tiger Day, that marks the first LTTE suicide attack in 1987, 
carried out by Captain Miller at a Sri Lankan army camp near Nelliday, Jaffna. See de Mel (2007). 
123 A large and important graveyard at Kopai, near Jaffna in the Northern Province, was 
bulldozed by the military and replaced by an army camp. The author was brought past the 
former graveyard site during fieldwork in 2012. Though the driver was reluctant to stop, the 
replacement of the graveyard with a huge military structure was clear and evidenced by 
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the dead from their families and ritualised their deaths in pursuit of Tamil 
unity and the aspiration of Eelam.124 Prabhakaran had stated:  
 
“Our history of liberation has been written in the lifeblood of these 
maka veerar (great heroes). Their passing away are not losses without 
meaning, their deaths have become the power that move forward our 
history – [they are] the life-breath of our struggle” (quoted in Bose, 
1994: 120). 
 
A discerning Sinhalese psychosocial worker commented that the construction 
and use of graveyards could be regarded as both “a symbol of heroic deaths and 
wasted lives” (AB, 2012). The destruction of graveyards in the post-war 
environment ignores the familial, religious and cultural attachment to these 
sites. A religious leader in Trincomalee simply stated, “families need these” (FY, 
2012). Another religious leader in the town emphasised the cultural 
importance of the last rites for the Tamil people, a right that was denied to so 
many at the End:  
 
“It is a regret for people. There was no time for the right to carry out last rites. 
It is something sacred, to give the best for the funeral to the dead ones, in 
traditional Tamil culture. This was denied in the last phase of the war” (ER, 
2013).  
 
Derges (2012) recounts how the LTTE, when the Kopai graveyard near Jaffna 
was bombed in the mid-90s, moved the broken pieces of headstones to a glass 
cabinet and displayed them as reminders of the violence committed against 
the Tamil people. Echoing this act, people in Mullaitivu, the location of the 
End and a site of Tamil graveyards, took stones from the rubble of the 
graveyards after they were destroyed and have kept them in acts of 
remembrance (NR, 2012). Even without the presence of the LTTE, physical 
memorials for the dead are important to the people. The identity of 
persecution and victimhood persists and is manifest in these acts, in a desire 
to commemorate the dead. Social identity theory holds that an individual’s 
core identity exists in parallel with a social identity, “that part of the 
                                                                                                                                                              
reference to a map. A military sentry point opposite the entrance, the driver asserted, had 
previously confiscated cameras from people attempting to take photographs.  
124 See Elaine Scarry (1985: 119) on the non-referential bodies of the war dead. She explains that 
bodies of soldiers killed on the battlefield are indistinguishable from one another but for the 
symbols and decorations on their clothing. She argues that once they are dead, their individual 
agency has ceased and their bodies are empty signifiers on which meaning is projected. 
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individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his 
membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and 
emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel, 1981: 251). Faced 
with the End, a catastrophe that claimed thousands of lives and the aftermath 
of which has allowed no space for commemoration (described below), the 
Tamil relationship to death is dramatically altered. Without LTTE coercion 
and commemorative rituals, how can the Tamil community reconfigure their 
identity in the post-conflict phase? How can they reconcile with the history of 
the LTTE and the fall of the movement? Can the community ‘recover’ and 
unify without recourse to ideologies of martyrdom and Eelam? 
 
 
5.12 Erasure: Physical Memory and Collective Scars 
 
State forces have destroyed the LTTE memorials that previously embellished 
the landscape of the Jaffna peninsula and wider LTTE-controlled areas in the 
Northern and Eastern Provinces. Replacing those physical vehicles of 
memory are victorious monuments honouring the Sri Lankan armed forces, 
army camps dotted along the landscape and Buddhist stupas.  Freud (1909: 
13) referred to monuments and memorials as mnemonic symbols of traumatic 
experiences, symbols that draw up memories of painful experiences of the 
past. While the trope of collective trauma might misleadingly apply an 
individual condition to the collective (Kansteiner, 2002), for the Tamil 
population, these new arrivals on the landscape are symbols of domination 
and colonisation (JU, 2012). It is “difficult” for the people (MSB, 2012) to see 
these new marks on the landscape. They are scars on the Tamil homeland, 
reminders of the brutal End, and symbols of the overthrow of a political 
ideology that defined Tamil lived experience for three decades. The master 
narrative of triumph over terrorism is imposed on the physical space and 
signifies the construction of a new conflict memory, a memory authored the 
state alone as the entity with the “power and the ability to dictate reality” 
(Perera, 2012). Vihanga Perera views this act as an indication of how insecure 
as a nation Sri Lanka has become, where political opponents must be “razed 
and vaporized from the face of the earth, and history” (Perera, V., 2012). More 
than that, however, the erection of monuments is an act of memory 
entrepreneurship by the government, a forceful imposition of conflict 
narrative upon the land that serves one purpose, as noted by a Tamil UN 
policy advisor: “to remind the population ‘you have been conquered’” (AS, 2012). 
The construction of these monuments is a violent act of colonisation and a 
crucial symbolic element of Sinhala-Buddhist nation-building. There is also a 
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very visible disparity between the war memorials erected for the purpose of 
valorisation of the (Sinhalese) Sri Lankan armed forces and the lack of public 
recognition of the Tamil civilian lives lost at the End.125 Symbolically, this is 
important for the Tamils:  
 
“It doesn’t take much symbolically to show people that they are equal citizens, 
that you are not treating them as conquered people. But it is as if the state is 
going out of its way to show the opposite” (AS, 2012). 
 
The state has, in contrast, commemorated civilians killed by the LTTE, 
particularly atrocities carried out against the Sangha, as representatives of the 
Sinhala-Buddhist state. For example, President Mahinda Rajapakse 
inaugurated a memorial museum in 2013 in Aranthalawa, Ampara Province 
in remembrance of the Aranthalawa massacre of June 2, 1987. The graphic 
sculpture by artist Anil Amarapura surrounds the bus in which the 31 
Buddhist monks travelled on the day they were killed (Daily Mirror, 2013).  
 
 
5.13 Commemorating the War, Erasing Civilians 
 
The absence of a physical monument for the Tamil civilians killed in the war 
is extremely significant. It is a carefully planned absence, an institutionalised 
forgetting that erases the Tamil dead and relegates them to a liminal pace in 
the newly constructed nation-state. A monument is a mere reminder of 
violence; it cannot bring an end to a cycle of violence or remedy continuing 
injustices. It certainly does not seek to return the victims to their pre-atrocity 
state, to repair the damage done or act as a full substitute for the losses 
endured (Roht-Arriaza, 2004; Butler, 2004). The value of a monument, 
however, is where it represents a “willingness by the state or civil society 
institutions to exhume the buried issues of the past” (Hamber and Wilson, 
2002: 39). Symbolic reparations such as monuments are, ideally, physical 
embodiments of a society’s recognition, remorse and atonement for wrongs 
inflicted (Roht-Arriaza, 2004: 122). In Sri Lanka, no such sentiments are 
available to be symbolised and no such monuments are offered. This is in 
marked contrast to the state’s hasty construction of triumphant war 
                                                        
125 Although, as an international agency senior staff member pointed out, there are no names on 
monuments erected for the soldiers killed. In this way, Southerners “can sympathise” with the 
Tamils of the North and their search for recognition of the dead. The government, he predicted, 
will not allow solidarity to grow between the two groups (RD, 2012). 
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memorials, loaded with Sinhala-Buddhist iconography: an act of nationalistic 
authorship on a defeated land. 
 
Interviewees spoke of state-driven efforts to forcibly suppress memory (MT, 
GK, 2012; RF, 2013), destroying graveyards and the monuments that represent 
the losses of the community as remnants on the physical space. These 
physical transformations of the landscape happened immediately post-war, 
along with a considerable rise in militarisation and the suppression of 
organised movements seeking accountability for the Tamil dead and missing. 
Responding to questions on these physical destructions and the impact on the 
community, interviewees were uniform in their response:  
 
 “We can’t do anything” (SM, 2012);  
 
“You can’t open your mouth, or you will be missing…People can’t raise 
memory for children at graves” (YO, 2012);  
 
The history of the LTTE is being wiped out. This is affecting people a lot….the 
leaders of the country failed, they could have risen above this” (FY, 2012); 
 
“What can they [the people] do? They feel that they are modern slaves” (PJ, 
2012). 
 
Along with this defeatist, colonised attitude, a determination to remember 
becomes a form of resistance:  
 
“You can destroy the physical things but you can’t destroy memory” (MTJ, 
2012);  
 
“They can break the graveyards but they can’t break minds” (TA, 2012).  
 
The words “destroy” and “break” are adversarial and accusatory, recognising 
the symbolic aspect of physical destruction and equating it with an attempt to 
decimate the resilience of the Tamil people and their separatist intentions. It is 
a display of hostility towards the state. The immediate bulldozing of physical 
vehicles of memory and separatist sentiment insinuates that “[t]he state is very 




A quote from a TNA politician in the Eastern Province is illustrative of an 
urge to remember based on lives lost and sacrificed during the struggle and 
the need to honour the dead cadres. While it represents an extension of the 
LTTE discourse on death that promoted the separatist ideology, it also 
illustrates the level of community interaction (whether coerced or voluntary) 
with commemorative rituals and the extent to which those rituals became 
important to them: 
 
“These people sacrificed their lives for the Tamil people. They [the people] have 
very big pain. They are breaking graveyards and building [army] camps. They 
are asking people to walk on the graves. People respect the graveyards. Before, 
people used to go and pray there, Prabhakaran would make a speech, the people 
would ‘lamp’ - carry campur and coconut oil in a little dish. Every year on the 
27 November since 1988, they would respect them. There would be an LTTE 
speech, then they would ‘lamp’. The government wants to delete remembrance 
from the Tamil people” (TA, 2012).  
 
The actions of the state perpetuate the discourse of the LTTE in its absence: a 
discourse of historical and continuing persecution and victimisation of the 
Tamil community by the Sinhalese-Buddhist state. At a personal and 
individual level, the destruction of graveyards also means that a physical 
place to mourn the dead has become inaccessible to their families. A human 
rights activist stated: 
 
“The emotional consolation of the physical place is being taken away. Feelings 
are not respected. There is no dignity at all afforded to the person. This is basic 
thing, human nature. No rights are allowed to them – even as fundamental as 
being allowed to cry at a cemetery” (NR, 2012). 
 
However, it is important to remember that these cemeteries were “not value-
free” (SM, 2012). The collective memory of victimhood and martyrdom was 
instrumentalised by the LTTE in rituals and practices to imbue the Tamil 
identity with the concept of persecution and victimhood at the hands of the 
Sinhala-dominated state.  
 
 
5.14 Mourning in the North, Celebration in the South 
 
The victimhood of the Tamil population – an identity nurtured by the LTTE 
and also used as a political tool by the state in the final months of the war – is 
brought to its logical conclusion in the suppression of mourning for LTTE 
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cadres and the lack of information afforded to the Tamil people on the 
missing and disappeared. Mourning is associated with recognising and 
counting the dead, a practice avoided by a government wary of war crimes 
allegations. “No mourning is allowed now. The government even asked the temples 
not to do Puja in the Vanni” (YO, 2012). 126 The 18th May and 27th November, the 
anniversary of the End and the LTTE-promoted Heroes Day respectively, are 
important dates of commemoration for the Tamil population. This is 
testament to the success of the LTTE’s cultural infiltration. For the families 
affected by loss, a Catholic activist noted, the choice to mourn on Heroes Day 
is not entirely political; it is the performance of tradition (RF, 2013). May the 
18th is an emotive date for the Tamil population, as the End was devastating 
in terms of lives lost, injuries, and damage to property and livelihoods. It is 
also symbolic as the date of defeat of the LTTE’s protective Tamil nationalist 
ideology. At the End, there was no pronounced public mourning: “There was 
no room, no space for that. Nobody organised anything” (SM, 2012). In the present 
day, practices of mourning and commemoration continue to be suppressed on 
these emotive and controversial days. The choice to mourn on the anniversary 
of the End is “also a counter to the celebrations held in the south for the end of the 
war” (RF, 2013). The message the Tamil population hopes to convey is: “We 
don’t celebrate, we are mourning” (RF, 2013). The rejection of a celebratory 
anniversary is a call for recognition of their losses and suffering.  
 
The government announced the date of the End as a day of official 
celebration, National Victory Day (Rajapaksa, 2009). In response to the 
announcement of the defeat of the LTTE, the streets in the South were sites of 
celebration (CM, 2012; Wickramasinghe, 2009). The wave of triumphalism 
and relief arising from the defeat of the LTTE overpowered any concern about 
civilian casualties and the manner in which the war was won. Interviewees 
spoke of their discomfort with the celebrations, viewing them as “indecent” 
and potentially hurtful for the affected Tamil population (SM, MSP, MC, 
2012). More appropriate, one Batticaloa-based NGO worker stated, would be 
for the government to declare an official day of mourning for the losses in the 
war. The people had the right to celebrate the end of the war, he contended, 
but ought to have been brought together to mourn also, to advance inter-
ethnic solidarity and grant recognition to the grief and loss of the Tamils. 
“Everyone suffered under this war” (MSB, 2012). The LLRC Report 
                                                        
126 Puja is a ceremony carried out in both Hindu and Buddhist religions, among others, in order 
to host, honour and worship deities, or to spiritually celebrate an event. The word puja is derived 
from Sanskrit, and means reverence, honour, homage, adoration, and worship. 
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recommended a similar strategy of remembrance, that a  “separate event be set 
apart on the National Day to express solidarity and empathy with all victims of the 
tragic conflict…” (LLRC, 2011: para. 8.304).  
 
With the militarisation of the Northern Province, people are “not permitted to 
have religious mourning ceremonies” (FY, ER, 2012; OHCHR, 2013: para. 54-55). 
Pro-government assailants have brutally broken up assemblies calling for 
information on the missing.127 For Judith Butler (2004), to grieve is not to be 
resigned to inaction but, rather, can be understood as a process by which we 
develop a point of identification with suffering itself. Departing from the 
disorientation of grief, Butler argues, can allow us to evaluate the conditions 
under which certain forms of human life are more vulnerable and considered 
more grievable than others. The grieving process prompts questions such as 
“Who have I become?”, “What is left of me?” and “What is it in the Other that 
I have lost?” that can be directed towards an appreciation of others on the 
basis of common human vulnerability (Butler, 2004: 30). Certainly, a hierarchy 
of grief can be identified in the manner in which lives are mourned and loss is 
apprehended. Sri Lankan soldiers are afforded dignity and recognition in 
state-sponsored monuments and idolised as war heroes. The losses suffered 
by Tamils civilians, conversely, (whether involved with the LTTE or not) are 
ignored and public commemoration and mourning is disallowed. Butler asks: 
“How do our cultural frames for thinking the human set the limits on the 
kind of losses we can avow as loss?” (2004: 32)  
 
In the state’s conception of wartime losses, Tamil life is not the grievable kind. 
To grieve for the Tamils is to betray the Sinhalese-Buddhist concept of the 
state, to distinguish between civilians and terrorists and to establish a 
common humanity that might legitimise calls for equal rights in the post-war 
state. Butler’s potential new politics, arising from grief and apprehending 
Others in their suffering, has been rejected in Sri Lanka, despite the 
recommendations of the LLRC and the rhetoric of ‘oneness’. The 
commonality upon which nation-building could occur at this post-conflict 
juncture has been precluded by the Rajapaksa regime’s adherence to the 
discourse of counter-terror and Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism. We can 
consider Tamil life, in Butler’s conception, as “unreal”- excluded from the 
state’s concept of humanity, a concept reminiscent of Fein’s (1990) “universe 
of moral obligation”. Those affected by violence “cannot be mourned because 
                                                        
127 For example, the National Peace Council (2013) reported that a public protest was organised 
by families of missing persons in Trincomalee on International Human Rights Day, 10 December. 
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they are always already lost or, rather, never “were” and they must be killed, 
since they seem to live on, stubbornly, in this state of deadness” (Butler, 2004: 
34). The state discourse of terrorism and Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism 
“derealized” the Tamils, rendering the violence perpetrated against them, 
particularly at the End, unsurprising. Dehumanisation had already been at 
work in the culture for some time.  
 
There is hyper-awareness of the dissimilarity in community reactions to the 
End - between celebrations in the South and the feeling of grief in the North 
and East. Framed as “triumph in the South and mourning in the North” (FY, 
2012), the adversarial foundations of commemoration perfectly encapsulate 
the politicisation of memory in post-conflict Sri Lanka and the nature of 
continuing Tamil grievance. An activist mused that the celebrations in the 
South prompted a reactionary, accusatorial kind of commemoration in the 
North: “If the celebrations in the South die down, maybe there would be less in the 
North” (RF, 2012). Noted by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights in its 2013 report, commemoration in Sri Lanka ought to be “an 
integral component of reparations” but “has been non-inclusive, a fact that 
risks further disaffecting the minority population” (2013: para. 55).  
  
 
5.15 Suppressing Commemoration: Maaveerar Naal 2012 
 
Heroes Day is now a day of stifled remembrance. On Heroes Day in Jaffna, 
three years into the post-conflict phase, reports told of plain-clothes men, 
“presumed to be military intelligence officers,” and suspected CID (Criminal 
Investigation Department) personnel storming university grounds to prevent 
commemorative ceremonies, demanding identification and terrorising people 
with intimidating behavior. Groups of students who gathered at the Jaffna 
University grounds to commemorate the dead and light lanterns of 
remembrance were threatened and intimidated by armed “unidentified men” 
on motorcycles (Watchdog, 2012). A student from Jaffna University was 
quoted as saying: 
 
“...as today is Maaveerar Naal, Government forces are trying to 
prevent any type of commemorations from taking place. Last year too, 
forces were deployed at many temples and churches, preventing them 
from carrying out even routine rituals and religious activities. 
Therefore, it is most definitely a military intelligence activity to prevent 
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people from lighting oil lamps and paying tribute to the martyrs” (in 
Watchdog, 2012).  
 
Heroes Day in 2012 coincided with a Poya public holiday, a Sri Lankan 
Buddhist celebration of the full moon. The Hindu celebration of Diwali, the 
festival of lights, also fell on the same day. Oil lamps are traditionally lit on 
this day to remember the dead. The military prohibited the lighting of lamps 
in churches, Hindu temples and individual homes (Groundviews, 
2012), treating all remembrance as political in nature.  
 
A protest was held by the students the next day, protesting the “terror tactics” 
of the military intelligence and the lack of freedom of assembly and 
association afforded to them. The students asserted their right to mourn and 
to do so without fear, exposing the state of terror in place in the unstable and 
militarised environment in the Northern Province. The Riot Police and plain-
clothes officers responded with force, breaking up the assembly and resulting 
in numerous injuries. The security forces alleged that the students had thrown 
stones at them, prompting a violent reaction, while university staff told the 
Jaffna media that the protest was peaceful in nature and that the authorities 
had attacked the students without cause (AI, 2013). The Sri Lanka Guardian 
reported days later that four students who attended the protest (who had 
previously been engaged in protests against human rights violations by the 
military in Jaffna) were arrested regarding an alleged arson attack on the 
office of the Sri Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) (Sri Lanka 
Guardian, 2012). The Sri TELO are widely considered to be a para-military 
group supportive of the government and connected to the state forces.128 The 
charges against the students later came to include the distribution of Heroes 
Day posters around Jaffna University. Both Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty International launched campaigns in the wake of the arrest of the 
students, who were detained for “rehabilitation” in state-run de-radicalisation 
camps meant for LTTE cadres (AI USA, 2012; HRW, 2012). The Kopai police 
summoned seven students involved in the protest. Four of those students 
were subsequently detained, without charge or due process, in Welikanda 
Rehabilitation Camp in the Eastern Province for “rehabilitation” after 
“engaging in subversive activities” (Colombopage, 2013). A fifth student 
surrendered to Jaffna TID and also spent over a month in Welikanda 
                                                        
128 Sri TELO is a splinter group of TELO. TELO is now within the TNA, having abandoned 
paramilitary activity in the mid-90s. The “Sri” in Sri TELO denotes the name of the TELO leader 
Sri Sabaratnam, who was killed by the LTTE in 1986.   
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(Amnesty, 2013). A civil society grouping expressed concern that the 
students’ arrest was “baseless and politically motivated, and constituted an 
act of reprisal against their activism and campaign against human rights 
violations by the Sri Lanka Army” (AHRC, 2012). 
 
This case raises serious questions about the punitive nature of detention for 
‘rehabilitation’. It is a method of silencing critics and repressing advocacy for 
political and human rights (Sasitharan, quoted in Tamil Guardian, 2014). There 
is a lack of due process in determining who ought to undergo this 
rehabilitation. In early 2014, veiled threats were made against Ananthi 
Sasitharan in this regard, an elected TNA member of the Northern Provincial 
Council. Responding to the comment made by a senior Defence Ministry 
official, Sasitharan identified the suggestion that she should be ‘rehabilitated’ 
because of her marriage to an LTTE leader “an atrocious threat, made to 
silence voices like herself in the run-up to the UN Human Rights Council 
session in March” (Tamil Guardian, 2014). The possibility of detention as a 
response to commemorative activity equates to the criminalisation of 
commemoration. The case also demonstrates that the state is willing to 
suppress commemorative practices with force, intimidation and extra-legal 
detention, amounting to undue restrictions on freedom of expression and 
association and illustrating an official policy of “political pacification” (TAG, 
2013). The intention of the government is to link any remembrance activities 
to political support of the LTTE, thereby amplifying the national security 
paradigm on which the government still relies. The notorious Prevention of 
Terrorism Act (1978) was brought into play in this case. In a performative act 
of clemency and at the behest of their parents, President Rajapaksa pardoned 
the students and they were released.129  
 
Mourning in some Tamil factions is indeed politicised in line with LTTE 
ideology, given the extent to which the organisation had bound its militant 
ideology into the traditions of the community. A senior international agency 
official offered his analysis:  
 
“It was not smart when people chose heroes day, martyrs day to mourn 
victims; a politically sensitive day. There needs to be some intelligence, 
sensitivity about the approach to this issue. It was almost provocative” (RD, 
2013). 
                                                        
129 Rajapaksa pardoned two of the detained students on the 13th February 2013 on these terms. 
The other two students had been released earlier. See ColomboPage (2013).  
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The notion of ‘provocation’ falls in line with the rhetoric of restraint discussed 
in Chapter Two. It assumes that political assertions and acts of solidarity 
within the Tamil community are justifiably countered with violence. The 
Sinhalese-dominated state favours a peace facilitated by repression over the 
honest contemplation of Tamil grievance. The state, a woman human rights 
defender stressed, sees the Tamil people “as a residue of the LTTE, holding the 
same ideology” (NR, 2012). All communities, as posited by the National Peace 
Council (2012) in response to the incident, have the right to mourn their war 
dead and to collectively remember the past. The reaction of the military, the 
police and the state in suppressing mourning ceremonies and brutally 
disbanding protests has the potential to “inflame ethnic tensions and obstruct 
the post-war reconciliation process” (NPC, 2012). Contrary to the 
recommendations of the LLRC (2011) that the war dead of all communities 
should be commemorated, the mourning permitted is on an ethnic basis, 
demonstrating that Sinhala-Buddhists sit atop the hierarchy of power in post-
conflict Sri Lanka.  
 
Considering the political sensitivity of this date, however, the LTTE’s reach 
and influence into cultural traditions must be recognised. For the LTTE, 
graveyards, rituals and traditional days were a means of “centralising 
mourning” (SM, 2012).  The Tamil community mourns the individuals lost to 
the movement, to the war and at the hands of the state forces. Rather than 
exclusively politicised mourning, MR (2012) explained, it is a religious and 
cultural display of melancholia and loss: 
 
“…virtually every family, they have lost something which you cannot replace. 
I may have lost my son. Somebody may have lost his father. Somebody may 
have lost his husband or wife. Once it is lost it is lost. So this is the psyche of 
the general community…(MR, 2012). 
 
 
5.16 Systematic Suppression of Commemoration: 
 
Interviewees spoke of a pattern of suppression of mourning since the End. A 
priest in Trincomalee listed the elements of the “traditional way of mourning”: 
“garland photos, light lamps and incense.” Post-war, he stated, “this is not allowed, 
even in private homes” (ER, 2012). Groundviews quoted people in Jaffna who 
complained that the army had stationed themselves at a local graveyard, 
Navanthurai, and prevented people from lighting lamps for the dead on 
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Heroes Day 2012 (Watchdog, 2012). The report quoted the Chairman of a local 
divisional council, Anaimukan Velayutham: “Some unidentified people 
stormed into my home and set some vehicle tires on the floor in the middle of 
my home and set them on fire.” Velayutham said that this attack was carried 
out because he was accused of paying homage to “fallen heroes,” in his home. 
A local businessman in Kilinnochchi, the previous LTTE administrative 
capital, was assaulted and intimidated by the military on the 28th November 
2012, in reaction to his commemorative lighting of lamps in his shop on 
Maaveerar Naal (Watchdog, 2012). Unidentified men attacked Subramaniam 
Thavapalasingham, President of the Jaffna University Students’ Union, in 
October 2011, accusing him of supporting Tamil separatism (AHRC, 2011). 
Similarly, a brutal attack on P. Tharshananth in May 2012 prevented him from 
attending a memorial ceremony for victims of the conflict (AI USA, 2013). 
Some stories have reached activists and religious figures of police and 
military intrusion into homes suspected of honouring dead cadres (RF, 2013; 
ER, 2012).  
 
The presence of the military automatically sustains a state of fear that restricts 
freedom of expression and assembly, particularly on politically sensitive 
issues (RD, 2013). The fear psychosis generated by these incidents sends a 
very clear message to the population. The restrictions on freedom of speech 
on this issue call to mind the question posed by Judith Butler: “We have to 
wonder under what conditions public grieving constitutes an “offense” 
against the public itself, constituting an intolerable eruption within the terms 
of what is speakable in public?” (2004: 35). Following this logic, considering 
the relation between the violence by which the lives were lost and the 
prohibition of public grieving, she asks: “Are the violence and the prohibition 
both permutations of the same violence?” (2004: 36). The structural violence 
inflicted upon the Tamils is continued in the post-conflict phase. The 
criminalisation of public (and private) commemorations as “glorifying 
terrorism” is problematic in a society where the vilified group was comprised 
of the local community. Actions such as the incidents in November 2012 can 
be expected to further marginalise the Tamil community and confirm their 
position as “precarious life” (Butler, 2004). In post-war Sri Lanka, Tamil life is 
not grievable. The determined adherence to traditional mourning practices 
can be expected in the face of state repression (RF, 2013), where the Tamil 
perception is of unequal treatment and persecution under Sinhalese-Buddhist 
rule (RD, 2013). 
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Furthermore, mourning processes can be conceptualised in terms of memory 
and cultural identity as a method by which a dialogue can be maintained with 
the past, drawing on melancholia and mourning as analytical principles to 
engage with the history of events of loss (de Mel, 2007). Mourning allows for 
“continuous engagements with the past that permits new insights and new 
understandings of lost objects whether loved ones, a place or an ideal” (de 
Mel, 2007: 161; Eng and Kazanjian, 2003: 3-4). Where mourning is suppressed 
and dialogue about the dead, suffering and loss is prohibited and forcefully 
suppressed, how can the Tamils understand what has been lost? As a former 
senior Tamil minister in Jaffna explained, while “trying to trace some of the 
wounds that this society is unable to bear with after the war”, the Tamil people “are 
yet to recover to know what has happened to them…People are still in shock” (MR, 
2012). Eng and Kazanjian (2003: 2), in their work on the politics of memory 
argue that “what is lost is known only by what remains of it, by how these 
remains are produced, read and sustained.” Where loss cannot be mourned, 
where the remains of the past are denied and suppressed, how can that loss 
be comprehended? For MR (2012), “people have lost hope. Why? This society has 
just got stunned. Being unable to tell others…what has happened to us? It [society] is 
so damaged”. Post-war, cultural erosion continues, he asserted, introduced by 
the state in a “planned”, “deep and intelligent” way (MR, 2012).  
 
 
5.17 Tamil Political Agency Post-LTTE 
 
Sharika Thiranagama (2011) argues for an appreciation of the ambivalent 
experience of being shaped by war and the fraught nature of the resultant 
identities. The “positive and creative qualities” (Fanon, 1963: 73) that violence 
invokes in people are “at the same time one’s trauma” (Thiranagama, 2011: 
76): the traces of violence embedded in a life of war. Echoing Kimberly 
Theidon (2007), Thiranagama (2011: 12) argues that new and deep identities 
emerged because of the war, a war that was “injurious yet productive and 
constitutive”. Identities must be negotiated anew in the post-conflict phase. 
Derges (2012) posits that a process of reconciliation and recovery must 
involve a total re-establishment of society and a readjustment to the profound 
losses suffered.  
 
The 2013 UNHRC Resolution states that “devolution of political authority” to 
the Tamil minority in Northeast Sri Lanka “is integral to reconciliation and 
the full enjoyment of human rights by all members of its population”. The 
international community housed in the UNHRC deems both accountability 
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and a political solution necessary to post-war recovery. With the 
establishment of the Northern Provincial Council in September 2013, and the 
landfall success of TNA candidates in the elections, there has finally been 
some progress towards a political solution. The role of the international 
community in prompting this development cannot be understated. 
 
A Tamil academic voiced optimism that the NPC – a strong civil 
administration – has the potential to secure a political voice for the Tamils and 
to curb the process of militarisation (KD, 2012). The Tamil people attended 
the polls and voted overwhelmingly in favour of the TNA candidates, 
including Ananthi Sasitharin, a Tamil teacher and the wife of an LTTE leader 
who disappeared after surrendering to the state forces in May 2009 (Jeyaraj, 
2013a). Sasitharin contested the election as a candidate seeking truth and 
justice for the families of persons who have gone missing or have disappeared 
during and after the war: a pertinent issue in the post-war environment and 
one the state is keen to suppress. She received the second highest number of 
votes in the elections, second only to C. V. Wigneswaran (Tamil Guardian, 
2013). 
 
The newly elected Northern Provincial Council Chief Minister C. V.  
Wigneswaran is a multilingual Jaffna-born Tamil who grew up in multi-
ethnic Colombo (Jeyaraj, 2013a, Jayatilleka, 2013a) His sons are married to 
Sinhalese women and all communities respect him in his capacity as a retired 
Supreme Court Judge. He was, when announced as the TNA’s candidate for 
the position, hailed as a “master-stroke” by the TNA leader R. Sampanthan – 
a strategic thinker “willing to stand up to and sacrifice more obvious ethno-
populist passions and pressures” and capable of political resurrection 
amongst the Tamils (Jayatilleka, 2013a). Although seen as capable of 
negotiating effectively and vociferously with the central government and an 
advocate of self-determination and federalism, he was not perceived as 
supporting separatism (Jayatilleka, 2013a). His candidacy, therefore, soothed 
the fears of the Sinhalese that the Provincial Council in the North was a 
“stepping stone” towards Tamil Eelam (Jeyaraj, 2013a). Seen as a moderate 
influence between the Sinhalese establishment and the Tamils, who could 
“help us discover a middle path”, Wigneswaran was elected in September 
2013 (Jayatilleka, 2013a).  
 
The NPC can be considered as a promising first step towards a political 
solution, though highly restricted in terms of powers and constrained by the 
militarisation of the political establishment in the North. It is important 
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primarily as an institution capable of channelling Tamil political agency. The 
state-appointed Governor is former Army Major-General Chandasiri and is 
reportedly involved in a power struggle with Chief Minister Wigneswaran, 
who calls him the “military official serving as Governor of the Northern 
province” (Jeyaraj, 2013b). Neloufer de Mel observes that the success of Sri 
Lanka’s militarisation process has meant that its military institutions and 
militant groups enjoy more prestige than their unarmed civilian counterparts 
(2007a: 242). The TNA has used the issue as a symbol of resistance, to 
emphasise the extent of the militarisation of the Northern Province. The 
journalist D. B. S. Jeyaraj accuses the TNA of “cheap politics” in this regard 
whereas, I argue, calls for a civilian Governor speak to the Tamil peoples’ 
latent resentment of life in a militarised environment.  
 
The TNA Manifesto calls for de-militarisation, speedy resettlement of 
displaced person, improved relations with the Muslim community – 
particularly important in advocating for one merged Northern and Eastern 
Provincial Council - and, as espoused by Councillor Ananthi Sasitharan, 
information on the missing and disappeared. Some commentators hailed the 
TNA’s success at the NPC polls as a separatist referendum, though the party’s 
manifesto declares an intention to pursue devolution of power within a 
unitary state, “on the basis of shared sovereignty” (TNA Manifesto, 2013). The 
TNA manifesto asserts the Tamil right to self-determination, demands an 
independent international inquiry into alleged war crimes by the state and 
LTTE at the End and rejects the 13th amendment as a final solution to the 
political question, given the concentration of power with the central 
government and the Governor (TNA Manifesto, 2013). The Provincial Council 
system constitutionally established in the 13th amendment (a result of the 
Indo-Lanka Accord 1987 and subsequently perceived by Sinhalese 
nationalists as an Indian imposition) is island-wide and was originally 
envisioned as a mechanism of power decentralisation, intending to aid in the 
process of seeking a political solution to the conflict. In the midst of debate 
about whether generous implementation of the measure (termed “13 plus” or 
“13A” in public discourse) would amount to a political solution, academic 
interviewees derided the state’s interpretation of the measure as “13 minus” - 
entirely insufficient to satisfy Tamil aspirations of political powers of self-
determination (KD, PNB, Guruparan, 2014). Chief Minister Wigneswaran 
claimed in his first budget speech that the TNA intends to expose the 
shortcomings of the 13th amendment “while established in office” rather than 
criticising from the side-lines (quoted in Jayatilleka, 2013).  
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Interviewees in early 2012 were sceptical as to whether the government 
would allow the 13th amendment to remain in the Constitution. Sinhala-
Buddhist nationalists have resisted the measure since its incorporation into 
the Constitution to such an extent that common sense understandings of the 
13th amendment are exceedingly negative. The Northern Provincial Council 
(NPC), ironically, is the only inactive branch of this system on the island. A 
Sinhalese political science professor in the South described how students at 
his university designed posters on the subject. They drew “13 +” in a symbolic 
fashion: designed to look like a demon, drawn to appear “big and threatening” 
(PNB, 2012). The Provincial Council system in the North has been deemed as 
“an impediment to the post-war development process” and a possible vehicle 
towards separatism by Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, the Secretary of Defence 
(Rajapaksa, G., 2012). In media interviews in 2012, he called for the repeal of 
the 13th amendment. The Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) hard-line Sinhala-
Buddhist political party concurred with the Secretary of Defence and tabled a 
Bill to Parliament demanding the repeal of 13+ (Daily Mirror, 2013a). Two 
other coalition government parties - the National Freedom Front (NFF), and 
the Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) – have also voiced hostility to 
13+ and argued for its repeal or amendment (ICPVTR, 2013). In the 
environment of persisting separatist sentiment, the devolution of power to the 
Northern Province under 13+ is perceived as a step back towards separatist 
agitation and conflict.  
 
The NPC election campaign was marked by pro-state violence and 
interference. The Centre for Monitoring Election Violence (CMEV) (2013: 6) 
referred to the intimidating presence of the military in its final report, 
indicative of the institutionalised manner in which the state forces were 
involved in election campaign and polling. The CMEV recorded incidents 
including intimidation of TNA candidates and supporters while canvassing 
by the EPDP and CID officers; physical assaults on TNA candidates Ananthi 
Sasitharan and Mr. Kajadeepan and their supporters; obstruction of a TNA 
meeting by military intelligence and the EPDP; attacks on the property of 
TNA candidates; and accounts of unidentified groups “roaming” the streets, 
discouraging voting (CMEV, 2013). Many of the individuals in question spoke 
Sinhala and monitors asserted their conviction that they were military 
intelligence officers (CMEV, 2013). Election day was marred by reports of 
intimidating behaviour towards voters and TNA candidates by police 
officers, military officers and unidentified groups of persons, deterring voters 
in some circumstances (CMEV, 2013).  
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Months before the election, in April 2013, the distribution centre and printing 
press of the regional newspaper Uthayan were destroyed, in Killinochchi and 
in Jaffna respectively (CMEV, 2013; TAG, 2013). TAG (2013) allocates 
responsibility for these attacks to the state forces. A particularly striking tactic 
of deception during the election campaign was the circulation of a false 
Uthayan newspaper, reporting that the TNA was boycotting the election and 
that Ananthi Sasitharin had defected to the government's party (TAG, 2013; 
Colombo Telegraph, 2013a). False election posters depicting C. V. Wigneswaran 
were distributed in Jaffna, encouraging voters to vote for candidate number 7, 
rather than number 10, Wigneswaran’s actual candidate number (Colombo 
Telegraph, 2013a). Following the vote count, M. A. Sumanthiran, a TNA MP, 
was quoted in the media: 
 
"Despite heavy army presence, blatant violations, voter intimidation 
and violence against our candidates, we secured a great victory. We 
bow to the Tamil people here" (quoted in Karthrik, 2013). 
 
The overt interference with the elections did not deter voting in favour of the 
TNA and the reconfiguration of Tamil political agency must now develop in 
an institutional setting, with the TNA advocating for an acceptable political 
solution with the Rajapaksa government from a position of relative power. 
The party’s staunch position rejects the state as a purveyor of political rights 
for the Tamils and faults the government’s apparent unwillingness to engage 
in real dialogue towards resolution of Tamil political grievances. The TNA 
has refused to engage with state initiatives such as the Parliamentary Select 
Commission, as noted by MP Suresh Premachandran (2013): “We are not 
expecting any meaningful, fruitful things from PSC.” Tamil nationalism 
remains the primary mobilising ideology, which has been re-shaped by the 
catastrophe of the End. Chief Minister of the Northern Provincial Council, C. 
V. Wigneswaran has drawn on Tamil nationalistic language, controversially 
stating that the “activities of successive Governments in this Country have 
bordered on genocide if not genocide,” and refusing to condemn the LTTE – 
sparking vilification in the South (quoted in Jayatilleka, 2013). 
 
 
5.18 The Northern Provincial Council Election: Evoking the LTTE 
 
During the NPC election campaign, Wigneswaran and the TNA moved away 
from a presumed “moderate” political positioning and openly engaged in the 
politics of mourning and the LTTE’s ideology of martyrdom. During the NPC 
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polls campaign the TNA observed two minutes silence in honour of the 
Maaveerar and used the language of Great Heroes, central to the Tamil 
nationalism of the LTTE (Jeyaraj, 2013). TNA candidates in the elections 
praised the leaders of the LTTE, demonstrating the complexity of the 
community’s relationship with the movement and the manner in which the 
LTTE remains at the core of Tamil nationalism. The long-established and 
widely read journalist D. B. S. Jeyaraj (2013a) accused the TNA of attempting 
to bring about “an emotional renaissance in favour of the tigers through 
platform rhetoric” and of striking a Faustian bargain by appealing to pro-
LTTE forces in its electoral strategy. While Chief Minister Wigneswaran has 
definitively rejected violence – “as far the Tamil people are concerned that 
they will never get involved in any activities endangering the national 
security” (Wigneswaran, 2013) – he spoke with veneration of the LTTE. On an 
electoral campaign visit to Valvettithurai, birthplace of the LTTE leader and 
described as the “cradle of Tamil militancy” by Jeyaraj, Wigneswaran 
asserted: 
 
“Prabhakaran is not a terrorist. He is a great hero who fought for the 
freedom of the Tamil people” (quoted in Jeyaraj, 2013a). 
 
In Wigneswaran, we see a figurehead who is willing to honestly engage with 
the ambiguous yet highly personal place the LTTE occupies in the Tamil 
community. He argues for the right to remember the militant form of struggle 
for self-determination while laying it to rest in favour of a new phase of 
political engagement and, if necessary, agitation. Where the LTTE cultivated a 
societal embrace of death, Wigneswaran’s NPC encourages the embrace of 
life, rejuvenation and political promise. On Maaveevar Nal in 2013, the Tamil 
media reported that the Sri Lankan military in Jaffna prevented the NPC from 
planting trees at a memorial square (Tamilnet, 2013). Criticising the “narrow 
minded” approach of the government to commemorative practices, the Chief 
Minister stated: 
 
“If you put the ball inside the water and push it downwards, it would 
bump up” (quoted in Tamilnet, 2013). 
 
Wigneswaran describes commemorative practices as manifestations of the 
emotional needs of the people. Responding to those practices with military 
force, he argues, is counterproductive and will, in turn, lead to a negative 
response. The purpose of commemorative practice, he clarifies, is not an act of 
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glorification but a performance of laying an incarnation of the movement to 
rest:  
 
“We plant trees symbolising our desire for the arrival of a new 
generation as one generation has left us” (quoted in Tamilnet, 2013). 
 
His focus is on political change; not condemning the history of the Tamil 
struggle under the LTTE but emphasising the advent of a new Tamil political 
life, a new generation. Drawing on the LTTE’s analogy of “seeds” of the 
movement, Wigneswaran’s construal is one based on growth rather than 
death and rebirth. Planting trees on private land, within the Ministerial 
complex, and proclaiming that act as outside of the jurisdiction of the 
military, he publically signalled the new meaning implicit in this 
commemorative act: 
 
“While praying that peace be upon the souls of those perished, we also 
regard this event as a sign of bringing ourselves into a new world” 
(quoted in Tamilnet, 2013). 
 
Resolutions were passed in October in two TNA-controlled divisional 
councils, Karaichchi and Chavakachcheri, calling for the renovation of LTTE 
cemeteries (Jeyaraj, 2013). The Island reported that all local authorities 
administered by ITAK could move similar resolutions (Ferdinando, 2013), a 
prospect that caused the Sri Lankan defence authorities to “express concern” 
(Perera, 2013a). Jehan Perera, a Sinhalese liberal who heads the National 
Peace Council, noted that the Northern Provincial Council and the leadership 
of the TNA have not expressed support. He interprets their silence on the 
issue as a sign that “they do not wish to confront either the government or the 
security forces on this emotional issue” and argues that the government ought 





The Tamil population had a complex relationship with the LTTE over the 
years of war: the organisation inserted itself deeply into the lives and culture 
of the people and was largely perceived as the only protection available 
against the persecutory Sri Lankan state. This chapter illustrated the 
genealogy of Tamil nationalism as a mode of resistance to state persecution 
and its performance in ritual practice as a means of public engagement. After 
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the End, the ban on commemorative practices is a performance of power that 
exposes the continuing repression of the Tamil people and the superficiality 
of the ‘post-conflict’ framework in Sri Lanka. The Chief Minister of the 
Northern Province has begun to challenge this blanket ban on 
commemorative practices and to reclaim the history of the LTTE as a 
manifestation of Tamil nationalism that has passed.  
 
In times of “political opening” such as stated periods of transition, it is 
presumed that “multiple social and political actors come to the scene, and 
they craft narratives that confront each other’s, and in doing so, they also 
convey their projects and political expectations for the future” (Jelin, 2003: 29). 
Sri Lanka, however, is not open to a “transformation of the state, a new 
foundational moment, with new meanings and readings given to the past” 
(Jelin, 2003: 30). Political culture determines the form of collective memory 
produced (Gibson, 2006), and the suppression of commemoration illustrates 
the nature of the repressive rule under which the Tamils exist.  
 
Conclusion 





This thesis has examined the production of Sri Lanka’s ‘national story’, its 
exclusionary and repressive nature and its political benefits for the Rajapaksa 
government. It has analysed the authorship of the national story as a form of 
state-corporate collusion designed to avoid accountability for war crimes at 
the End. It has sought to reveal state political performativity, as a method of 
state crime denial, one that aligns with acceptable ethnic behaviour and 
international discourses. This performativity reproduces the hierarchy of 
power with the Rajapaksa family at the apex.  
 
The modern state, and its process of ‘nation-building’, demands a common 
past as well as a common future (Perera, 2008). Domination, Paul Ricoeur 
reminds us, does not exclusively rely on coercion but instead attempts to 
entice the dominated by means of “an enterprise of seduction and 
intimidation in the form of words” (2004: 85). States draw on and create 
particular interpretations of history in order to consolidate their support base 
and to enhance ideologies or nationalistic sentiments that work in their favour 
(Hodgkin and Radstone, 2009: 5). By resisting or contesting the state’s official 
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version of history, counter-narratives from other groups with alternative 
perspectives of history (such as opposition political parties, minority groups 
and civil society groups) can challenge the hegemonic framing and 
remembrance of history. Hegemony is in a constant state of contestation, re-
written and re-framed in relation to political imperatives and ideologies 
(Gramsci, 1971). 
 
This research has explored ways in which the state lexicon was managed. 
Exploring the dynamics by which words are forbidden, promoted and 
distorted sheds light on the consolidation of discursive frameworks in Sri 
Lanka. An exploration of language itself, and the implications of a state-
managed lexicon, I have argued, reveals sites of power and the production of 
that power (Foucault, 1980). My empirical research in Sri Lanka demonstrates 
the widespread adherence to this lexicon and the motivations and pressures 





ii. Sri Lanka’s National Story 
 
For the Sinhalese-dominated government and majority population, the End 
was an “epic” event (Kirschenbaum, 2005: 106) and a “lieu de memoire” 
(Nora, 1989). It was an event mythologised as it occurred and invested with 
huge symbolic significance for the project of nation-building that lay ahead. 
As the prevalence and influence of extremist Sinhala-Buddhist elements in 
politics has risen, the desire for a hegemonic state identity has shifted further 
towards exclusion of minorities (Raghavan, 2013). Forging a national identity 
premised on the principles of Sinhalese-Buddhism has meant a consolidation 
of power in the Rajapaksa brothers, a government that has brought continuity 
and closure to this mytho-history in the present day. The promotion of 
Sinhalese identity as a nationalist ideology unites the majority under the 
Rajapaksa government and conceals the very real grievances of minorities. As 
Wickramasinghe (2009: 1047) states, “the president’s vision merges nation 
and state and promotes a love of country based on a particular reading of the 
history and foundation myth of the Sinhala people in which all other 
groups—those formally known as minorities—are present merely as 
shadows, not as constitutive elements of a common political culture.” 
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For criminologists, the techniques of distortion used by the state and the 
objectives of that distortion are worthy of analysis. This distortion can enable 
state deviance and the avoidance of accountability for harm caused to its 
population, contrary to the state’s obligation to respect human rights. In this 
way, it becomes an element of state crime (Green and Ward, 2004). The state 
can author and reconstruct history. It can promote and institutionalise a 
‘national story’ that supports its political objectives, often as events are 
unfolding. In this endeavour, the state has many partners available for hire. 
As this thesis has demonstrated, the Sri Lankan state has deliberately pieced 
together a favourable narrative with input from advisors, including lawyers 
and public relations companies. The involvement of such actors indicates 
what I describe as a rising professionalisation of state denial, resulting in 
impunity for gross violations of human rights and international law.  
 
Far from reconciliatory, the institutionalisation of a ‘history’ based on Sinhala 
supremacy and Tamil ‘terrorism’ is a violent interpretation, designed to 
glorify the military, justify the enormous violence perpetrated upon the Tamil 
people at the End, and promote the Rajapaksas as war heroes. The discourse 
of triumph over terrorism masks the violence perpetrated upon the Tamil 
population at the End, and simplifies the complex relationship between the 
defeat of the LTTE, the legacies of the LTTE’s Tamil nationalism and the 
possibility of equal rights for the Tamil people in the Sinhala-Buddhist state. 
The Tamil nationalist movement is stripped from the official public record; 
the “undisciplined army” (MR, 2012) of the Tamil people is depoliticised and 





This thesis has sought to explore the Sri Lankan post-war landscape by 
tracing the continuities of political contestations into the present, in order to 
demonstrate how the End has been folded into the competing historical 
nation-building narratives. Contributing to the literature on the End and Sri 
Lanka’s ‘transition’ from war to a peace founded on “securitized 
development” (Goodhand et al., 2011), I contend that attention to discourse 
and its production reveals the state’s mechanisms of manufacturing consent 
for atrocity and continuing the repression of the Tamil minority. Authoring 
the End, I argue, is a contemporary imperative for the contesting nation-
building projects. By interrogating the content, rhetorical presentation and 
commemorative practices of Sinhala-Buddhist and Tamil nationalisms, this 
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thesis has demonstrated that the military ‘End’ of the war has resolved little. 
Post-conflict, the political contestations remain the same. Tamil distrust and 
hostility towards the state remains, just as state violence and terror persists.  
 
This thesis has explored the role of state discourse in consolidating Sinhala-
Buddhist hegemony in a national security state. The state has re-narrativised 
and reworked violence during the war (and particularly at the End) through 
orchestrated techniques of denial and mass ritual discourse, drawing on and 
perpetuating a heightened Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism that consolidates 
power under Sinhalese political elites, sustains minority grievances and, in 
turn, sustains the repression of the Tamil community of the Northeast. 
Offering a genealogy of Sinhala-Buddhist power, this thesis has interrogated 
the state’s mechanisms of discursive control, the structural forms of political 
violence and institutionalised terror, the adaptation of international 
discourses in the pursuit of local and international legitimacy, and the 
promotion of an exclusionary form of nationalism in political performances 
and authorship of public space. In this context, I argue, the End represents a 
striking contemporary landmark in a process of persecution and anti-
democratic nation-building.   
 
In the aftermath of the End, atrocity becomes the inescapable foundation of 
Sinhalese-dominated post-conflict nation-building. The End is the backdrop 
against which political contestations continue in the post-conflict phase: an 
event illustrative of state power, Sinhala-Buddhist politico-military 
dominance and the persecution of the Tamil community. The original 
empirical work informing this thesis bolsters the wider claim that violence 
and repression are embedded methods of post-war governance in the Tamil-
dominated North and Eastern Provinces. Interviews revealed the ways in 
which state discourses of triumph over terrorism, humanitarianism, and 
reconciliation are rejected, contested and strategically appropriated. The 
struggle to define the End, I argue, is crucial to understanding the restrictions 
on Tamil political agency in the present. Violence wielded by the state to 
politically pacify the Tamil people – in the form of militarisation and 
detention for ‘rehabilitation’ for example - is consistently renamed, reframed 
and marketed as progressive and positive. Interviews confirmed the 
overwhelming presence of violence in Tamil lived experience.  
 
The End is consigned to the past by the state’s post-conflict rhetoric of 
‘moving on’, development and reconciliation, and the support of the 
international community for reconciliation and accountability initiatives (in 
 260 
line with increasingly standardised approaches to post-conflict and 
transitional justice). Despite this, the End exists in the present. It is embedded 
in every personal interaction and political decision in post-conflict Sri Lanka. 
It has been folded into the constituent narrative of the competing Sinhala-
Buddhist and Tamil nationalisms. Mainstream conceptions of post-conflict 
‘recovery’ (and accountability as a process from which that recovery can 
begin) fail to comprehend that this profound alteration in the Tamil struggle 
for self-determination – the destruction of the LTTE – has not altered the 
essence of the struggle nor the position of the state regarding the Tamil 
minority.  
 
My research demonstrates that the conflict continues in the present day in 
different forms, more veiled and sophisticated than armed conflict. Discursive 
and physical violence follows a primarily ethnic logic and amounts to Tamil 
persecution and oppression. The state, over the course of the conflict, has 
increasingly relied on expansive security measures and apparatus to suppress 
political activism and violence, both Sinhalese and Tamil. The defeat of the 
LTTE has not led to a reduction in the state’s repressive capacities. In fact, the 
post-conflict phase has been further marked by features associated with a 
national security state paradigm: the centralisation of power in the hands of 
the executive at the expense of accountability and transparency normally 
derived from the separation of state powers; the use of surveillance and 
violations of due process guarantees; an expanded role for the military and 
intelligence agencies in civil life; and increased restrictions on individual 
rights of liberty, speech, association and privacy (Mullin, 2014).  
 
With this in mind, this thesis offers a challenge the application of mainstream 
post-conflict and transitional justice concepts and processes to Sri Lanka. 
Rejecting international discourses of accountability, the state asserts that ‘time 
and space’ is all that is required to heal and ‘rebuild’ the nation. Post-conflict, 
the state’s purported adherence to ‘transition’ as directed by the global liberal 
peace framework is a deliberate and staged performance, designed to conceal 
on-going violence and oppression, and to facilitate favourable political and 
trade agreements with international partners (Thiranagama, 2012; Gowing, 
2013; Höglund and Orjuela, 2013). Discourses of accountability and ‘healing’ 
do not account for the extent to which the End has altered social and political 
life in Sri Lanka, nor the encroachment of the Sinhala-dominated oppressive 
apparatus into Tamil life. On-going processes perpetuate the narratives by 




The struggle to author the End is important in this period of ‘transition’ 
because it is a defining moment in the conflict on which ‘nation-building’ (as 
envisioned by the architects of power) is premised. The End underpins the 
contemporary narrative of the country’s contesting nationalisms. By 
recognising nationalism as a tool in the construction of hegemony within the 
framework of the nation-state, by which political elites retain power, it 
becomes clear that ‘nationalisms’ must be consistently performed in order to 
stabilise the political order (Thiranagama, 2011). To stabilise the meaning of 
the End in state triumph and victory over ‘terrorism’ is to seal the 
achievement of hegemony on the basis of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism. The 
persistent counter-narrative of the Tamil community (which influences the 
international movement for accountability) destabilises this hegemony and 
offers a form of resistance. Domestically, this resistance continues to be 
couched in Tamil nationalism, discernible in the political narrative of the 














List of Ministry of Defence and Urban Development News Portal Reports 
in Discourse Analysis 
 
Available at the ‘Archive’: http://www.defence.lk/archives.asp?id=0 
 
22 December 2008 
“Free innocent Tamils or face ban - President to LTTE”  
“Six air raids at LTTE positions - Kilinochchi, Mullaittivu”  
“Troops march towards Kilinochchi; LTTE suffered heavy damages in 
confrontations – Kilinochchi”  
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“Wanni exodus continue, 60 civilians seek protection with security forces- 
Mullaittivu”  
“59 Div troops extend their defences; LTTE body found – Mullaittivu”  
“Army sniper guns down a terrorist – Muhamalai”  
“Jets strike at identified LTTE positions, attack craft destroyed”  
 
13 January 2009 
“Secretary Defence visits Indonesia: Discussions for more stringent counter 
terrorist activities”  
“86 Tamil civilians reach security forces seeking safety – Jaffna”  
“Tigers used Thanniyuttu - Mulliyavalai hospital in Army hands”  
“Mass exodus expected from Wanni”  
“LTTE receives heavy damages in confrontations – Mullaittivu”  
“Troops continue the offensive march; 2 LTTE bodies found - kilinochchi 
front”  
 
31 January 2009 
“DMK flays LTTE for not responding to 48-hour ceasefire”  
“Troops overrun LTTE terror base, seize large haul of military hardware in 
Mullaittivu”  
”LTTE sea tiger 'group leader' killed in confrontation- Mullaittivu”  
“Defamation enjoining order further extended”  
“Underground built two storied, luxury LTTE hideout found- Mullaittivu”  
“UNSG welcomes President Rajapaksa's announcement of safe passage for 
civilians”  
“More civilians flee from LTTE: Over 100 seek protection with security forces- 
Mullaittivu”  
“57 Div troops locate high profile LTTE hideout- Visuamadu”  
 
2 February 2009 
“Troops avert LTTE suicidal attempt to wreck disaster: 'planned to destroy 
Iranamadu Tank bund'”  
“96 civilians flee from LTTE: seek protection with security forces”  
“SLAF raids identified LTTE resistance positions in Mullaittivu”  
“LTTE continues firing artillery from civilian safe zone in Mullaittivu”  
“President calls LTTE to surrender, Military operations irreversible and 
irrevocable:” 
 
9 February 2009 
“Health Secretary holds ICRC responsible”  
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“Sri Lankan ambassador in Washington calls upon LTTE to release Tamil 
civilians”  
“Over 4500 Tamil civilians reach security forces seeking safety – Mullaittivu”  
“SLAF raids sea tiger facility - North of Mullattivu lagoon”  
“Security forces enter Sugandirapuram: 7 LTTE bodies uncovered – 
Mullaittivu”  
“"We have no sympathy for LTTE" says Indian External Affairs Minister”  
“Troops uncover military hardware during search operations- Kilinochchi  
“Govt not prepared to reverse ongoing operations”  
“United Nations deplores LTTE suicide attack on IDP rescue center”  
“United States government condemns LTTE suicide attack on Tamils 
civilians”  
“Civilian accounts give lie to the UN reports on civilian casualties in Sri 
Lanka”  
“Widespread condemnation of LTTE suicide attack on Tamil civilians fleeing 
terror”  
“LTTE continues targeting Tamil civilians: suicide bomb attack at IDP rescue 
centre – Kilinochchi”  
 
10 February 2009 
“2 STF personnel killed, civilian injured in pressure mine explosion- 
“Okanda”  
“Counter terrorist operations continue in the Mullaittviu battlefront”  
“LTTE takes heavy beating in fighting at Puthukkudiyirippu- Mullaittivu”  
“'Failed attempt to trigger a backlash' - The Island editorial”  
“Over 6500 civilians seek protection with security forces: Unveil LTTE 
perpetrated humanitarian tragedy”  
“"GoSL to be congratulated on prosecution of war against LTTE" says defence 
analyst”  
“Defence Sec. tells intl. organizations to be mindful of the responsibility cast 
upon them”  
“MI-24 Helicopters strafe LTTE reinforcements – Mullaittivu”  
“LTTE fire fleeing civilians; 19 killed , Army rescue 1046 civilians  - 
Puthukkuduyiruppu [Updated]”  
“Army 57 Div reach Kuravilkulam Junction – Mullaittivu”  
 
12 February 2009 
“Professional counseling for those kept as LTTE hostages”  
“Colombo Bishop condemns LTTE, Tigers must stop suppression of Tamil 
civilians”  
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“Government tells Tamil Diaspora to realise the suffering LTTE has brought 
on Sri Lankan Tamils”  
“US treasury targets LTTE front office” 
“Take courageous, just measures required to curb terrorism, Mahanayakes 
tell President”  
“Troops avert LTTE attempt to cripple normalcy – Jaffna”  
“Amnesty International forgets suicide bombers kill people” 
“Army 58 Div makes significant gains on battleground- North of A-35”  
“Navy assists in evacuating sick and wounded Tamil civilians in Mullaithivu”  
“Sri Lanka welcomes U.S. decision to designate the 'Tamil Foundation' as 
LTTE front”  
“Foreign Minister meets with the ICRC Head”  
“'No fire zone' declared further facilitating civilian safety”  
“Catholic nun claims shot at by LTTE, while evacuating sick people”  
“"Mischievous media reports have distorted developments in Northern Sri 
Lanka" says Ambassador Aryasinha”  
 
13 February 2009 
“'Piece-makers': Dark secrets unravel as troops close-in on LTTE- Mullaittivu”  
“373 more people seek protection with security forces- Mullaittivu”  
“Troops of 57 Div uncovered more LTTE military items and vehicles – 
Visuamadu”  
“Sri Lanka rejects Britain's special envoy as intrusive and disrespectful”  
“58 Div troops inflict damages to enemy; 2 LTTE bodies uncovered - North of 
A-35”  
“Donation of shaving razors for our war heroes”  
“1657 Civilians reach to government controlled area”  
“Intense fighting reported in Pudukudiirippu; heavy damages to terrorists”  
“Boston Globe favouring LTTE - Prof. Rajiva Wijesinha”  
“Ellawala Medananda thero donates wheel chairs for war heroes”  
“Oceans' full harvest now ours – President”  
“SLAF commander visits Palaly Air Force base – Palaly”  
Year of English & IT”  
“2009 - Year of Peace, Reconciliation and true Independence – President”  
“Soldiers of humanity” 
 
19 February 2009 
“57 Div troops uncover 50 AP mines, 32 claymore mines in search operations 
– Mullaittivu” 
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“Troops make further inroads at Puthukkudiyirippu: LTTE confined to mere 
100sq.Km's” 
“And then they came for UN staff- Island Editorial” 
“Govt to probe NGO spending in North and East” 
“Heavy confrontations result more damages to LTTE; 5 LTTE bodies found – 
Puthukkudiyiruppu” 
“More catholic priests from Wanni receive Tender Hospitality” 
“Three LTTE infiltrators killed; LTTE military items found – Oddusudan” 
“LTTE's largest fuel distribution center captured – Puthukudiyiruppu” 
“Commander Evaluates Security in Jaffna” 
“John Holmes meets Secretary Defence” 
“'Winning hearts and minds: Sri Lanka's humanitarian campaign to save 
civilians'” 
“LTTE has caused damage to Tamils, should lay down arms – India” 
 
9 April 2009 
“19th batch of patients and civilians trapped in Mullaittivu evacuated with 
the Naval Assistance” 
“Mexico reassures Sri Lanka of its support” 
“Rebellion crushed in the NFZ?” 
“Democratic Tamils condone LTTE 'attention rallies'”  
“LTTE THREAT TO SONIA GANDHI AND CHILDREN”  
“Indian spy satellite to eye terrorists” 
“Opportunities dawn for Puttalam IDPs” 
“Counter terror operations continued - Puthukkudiyiruppu East” 
 
4 May 2009 
“'Let the civilians leave', Akashi urges LTTE”  
“Foreign media taken on a free ride by the LTTE”  
“"Miliband and Kouchner went speechless" when questioned on duplicity 
treating terrorism, says Al-jazeera”  
“More arrests in pro-LTTE attack on Indian Army convoy”  
“LTTE takes heavy beating, troops capture earthbund – Mullaittivu”  
 
5 May 2009 
“Seized camera reveals dark secrets of LTTE”  
“UNOSAT Data on Sri Lanka: Interpretation not substantiated with out 
ground verifications - Says Remote Sensing expert” 
“LTTE attacks fleeing civilians at Vellamullivaikkal” 
“'Canada won't support LTTE terrorists' says Minister Oda”  
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“Employment opportunities at SLT for disabled war heroes”  
“"Attack on Army convoy is a dangerous trend"-Chidambaram”  
“LTTE triggers claymore mine, civilian killed- Konketiyawa”  
“'How UK can help SL' - Island Editorial”  
“Kill or be killed: 11-year-olds forced to fight for Tamil Tigers”  
“Troops close in on last LTTE hideout, amidst stiff LTTE resistance”  
“Mr. Miliband Prevaricates”  
“'No let down in food distribution to NFZ, over 3000MT delivered- WFP”  
“Sri Lankans in Cyprus make donation for war heroes”  
“JHU demands 50 billion pounds from UK”  
“Pirith Chanting to bless country & War heroes” 




























President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s Speeches 
Available at: http://www.president.gov.lk/speech_latest.php 
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• “We will liberate the people and children of the North from terror – 
President” 22 September 2008 
• President’s speech at the 63rd UN General Assembly, 24 September 
2008 
• Finalize global conventions against terrorism – President at Ankara, 3 
December 2008 
• Address by H. E. President Mahinda Rajapaksa at the ceremonial 
opening of the Kerawalapitiya Combined Cycle Power Station, 9 
December 2008  
• Keynote Address by President Mahinda Rajapaksa to the Honorary 
Consuls of Sri Lanka abroad - Presidential Secretariat, Colombo, 19 
January 2009 
• Address by His Excellency President Mahinda Rajapaksa, at the 61st 
Independence Anniversary Celebrations. Galle Face, Colombo, 4 
February 2009   
• Address by His Excellency President Mahinda Rajapaksa, at the 
ceremonial launch of "2009 - Year of English and Information 
Technology", 13 February 2009 
• Address by His Excellency President Mahinda Rajapaksa, at launching 
the National Campaign against the Recruitment of Children for Armed 
Conflict, 26 February 2009 
• President Mahinda Rajapaksa addressing the SAARC Foreign 
Ministers Conference in Colombo, 27 February 2009 
• President Mahinda Rajapaksa announcing the extension of the 
Colombo – Jaffna Railway Line, and the resumption of the Yal Devi 
Express train service, 29 March 2009 
• President Mahinda Rajapaksa addressing the ceremony to mark the 
90th anniversary of the International Labour Organization at the 
Presidential Secretariat, 28 April 2009  
• The speech made by His Excellency the President at the ceremony to 
mark the 50th anniversary of the Chandrikawewa, 30 April 2009 
• President Mahinda Rajapaksa addressing the new ministers and 
members at the Western Provincial Council at Presidential Secretariat, 
4 May 2009 
• Address by H. E. President Mahinda Rajapaksa to the Diplomatic 
Community in Colombo on current developments in Sri Lanka at 
Presidential Secretariat, 7 May 2009  
• Address by President Mahinda Rajapaksa at the G-11 Summit, Jordan, 
16 May 2009  
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• Address by HE President Mahinda Rajapaksa at the ceremonial 
opening of Parliament, Sri Jayawardhanapura - Kotte, 19 May 2009  
• Address by President Mahinda Rajapaksa at the Victory Day Parade 
and National Tribute to the Security Forces following the defeat of 




































List of Interviewees, Anonymised as Requested 
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1. Gomin Dayasri (GD):  
A Sinhalese lawyer and political commentator based in Colombo, Dayasri 
writes prolifically on the conflict, political issues and with legal analysis, most 
notably rejections of the UN investigative process into the End.  
 
2. KG: 
A Tamil lawyer and academic based in Jaffna, KG is involved with Tamil civil 
society and legal challenges to state land grabs. He writes in public and 
international forums on militarisation, the post-war environment and political 
solutions to the conflict. 
 
3. LG: 
LG is a Sinhalese, Marxist former state-owned newspaper editor (during a 
liberal period under President Chandrika Kumaratunga) based in Colombo. 
Now a freelance journalist and free media activist, LG has links to 
international free media movements. LG is a progressive political 
commentator and analyst of political theory and inter-ethnic relations. 
 
4. PNB: 
PNB is a senior Tamil political science academic based in Peradenyia. 
Involved in National Integration initiatives funded by Norway under 
President Chandrika Kumaratunga, PNB writes on constitutionalism, state-
crafting projects and political solutions for the conflict, such as devolution. 
 
5. EV: 
A retired Tamil criminal lawyer and political analyst based in Colombo.   
  
6. AS: 
A Tamil UN Human Rights adviser, researcher and academic based in 
Colombo, AS writes on militarisation, human rights and Tamil minority 
rights academically and on public international platforms.  
   
7. AH  
An international aid worker based in Batticaloa, AH worked in the North-
East through the final stages of the war. AH has strong networks within the 




A Tamil representative of a local branch of an international charity, CB works 
on human rights, peace and inter-community mediation in Batticaloa and the 
surrounding regions, between the Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese.  
 
9. Dinesh Dodamgoda (DD): 
A former United National Party MP, lawyer and political science academic, 
Dodamgoda is embedded in the “reconciliation sector” in Colombo, writes on 
reconciliation, the politics of accountability and presents a Sinhalese political 
talk show.  
 
10. FY: 
A Tamil religious civil society leader based in Trincomalee, FY leads an 
organisation that provides legal services, support services on Human Rights 
and other issues pertaining to the post-war environment, such as 
militarisation, disappearances and employment difficulties.  
 
11. JP:  
A Sinhalese civil society and peace worker in Colombo, JP writes prolifically 
on political issues, human rights abuses and makes regular public 
recommendations to government. JP is one of the primary voices in civil 
society. 
 
12. KD:  
A Marxist political commentator and senior academic based in Colombo, KD 
writes on political issues in both local and international platforms.   
 
13. Lakshman Hullugulle (LH):  
Hullugulle is the former Head of the Media Centre for National Security 
(Head at the time of interview). The Secretary of Defence Gotabhaya 
Rajapaksa established the MCNS for the specific purpose of countering LTTE 
‘propaganda’, as a vehicle for the state’s conflict narrative.  
 
14. MM:  
A senior academic, trade unionist and free media activist based in Colombo, 
MM speaks publicly on democracy, rights issues, education and the rule of 
law. MM is vocal on the violent suppression of students by the state security 
apparatus.  
 
15. Mano Ganesan (MG): 
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A Tamil, Colombo-based politician, Ganesan is the leader of the Democratic 
People’s Front and a human rights activist. Convener of the Civil Monitoring 
Commission, he works publicly on issues related to the disappeared and 
extrajudicial killings. His co-convener, Nadarajah Raviraj, MP, was murdered 
in Colombo 50 days after the formation of the CMC. He lives in a fortified 
suburban home, with an armed guard on 24-hour duty. 
 
16. Malinda Seneviratne (MS): 
A Sinhalese newspaper editor at The Nation, Seneviratne is a political 
commentator and poet. A prolific writer and a strong Sinhala-Buddhist 
nationalist, he is known for public attacks on adversaries.  
 
17. MSP: 
A Sinhalese academic in the History Department of Peradeniya, MSP was 
introduced to me as exceptional amongst his peers for his incisive political 




A Muslim newspaper editor and free media advocate based in Colombo, MA 
has links to international free media movements. MA speaks Tamil, Sinhalese 
and English, which allows a comparative media critique. 
 
19. MR: 
A senior Tamil public figure in Jaffna, MR is a former first citizen of Jaffna. 
MR was a thoughtful and mournful interviewee, with much to say about 
Tamil cultural erosion and structural discrimination throughout the war and 
in its aftermath.  
 
20. NR: 
A Tamil woman Human Rights defender, NR is based in Colombo but 
engaged in countrywide and international programmes on women’s rights, 
leadership and empowerment.   
 
21. Sharminda Ferdinando (SF): 
A Sinhalese journalist at The Island newspaper, Ferdinando covered the 
conflict in detail, with specific emphasis on the mechanics of warfare, as well 
as politics more generally. Pro-government and virulently anti-LTTE, he often 
covers stories on Sri Lanka’s engagement with the international community. 
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22. Prabath Sabahunda (PS): 
Sabahundu is editor of The Island. This English language newspaper has one 
of the largest circulations in the country, particularly in Colombo where the 
English-speaking urban elite is concentrated. A Sinhalese man, he denies state 




A Tamil journalist based in Jaffna, PJ reports for both national and 
international news wires on Jaffna news. PJ was assaulted and detained by 
supporters of the ruling SLFP as he attempted to expose a corruption scheme 
in Jaffna several years ago. Some of his land has been grabbed by the military 
as a High Security Zone.  
 
24. Pushpi Weerakoon (PW): 
A young, Sinhalese, Western-educated Rotarian, Weerakoon is at the heart of 
Sri Lankan reconciliation initiatives. She is coordinator of the Sri Lanka Youth 
Reconciliation Forum and works closely with Professor Rajiva Wijensinha, the 
Presidential Advisor for Reconciliation. She is responsible for identifying 
needs “on the ground” and personally seeks independent funding to launch 
programmes. Her work receives no state funding.   
 
25. Buddhi Passaperuma (BP): 
Passaperuma is Chairman/Chief Executive Officer of the Resettlement 
Authority, Sri Lanka. The Authority was established under The Resettlement 
Authority Act (2007), arising from concern about the lack of a coherent policy 
on resettlement for the displaced. A senior public official, Passaperuma is 
Western-educated and deeply dutiful and patriotic. 
 
26. RF: 
A Sinhalese Human Rights defender and activist, RF is largely involved with 
the war-affected in the North. Concerned with disappearances, the missing, 
freedom of expression and detention, RF has organised networks of activists 
in the Northeast on advocacy issues and visits to detained persons. Arrested 
under the Prevention of Terrorism Act in the course of his work, but released 
after national and international outcry. 
 
27. SH:  
A Sinhalese media activist based in Colombo, SH presents a critical political 
“in conversation with” talk show and promotes new media freedom of 
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information and citizens’ journalism. SH is the editor of a prominent online 
alternative news platform.  
 
28. AHB: 
A former/occasional journalist based in Trincomalee, AHB was forced to 
relocate due to threats and intimidation related to his work. Now a senior 
staff member at a local social support organisation, he is dedicated to 
improving the lies of the poor and “downtrodden” through administrative 




A Sinhalese senior lawyer at a Colombo-based legal human rights 
organisation, CM is involved in research, legal advice and support work, 




A half-Tamil, half-Sinhalese television journalist based in Colombo, with a 
history in documentary production. Oversees a regular English-language 
news “update” programme with a high circulation that focuses on issues 
related to social justice, sustainable development and conflict resolution.  
 
31. SHC: 
A Senior Sinhalese sociology academic based in Colombo, SH is 
internationally respected and works on youth, social change and 
globalisation, violence and governance.  
 
32. MSB: 
A Tamil civil society actor and NGO worker based in Batticaloa, MSB works 
primarily on development programmes and local community economic 
programmes in the Batticaloa region. 
 
33. MT: 
MT is a senior Tamil academic based in Sri Lanka. A qualified lawyer, he 
works on human and minority rights, constitutionalism, humanitarianism 
and public international law, among other subjects. He has served on a 




A highly respected, progressive Sinhalese academic based in Colombo, JU 
writes on the conflict, constitutionalism, political solutions and sociological 
perspectives on violence. 
 
35. MTJ: 
As head of a Tamil-language media education and training centre in Jaffna, 
MTJ is concerned with providing exceptional media skills to students and 
promoting international engagement. MTJ is dedicated to improving the 
standard of journalism in Sri Lanka.  
 
36. YT: 
A Tamil journalist for a popular Tamil-language newspaper in Jaffna, YT and 
I met at an event organised to pay tribute to the journalist Marie Colvin. The 
newspaper has faced arson and attacks in the past, and journalists live in fear 
of attacks, surveillance and intimidation. 
 
37. YO: 
A senior Tamil staff member of an international charity, YO is based in 
Batticaloa. Many of the organisation’s staff members were detained in the 
state “welfare camps” for months after the End. It is a humanitarian aid 
organisation, which largely remains silent on political issues.   
 
38. ER: 
A Tamil Catholic priest based in Trincomalee, ER is Western-educated and 
has studied human rights and international relations. He is an educator and 
community leader.  
 
39. VJ: 
VJ is a senior member of the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam, a 
democratically elected organisation founded in 2010. Based in London, he and 
other members of the TGTE attempt to coordinate and speak for the diaspora, 
to support the Tamil National Alliance political party in Sri Lanka and to 
funnel aid to war-torn areas.   
 
40. VV: 
A long-standing member of the Tamil diaspora community in London, VV 
directs a low-key human rights documentation and legal advice centre with a 




HR is a coordinator at a Jaffna human rights advocacy, free legal aid and 
administrative assistance clinic. He travels regularly to the local villages. 
After the End, people with connections to the LTTE (however tentative) came 
to his organisation and sought their advice and protection before 
surrendering to the military or declaring their connection. The organisation 





A former ICRC worker based in Trincomalee, IT worked providing medical 
supplies and infrastructure. He left his position at the ICRC after the End 
because they could not get access to war-affected areas and began to work for 
the Italian Organisation for Solidarity among People, a medical charity. IOSP 
set up medical infrastructure in the camps and provided necessities. Once 
people began to leave the camps, the organisation could not get permission to 
shift to supporting local villages.  
 
43. TA: 
Tamil National Alliance MP in the Batticaloa area. Agreed to meet in a 
clandestine fashion, on condition of anonymity.   
 
44. MAB:   
A senior member of a Muslim welfare charity in Batticaloa, MAB works on 
food security, micro-finance and infrastructure work for education, water and 
sanitation. Part of the North East Inter-Religious Forum for Reconciliation, 
MAB also contributes to peacebuilding and intercommunity initiatives. 
 
45. PSJ: 
A Political Science academic based in Jaffna, PSJ would not give his name in 
interview; he has faced threats and intimidation over the phone for 
expressing views critical of the government. In a clandestine interview, he 
expressed great hopelessness and fear and spoke of militarisation, 
surveillance and the lack of social justice for Tamils.  
 
46. PK: 
A senior Tamil academic at Peradeniya University, PK is a political scientist 
and feminist activist. She advocates passionately for women’s participation in 




A senior international organisation staff member, RD was posted in Sri Lanka 
in the aftermath of the End. His organisation works with the government on 
infrastructure, aid, the movement (“return”) and registration of people, and 
psychosocial and medical support. RD’s organisation funds local NGOs and 
provides livelihood and employment assistance. The organisation was 
initially working within the rehabilitation camps but stopped once criticised 





A political economist based in Colombo, SBP was attached for a time to the 
prestigious International Centre for Ethnic Studies. SBP has published widely 
on the political economic implications of the conflict and on democracy, 
devolution and foreign aid.  
 
49. SP: 
A senior Tamil National Alliance MP based in Colombo. SP suggested that we 
meet in the TNA offices: humble, unmarked offices in an accessible part of 
Colombo. Involved in local and international politics, SP often acts as 
spokesperson for the party. 
 
50. ST: 
A senior Tamil National Alliance MP based in Colombo, ST is a qualified 
lawyer and vocal participant in parliamentary debates on post-conflict justice, 
land grabs and political issues. He lives in suburban Colombo in a fortified 
house with a 24-hour armed guard.  
 
51. NT:  
NT is a Tamil National Alliance MP based in Trincomalee and spoke on 
condition of anonymity. Keen to speak of ‘Sinhalisation’, NT is particulary 
concerned with corruption and the ethnicised staffing of development 
projects in the area.  
 
52. AB: 
A psychosocial worker based in Batticaloa, AB is an incisive and thoughtful 
socio-political analyst and pioneer in the delivery of psychosocial care. AB 
founded systems in Sri Lanka that encourage civic engagement, in order to 
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promote empathetic and effective psychosocial services to survivors of war 
and natural disaster. 
 
53. SM:  
A Tamil academic based in Batticaloa, SM works on Tamil nationalism, 
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